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CHAPTER 8.
BANKS AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEES UNDER ENGLISH
LAW
Unless a bank is an express trustee of funds, it will not, normally, be
under any of the obligations of a trustee or a fiduciary to its
customer or a third party (such as, the beneficiary of a trust). If it is
an express trustee of money, then the bank will have to keep those
funds separate. The bank will not be permitted to treat the money
deposited as its own (as it can with an ordinary deposit, which is
recorded as a debt), and merely repay the equivalent amount, when
demanded. However, there are situations - such as where a bank
assists a trustee (who may be a customer) in a dishonest or
fraudulent breach of trust, or the bank receives trust property in
breach of trust - when the law will constructively clothe the bank
with the obligations of a trustee, although the bank is a stranger to
the trust (or another type of fiduciary relationship).
Barnes v. Addv : Knowing Receipt and Dishonest Assistance
The starting point, for bank liability as a constructive trustee to a
beneficiary of a trust, is the speech of Lord Selborne L.C., in the
leading case of Barnes v Addv1. In that case, his Lordship, in a well-
known passage, said of a banker's liability as a constructive trustee:
"Now in this case we have to deal with certain persons who are trustees,
and with certain other people who are not trustees. That is a distinction
1 (1874) 9 Ch. App. 244, at p.251 (Court of Appeal in Chancery); James and
Mellish L.JJ. concurred.
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to be borne in mind throughout the case. Those who create a trust
clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the trust
property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That
responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not
properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees
de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the
trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust.
But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive
trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in
transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a
Court of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and
become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or
unless thev assist with knowledge in a dishonest and
fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. Those are the
principles, as it seems to me, which we must bear in mind in dealing
with the facts of this case. If those principles were disregarded, I know
not how any one could, in transactions admitting of doubt as to the view
which a Court of Equity might take of them, safely discharge the office
of solicitor, of banker, or of agent of any sort to trustees. But, on the
other hand, if persons dealing honestly as agents are at liberty to rely
on the legal power of the trustees, and not to have the character of
trustees constructively imposed upon them, then the transactions of
mankind can safely be carried through; and I apprehend those who
create trusts do expressly intend, in the absence of fraud and
dishonesty, to exonerate such agents of all classes from the
responsibilities which are expressly incumbent, by reason of the
fiduciary relation, upon the trustees." (Emphasis added.)
There are two limbs to Lord Selborne's pronouncement:
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(a) agents (in this case, banks) who (with knowledge) receive and
become chargeable with some part of trust property ("knowing
receipt") - this is receipt or restitution based liability2; and
(b) those agents who dishonestly and fraudulently assist in a breach
of trust (which may be innocent by the trustee) ("dishonest
assistance") - this form of liability is fault based3.
The two forms of liability are separate and distinct. This is
something that has not always been appreciated in the case law;
although one needs to be careful not to read Lord Selborne's words as
though they were a statutory enactment.4
2 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at pp.382D-E and 386F-
G, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, delivering the advice of the Privy Council;
Agip (Africa) Ltd. v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292, per Millett J. (as he then
was); see the note of this case by Harpum, C., "Liability For Money Laundering"
[1990] C.L.J. 217. See also Millett, the Hon. Sir Peter, "Tracing the Proceeds of
Fraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R. 71, at pp.72 and 80-81.
3 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan, supra, at pp.385 and 387-389, per Lord
Nicholls; Millett, the Hon. Sir Peter, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107
L.O.R. 71, at pp.72 and 83.
4 See Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, delivering the advice of the Privy Council,
in Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.386B-C; Peter
Gibson J. in Baden Delvaux & Lecuit v. Societe Generale pour Favoriser le
Developpement du Commerce et de l'industrie en France S.A. ("Baden") [1983] 1
W.L.R. 509 (Note) (decision handed down on 25 April, 1983); Harpum, C., "The
Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.O.R. 114, at p. 145; and
Thomas J. in Powell v Thompson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597, atp.611, lines 32-34.
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(a) Dishonest Assistance: Accessory Liability
Dishonest assistance (which was formerly, and inaccurately, referred
to as knowing assistance) by a stranger to a trust (i.e., a lender) does
not depend on receipt by the assistant (i.e., the bank) of trust
property.5 As there is no proper trust, the accessory is treated as if
he were a constructive trustee.6 Accessory liability is secondary
liability and only arises where there is a breach of trust7; it is
5 Per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, delivering the advice of the Privy Council
in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.382E (on appeal
from the Court of Appeal of Brunei Darussalam). The other members of the
Board were: Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Ackner, Lord Steyn and Sir John May.
Although this case is technically not binding on an English Court, it is now the
leading authority on this area of the law, and sets out the law with great clarity
and simplicity of language. See case notes on Roval Brunei Airlines by: Birks,
P.B.H., "Accessory Liability" [1996] L.M.C.L.O. 1; Berg, A., "Accessory Liability
for Breach of Trust" (1996) M. L, R. 443; and Stevens, J., "Dishonest
Assistance"[1994] Restitution Law Review 105. A similar view to Lord Nicholls
has been expressed by Sir Peter Millett: see the "Introduction" to Commercial
Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (1992) (E. McKendrick, ed.); and by
Birks, P.B.H., "Trusts In The Recovery Of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts, and
Restitution" ("Misapplied Assets") : Ch.8 in Commercial Aspects of Trusts and
Fiduciary Obligations, supra.
6 See The Hon. Sir Peter Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107
L.O.R. 71. at p.83.
7 Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.382E, per Lord
Nicholls.
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personal liability, rather than proprietary liability, because the
accessory has not received any property.8 What is important in
accessory liability is the state of mind of the accessory: there is no
need for there to be a dishonest and fraudulent scheme by the
trustee.9 If there has been a breach of trust, even an innocent one,
the trustee is strictly liable for the loss and must replace the lost
assets. In accessory liability, it is the character of the accessory's
conduct which is the key: not the impropriety of the trustee.10 A
trustee may innocently breach a trust, such as where a professional
adviser misleads the trustee into thinking that certain conduct is not
in breach of trust when it is; in this situation, the accessory would be
guilty.11
Why then is a third party who has not received trust property liable?
The rationale for imposing such liability is that a beneficiary is
entitled to expect a trustee to carry out its obligations properly12,
and if the trustee does not, then the beneficiary has a personal action
against the trustee for the loss suffered. Therefore, the beneficiary is
8 Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.387E-F, per Lord
Nicholls.
9 At p.382E-F, per Lord Nicholls.
10 At pp.384-386, per Lord Nicholls.
1 1 And the accessory's guilt is all the greater, as he is responsible for the
breach of trust: see at p.384E-G, modifying, slightly, an example given by Lord
Nicholls.
12 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.387A-B, per Lord Nicholls.
361
entitled to expect that a trustee will be allowed to fulfil his
"obligations without deliberate interference from third parties".13 In
this respect, dishonest assistance (or accessory liability) is analogous
to a tortious interference with a contract.14 Indeed, it can be argued
that this liability has more in common with the intentional torts, such
as fraud or interference with contractual rights, than it does with
trusts.15
13 Atp.387B-C.
14 Ibid. Ironically, inducing a breach of contract requires knowledge, but the
knowledge based approach to accessory liability was abandoned in the Roval
Brunei Airlines case, as it led to "tortuous convolutions": see Berg, A.,
"Accessory Liability for Breach of Trust" (1996) M.L.R. 443, at point 2. on p.451.
15 See Lord Hoffman, "The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance" : Ch.2 in
Frontiers of Liability (1994) Vol. 1 (P. Birks, ed.), at p.29, who advocates the
abolition of knowing (or, more correctly, dishonest) assistance. His Lordship
says that, instead, if the accessory is involved in fraud, then the cause of action
lies in fraud; likewise, if he is negligent, the cause of action is in negligence;
and if the accessory intentionally interferes with another's legal or equitable
rights, then "the principles of Lumlev v. Gve with whatever adaptation is
required by the nature of the particular equitable right" should found the
basis of the action; cf his Lordship's judgement in Law Debenture Trust Corp.
pic v, Ural Caspian Oil Corp. Ltd. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 138, where he allowed damages
for interference with a contractual remedy; this was overturned on appeal:
[1995] 1 All E.R. 157; Birks, P.B.H. "Accessory Liability" [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 1. at p.5.
who argues that accessory liability should be part of deceit and conspiracy;
and Stevens J., "Dishonest Assistance: Developing The Concept of Equitable
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The remedy against the accessory serves two purposes: (i) it means
that if the accessory is liable, there is less chance of the beneficiary
suffering a loss if the trustee cannot restore the property to the trust
where there has been a breach of trust; and (ii) it deters others from
acting in such a way.16
Unlike the trustee (of whom a very high standard of conduct is
expected), the accessory is not under strict liability, so that he will
not be liable when he did not know or was unaware that he was
receiving trust property, or that he was dealing with a trustee - a
third party cannot be expected to deal with trustees at their peril.17
Although liability is fault based, negligence is not sufficient to found
liability.18 If negligence was the test, this would mean that a lower
standard of conduct would be expected from an accessory that acted
wrongfully, than from a trustee who fraudulently breached the
Wrongs" [1994] R.L.R. 105, at p.108. In Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd. v. Tan.
Lord Nicholls does not speak of accessory liability in terms of constructive
trusts.
16 Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at pp.386H-387A, per
Lord Nicholls.
17 At p.387F-G, per Lord Nicholls.
18 At p.391E-H, per Lord Nicholls. This has clarified a long running battle as to
whether negligence was sufficient to ground liability for the accessory or
whether dishonesty was required. Lord Nicholls, at pp.388H-389B, noted that
many commentators had adopted the latter view.
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trust.19 Moreover, there was no basis for generally imposing on an
accessory, e.g., professional adviser or a bank, a general duty to the
beneficiary or beneficiaries of a trust to check that their trustee was
not acting improperly.20 The bank owes a duty of reasonable skill
and care to the trustee whom it had undertaken to work for21, but it
owed no duty of care directly to the beneficiaries, and had not
undertaken such a duty.22
The touchstone of liability is dishonesty (or lack of probity), which is
a necessary and sufficient ingredient of liability.23 Dishonesty is an
objective standard: of not acting as an honest person would in the
circumstances, e.g., deliberately misleading someone to their
detriment, or not asking the questions that an honest person would
ask when unsure about a situation for fear of being told, or finding
19 Norman, H., "Knowing assistance - a plea for help" (1992) Vol.12 Legal
Studies 332, at p.334.
20 Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at pp.391G-H and
392B-D, per Lord Nicholls.
21 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.391G-H, per Lord Nicholls. If the trustee failed to sue
the bank where it had not exercised the requisite skill and care, then the
beneficiary or beneficiaries could sue the bank: see at p.391F-G, per Lord
Nicholls.
22 At p.391G-H, per Lord Nicholls.
23 At p.387H. Unconscionability was also rejected as a basis for liability: see at
p.392D-F.
364
out something, that they did not want to.24 It involves conscious
impropriety.25 So "[a]cting in reckless disregard of" the rights, or
possible rights, of others "can be a tell-tale sign of dishonesty".26 In
determining whether a person has acted dishonestly, the court will
look at the circumstances known to the accessory at the relevant
time and the accessory's personal attributes, e.g., experience,
intelligence and why the accessory acted in the way he did.27
With dishonesty being the basis of liability, it is inapt to refer to an
accessory as having knowingly assisted, and to the various degrees of
knowledge, which relate to differences "of degree and not kind".28 It
24 At p.389C-D. A similar view is expressed by Millett J. in Agip (Africa') Ltd. v.
Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.293E-G, who warned against over refinement, and
said the real "distinction is between honesty and dishonesty". This judgement
was approved by the Court of Appeal: [1991] Ch. 547. See also The Hon. Sir Peter
Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R. 71, at p.85, who said
that "the law should . . . require no more than a general awareness of the
dishonest nature of the arrangements that an honest man would have nothing
to do with them."
25 [1995] 2A.C. 378, at p.389D-E, per Lord Nicholls.
26 At p.390G-H. His Lordship (at p.390G) approved the statement of Knox J. in
Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust pic [1992] 4 All E.R. 700, at p.761, of
being "guilty of commercially unacceptable conduct in the particular context
involved."
27 [1995] 2 A.C.378, at p.391B-C, per Lord Nicholls.
28 At p.391D, per Lord Nicholls.
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follows that the five categories of knowledge outlined in the Baden
case29 are "best forgotten"30
For the banker, the significance of this form of liability relates to: (1)
cases where a banker has assisted a trustee to commit a breach of
trust, e.g., by honouring a cheque drawn on a trust account or
transferring money from the trust account31; (2) cases where a bank
assists in the acquisition of a company's shares with its own money
(i.e., financial assistance), e.g., providing credit to purchase shares or
receiving payment made out of the company's money with
29 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509 (Note), [1992] 4 All E.R. 161 (a case decided in 1983). The
five categories were as follows:
(i) actual knowledge;
(ii) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious ("Nelsonian knowledge");
(iii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and
reasonable man would make;
(iv) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest
and reasonable man; and
(v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable
man on inquiry.
30 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.392G-H, per Lord Nicholls.
31 Harpum, C., "The Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.O.R.
114, at p.148. See also Paget's Law of Banking (1996) 11th edn. (by M. Hapgood
Q.C.), at pp.397-402.
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knowledge it was transferred in breach of trust32; and (3) the
increasingly prevalent problem of money laundering or commercial
fraud.33
DifficultiesWith Accessory Liability
Although a lot of the difficulties regarding dishonest assistance (or
accessory liability) have now been clarified,34 some difficulties still
arise. First, there is the continued classification of this liability under
the umbrella of constructive trusts. It is suggested that dishonest
assistance should be treated as an intentional tort, as there is a
conscious action on the part of the accessory involving dishonesty,
which harms the trust.35 This raises the issue of concurrent liability
where there is a contract between the trustee and the beneficiary for
32 Harpum, C., "The Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.O.R.
114, at p.150. It is suggested that this second example is also a case of knowing
receipt.
33 See, for example, Baden, supra: and Agip. [1990] 1 Ch. 265, [1991] Ch. 547
(C.A.). And see the 1991 Presidential Address by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson
V.C. (as he then was) to the Holdsworth Club of Birmingham University,
entitled "Constructive Trusts and Unjust Enrichment", at p.2.
34 Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan H9951 2 A.C. 378 (P.C.).
35 See Lord Hoffman, "The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance" : Ch.2 in
Frontiers of Liability (1994) Vol.1 (P. Birks, ed.), at p.29; Birks, P.B.H.
"Accessory Liability" [1996] L.M.C.L.O. 1, at p.5; and Stevens J., "Dishonest
Assistance: Developing The Concept of Equitable Wrongs" [1994] R.L.R. 105, at
p.108.
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inducing breach of contract, and in equity as a constructive trust
claim.36 In the former, the proof of dishonesty would not be
required37, which would make proving a claim easier.
Secondly, the touchstone of dishonesty is not always as clear-cut as
Lord Nicholls would have us believe, and will involve areas of
difficulty, despite the guidance which his Lordship provided38. The
answer maybe that dishonesty is something you know when you see
it, but there are differences of interpretation. In this regard, the
view of Professor Birks that it would have been helpful to have
retained the Baden categories of knowledge39, relating to dishonesty,
with the warning that the first three categories are indications of
dishonesty, and not a code40, makes sense. As the learned Professor
put it, "judges cast adrift on the sea of an undefined and objective
dishonesty may find themselves still grateful for the guideline . . .
fBadenl attempted to throw them."41
36 Berg, A., "Accessory Liability for Breach of Trust" (1996) M.L.R. 443, at point
3, on p.451.
37 Ibid.
38 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.389-391, especially at p.389F-G. At p.390E-G, his
Lordship appears to acknowledge there can be difficulties.
39 See fn.29.
40 Birks, P.B.H., "Accessory Liability" [ 1996] L.M.C.L.O. 1, at pp.5-6.
41 Birks, P.B.H., "Accessory Liability" [1996] L.M.C.L.O. 1, at p.6.
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(b) Knowing Receipt
This second head of liability42 is based in unjustified enrichment, 43
and is the equitable equivalent of the common law claim of money
had and received.44 Knowing receipt is concerned with the liability
of a person (i.e., the bank) as a recipient of trust property or its
traceable proceeds.45 The liability of the bank for knowing receipt
will, generally, be personal46 for the value received by the bank47 (as
42 Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597, at p.607, where Thomas J. says that
it is better to perceive of the two categories as heads of liability. With this view
it is agreed.
43 See Gray v. Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at p. 14, per Lord Wrestbury, "if a
trustee, for his own private purposes, aliens or hands over a position of the
trust estate by a breach of trust, the party knowingly receiving the property
stands in the shoes of the trustee, and is equally liable to make restitution".
See also Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Roval Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan
[1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.386F, who says "[Recipient liability is restitution based";
and Thomas J. in Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R., 597, at p.608.
44 Millett, the Hon. Sir Peter, "Tracing The Proceeds Of Fraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R.
71, at pp.76-79.
45 Per Lord Nicholls in Roval Brunei Airlines v. Tan, supra, at p.382 D-E.
46 It is an inpersonam constructive trust, i.e. a claim for monetary
compensation: not a claim to a fund in specie: see Scott L.J. (as he then was) in
Polly Peck International Pic v Nadir [1992] 4 All E.R. 769, at pp.776e-f and 781]
(referring to the context of the case before him).
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money is not normally possible to identify in specie) - but if there is
still value in the hands of the banker48 then there can be a
proprietary right.49 This will give rise to a right to trace in equity
and follow the money into a bank account, where it may be mixed
with other funds.50 Thus, the intermeddler will have to "either
relinquish an improper gain that he has made in his self-assumed
fiduciary capacity role, or to make good a loss suffered as a result of
47 Birks, P.B.H., "Trusts In The Recovery Of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts,
And Restitution"("Misapplied Assets") : Ch.8 in Commercial Aspects of Trusts
and Fiduciary Obligations (1992) (E. McKendrick, ed.), at p.152.
48 Birks, "Misapplied Assets", supra, at p.152, and "Misdirected Funds", supra, at
pp.297-298 and 311-312.
49 See the discussion by T.G. Youdan, "The Fiduciary Principle: The
Applicability of Proprietary Remedies" in Equity. Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989)
Carswell, (T.G. Youdan, ed.); and Birks, "Misapplied Assets", supra, and
"Misdirected funds: restitution from the recipient" [1989] L.M.C.L.O. 296
("Misdirected Funds"), especially at pp.297-298 and 311-312.
50 A beneficiary will have to bring a claim in equity, under knowing receipt,
rather than under the common law equivalent of money had and received, as
the beneficiary does not have a sufficient legal interest - he only has a
beneficial interest (but this is recognised by equity): see Lord Goff of
Chieveley in Lipkin Gorman v, Karpnale [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p.572. To trace in
equity, a fiduciary relationship is required: see Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch.
D. 696, at p.708, per Sir George Jessel M.R.
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his actions"51. This derives from the principle that where there is a
breach of trust, the trustee is strictly liable to place the trust estate
in the same position it would have been in had there been no breach
- questions of foreseeability and remoteness do not apply.52
For a knowing receipt claim to succeed, three elements need to be
established:
(i) a disposal of the plaintiffs assets in breach of a fiduciary duty;
(ii) "beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable
as representing the" plaintiffs assets; and
(iii) knowledge by "the defendant that the assets he received are
traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty".53
In knowing receipt, unlike accessory liability, there is no
requirement of dishonesty54, as the breach of trust can be fraudulent
51 Harpum, C., "The Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.O.R.
114, at p. 118.
52 Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns (a firm) [1996] 1 A.C. 421 (H.L.(E.)).
53 Per Hoffman L.J. (as he then was) in El Aiou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic
[1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 464, at p.478 b-c.
54 See Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292, per Millett J.; and
the Hon. Sir Peter Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R. 71.
at p.80. But, in most cases, there will be some dishonesty, as (mis)appropriating
trust money (which does not become the bank's money) with knowledge is not
the sort of conduct that honest men will be involved in.
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or innocent55: it is the unjustified enrichment of the stranger to the
trust (i.e., the bank) at the expense of the beneficiary, rather than the
stranger's conduct (in the sense of dishonestly assisting a breach of
trust) which is in question56 - although, where a bank knowingly
uses trust money to reduce a customer's overdraft it has also acted
dishonestly.57 However, it is an error to treat knowing receipt as a
single category. Care is needed to distinguish between the two
different situations which may arise:58
(i) The first situation relates to persons "who receive for [their] own
benefit trust property transferred to [them] in breach of trust"59,
where there is actual or constructive knowledge60 that the property
is trust property, and the transfer of the property was in breach of
55 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292, per Millett. J. (as he
then was); and see the Hon. Sir Peter Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud"
(1991) 107 L.O.R. 71, at p.80. See also Lord Nicholls in Roval Brunei Airlines
Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378, at p.382 E-F.
56 Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597, at p.608.
57 See, for example, Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41.
58 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.291, per Millett J. (as he
then was); this was approved on appeal: [1991] Ch. 547.
59 Ibid.
60 A lack of knowledge proved fatal in the Scottish case of Thomson v
Clydesdale Bank Ltd. 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59; [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L.(Sc.)), even
though the bank had applied money received in breach of trust from a
customer and had applied it to reduce the customer's overdraft.
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trust. Alternatively, the property may be received without notice of
such a breach of trust, but the facts are subsequently discovered.61
Liability to account, as a constructive trustee, for the property arises
from the time of receipt in the first case, and from the time of notice
in the second.62
(ii) The second class of case, which is distinct from the first, occurs
when a person (normally a trustee's agent) "receives trust property
lawfully and not for his [the agent's] own benefit", but who then
misappropriates the trust property, or deals with it in a way that is
inconsistent with the trust.63 Provided the person receiving the
property knows it to be trust property, he will be "liable to account
as a constructive trustee"64, even though he does not know the
precise terms of the trust.65
61 Ibid.
62 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.291. See also The Hon. Sir
Peter Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud", supra, at p.80.
63 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.291, per Millett J. (as he
then was). See also the Baden case [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509 (Note); Polly Peck
International pic v Nadir (No.2) [1992] 4 All E.R. 769, at p.777d, per Scott L.J.;
and Eagle Trust Pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 484, at p.497, per
Vinelott J.




Receipt For Beneficial Use
The cardinal feature of the first class of case is that "the recipient
must have received the property for his own use and benefit"66, in
the sense of setting up title to it,67 i.e., beneficial receipt. Therefore,
when a bank knowingly uses trust property (money) to reduce the
trustee's (or fiduciary's) (i.e., the customer's) indebtedness to the
bank by applying it towards the trustee's overdraft with the bank,
the bank will be liable to the beneficiaries of the trust.68 Beneficial
receipt is to be distinguished from "ministerial receipt"69, which does
not attract liability from knowing receipt. Ministerial receipt arises
where an agent receives trust property and passes it onto his
principal, even if he has knowledge of a breach of trust by the
principal, i.e., the agent is acting as a mere conduit, in accordance
with the principal's instructions, and is not setting up title to the
property. If the bank had no knowledge of the trust, or, that there
66 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292; and Westpac Banking
Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41.
67 Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41, at pp.82-83. See
also Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [19901 1 Ch. 265, at p.291.
68 Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41; and Millett, The
Hon. Sir Peter, "Tracing The Proceeds ofFraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R. 71. atp.83.
69 Birks, P.B.H., "Misdirected Funds" [1989] L.M.C.L.O. 296, at pp.303-304; and
Brightman J. (as he then was) in Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Burden (No. 2) [1972]
1 W.L.R. 602, at pp.632-633.
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had been a breach of trust, there will be no liability.70 Hence, when
the bank is acting in its capacity as the paying or collecting agent it is
not liable because, in paying or collecting cheques, the bank is only
acting as agent for his principal (the customer),71 and is not setting
up title to the money; if the money is trust money, the bank cannot
set up a title to it - the position is different from the normal situation
where a customer deposits funds in his or her current account, as
such money becomes the bank's, which it can lend out, subject to a
personal obligation to repay the customer's debt on demand.
The requirement of beneficial receipt is regarded not as a "technical
or fanciful"72 requirement, but "essential if receipt based liability is
to be properly confined to those cases where the receipt is relevant
to the loss" 73
70 In Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, accountants set up a dummy
company for a fraudster who had misappropriated funds. The accountants had
received the misdirected funds from the dummy company into their bank
accounts, but passed it on inaccordance with their principal's instructions. It
was held that the accountants were not liable as recipients, as they had not
received any benefit - they were mere agents, but were liable as accessories,
because they had assisted in the fraud; this issue was not dealt with on appeal:
[1991] Ch. 547.
71 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292, per Millett J.; and The




Ordinarily, the agent will be liable to his principal (the trustee) and
not to the beneficiary or beneficiaries of a trust74 but where the
agent ceases to act as an agent of the principal75 by, for example,
using the trust property for his own benefit and, thus, setting up his
own title to the trust property, he will be liable to the beneficiary.
As the beneficiary will, normally, not have an action against the
agent if it breaches the terms of its agency agreement, who is not
connected with the trust and with whom it has no relationship, but
only an action for any breach of trust against the trustee (who, in
turn, may have an action against the agent), what the beneficiary is
seeking is a mechanism for suing the agent where there has been a
breach of trust by the trustee which has resulted in a loss to the
beneficiary and the trust property can not be recovered from the
trustee. This mechanism will arise when the agent goes beyond his
agency and has some greater association with the misdirected trust
property: either through dishonestly assisting a breach of trust, or, as
here, by receiving and becoming chargeable with the property.
Areas of Contention
Two areas of difficulty have arisen:
74 Tan, Y.L., "Agent's liability for knowing receipt" [1991] L.M.C.L.O. 357, at
pp.361 and 363. In this article, there is an historical perspective of this head of
liability. Tan argues that the requirement of setting up title to the trust
property as being determinative of receipt is only a recent trend and is against
authority: see at pp.373-376.
75 Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41, at p.69, per Sir
Clifford Richmond.
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(i) the type of knowledge required; and
(ii) the related question of whether it is also necessary to receive
trust property for your own benefit if you are acting as an agent.
(i) Knowledge: Actual or Constructive?
Although there is no reference to knowledge, in Lord Selborne's
formulation for knowing receipt76, it is clear knowledge of the breach
of trust is required.77 The question is: does this knowledge have to be
actual knowledge, or is constructive knowledge (or notice) sufficient?
(Constructive knowledge (or notice), in this context, means that a
reasonable man would be put on inquiry - it is not referring to
constructive notice in the strict conveyancing sense.78) There is a
conflict of authority on the type of knowledge, but the better view is
that constructive knowledge is sufficient.
The leading authority of the decision of the House of Lords in the
Scottish case of Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd.79. indicates, albeit a
76 Barnes v. Addv (1874) 9 Ch. App. 244, at p.251.
77 Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L.(Sc.).
78 Agip (Africa! Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.291, per Millett J.; and E[
Aiou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic [1993] 3 All ER 717, at p.739, per Millett J.
79 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59; [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L.(Sc.)). A case sometimes forgotten
about by Scots lawyers: see Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia. Vol. 24, "Trusts,
Duties Of Trustees and Others", and Norrie, K. McK., and Scobbie, E., Trusts, in
which there are no references to it. Cf Menzies On Trustees (1913) 2nd edn., at
paras. 1273-74, on pp.810-813, and Wilson, W.A., and Duncan, A.G.M., Trusts.
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little obliquely80, that constructive knowledge is sufficient. For
example, Lord Shand's references to the bank being liable only where
it had "shewn directly, or as the reasonable inference from facts
proved, that these parties were cognisant that the money was being
wrongfully used, in violation of the agent's duty and obligation",81
suggests, that constructive knowledge is sufficient; as does Lord
Herschell L.C.'s reference to the party receiving the money having
"reason to believe that the payment is being made in fraud of a third
person and that the person making the payment is handing over in
discharge of his debt money which he has no right to hand over . . ."82
Moreover, in the Outer House, the Lord Ordinary (whose decision was
expressly approved in the House of Lords by Lords Watson and
Trustees and Executors (1995) 2nd edn., at paras.10-11 and 10-13, on pp.146-147,
which do refer to it.
80 See the penetrating discussion in Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin
[1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41, at pp.62-63, per Sir Clifford Richmond. See too Lankshear v
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand! Ltd. [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 481, at p.493, where it is
said that the position as to the amount of knowledge is unclear. Professor Birks
regards it as clear that it is constructive knowledge: see "Misdirected Funds",
supra, at p.320.
81 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, at p.63, [1893] A.C. 282, at p.293, respectively. See also
Byrne J. in Coleman v Bucks and Oxon Union Bank [1897] 2 Ch. 243, at p.254,
who refers to, inter alia, "bankers hav[ing] the slightest knowledge or
reasonable suspicion" (Emphasis added)
82 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, at p.60, [1893] A.C. 282, at pp.287-288. Lord Watson
referred to showing "that the recipient of the [trust] money did not transact in
good faith": see 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, at p.61, [1893] A.C. 282, at p.280.
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Shand83), indicated it could be either, as he refers to "at least
knowledge, actual or constructive, on the part of the creditor seems
essential; and such knowledge on the part of the bank is here, I think,
excluded by proof."84 This is the correct view regarding knowledge
for knowing receipt, and is consistent with it being based on
unjustified enrichment, rather than dishonesty.
In Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd.85, a broker paid a cheque,
endorsed to himself, representing the proceeds of sale of some shares
of his client (Thomson), into his (the broker's) account with the bank.
This account was overdrawn by an amount exceeding the sum of the
cheque, and the cheque was applied by the bank in reduction of that
overdraft. The broker absconded soon afterwards, and Thomson
sought repayment of the amount of the cheque from the bank. The
bank was aware that the cheque represented the proceeds of sale of
83 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, at pp.61 and 64, [1893] A.C. 282, at pp.290 and 294,
respectively.
84 Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd. 1891, 18 R. 751, at p.754. See also Be 1 mont
Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Williams Furniture (No. 21 [1980] 1 All E.R. 393, at pp.405
and 407, per Goff L.J. and Buckley L.J. (C.A.); International Sales and Agency
Ltd. v. Marcus [1982] 3 All E.R. 551; and Millet J. in the Agip (Africa) Ltd. v.
Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292, and in El Aiou case v. Dollar Land Holdings
pic. [1993] 3 All E.R. 717.
85 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L.(Sc.)).
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certain shares, but it did not know, and it had not enquired, whether
the money was held by the broker as agent or in his own right.86
The House of Lords said that the bank was entitled to retain the
money and apply it against the broker's debt to it, as it did not have
notice of the fact the money was not the broker's;87 they also took the
view that there was no duty, under ordinary circumstances, for a
bank to enquire as to the source of the customer's funds.88
Actual Knowledge: Want of Probity
There has been a divergence in some recent authorities on knowing
receipt, which have sought to use want of probity as the basis of
86 It was not unusual for a bank to receive such a cheque in the ordinary
course of business from a broker, as it was the practice of the Edinburgh Stock
Exchange that the selling broker received a cheque from the buyer's broker
(which was paid into the seller's broker's bank account), and the seller's
broker either made payment to his own client by his (the broker's) own
cheque, or, where instructed, the seller's broker reinvested the money and
delivered the new investments to his client. The shares, and hence the
proceeds of sale, were part of a trust fund.
87 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.291, per Millett J.; and El
Aiou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic [1993] 3 All ER 717, at p.739, per Millett J.
88 See Lord Herschell L.C., 1893 20 R. (H.L.) 59, at p.60 [1893] A.C. 282, at pp.287-
288.
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liability.89 It is clear this no longer represents the law, as dishonesty
is not required for knowing receipt.90
No Constructive Notice In Commercial Cases
A series of recent cases91 have referred to imputed or inferred
knowledge being sufficient for knowing receipt, but have declined to
apply this standard in commercial cases, because of the general
prohibition against imputing constructive notice into commercial
89 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch. 264, at p.285, per Sir Robert
Megarry V.C., who thought constructive knowledge in terms of categories (iv)
or (v) of the Baden scale was not permissable. A similar view was expressed in
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co. (No.21 [1969] 2 Ch. 276, at pp.298 and
304, per Sachs L.J. and Edmund-Davies L.J. (as he then was); and also in
Barclays Bank pic v. Ouincecare Ltd. [1992] 4 All E.R.363, at p.375, per Steyn J.
(as he then was). See the cogent criticisms of these views by Harpum, C., "The
Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part II) (1986) 102 L.O.R. 267, at pp.286-87.
90 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bid, v. Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378 (P.C.).
91 Eagle Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 484, at pp.489-495, and
at pp.504-505, per Vinelott J.; Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v. Eagle Trust pic
[1992] 4 All ER700, at p.760, per Knox, J; and Eagle Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities
Ltd. (No. 2) [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 121, at p. 152 b-d, per Arden J. The question of the
type of knowledge required was left open by Scott L.J. in Polly Peck
International pic v. Nadir (No. 2) [1992] 4 All E.R. 769, at p.777f (C.A.). His
lordship (who delivered the leading judgement) did, however, agree with the
view of Vinelott J. that "[t]he courts have always been reluctant to extend the
doctrine of constructive notice to cases where moneys are paid in the ordinary
course of business . . .": see at p.782d-e.
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matters.92 The courts have required actual knowledge (or such
constructive knowledge as is deemed to be equivalent to "actual
knowledge"), in commercial cases, based on the first three levels in
the (now obsolete) Baden scale of: (i) actual knowledge; (ii) wilfully
shutting your eyes to the obvious ("Nelsonian" knowledge); and (iii)
wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest
and reasonable man would make.93
These decisions are based on policy and pragmatism, rather than
principle. Receipt based liability is not concerned with dishonesty,
which requires a high threshold, but restitution. By adopting a test
of actual knowledge, the courts are, in effect, adopting a requirement
that is close to dishonesty. This is not correct. From the bank's point
of view, it is a welcome development, and means that banks are not
having to play the "amateur detective",94 which, would be very
difficult, given the volume of cheques passing through a bank each
92 See Lindley L.J. (as he then was) in Manchester Trust v. Furness [1895] 2 Q.B.
539, at p.545.
93 Baden v. Societe General pour Favoriser le Developpement Commerce et de
l'lndustrie en France S.A. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509 (Note), at p.575H, per Peter Gibson
J. (as he then was). The other two categories, which are considered to amount
"constructive knowledge", are: "(iv) knowledge circumstance which would
indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man; (v) knowledge of
circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry":
see at p.576A.
94 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 987, at p.1006, per Alliott J., at
first instance.
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day.95 But for a beneficiary, it means that, where trust property is
concerned, the bank has a low obligation of investigation if it applies
a deposit to reduce indebtedness of a customer. To make a bank
monitor every cheque drawn on a trust account would be
"commercially impracticable and the law should not readily produce
a result which has that effect".96 As Millett J. said, the "recipient is
95 See May L.J. in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at
p.l356E-H, who says:
"Having in mind the vast numbers of cheques which are presented for
payment every day in this country, whether over a bank counter or
through the clearing bank, it is, in my opinion, only when the
circumstances are such that any reasonable cashier would hesitate to
pay a cheque at once and refer it to his or her superior, and when any
reasonable superior would hesitate to authorise payment without
inquiry, that a cheque should not be paid immediately on presentation
and such inquiry made. Further, it would, I think, be only in rare
circumstances, and only when any reasonable bank manager would do
the same, that a manager should instruct his staff to refer all or some of
his customer's cheques to him before they are paid".
96 Per Dunn L.J. in Nihill v. Nihill. unreported decision of the Court of Appeal,
[1983] C.A. Transcript 276. See also Wallace J. in Lankshear v. A.N.Z. Banking
Group (New Zealand! Ltd. [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 489, at 495, who says:
". . . the decided cases emphasise the need for the Court to be aware and
take full account of commercial reality. Bankers cannot be placed
under obligations which are uncertain or which would render our
system of commerce difficult to operate. Those considerations would
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not expected to be unduly suspicious and is not to be held liable
unless he went ahead without further inquiry in circumstances in
which an honest and reasonable man would have realised that the
money was probably trust money and was being misapplied."97 With
these views, it is respectfully agreed.
(ii) Personal Benefit; Ministerial Receipt
Related to the question of knowledge or notice, is the question of the
character of the receipt by the agent bank: is it mere receipt (in
whatever form), which invokes liability, or, does it have to be
beneficial receipt?
The correct view is that where trust property passes through the
agent's (i.e., bank's) hands to his principal (the trustee/customer),
then, even if the bank has knowledge of a breach of trust by the
trustee, the banker is only acting in accordance with his principal's
instructions, and has not made any claim on the property, he will not
be liable for knowing receipt, as the receipt is not in any sense
permanent, and the agent has not received and become chargeable
with the trust property; once the property is out of the agent's hands,
appear to be of particular importance where a bank is acting purely in
its capacity as agent, as distinct from asserting title of its own to the
funds ..."
97 El Aiou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic [1993] 3 All E.R. 717, at p.739H-J, per
Millett J. Millett J. regards this as being consistent with the idea of "the
underlying trust being a subsisting trust.": see at p.739j.
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he cannot be liable qua recipient98, although he may still be liable as
an accessory99.
The reason for this is that even if the banker is "incidentally
aware"100 of a breach of trust contemplated by a customer who
draws a cheque for that purpose, the banker, who is not a party to
the transaction, does not have a right to not pay the cheque because,
by doing so, he would make "himself a party to an inquiry as
between his customer and third persons."101 By refusing to honour
his obligation against his customer, the banker - to whom special
rules apply - would be setting up a jus tertii,102
The Contrary View to Ministerial Receipt
The view that an agent is immune from liability where his receipt of
trust property is ministerial because he has not personally benefited
from it, even though he has knowledge of a breach of trust, has been
98 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265; affmd on appeal: [1991] Ch. 547;
and Birks, P.B.H., "Misdirected Funds", supra, at p.303.
99 Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265; affmd on appeal: [1991] Ch. 547;
and Birks, P.B.H., "Misdirected Funds", supra, at p.304.
100 Constructive notice.
101 Gray v Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at p. 14, per Lord Westbury. Cf. Lord
Cairns L.C., at p.l 1, who refers to bankers not hiding behind being a bankers.
102 Ibid.
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challenged.103 It has been cogently argued that this idea of receipt
for personal benefit is one of recent invention and against earlier
authority. Rather, there has been a failure to distinguish between
knowledge of a trust and knowledge of a breach of trust. Moreover,
saying an agent who receives trust property in breach of trust qua
agent is not liable for knowing receipt "is tantamount to condoning an
act which facilitates a breach of trust"104; and there is a difficulty in
seeking to sue for knowing assistance as this "predicates a fraudulent
breach of trust"105.
The Difficulties with the Contrary View
The difficulties with this view are two fold. First, it is, with respect,
not correct to say that the authorities are against personal benefit.
For example, in Coleman v. Bucks and Oxon Union Bank.106 Byrne J.
stated that:
103 Tan, Y.L., "Agents's liability for knowing receipt" [1991] L.M.C.L.O. 357,
especially at pp.358-359.
104 Supra, at p.358.
105 Ibid.
106 [1897] 2 Ch. 243, at p.254. See also Lord Cairns L.C. and Lord Westbury in
Gray v, Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at pp.13 and 15, respectively. The third
Law Lord, Lord Colonsay, agreed with both speeches. In that case, the lack of
any real personal benefit to the bank (Gray) in acting as a collecting and
paying bank proved fatal, and, in this regard it is consistent with the views of
Millett J. in Agip (Africa] Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p.292; and in
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"If bankers have the slightest knowledge or reasonable suspicion that
the money is being applied in breach of a trust, and if they are going to
derive a benefit from the transfer and intend and design that they
should derive a benefit from it, then the bankers would not be entitled
to honour the cheque drawn upon the trust account without some
further inquiry into the matter." (Emphasis added.)
The second difficulty is that, as this head of liability is restitution
based, the beneficiary must show the banker is unjustifiably
enriched at its (the beneficiary's) expense. However, if the banker
has not obtained a benefit at the beneficiary's expense, but has
merely acted as a conduit for the trustee of the beneficiary's money,
the banker cannot be said to be enriched. The enriched party is the
trustee (or fiduciary): not the banker. And it is to that party to
which the beneficiary must look to recover his money.
It has also been argued that where a banker is aware of the breach
of trust by the trustee, the banker cannot avail himself of the
defence of ministerial receipt, i.e., the receipt has to be innocent.
With respect, if this is the case, then there is no liability, because the
bank will lack the element of knowledge concerning the breach of
trust, which is required. However, knowledge of a breach of trust
will defeat the other defences of bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, and change of position defence (which has to be in
good faith).
"Tracing The Proceds Of Fraud" (1991) 107 L.O.R. 71, at p.83. See also Lord
Selbourne in Barnes v. Addv (1874) 9 Ch. App. 244, at pp.254-255.
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Conclusion
The key under both heads of liability is the knowledge of the bank in
relation to the character of the money it comes into contact with, as
the bank can set up title to non trust money, and lend it out, but
cannot do so with trust money. Where the bank is aware of a breach
of trust, then it needs to act with great care. Although the basis for
liability in dishonest assistance is dishonesty, and in knowing receipt
it is unjustified enrichment, nonetheless, both types of liability are
likely to involve dishonesty, because the bank, in both situations
where it knows the money is trust money, is depriving the
beneficiary of trust money (or money that is the subject of a
fiduciary relationship). Where a bank is on notice of a breach of
trust by the trustee (or fiduciary), it needs to balance a possible
claim for dishonest assistance (or knowing receipt) and the attendant
bad publicity, with a possible claim (if the suspicion is wrong) for
breach of mandate and/or defamation. For a teller at a branch, he or
she is best to refer matters of doubt to his or her superiors, who can
take the matter further, and, if necessary, obtain legal advice.
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CHAPTER 9.
RECOVERY OF MONEY IN BREACH OF TRUST AND
LIABILITY FOR ASSISTANCE IN FRAUD. UNDER SCOTS
LAW
When a bank has made a loan to a customer (or even if it has not),
the customer's account will be the subject of payments in and
payments out, which are necessary for the customer, if trading, to
operate1 - and, indeed, a charge may even be taken over book debts
of a corporate customer2. In such circumstances, the bank will be a
paying or collecting bank (as well as, possibly, being a secured
creditor) and, provided it is not aware of any difficulties with the
cheques, it will not usually be concerned to whom payments are
made by the customer, or from whom the customer receives money.
Difficulties will arise, however, when money paid in to a current
account has been misappropriated by the customer - in breach of
trust or a fiduciary relationship - and: (a) the customer absconds
with the money or spends it, or (b) the bank, pursuant to its right of
set-off, applies it against the customer's overdraft, either on that
account or another, or (c) the bank, in some way, assists the customer
in the commission of the misappropriation of the trust money (or
1 The same is true for a non-corporate customer, who will need to live. Such a
customer will receive a salary/wage or other payments in, and also have
outgoings.
2 This charge would he a floating charge or an assignation by way of security ,
and would be registerable under s.410 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended).
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money obtained in breach of fiduciary duty). In such situations, the
bank may have to pay out twice: once to the fraudster, and also to
the true owner of the money where the bank has knowledge of the
misapplication, i.e., there will be a double payment by the bank,
where there would have only been one. To take a paradigm example,
a customer sells boats as agent for a company and receives a
commission on each boat sold. The customer pays the total sum of
the proceeds of sale into his bank account and is to remit the balance,
after he has deducted his commission and expenses, to the company.
The customer also sells boats on his own account. However, his bank
account is overdrawn, which is of some concern to the bank, although
it temporarily increases the customer's overdraft on an assurance
that it will be reduced. The owners of the boats are not paid and the
customer goes into liquidation inevitably. The bank knows that a
greater percentage of the payments in will relate to boats sold as
agent, however, it and the customer do not separate these funds from
other funds received. To preserve its own position, the bank
knowingly applies all payments into its customer's bank account
(including those reflecting the proceeds of sale) in reduction of the
bank's overdraft.3 In such a case, the true owner has an action
against the lender, who has not only received misapplied trust
money and used it for its own benefit, but has assisted the customer
to commit the fraudulent breach of trust.
Such claims, under English law, would be dealt with as cases of
constructive trusts for knowing receipt and dishonest assistance (the
latter not really being a case of constructive trust). Scots law
3 Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41 (C.A.).
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recognises receipt based liability as a constructive trustee, but not
dishonest assistance as a constructive trustee. Cases coming in the
first category could also be dealt with as cases of unjustified
enrichment (i.e., recompense and repetition); whereas cases coming
within the second category are likely to be dealt with as delict cases.
Whilst Scots law recognises the constructive trust,4 it is rarely used in
practice in Scotland.5 Scots lawyers instead prefer to plead cases: (i)
for the recovery of money received in breach of trust in unjustified
enrichment (Scotland having a longstanding, if not entirely coherent
4 York Buildings Co. v Mackenzie (1795) 3 Pat. 378, particularly at p.393, per
Lord Thurlow, who said:
"It is undoubtedly clear that no man can be trustee for another, but by
contract; but it is equally clear, that under circumstances, a man may
be liable to all the consequences in his own person which a trustee
would become liable to by contract."
It was followed in a subsequent Scottish case, which also went to the House of
Lords: Aberdeen Rlv. v. Blaikie Bros. (1853) 1 Macq. 461. For a discussion of the
constructive trust: see also Burgess, R., "The Unconstructive Trust?" (1977)
Juridical Review 200; Wilson, A.R., "The Constructive Trust In Scots Law" (1993)
Juridical Review 99; Hood P., "Tracing, Constructive Trusts and Unjustified
Enrichment: Southern Cross Commodities Property Ltd v. Martin" 1994 S.L.T.
(News) 265; and Gretton, G.L., "The Constructive Trust" (1997) 1 Edinburgh Law
Review 281-316 and 408-419.
5 Gretton, G., "Unjust Enrichment in Scotland" [1991] J.B.L. 108.
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system of unjustified enrichment),6 or (ii) where there has been
assistance in a fraudulent breach of trust (or fiduciary duty), in
delict, because there is no category of dishonest assistance. For
example, where money was stolen, the court held that the correct
cause of action against the thief was one in delict.7 This approach is
similar to that advocated by Professor Birks of: (i) compensation for
assistance in a fraud, and (ii) unjustified enrichment for receipt
based liability.8
A common theme running through receipt based liability is the
principle that a party cannot benefit from another party's fraud,
unless the first party was both innocent or ignorant of the fraud, and
it gave valuable consideration, i.e., it cannot be implicated in the
6 See Style Financial Services Ltd. v. Bank of Scotland 1996 S.L.T. 421, at p.425L,
where the Second Division preferred to treat a receipt case, in a plea to the
relevancy, as one of recompense. The court said it was not clear from the
pleadings whether the case was one of tracing or recompense. This is not
correct, as tracing is not a cause of action, but a procedure for identifying
missing assets - the cause of action is unjustified enrichment. Senior counsel
for the pursuers argued the two were not discreet, which is correct.
7 See Gorebridge Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Turnbull 1952 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 9. A
claim to recover tokens that were also taken with the money was said to be best
pleaded in restitution.
8 "Trusts In The Recovery of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts and Restitution"
: Ch.8 in Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (1992) (E.
McKendrick, ed.), especially at pp. 152-154 and 159ff.
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other party's fraud.9 So, where a bank receives misapplied money
and applies it to reduce a customer's overdraft, the bank will not be
liable where it had no knowledge (i.e., constructive knowledge10) of
the misapplication, as the continued provision of banking services,
i.e., the overdraft will constitute consideration.
(1) Receipt Based Liability
Where a beneficiary is seeking to recover money from a lender who
has knowingly received and misapplied trust money from a customer
for its own benefit, the beneficiary has two causes of action against
the lender: (i) as a constructive trustee of the money; or (ii) for
unjustified enrichment - repetition and/or recompense.
(a) Liability As A Constructive Trustee
Under Scots law, a constructive trust can arise in two situations:
"(i) where a person in a fiduciary position gains an advantage by
virtue of that position;
(ii) where a person who is a stranger to an existing trust is to his
knowledge in possession of property belonging to the trust."11
9 Thompson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd. 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, [1893] A.C. 282
(H.L.(Sc.)); Clydesdale Bank Ltd. v. Paul (1877) 4 R. 626; and Universal Import
Export GmbH v. Bank of Scotland 1995 S.C. 73. Cf. Gibbs v. British Linen Bank
(1875) 4 R. 630.
10 Thompson v. Clydesdale Bank, supra.
1 1 Wilson, W.A., and Duncan, A.G.M., Trusts. Trustees and Executors (1995) 2nd
edn., at para.6.61, on p.99. This statement was approved by Lord Clyde in
Raymond Harrison & Co.Trustee v North West Securities 1989 S.L.T. 718, at
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In the context of this chapter, concerned with bank liability, it is the
second category which is of most relevance.12 A constructive trust
has been said to arise "where the trust funds come into the hands of
a third party, either gratuitously or with knowledge of a breach of
trust".13 In such circumstances, the beneficiary is able to trace the
proceeds of the trust money, or the money obtained in breach of
fiduciary duty, into the trustee's/fiduciary's bank account.14 Where
p.722F-G; and Sheriff Lovat in Black v. Brown 1982 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct. Reports) 50, at
p.54. See also Huisman v. Soepboer 1994 S.L.T. 682, at p.683, per Lord Coulsfield.
12 Wilson, W.A., and Duncan, A.G.M., Trusts. Trustees and Executors (1995) 2nd
edn., at paras.6-65 - 6-68, on pp. 100-101. See also the Stair Memorial
Encyclopaedia. Vol.24, at para.52, on p.32; and St. Clair, J.B., and Drummond-
Young, J.E., The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland (1992) 2nd edn., at
p.247, fn 5.
13 This is in a slightly different form from the passage quoted earlier, where
the reference is only to knowledge.
14 See Jopp v. Johnstone's Trs 1904 6 F. 1028, following Re Hallett's Estate (1880)
13 Ch. D. 696, that inorder to trace into a bank account (with mixed funds),
there needs to be a fiduciary relationship. In Southern Cross Commodities
Property Ltd. v. Martin 1991 S.L.T. 83, at p.85A-D, Lord Milligan laid down four
relevant principles, concerning tracing:
(i) where a trustee has mixed his own funds with trust funds, then they are all
treated as trust funds, except so far as the trustee can distinguish them;
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the bank is a mere conduit for its trustee/fiduciary customer, the
bank is not liable, because the true recipient is not the bank, but its
principal: the customer.15 The degree of this knowledge required can
be either actual or constructive knowledge.16 A beneficiary is able to
trace.
(ii) where part of the fund is used to acquire other property, that property at
the beneficiary's election, can be treated as trust property, at least up to the
value of the contribution of the trust to the mixed fund;
(iii) where there is a dissipation of the balance of the mixed fund, the property
acquired is to be treated as trust property, at least up to the value of the
contribution of the trust property to the mixed fund:
(iv) where there is a wilful breach of trust, any profit on the property
acquired, accrues to the trust.
See the discussion of this case by Hood P., "Tracing, Constructive Trusts and
Unjustified Enrichment: Southern Cross Commodities Property Ltd v. Martin"
1994 S.U.T. (News) 265.
15 In Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48, Watt, who received a
forged cheque, was, or should have been, suspicious of the money he received;
this was a factor which weighed heavily with the court in making him liable
for the value he had received, and not just for the value of the misapplied
money surviving in his bank account.
16 Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59, [1893] A.C. 282; and Westpac
Banking Corpn. v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41 (C.A.). Both cases were cited with
approval by Lord Gill in Style Financial Services Ltd. v. Bank of Scotland 1998
S.L.T. 851, 1997 S.C.L.R. 633.
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(b) Unjust Enrichment
The Scottish approach to receipt based liability is similar to the
approach advocated by Professor Birks17 namely, return of the
enrichment, unless there is reason why it should not be returned.18
Recompense and Repetition
Normally, the beneficiary will be suing to recover money from a
solvent bank, and so there will be no need to assert a proprietary
claim, only a personal one. Hence, a personal claim in unjustified
enrichment will be sufficient; and, in this regard, there are two
relevant remedies: (i) recompense, which is the more broadly based,
and concerns situations where a "benefit was received by [a]
defender in circumstances other than under a contract or supposed
17 Birks, "Misapplied Assets", supra.
18 See the discussion of the Scots Law of unjustified enrichment by Professor
Birks, who does not approve of the categorisation of the benefit-based
approach in Scots law: he argues for a unified theory of unjustified
enrichment: see "Restitution: A View of the Scots Law" (1985) 38 C.L.P. 57
("Scots Restitution"), and "Six Questions In Search Of A Subject - Unjust
Enrichment In A Crisis Of Identity" [1985] Juridical Review 227 ("Six
Questions"); see also MacQueen, H.L., "Unjustified Enrichment in Scots Law"
[1991] J.B.L. 333, at p.334; and MacDonald, D.R., "Mistaken Payments in Scots
Law" [1989] Juridical Review 49, at p.68, on the last point. But Professor Birks
prefers an approach similar to the unjustified enrichment approach of Scots
law to receipt based liability, to the English approach based on trusts: see "Scots
Restitution", supra and "Misapplied Assets", supra.
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contract".19; and (ii) repetition, which relates to a demand "for the
payment of money".20
Both actions, however, are "means to the same end, which is to
redress an unjustified enrichment upon the broad equitable principle
nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura."21
(a) Recompense
Recompense, is the general enrichment action.22 It is not capable of a
precise definition,23 but a useful starting point is the definition of
Professor Bell, who said:
19 Per Lord President (Hope) in Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.C. 151, at p.l55C-D.
20 Ibid.
21 The Morgan Guaranty case, supra, at p.l55D-E. See too Lord Roger in Dollar
land (Cumbernauld) Ltd. v. CIN Property Ltd. 1996 S.C. 331, at p.353C-D, who
interpreted this statement to mean "that the pursuers must show that the
defenders have been enriched at their expense, that there is no legal
justification for the enrichment and that it would be equitable to compel the
defenders to redress the enrichment". Cf. Gloag and Henderson, The Law of
Scotland (1995) 10th edn. (by W.A. Wilson and A.D.M. Forte and others), Ch. 29,
"Unjustified Enrichment", at para.29.1, on p.470. In the Morgan Guaranty,
case, supra, at p,169A-B, Lord Clyde said: [T]he two formulations [of recompense
and repetition] are closely related to each other and may well be treated as
falling under the single descriptive heading of unjust enrichment".
22 Seller, W.D.H., and MacQueen, H.L., "Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law".
"Unjustified Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of
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"[W]here one has gained by the lawful act of another done without any
intention of donation he is bound to recompense of indemnity that other
to the extent of the gain".24
This definition has been criticised as being too wide, because it would
cover incidental benefits to another which did not involve loss to the
pursuer.25 Subsequently, case law has identified the following
elements of this remedy, which are not settled:26
(i) Loss suffered by the pursuer;27
(ii) There is no intention of donation by the pursuer;28
Restitution" (1995) (E.H.J. Schrange, ed.) p.289, at pp.296-297, and 300. Cf.
Whitty, N.R., "Some Trends and Issues in Scots Enrichment Law" 1994
Jurdical.Review. 127, at p. 131, fn. 37.
23 Per the Lord President (Dunedin) in Edinburgh and District Tramways Co.
Ltd.. v. Courtenav 1909 S.C. 99, at p. 105.
24 Principles, s.538.
25 See Lord President Dunedin in the Edinburgh and District Tramways case,
supra, at p. 105; see also Lawrence Building Co. Ltd. v. Lanark County Council
1979 S.C. 30.
26 See Gloag & Henderson, supra, at para.29-13, on pp.480-483.
27 See Lord President Emslie in Lawrence Building Co. Ltd. v. Lanark County
Council 1978 S.C. 30, at p.41.
28 Ibid.
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(iii) The defender has been enriched due to the pursuer's loss - this
would not include the payment of a debt to him;29
(iv) No other remedy, e.g., an action for breach of contract, must be
available to the pursuer, except in special circumstances.30
Recompense is an equitable remedy, and so it needs to be shown,
taking into account all the circumstances of the matter, that it would
be inequitable for the pursuer to be reimbursed.31
The essence of recompense is that someone has obtained an
unintended benefit at the expense of the pursuer. There is an
element of the enrichment side of unjustified enrichment, and the
subtraction principle (of a loss to the pursuer).
29 Universal Import Export GmbH v. Bank of Scotland 1995 S.C. 73, at p.93, per
Lord Caplan, citing Gloag, On Contract (2nd edn.), at p.31.
30 Cf. Varnev (Scotland) Ltd. v. Lanark Town Council 1974 S.C. 245, and
Lawrence Building Co. Ltd. v. Lanark County Council 1978 S.C. 30.
3 1 See Lawrence Building Co. Ltd. v. Lanark County Council 1978 S.C. 30, at p.42,
per Lord President Emslie.
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(b) Repetition
In contrast, repetition, based on the Roman law, is concerned with
payment by mistake.32 Gloag and Henderson33 divide repetition into
four categories, which "are not straightjackets but merely serve to
distinguish various situations in which repetition may be available"34,
although it is possible that there may be some overlap:
(i) Condictio causa data causa non secuta,35
(ii) Condictio Indebiti.36
(iii) Condictio Obturpem velinjustam causam31
32 See the definition by Professor Walker, Contracts and other obligations (2nd
edn.), at para.35.3, cited with approval in the Watt case, supra, at p.58, per The
Lord Justice-Clerk (Ross), and at p.61, per Lord Mayfield.
3 3 The Law of Scotland (1995) 10th edn. (by W.A. Wilson and A.D.M. Forte and
others), Ch. 29, "Unjustified Enrichment", at para.29.2, on p.471.
34 Ibid.
35 A "claim for something given on a basis which has failed": see Gloag and
Henderson, supra, at para.29.3, on p.471.
36 A "claim for recovery of a payment which is not due": see Gloag and
Henderson, supra, at para.29.4, on p.472.
37 A "claim on account of a base or unjust consideration": see Gloag and
Henderson, supra, at para.29.6, on p.474.
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(iv) Condictio sine causa.38
Repetition is an equitable claim and is not to be granted "unless it
appears that retention of the money would be inequitable"39. In a
claim for repetition, "[t]he emphasis is not upon the extent to which
the party receiving the payment has been enriched, but upon
whether that person has any good and equitable reason to refrain
from repaying the money to the person who paid it under a mistake.
Is it equitable that he should return the money paid to him in
error?"40 The onus of proving that it would be inequitable to repay
the money, rests on the defender.41
It is not correct, however, despite dicta to the contrary,42 that a
pursuer does not have to prove the defender has been enriched. If
38 A "claim for something retained without legal justification": see Gloag and
Henderson, supra, at para.29.7, on p.474.
39 Gloag, W.M., On Contract (2nd edn.), at p.61.
40Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48, at p.57, per Lord Justice Clerk
(Ross).
41 See Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48, at p.57, per the Lord
Justice-Clerk (Ross), and, at p.62, per Lord Mayfield; and Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. Lothian Regional Council 1995 S.C. 151, at p,173B-D, per
Lord Clyde.
42 See Lords Mayfield and McCluskey in Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991
S.C. 48, at pp.61 and 65, respectively. In that case, enrichment was found when
W briefly deposited a forged cheque from P in his account to hold for P. The
court found that even having money in a bank account for a brief period
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the defender has not been enriched, it would be odd to make him
liable in an enrichment action.
In repetition, a defender who has received money is liable for the
full amount received, and not just the value surviving, where he has
parted with some of the money.43
Defences To A Claim For Repetition
(i) Change of Position
The major reason why a court, exercising its equitable jurisdiction,
will not require a defender to return the money it has received will
be because the defender has, in someway, altered its position on the
strength of its enrichment, and it would not now be equitable to
amounted to enrichment. W did not know the cheque was forged, but W was
"extremely naive" and "had been careless to the point of recklessness": see
Lord McCluskey, at p.64, i.e., it was a rather primitive form of money
laundering. This dicta has been criticised: see Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia.
Vol. 15, at para.31, on p.27; Whitty, N.R., "Some Trends and Issues in Scots
Enrichment Law" 1994 Juridical Review 127; Gloag and Henderson, The Law of
Scotland (1995) 10th edn., at para.29.1, fn.3, on p.470; and Evans-Jones, R.,
"Identifying The Enriched" 1992 S.L.T. (News') 25; MacQueen, H.L., "Unjustified
Enrichment In Scots Law" [1992] J.B.L. 333.
43 Roval Bank of Scotland v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48 (I.H.). Stewart criticises the
decision on this point: The Scots Law of Restitution (19921. at para.4.53, on p.57.
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reverse the enrichment.44 For example, paying money to charity.45
But simply honouring a pre-existing obligation, such as a debt, will
not amount to a change of position. This is because expenditure
normally incurred is excluded.46 Furthermore, the defence will not
be available where the defender has acted in "bad faith"47, or has not
acted reasonably48, or is "a wrongdoer"49. Thus, it is a difficult
defence to succeed under.
(ii) Personal Bar
This is very similar to the change of position defence, except that it is
reliance by the defender on an action or statement of the pursuer
44 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (1995) 10th edn., at para.29.8, on
p.477.
45 Per Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p.579F-
G.
46 See Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p.580G.
It is for this reason, that the result in Lipkin Gorman, allowing the defence
may be challenged, as a casino honouring its customer's bets does not amount
to a change of position - the casino was doing what it normally does.
47 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p.580, per Lord Goff of
Chieveley.
48 As in Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48, at p.58, per Lord Justice-
Clerk (Ross), at p.62, per Lord Mayfield, and, at p.66, per Lord McCluskey.
49 Lipkin Gorman v, Karnnale. Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548, at p.580C-D, per Lord Goff.
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which results in the defender altering his position (or suffering
detriment).50
(iii) Ministerial Receipt
As referred to earlier, this defence is available to a defender, so that
a paying and collecting banker would not be liable.51 One difficulty is
that money paid into a bank account (except for trust money or
money the subject of a fiduciary relationship) is the bank's, and not
the customer's, with the bank having a personal obligation to repay
an equivalent amount to the customer. Therefore, technically, the
bank has this additional money available to lend out to borrowers, at
a commercial rate of interest, which is a benefit. So, if receipt of
money in a bank account52, even for a short period of time is a
benefit, the bank has benefitted.
50 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (H.L.(E.)).
5 1 Agip (Africa! Ltd. v, Jackson [1990] Ch. 265, at p.292, per Millett J. (as he then
was).
52 See Roval Bank of Scotland pic v. Watt 1991 S.C. 48. Cf. Rose-Innes J. in
Govender v. Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd. 1984(4) S.A. 392, at p.404, who
said:
"The fact of payment of money is itself prima facie proof of enrichment,
but not conclusive proof. In assuming whether defendant has been
enriched by the payment, account must be taken of any performance
rendered by defendant which was judicially connected with his receipt
of the money."
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Bank's Liability For Repetition and Recompense.
From a bank's point of view, the situations giving rise to liability that
will most commonly arise are when:
(a) it receives money from a customer, which in reality belongs to a
third party, the customer flees with the money and the true owner
sues the bank for the money on the basis of repetition or recompense
(even though the bank no longer has the money); or
(b) the bank may apply the money in reduction of the customer's
overdraft in circumstances when a reasonable banker would be put
on notice53, for example, where a customer with a large overdraft,
suddenly, for no apparent reason, makes a large deposit in his
current account.
In such a case, the true owner of the money will seek to recover the
value received from the bank. The claim will be a personal one,
unless the money can be identified in specie. The owner could argue
that the payment to the bank was a mistake. A more likely course of
action is that the true owner of the money could sue for recompense,
on the basis that there has been a benefit to the bank without
intention to donate and it would be inequitable for the bank to keep
the money. The benefit to the bank is that it will have the money it
received available again to lend out to another customer. The bank,
in such situations, will need to rely on the defences of bona fide
purchaser for value without notice, or change of position.
53 Cf. Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd.. supra, where lack of knowledge on the
part of the bank meant it was not liable.
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(2) Liability of a Lender for Assisting In A Breach of Trust
The dishonest assistance category of constructure trusteeship, in
English law, is not part of Scots law. A claim against a bank for
assisting in breach of trust by a trustee (or a breach of fiduciary duty
by a fiduciary) will be brought in delict rather than as a constructive
trust claim - being part of the law of wrongs.
(i) Fraud
Thus, where fraud is involved, the case will be treated as one of
fraud. For example, if money is borrowed by trustees of a trust
which has a borrowing power, "a lender may presume that the
borrowing has taken place in the ordinary administration of the
duties imposed upon the trustees by the settlement, unless it can be
shewn that the lender knew that the money borrowed was not going
to be so employed, and so that he was ancillary to something like
fraud. "54
Similarly, if a trustee misuses trust moneys for his own benefit and
the bank knowing this then uses the money for its benefit (i.e., a
reduction of the trustee's overdraft), the bank can be liable as an
accessory to fraud, as permitting the trustee to act in violation of
trust.55
54 Buchanan v. Glasgow University Court 1909 S.C. 47, at p.54, per Lord Dundas,
quoting the Lord Ordinary.
55 See Tavlor v. Forbes (1830) 4 W&S 444 (H.L.), at p.454, per Lord Wynford.
Wilson, W.A., and Duncan, A.G.M., Trusts. Trustees and Executors (1995) 2nd
edn., at para.10-13, on p.147, regard the case as supporting the proposition that
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(ii) Negligence Rather Than Fraud
Where the bank has been negligent, rather than fraudulent, and its
conduct has resulted in loss to the trustee or fiduciary, then an action
will, under Scots law, be properly brought in negligence. For
example, in Weir v National Westminster Bank pic56, the question
concerned a bank's liability to an agent of a customer of the bank
who was the sole signatory of the customer's account for paying a
cheque forged by an employee of the agent drawn on the customer's
account, when it should have been on notice; it was contended that if
this first forgery had been detected by the bank, this would have
prevented further forgeries which resulted in loss to the agent.57
The Inner House said, on a plea as to the relevancy, that there could
be a claim for liability in negligence for pure economic loss on the
ground that there was sufficient proximity between the agent, as sole
signatory of its customers' account, and the bank.58
where a third party takes trust property in bad faith, or without giving value,
the property can be recovered. With respect, whilst true, this is a little
simplistic.
56 1994 S.C. 1251 (I.H.). The court comprised the Lord President (Hope) and
Lords Allanbridge and Mayfield.
57 The agent was the sole partner in a law firm and was required under the
Solicitors' Accounts Rules to replace all the moneys lost owing to the forgery.
5 8 Lord Hoffmann, would agree with treating a situation where there has been
negligence as one to be pleaded in negligence, rather than seeking to impose a
constructive trust: see "The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance": Ch. 2 in Vol.
1, in Frontiers of Liability (1994) (P. Birks, ed.), at p.29.
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CONCLUSION
Where forgery of a cheque, or any other type of fraud, is involved,
the critical question is: the knowledge of the bank, via its employee,
who cashed the cheque, or failed to detect the fraud. In determining
liability, the court will be looking at such factors as the standing of
the customer, the bank's knowledge of the signatory, the sum
involved, the necessity of a speedy transfer, the presence of unusual
features, and the means and scope for making reasonable inquiries.59
There is one overriding factor, though: a bank will approach a
suggestion that a fiduciary is seeking to defraud its beneficiary with
"instinctive disbelief"60, as it is trust, rather than distrust, which is
the basis of the banker's dealings with its customers.61
59Barclavs Bank pic v. Ouincecare Ltd. [1992] All E. R. 363, at p.377, per Steyn J.





DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BY A LENDER
When a lender breaches the terms of either: (i) a loan agreement, or
(ii) the general banking contract, it may be liable in damages for the
loss suffered by the borrower/customer, due to the breach, provided
that this loss is not too remote. The most common situation where
this arises is the wrongful termination of a loan facility by the lender,
under the misapprehension that it is an on demand facility (i.e., an
overdraft).
The question of the liability of a lender for breach of contract will be
considered under five headings: (a) the general principles applicable
to damages breach of contract; (b) the limitation imposed on recovery
of damages, by the concept of remoteness of damage; (c) common
situations in which lenders will be liable for breach of contract; (d)
damages for mental distress; and (e) contributory negligence.
TA1 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT DAMAGES
(i) Aim of Contractual Damages Awards
The aim of an award of damages for breach of contract is to place the
injured party (as far as it is possible to do so in monetary terms) in
the position they would have been in had the contract been
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performed1. This rule "identifies both the subject of compensation
(loss sustained by reason of a breach of contract) and the measure of
damages (the amount required to place the innocent party in the
same situation as if the contract had been performed)."2
Importantly, what an award of damages seeks to do is compensate
the injured party, rather than punish the contract breaker by
depriving the latter of any benefit he has obtained due to his
breach.3 It keeps the parties to the "benefits and burdens" of their
contract, with the pursuer/plaintiff recovering "no more than the net
benefit he would have received under the contract", whilst the
1 See Lord Wright in A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker v. Monarch Steamship Co.
1949 S.C. 1, at p.18, [1949] A.C. 196, at p.220; Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850,
at p.855, per Parke B, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363; Watson Laidlaw & Co. v. Pott,
Cassels. & Williamson 1914 S.C. 18 (H.L.); Lord Murray in Duke of Portland v.
Wood's Trs 1926 S.C. 640, at p.645; and Lord Gifford in Houldsworth v. Brand's Trs
(1877) 4 R. 369, atp.375.
2 Commonwealth of Australia v. Amann Aviation Ltd. (1991) 174 C.L.R. 64, at
p.98, per Brennan J. (as he then was).
3 Teacher v. Calder (1899) 1 F. (H.L.) 39, [1889] A.C. 451 (H.L.(SC.)); and Tito v.
Waddell (No. 2) [1977] Ch. 106, at p.332, per Sir Robert Megarry V.C. In England,
current judicial opinion is now in favour of recovery of restitutionary
damages for breach of contract: see Attorney-General v. Blake [1998] 2 W.L.R.
805, [1998] 1 All E.R. 833. In Scotland, the position would still be governed by
Teacher v. Calder. where there has been a breach of contract. Any claim to
recover the gain would have to brought in unjustified enrichment; this is also
true of the position in England, at present.
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defender/defendant obtains "no right to profit from his breach"4. The
onus of proof, regarding damages, rests upon the pursuer/plaintiff
(i.e., the borrower).5
(ii) Election Between An Expectation and a Reliance Loss
When a lender has breached a contract with a borrower, case law, in
England, indicates that the latter, in seeking to recover its loss, is put
to an "election": the borrower can claim either: (i) an expectation loss
(which is the normal claim), or (ii) a reliance loss6.
4 Commonwealth of Australia v. Amann Aviation Ltd. (1991) 174 C.L.R. 64, at
p.98, per Brennan J. (as he then was). However, the defender/defendant,
nonetheless, in practice, can profit from his breach, as it may be more
profitable to break the contract than observe it, as in Teacher v. Calder.
5 Commonwealth of Australia v. Amann Aviation Ltd. (1991) 174 C.L.R. 64, at
p.80, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J, and, at p.99, per Brennan J. (as he then was).
6 Cullinane v. British 'Rema' Manufacturing Co. [1954] 1 Q.B. 292; Anglia
Television Ltd. v. Reed [1972] 1 Q.B. 60; C & P Haulage ta firml v. Middleton
[1983] 1 W.L.R. 1461; and C.C.C. Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd.
[1985] Q.B. 16. The decision in Cullinane has been criticised: see MacLeod, J.K.,
"Damages: Reliance or Expectancy Interest" (1970) J.B.L. 19, at pp.31-34. The
idea of making an election does not sit well with the rule that damages should,
as far as possible, place the innocent party in the position they would have
been in had there been performance of the contract. Cf. the High Court of
Australia in Industrial (T.C.I Plant Properties Ltd. v. Robert's (Queensland) Ptv.
Ltd. [1964] A.L.R. 1083, and Commonwealth of Australia v. Amann Aviation Ptv.
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Expectation Loss
An expectation loss is the profit element that the innocent party
anticipated making from the contract. The borrower's damages
award "protects [his] expectation of receiving the [lender's]
performance"7, This "expectation arises out of or is created by the
contract", and is to be viewed objectively8. Thus, such damages
compensate the borrower for the loss of a bargain; the borrower, of
course, will need to show that it was more likely than not that its
expectation would have been the result of the contract being
performed, and that this was not a "mere expectation".9
Reliance Loss
A reliance loss, on the other hand, is the wasted expenditure incurred
by the innocent party in performing its obligations under the
Ltd. (1991) 174 C.L.R 64; the latter case is noted by Treitel, G.H., "Damages for
Breach of Contract in the High Court of Australia" (1992) 108 L.O.R. 226. In
Amann Aviation, supra, the court disapproved of the idea that a plaintiff (or
pursuer) is put to an "election" as to whether to recover an expectation loss or
a reliance loss. Their Honours were of the view, that a reliance loss was
merely an aspect of the rule in Robinson v. Harman. rather than an
alternative method of assessing damages.





(breached) contract, in reliance on the other party performing their
obligations; it is "an alternative measure of gains prevented"10. This
measure of contractual damage is, coincidentally, equivalent to the
measure in delict1 b The result is that a pursuer is returned to the
position he would have been in if the contract had not been made.12
Reliance damages are claimed where the profit element is too
speculative to ascertain, or there was no profit to be made. The
burden of proof, in such a claim, is initially on the plaintiff, who has
to prove his loss; thereafter, the burden of proof shifts onto the
defendant to show that the plaintiff would not have recouped his
expenditure in full if the contract had been performed.13 When it is
not possible to say what position a plaintiff would have been in, had
there been full performance of the contract, then, logically, an award
of damages cannot be assessed under the general principle governing
recovery.14 In such a situation, "the law considers the just result", is
10 Corbin on Contracts, vol. 5 (1964), at p.192, cited by Deane J., in Amann
Aviation, supra, at p. 128.
1 1 Mason C.J. and Dawson J., at p.86, and Gaudron J., at p. 155, in Amann
Aviation, supra.
12 See Amann Aviation, supra, at p.86, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J.
13 See CCC Films Ltd v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd. [1985] Q.B. 16, at p.38, per
Hutchison J; L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co. (1949) 178 F. 2d. 182, at
p.189, per Learned Hand C.J.; and C & P Haulage (a firm) v, Middleton [1983] 1
W.L.R. 1461: and Amann Aviation, supra.
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to permit the injured party "to recover such expenditure as is
reasonably incurred in reliance on the defendant's promise".15 This
view is based on the assumption that the victim of a breach of
contract "would at least have recovered his or her expenditure had
there been full performance of the contract".16
Why An Election?
The reason for this "election" is to prevent the borrower from being
in a better position, where a contract has been breached, than he
would have been in if the contract had been performed, and he had
obtained only an expectation benefit.17 This expectation benefit will
have taken into account the expenditure incurred.18 If the borrower
could recover both types of loss, he would be awarded the equivalent
of a gross profit, which he would not obtain if the contract was
performed.
14 Amann Aviation, supra, at p.86, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J. See too: Deane
J., at p.126-127, and Gaudron J., at p. 156.
15 Amann Aviation, supra, at p.86, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J.
16 Ibid.
17 See Ackner L.J. (as he then was) in C & P Haulage v. Middleton [1983] 1 W.L.R.
1461, at p. 1468; and see too Fuller, L.L. and Perdue, W.R.,"The Reliance Interest
in Contract" (1936) 46 Yale Law Journal 52, at p.79.
18See the discussion on this by MacGregor, L.J., "The Expectation, Reliance and
Restitution Interests in Contract" 1996 J.R, 227; and Amann Aviation, supra, at
p.81, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J.
414
Reliance Damages Under Scots Law
In Scotland, the position, as to the making of an election between an
expectation and a reliance loss, has been less clear than in England,
but recent case law indicates it is now possible.19
Under Scots law, reliance damages have included finance and interest
charges and overdraft interest. For example, a pursuer was able to
recover interest charges, under Hadlev v. Baxendale20, when a
property it had purchased could not be re-sold at their time of
choosing, i.e., when the market was buoyant, as the original seller
failed to obtain a local authority completion certificate within the
time period specified in the missives, and because stone work did not
accord with certain planning permissions. The reasoning of the Lord
Ordinary was that as both parties were property companies, it must
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the seller that the
buyer would have to borrow some of the purchase price, and, if there
was a delay in the re-sale, due to a breach of contract by the original
seller, the buyer incurs loses by way of interest charges. The Lord
Ordinary felt this view was borne out by the contract, and what the
1 9See Dalian Developments Ltd. v. Armia 1981 S.C. 48, at p.51, per Lord M'Donald;
R & J Dempster Ltd. v. Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd. 1964 S.L.T.
353.
20 (1854) 9 Ex. 941.
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parties, as reasonable business men, would have contemplated, when
they contracted21
Part of the General Principle
Whilst it is convenient to divide damages claims into ones for lost
profits or wasted expenditure, it needs to be remembered that such
damages "are simply two manifestations of the general principle"
that a damages award for breach of contract should put the innocent
party (the borrower) in the position they wanted have been in if the
contract had been performed.22
21 See Caledonian Property Group Ltd. v. Oueensferrv Property Group 1992
S.L.T. 738, at pp.739-40, per Lord MacLean (O.H.) Quaere: the question of
knowledge, regarding the re-sale. Cf. Rapide Enterprises v. Midglev. The
Times, 30th July, 1997 (Outer House of the Court of Session). The decision in
Caledonian Property can be justified on the reasoning of Lord Wright in The
Monarch Steamship 1949 S.C. 1, at pp. 19-21, [1949] A.C. 196, at pp. 222 and 223, as
qualified and explained by Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle in Balfour Beattv
(Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power pic. 1994 S.C. 20, at pp.31I-32C, concerning
business men, who are dealing with each other, having a knowledge of each
other's business. For a review of the cases on reliance loss: see MacGregor, L.J.,
"The Expectation, Reliance and Restitution Interests In Contract Damages" 1996
J.R. 227, at pp.237-241. Cf. Stewart, W.J., "The Theory of the Scots Law of
Contract" 1996 J.R. 403, at pp.409-41 1.
22 Amman Aviation, supra, at pp.82 and 85, per Mason C.J. and Dawson J.
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(iii) Anticipatory Breach
If, after a loan has been agreed, but, before it has been drawn down,
the lender, in breach of the loan agreement, refuses to lend the sum
agreed to the borrower, this would constitute an anticipatory breach
of the contract, being a breach of a contract prior to the date of
performance. In such a situation, the borrower has to elect whether
to: (i) accept the repudiation23, and sue for damages for breach prior
to performance, or, (ii) affirm the contract, and wait for the date of
performance and then sue for breach when there is no
performance.24 In this second situation, the loss is assessed at the
date of performance: not the date of refusal to perform.25 A third
23 There is no particular form required for acceptance of a repudiation,
provided "the communication or conduct clearly and unequivocally conveys to
the repudiating party that [the] aggrieved party is treating the contract as at
an end": see Lord Steyn in Vital S.A. v. Norelf Ltd. [1996] A.C. 800, at pp.810H-
811A. Moreover, the victim of the breach (or his agent) does not need to give
the repudiating party notice of the election to end the contract, provided the
election comes to the repudiating party's attention: see Lord Steyn in the Vital
case, supra, at p.811A-B.
24 See, for example, Hochster v. De la Tour (1853) 2 E & B 678; and the House of
Lords in Vitol SA v. Norelf Ltd. [1996] 3 W.L.R. 105, at p.113, per Lord Steyn, and
Ferco Metal S.A.R.L. v. Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA [1989] A.C. 788, at p.799,
per Lord Ackner.
25 Howie v. Anderson (1848) 10 D. 355; and Tai Hing Cotton Mill v, Kamsing
Knitting Factory [1979] A.C. 91, at p. 104F-G, per Lord Keith of Kinkel.
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option is for the borrower to perform its side of the bargain, e.g., by
issuing a notice of drawdown and fulfilling all the conditions
precedent in the loan agreement, and then sue for the full contract
price, under the controversial decision of the House of Lords in the
Scottish case of White & Carter (Councils) Ltd v. McGregor.26 when
the lender fails to perform. The third option is a variation of the
second. Of these three options, the first is the most likely, as the
borrower will, normally, wish to minimise its loss, where it knows of
a breach, and seek to borrow money from another source, rather
than wait for the due date of performance.
(iv) Obligation On Borrower To Mitigate Its Loss
Where there has been a breach of contract by a lender, the borrower
will be expected to take reasonable steps to mitigate its loss27, by
26 1962 S.C. 1 (H.L.), [1962] A.C. 143 (H.L.(Sc)).
27 British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground
Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673, at p.689, per Viscount
Haldane L.C.; Pavzu Ltd. v. Saunders [1919] 2 K.B. 581 (C.A.), and The Admiralty
v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling Co. 1910 S.C. 553. Cf. Sotiros Shipping Inc. v.
Sameiet Soholt: The Soholt [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 605, at p.608, col. 1, where Sir
John Donaldson M.R. (as he then was), delivering the judgement of the Court,
said that the innocent party was "under no duty to mitigate his loss, despite the
habitual use by lawyers of the phrase 'duty to mitigate'". Rather, he could act
as he thought was "in his best interests". But, if the victim does this, the
contract breaker is not responsible for all the losses suffered by the plaintiff,
as a consequence of acting in this way - the contract breaker "is only liable
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seeking to borrow from another lender in the market place;28 a
failure to do so "debars [the borrower] from claiming any part of the
damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps".29
From a business point of view, the duty on the borrower to seek to
mitigate its loss is common sense, as a court case will take several
years before it is heard, and the borrower will want to reduce its
losses before this happens, so that it may continue trading; also, there
is no certainty of winning any litigation and it is costly in terms of
money and management time. Moreover, businesses, generally, do
not wish to stand still until a dispute is resolved. This will be
especially so if the borrower does not have the capacity to bear the
loss financially, which is likely if it has had to borrow money in the
first place. Hence, the borrower will seek to reduce its potential
losses, due to not having the loan funds, so as to maintain any
business advantage it has, with a view to profit. For example, a
for such loss as is properly to be regarded as caused by [his] breach of duty".
The court went on to cite Viscount Haldane L.C. in British Westinghouse v.
Electric Railways Co. of London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673, at p.689, in support of this.
With respect, the passage from Viscount Haldane L.C. contradicts, rather than
supports, the view of the Court of Appeal. The Soholt has been criticised by
Bridge, M., "Mitigation of Damages and the Meaning of Avoidable Loss" (1989)
105 L.O.R. 398, at pp.420-422.
28 Normally, the London Interbank Market.
29 Viscount Haldane L.C. in British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing
Co Ltd v. Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd. [1912] A.C. 673, at
p.689.
419
borrower who has entered into a contract for the purchase of goods,
will be in breach of that contract if it cannot pay the price, because
the loan it thought it was obtaining is not now available, due to a
breach of the loan agreement by the lender. Consequently, the
borrower will seek alternative finance so that it will be in a position
to pay the seller when the price is due. There may be follow on
effects if the borrower intended to use goods in its business to
manufacture a new product or on sell them to a fourth party.
fv) Measure of Damages
Depending on its financial position (and the state of the market), a
borrower, who is the victim of a breach of a loan agreement, will be
confronted with three general situations: (i) obtaining a loan on the
same terms as before, in which case the damages will be nominal; (ii)
borrowing on different terms from the original loan, e.g., borrowing a
smaller amount, borrowing at a higher rate of interest, borrowing for
a shorter period (which would increase the size of the repayment
instalments), or borrowing on more stringent terms30; or (iii) being
unable to borrow from another lender.
In the case of (iii), the borrower will be entitled to recover the loss of
profits he would have made on the deal, providing he can prove this
and the loss is not too remote31. This will be the gross profit less the
30A similar view is expressed by Chitty L.J. in The South African Territories
Ltd. v. Wallington [1987] 1 Q.B. 692, at p.696.
31 See Section [B] "Remoteness of Damage".
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cost of the loan. Here, the transaction has failed to materialise. If a
profit is too speculative or cannot be quantified, then there may be a
claim for a reliance loss, such as fees and charges and costs incurred;
alternatively, there may be a claim for damages for the loss of a
chance.32
With regard to (ii), this may mean that the business transaction can
go ahead under restricted conditions. For example, if the interest
rate is higher, the measure of damages will be the difference
between: (a) the interest rate under the original loan, and (b) the
higher rate under the new loan. This assumes that the rate is fixed,
and is not a floating rate or a mixture of the two. If, however, the
loan is for a smaller amount, this may mean that the project will be
unable to proceed. In that case, the borrower will need to prove this,
and prove its loss (i.e., lost profits) is due to the failure of the loan to
proceed. In this latter situation, there may, alternatively, be a claim
for a reliance loss. Where the loan is for a shorter period of time, and
this results in higher repayment instalments, which will affect the
borrower's cash flow and profits, the measure will be the difference
between the amount of the instalments per month or per quarter
32 See Custom Credit Corporation Ltd. v. Cenepro Ptv. Ltd.. unreported decision
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal, delivered on 7th
August, 1991, per Kirby P. (as he then was) and Mahoney J.A.; Clarke J.A.
dissenting. Here, a finance company (Custom Credit), in breach of contract,
failed to provide "full funding" to finance a property development project,
which collapsed; the borrower could not obtain alternative finance, and it was
held the borrower could recover damages for loss of a chance to make a profit.
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under the first loan, and the amount of the monthly or quarterly
instalments under the new loan; this difference in the amount of the
instalments is being paid for out of the profits of the company, and it
could be investing that money or using it for other purposes.
rBl REMOTENESS OF DAMAGED
The key to a borrower recovering his loss for breach of contract is
whether or not that loss is too remote. The test for remoteness is
found in the well known judgement of Alderson B. in, the English
case of Hadlev v. Baxendale34. which also applies in Scotland35. That
test provides:
"Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect
of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably
33 This topic has been discussed in a series of recent articles: see Cartwright, J.,
"Remoteness of Damage In Contract and Text: A Reconsideration" (1996) C.L.J.
488, at pp.490-496; Hood, P., "Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited:
Balfour Beatty v. Scottish Power" (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127; McBryde,
W.W., "Remoteness and Breach" 1996 Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly 341;
and MacQueen, H.L., "Remoteness of Damage and Breach of Contract" 1996 J.R.
295.
34 (1854) 9 Exch. 341, at pp.354-355, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep 145 .
35 See Balfour Beattv Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power pic 1994 S.C.
20 H.L. This test represents the position in Scots law as it stood, prior to Hadlev
v. Baxendale.
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be considered as arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of
things from such breach of contract itself, or may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now,
if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually
made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus
known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a
contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of
contract under these special circumstances so known and
communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the
most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the
amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great
multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such
a breach of contract."
The test has historically been seen in terms of two limbs, although
this approach has been criticised by the House of Lords, which sees
the principle in terms of a single test3 6. The key to determining
liability is the degree of knowledge of the contract breaker.
Nonetheless, the two limb approach is still used by judges (especially
36 See Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd: The Heron II [1969] 1 A.C. 350 (H.L.(E.)), and
Balfour Beattv Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power pic 1994 S.C. 20
H.L.
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in Scotland)37, and is an acceptable shorthand to distinguish between
the types of knowledge required of the contract breaker38. The so-
called first limb refers to the general knowledge of the contract
breaker, regarding matters concerned with the contract. The second
limb refers to knowledge of special circumstances, which the
contract-breaker is made aware of, i.e., matters outside those you
would normally expect. Remoteness, it must be remembered, is a
device which seeks to limit the recovery by a victim of a breach of
contract.
The test, in Hadlev. which has its origins in the Civil law systems39
(and was similar to the position already existing in Scotland)40, is
37 See, for example, both the Outer and Inner Houses in Balfour Beattv 1992
S.L.T. 811, at p.813H-I, and 1993 S.C. 350, respectively; and Lord Abernethy in
Ogilvie Builders Ltd v. City of Glasgow D.C. 1995 S.L.T. 15. In England, see the
Court of Appeal in Brown v. K.M.R. Services Ltd. [1995] 4 All E.R. 598, and
Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119.
38 This view has been expressed previously by this writer: see Hood, P.,
"Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited: Balfour Beatty v. Scottish Power"
(1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127, at p. 130, fn. 23.
39 See Zimmerman, R., The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the
Civilian Tradition (1990), at pp.829-830. See too Faust, F., "Hadley v. Baxendale:
an understandable miscarriage of justice" (1994) 15 Journal of Legal History
41, who points out Hadlev was a delict, and not a contract, case.
40 See MacQueen, H.L., "Remoteness And Breach Of Contract" 1996 J.R, 295.
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easy to state, but has proved difficult to apply in practice.41
Consequently, it has been criticised, and some commentators have
argued that it be replaced42
Principles Of Remoteness Of Damage
Despite problems in cases since Hadlev v. Baxendale. the position,
regarding remoteness, can be stated in the following five
propositions:
41 Hood, P., "Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited: Balfour Beatty v.
Scottish Power" (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127, at p.128.
42 See Sir Robin Cooke (as he then was) in: (i) McElorv Milne v. Commercial
Electronics Ltd. [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 39, at p.42, who referred to Hadlev as "being a
ritualistic incantation"; see case note by Ahdar, R., "Remoteness, 'Ritual
Incantation' and The Future of Hadley v. Baxendale: Reflections from New
Zealand" (1994) 7 J.C.L. 53, and (ii) "Remoteness of Damage and Judicial
Discretion" (1978) C.L.J. 288, at p.290. See also, Eisenberg, M.A., "The Principle
of Hadlev v. Baxendale" (1992) California Law Review 563, who thinks the test
of remoteness in contract should be based on "proximate cause, contractual
allocation of loss and fair disclosure". Cf. Cooke P. (as he then was) in McElrov.
supra, at p.43, who speaks of factors other than contemplation, such as,
"directness, 'naturalness' . . . the magnitude of the claim and the degree of the
defendant's culpability" as factors that help to "establish a just balance
between the parties".
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(1) The so-called "two limbs" are to be regarded as one rule, based
on a single principle43, with the critical question being the degree of
knowledge possessed by the contract breaker, in the circumstances
of the case.
The position is well put by Robert Goff J. (as he then was), in Satef-
Huttenes Albertus S.p.A. v. Paloma Tercera Shipping Co. S.A.: the
Pegase44 , who said:
". . . the principle of Hadlev v. Baxendale is now no longer stated in
terms of two rules, but rather in terms of a single principle - though it
is recognised that the application of the principle may depend on the
degree of relevant knowledge held by the defendant at the time of the
contract in the particular case. This approach accords very much to
what actually happens in practice; the courts have not been over ready
to pigeon hole the cases under one or other of the so called rules in
Hadlev v. Baxendale. but rather to decide each case on the basis of the
relevant knowledge of the defendant."
(2) The reference to "probable", in Alderson B's formulation, means
"not unlikely to occur" or "a very substantial degree of probability".
43 Victoria Laundry ('Windsor') Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528
(C.A.); Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd: The Heron II [1969] 1 A.C. 350 (H.L.(E.)); and
Balfour Beattv Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power pic 1994 S.C. 20
H.L.
44 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 175, at p. 182.
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The position is set out in the speech of Lord Reid in Koufos v. C.
Czarnikow Ltd: The Heron II.45 which was approved by the House of
Lords in Balfour Beattv Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power
pic46 . In The Heron II. Lord Reid stated:
"... it is generally sufficient that the event would have appeared to the
defendant as not unlikely to occur. It is hardly ever possible in this
matter to assess probabilities with any degree of mathematical accuracy.
But I do not find . . . any warrant for regarding as within the
contemplation of the parties any event which would not have appeared
to the defendant, had he thought about it, to have a very substantial
degree of probability."
Previously, there was a protracted, and unhelpful, debate on what
"probable" meant47
45 [1969] 1 A.C. 350, atp.388E.
46 1994 S.C. 20, at p.29G.
47 In Victoria Laundry [1949] 2 K.B. 528, at p.540, Asquith L.J. (as he then was),
in his sixth proposition, used various expressions to refer to "probable" in the
Alderson B "formula" in Hadlev. For example, his lordship used: "liable to
result", "likely so to result", "serious possibility", "real danger" and "on the
cards". In The Heron II. supra, there was much debate on this point. Lord Reid
disapproved of "on the cards", "a real danger" and "a serious possibility" (at
p.390), but approved "not unlikely to occur", or "a very substantial degree of
probability" (at p.388) and "likely to occur" (at p.385E); Lord Morris of Borlh-y-
Gest also disapproved of "on the cards", and approved "not be unlikely", "liable
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It can be argued that "not unlikely to occur" or "a very substantial
degree of probability" do not mean exactly the same thing, and that
the latter is a more exacting requirement than the former, and, thus,
needs "a stronger degree of certainty", concerning the occurrence of
the damage48. This, apparent, difference was rationalised in Fvffes
Group Ltd and Caribbean Gold Ltd v. Reefer Express Lines Ptv Ltd
and Reefkrit Shipping Line: The Kriti Rex49 by Moore-Bick J, in the
English Commercial Court, who opined that "a very substantial degree
to result", "a serious possibility" or "a real danger" (at pp.399-400); Lord Hodson
held that "liable to result" could not be improved upon (at pp.410-411); Lord
Pearce, too, disapproved of "on the cards" (at p.415); and Lord Upjohn was
content to adopt "a real danger" or "a serious possibility" as the test (at p.425.)
48 See Hood, P., "Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited: Balfour Beatty v.
Scottish Power" (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127, at p. 130.
49 [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171. This is the only English decision to refer to the
Balfour Beattv case since it was decided. The problem would appear to be that,
despite it being a House of Lords decision, it has not been reported in any
series of English Law Reports, yet (although it was reported in The Times, 23rd
March, 1994, and is referred to in Chittv on Contracts: General Principles
(1994) 27th edn. (A.G. Guest Q.C. ed., at para.26-026)). Ironically, one of the
senior counsel in The Kriti Rex. Mr Angus Glennie Q.C., is a member of the
Faculty of Advocates, as well as being an English barrister. It may be that Mr.
Glennie Q.C. became aware of this case, due to his Scottish links. In Brown v.
KMR Services Ltd. [1995] 4 All E.R. 598 (C.A.), decided after Balfour Beattv. the
Court of Appeal did not refer to that case; nor did it do so in Kpohraror v.
Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119.
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of probability" was not intended "to suggest that the defendant must
have contemplated that the event causing damage was more likely
than not to occur"50. His Lordship went onto state that "a very
substantial degree of probability" was used "simply to emphasize
that the defendant must have realised that there was a real prospect
as opposed to a mere chance that the circumstances giving rise to the
loss would occur, which is what Lord Reid meant by saying that it is
'not unlikely to occur'"51. Moore-Bick J, also, observed, however, that
Lord Reid appeared to favour "not unlikely to occur".52
Whilst Balfour Beattv appears to have narrowed the test for liability
under the so-called first limb of Hadlev v. Baxendale53. "probable", in
Alderson B's. "formula", is intended to mean "not unlikely to occur",
although a substantial degree of probability may also be used.54
50 Supra, at pp.202 and 203, col. 1.
51 Supra, at p.203, col. 1.
52 Ibid.
53 Cf. Moore-Bick J. in The Kriti Rex, supra, at p.203, col. 1, who says that the
House of Lords in Balfour Beattv was not "intending to modify the principle in"
The Heron II.
54 Cf. Lord Jauncey in Balfour Beattv. supra, at p.32D, who says there was
nothing to indicate that the rupturing of the fuses would have a very
substantial degree of probability. One of the problems with The Heron II is
that the language used is confused and somewhat contradictory in parts.
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(3) It is not a general rule that, in all cases, business men, who are
parties to a contract, will be reasonably well acquainted with each
other's business, thereby automatically giving rise to a claim under
the first limb in Hadlev. Moreover, the degree of knowledge each
has of the other's business will vary from case to case55. The critical
question, here, is what was in the contract-breaker's reasonable
contemplation at the time of the contract?56
The position is well put by Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle in Balfour
Beattv. who said:57
"It must always be a question of circumstances what one contracting
party is presumed to know about the business activities of the other. No
doubt the simpler activity of the one, the more readily can it be inferred
that the other would have reasonable knowledge thereof. However,
when the activity of A involves complicated construction or
manufacturing techniques, I see no reason why B who supplies a
commodity that A intends to use in the course of those techniques
should be assumed, merely because of the order for the commodity, to be
aware of the details of all the techniques undertaken by A and the effect
thereupon of any failure of or deficiency in that commodity."
55 Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle in Balfour Beattv. supra, at pp.31G-32C,
clarifying Lord Wright in The Monarch Steamship 1949 S.C.L, at pp.19 and 21,
[1949] A.C. 196, at pp.222 and 224. See too Lord Upjohn in The Heron II. supra, at
p.424C.
56 Balfour Beattv. supra, at p.32C, per Lord Jauncey.
57 1 994 S.C. 20, at p.31I-32B.
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In the case of a lender, it will need to have a reasonable amount of
information about a borrower in order to assess the borrower for
credit purposes. For example, the lender will need to know: the
nature of the borrower's business, its corporate performance, and the
type and purpose of any loan, i.e., it may be that a general trading
overdraft is required, or that a term loan is required for a specific
purpose, such as to purchase stock or expand. Also, if there is a long¬
standing, "supportive" relationship between a banker and its
customer, the lender will have information about the borrower.
(From the bank's point of view, it is important to understand a
borrower's business, and have a considerable amount of information
about the borrower, as the bank will want to be sure that it has lent
to a borrower who can service the loan made to it; also, the bank will
wish to see the borrower's business develop and grow, as this will
have benefits for the bank, which will be providing the business with
banking services).
Ultimately, the question is: was the lender's knowledge sufficient to
say that the lender would have realised that a breach of contract by
it would have resulted in the losses claimed by the borrower?
(4) The loss for which damages are recoverable for breach of
contract is the specific damage that occurred: and not merely the
type of damage.
The loss recoverable for a breach of contract should be that which
the parties would have contemplated as happening if the contract
was breached. The position, however, has been confused by Court of
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Appeal, in Parsons v. Utlev58. which held that it is sufficient if the
type of loss that arose could have been contemplated: the scale of the
loss was not relevant. This measure of damages is akin to delict/tort,
rather than contract59, and is not correct. Nonetheless, although
impliedly doubted by the House of Lords in Balfour Beattv60, Parsons
has been followed subsequently by the Court of Appeal, albeit
without reference to Balfour Beattv61
58 [1978] Q.B. 791. (C.A.) The case has been noted and criticised by Hadjihambis,
D.H., "Remoteness of Damage in Contract" [1978] M.L.R. 483.
59 Cf. with Robert Goff L.J., in the delict case of Muirhead v. Industrial Tank
Specialties Ltd. [1986] Q.B. 507, at p.532D, who said:
". . . In my judgement, the true question to which the judge should have
addressed his mind was simply whether damage of the type was
reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturers, i.e., physical harm to fish
stored in a tank at a fish farm." (Emphasis added),
See also: Smith v. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd [1962] 2 Q.B. 405, at p.415, per Lord
Parker C.J., who, en passant, referred to the position in Scotland; and Lord
Bridge of Harwich in Qgwo v. Taylor [1988] A.C. 441, at pp.444-445. See too:
Goode, R.M., Commercial Law (1995) 2nd edn., at pp.406-408, who expresses a
similar view to that in the text above about the Parsons case using a delictual
test for contractual remoteness.
60 1994 S.C. 20, at p.32E-F, per Lord Jauncey, who declined to say whether
Parsons "correctly stated the law".
61 See Brown v, KMR Services Ltd. [1995] 4 All E.R. 598 (C.A.) and Kpohraror v.
Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119 (C.A.). Cf. the Lord Ordinary
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The correct position is stated by Lord Reid in The Heron II. who
said:62
"I am satisfied that the court did not intend that every type of damage
which was reasonably foreseeable by the parties when the contract was
made should either be considered as arising naturally, i.e., in the usual
course of things, or be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
the parties. Indeed the decision [in Hadlev v. Baxendalel makes it clear
that a type of damage which was plainly foreseeable as a real possibility
but which would only occur in a small minority of cases cannot be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties: the parties
are not supposed to contemplate as grounds for the recovery of damage
any type of loss or damage which on the knowledge available to the
defendant would appear to him as only likely to occur in a small
minority of cases.
In cases like Hadlev v. Baxendale or the present case, it is not enough
that in the plaintiff's loss was directly caused by the defendant's breach
of contract. It clearly was so caused in both. The crucial question is
whether, on the information available to the defendant when the
contract was made, he should, or the reasonable man in his position
would, have realised that such loss was sufficiently likely to result from
the breach of contract to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed
(Clyde) in Balfour Beattv 1992 S.L.T. 811, at p.813-B, who referred to Parsons
with approval, and was cited without disapproval by Lord Jauncey in the House
of Lords: see 1994 S.C. 20, at p.28H.
62 [1969] 1 A.C. 350, at pp.385-386.
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naturally from the breach or that loss of that kind should have been
within his contemplation."
The difficulty with Parsons is that there is no correlation between: (i)
the loss that occurred because of the breach of contract, and (ii) what
the parties would have contemplated as flowing naturally from the
breach, i.e., had they considered the matter, what damage did the
parties think was "not unlikely to occur" or had "a very substantial
degree of probability" of occurring, due to the breach of contract63
(5) There is a distinction between the delictual test for remoteness of
damage and the contractual test. Whilst there can now be concurrent
liability in delict/tort and contract64 (provided an established
contractual chain is not disturbed),65 this does not mean that the
tests for remoteness are, or have to be, the same66. The delictual test
63 This writer has expressed a similar view previously: see Hood, P.,
"Remoteness of Damage in Contract Re-visited: Balfour Beatty v. Scottish
Power" (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127, at p. 132.
64 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at p,185H, per Lord
Goff of Chieveley.
65 Henderson v. Merret Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145, at p,196A-C, per Lord
Goff of Chieveley (with whom Lords Keith of Kinkel, Browne-Wilkinson,
Mustill and Nolan agreed).
66 A different view is expressed by Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. (as he then was)
in Banque Bruxelles Lambert S.A. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [1995] Q.B.
375, at p.405D-E. See also Lord Denning M.R. in Parsons, supra, at p.802, and
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is less stringent than the contractual test, and by applying a delictual
test for breach of contract in Parsons, the Court of appeal is
undermining the restriction on recovery that remoteness is
concerned with.67
Moreover, failing to distinguish between the tests of remoteness: (i)
in contract (i.e., what was in the reasonable contemplation of the
party in breach), and (ii) in delict (what is reasonably foreseeable),
ignores the different bases of the two obligations.68 As this writer
Principles of European Contract Law Part I: Performance. Non-performance
and Remedies (1995) (O. Lando and H. Beale, eds.), at Art. 4.503: Foreseeability,
on p.202ff. This Article provides: "The non-performing party is liable only for
loss which he foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen at the time of the
conclusion of the contract as a likely result of his non-performance, unless
the non-performance was intentional or grossly negligent".
See too MacQueen, H.L., "Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Future
Development of Scots Law in its European and International Context" (1996) 1
Edinburgh Law Review 200, at p.219.
67 Per Lord Goff of Chieveley in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2
A.C. 145, at p. 185F.
68 Hood, P., "Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited: Balfour Beatty v.
Scottish Power" (1996) 1 Edinburgh Law Review 127, at p. 134 Cf. the view of
Lord Hoffman in South Australia Asset Management Corporation v, York
Montague Ltd. [1996] A.C. 191, at p.211G-H who, after referring to concurrent
liability and noting that "the scope of the duty in [delict] is the same as
in contract", says:
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has argued elsewhere69, a contractual obligation is consensual; it is an
obligation arrived at because of the agreement of the parties in
contract - subject to any claim under the jus quaesitum tertio, in
Scots law. The obligation is only owed to the parties to the contract,
who, based on their "common knowledge"70, have "contractually
assumed liability"71 for any breach of that obligation. The parties are
able to assess and allocate risks (or else, not contract, if they do not
like the risks).72 Delict/tort, on the other hand, is an "obediential
"A plaintiff who sues for breach of a duty imposed by the law (whether
in contract or tort or under statute) must do more than prove that the
defendant has failed to comply. He must show that the duty was owed to
him and that it was a duty in respect of the kind of loss which he has
suffered."
See the commentary on this case by: (i) Stapleton, J., "Negligent Valuers and
Falls in the Property Market" (1997) 113 L.O.R. 1; (ii) Manning, P., "South
Australia - A Fair Causation Test But . . ." [1997] J.I.B.L, 3; and (iii) Alcock. A.,
"Limiting Contractual Damages" [1997] L.M.C.L.O. 26.
69 Hood, supra, at p. 134.
70 The Heron II [1969] 1 A.C. 350, at p.422F, per Lord Hodson.
7 'See Hobhouse J. (as he then was) in Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
v. Ierax Shipping Co. of Panama: The Forum Craftsman [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 81,
at p.85, col. 2.
72 See Gloag, W.M., The Law of Contract (2nd edn.), at p.696, who said:
. . it is unfair to saddle a contracting party, even although he may
have broken his contract with consequences which could not
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obligation"73, i.e., an obligation or duty imposed on the parties by
law, rather than by their own agreement. The duty is owed to a
wider audience: your "neighbour"74 - being all those who are in a
close and direct relationship with you (i.e., a relationship of
proximity), whom it is foreseeable will be harmed by an act or
omission done without reasonable care, subject to policy
considerations that, in all the circumstances, it is fair, just and
reasonable, to impose liability75. Consequently, because remoteness
is a device to restrict recovery for breach of an obligation, and a
reasonably have been in his contemplation at the time he entered into
the contract, and which, if realised, might have led him to elect not to
enter into the contract rather than accept the risk."
And see Lord Reid, in The Heron II. supra, at p.386A-C.
73 See Stair, Viscount, Institutions. 1.3.3. and 1.9, who describes an obediential
obligation as one which is "put upon men by the will of God, not by their own
will, and so are most part natural, as introduced by the law of nature, before
any addition made there to by engagement and are such as we are bound to
perform solely by our obedience to God ..."
74 See Lord Atkin's seminal speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson 1932 S.C. (H.L.)
31, at p.44, [1932] A.C. 562, at p.580, as subsequently interpreted by the House of
Lords. See the latest decision of their Lordships on negligence and the duty of
care: Marc Rich: & Co. v. Bishop Rock Ltd: The Nicholas H. [1996] 1 A.C. 211
(H.L.(E)). Cf. Hedlev Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465
and Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 A.C. 145.
75 See, for example, Marc Rich & Co A.G. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd: The
Nicholas H [1996] i A.C. 211 (H.L.(E.).
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contractual obligation is narrower in its ambit than a delictual one, a
fortiori it follows that the test for remoteness in contract should also
be narrower than the one for delict. The delictual test of "reasonable
foreseeability" connotes that the damage which occurred was a
possibility, even though it maybe "a most unlikely one"76 - and taken
to extremes, almost anything is foreseeable. However, reasonable
contemplation indicates forethought of what is likely to happen if the
contract is breached.77 It is suggested that the failure to distinguish
between contract and delict has led to confusion, and decisions like
the one in Parsons.
As a result of Balfour Beattv, a more restricted approach is being
adopted to recovering damages under Hadlev v. Baxendale. where
general knowledge is an issue: if a pursuer wishes to recover
extraordinary losses, it will need to demonstrate specific knowledge.
76 The Heron II. supra, at p.422F, per Lord Upjohn.
77 See the view of McHugh J.A. (as he then was), of the New South Wales Court
of Appeal, in Alexander v. Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd. (1987) 9 N.S.W.L.R.
310, at p.365E, who said there was a real, and not just a semantic, distinction
between "reasonable contemplation" and "reasonable foreseeability". This
resulted "in a significant narrowing of liability" in the former case. In his
Honour's view, "contemplation" seemed to indicate '"thoughtful consideration'
or perhaps 'having in view in the future'". Moreover, it "emphasise[d] that, if
the parties had thought about the matter, they would really have considered
that the result had at least a 'serious possibility' of occurring."
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Summary of Remoteness
The position is well summed up by Evans L.J. in Kpohraror v.
Woolwich Building Society.78 who said, in allowing damages for loss
of credit and reputation for wrongful dishonour of a cheque, but
refusing a claim for loss of profits in rectifying the wrongful
dishonour, that:
. . the test of remoteness and therefore of the right to recover a
particular head of damage depends upon the state of the defendant's
knowledge of the likely, or 'not unlikely' . . . , consequences of his
breach whether 'in the usual course of things' because of what the
defendant is taken to have known or by reason of his actual
knowledge of special facts".
Thus, ultimately, the question is: was the damage which occurred,
because of the breach of contract, something which the contract
breaker, on the knowledge he had at the time of the contract, should
have anticipated would result, if the contract was breached in the
way that it was.
rCI SITUATIONS WHEN LENDERS WILL BE LIABLE IN
DAMAGES
As was stated at the beginning, a lender will be liable for breaches
of: (1) the general banker-customer contract, and (2) of a loan
78 [1996] 4 All E.R. 119, at p. 125.
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agreement. The following discussion will apply the general
principles, referred to previously, to situations which expose a
banker to liability for breach of contract.
(1) GENERAL BANKING CONTRACT
(a) Wrongful Dishonour of Cheques
The most common action for breach of the general banking contract
will be for wrongful dishonour of a cheque. A trader was always
entitled to recover for loss of credit and reputation without proof of
special damage79, and now a non-trader can also recover for this
loss80; such claims will rely on general knowledge, i.e., this arises
naturally from the breach of the contract; any claims beyond that,
such as claims for loss of profits, for example, will need to be brought
under the second limb of Hadlev v. Baxendale (i.e., special
knowledge). The customer will also need to mitigate its loss by
contacting the bank as soon as it can of the wrongful dishonour, and,
if possible, the payee; if, which may be impossible, a temporary short
term source of finance is available, the customer should seek this81
79 See Wilson v. United Counties Bank Ltd. ri9201 A.C. 102 (H.L.(E.)).
80 Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119 (C.A.). See the
article on this case by Enonchong, N., "Contract Damages for Wrongful
Dishonour of a Cheque" [ 1997] M.L.R. 412.
81 See too Roval Bank of Canada v. Roland Home Improvements Ltd. (1994) 17
B.L.R. (2d.) 108 (Ontario Court of Appeal), a case in which a business collapsed
after a bank wrongfully refused to honour a business's cheques.
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(b) Wrongful Debitting of a Customer's Accounts
Similar principles to those concerning wrongful dishonour of a
cheque, will apply to wrongful debiting of a bank account, although
the principal cause of action lies in debt, not contract.82
{2} LOAN AGREEMENTS
(a) Failure To Advance Money Under A Loan Agreement
Where a lender wrongly refuses to advance money under a loan
agreement, the borrower will be able to recover any "thrown away"
expenses it has incurred up to the breach, i.e. a reliance loss, such as
the fees paid to the lender for arranging the loan. But if the
borrower wishes to claim any lost profits, the borrower will need to
mitigate its loss by going into the market place and seeking to
borrow replacement funds.
If the borrower can borrow funds at a comparable rate, then there
should be little difficulty. The borrower will recover nominal
damages. However, where the borrower cannot: (i) borrow funds, or
(ii) has to borrow them at a higher rate, which it cannot afford, thus
making it, effectively, impossible to borrow, serious consequences
may follow for the bank, depending on the knowledge it has and the
situation in the market. For example, the borrower may suffer
economic harm, such as losing a business opportunity, e.g., it may no
longer be able to: (i) purchase goods for re-sale at a profit, or (ii)
82 For a fuller discussion of this subject: see Wrongful Debitting of a Customer's
Account, in the chapter 2, "The Banker-Customer Relationship".
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fund a construction project, in which other parties have contracts
with the borrower, and they have incurred expenditure in reliance
on this. In both these situations, the damages will involve an
evaluation of the lost chance to make profits.
Loss Of A Chance
Such an exercise was undertaken by the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in Custom Credit Corpn. Ltd. v. Cerepro Ltd.83 There, the
Court had to consider the damages to be awarded when a proposed
property development collapsed where a lender ("CCC") refused to
provide "full funding", as it had agreed. The borrower ("Cenepro")
wished to purchase certain properties and develop them so that
there were commercial premises at ground level with residential
units. This involved purchasing four premises, and redeeming a
mortgage on a fifth property owned by a director of the borrower;
the director would sell the property to the borrower. Despite
temporary facilities, the full amount of the loan was not paid to
Cenepro. CCC had a change of policy towards Cenepro, but did not
indicate this to them, and continued to give them assurances that full
funding would be in place, when this was no longer its intention.
Ultimately, the project collapsed. CCC sued for the outstanding
balances of loans made; Cenepro counter-claimed for breach of
83 Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of
Appeal, delivered on 7th August, 1991.
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contract. It was held by a majority84, that Cenepro could recover
damages for loss of a chance to make profits on the redevelopment.
Mahoney J.A.,85 after referring to the general principle of contractual
damages, made the following observations about the calculation of
damages in these circumstances:
(a) Cenepro were not permitted to have the profits they would have
obtained if the project had "gone well" - they were to be treated
as if, through full funding, they would have had the chance to
make such profits, i.e., the loss the borrowers suffered and for
which they are to receive compensation is "the loss of the
advantages of that chance"86
(b) There is no single method of assessing damages for this loss —
the court will use a method that gives "the true, or at least the
best, reflex of the [borrower's] loss"87
(c) This may involve valuing the chance — here, it was the chance of
making a profit from developing property "with the benefit of
such finance as the contract provided".88
84 Kirby P. (as he then was) and Mahoney J.A.; Clarke J.A. dissented on the
findings of the trial judge and how they related to the question of damages.
85 Kirby P., expressed agreement on this area.
86 At p.97 of the transcript.
87 At pp.97-98 of the transcript.
88 At p.98 of the transcript.
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(d) Alternatively, it may mean calculating the profits that would
have been made if the project had proceeded "according to its
terms", and then reducing the profits to reflect contingencies,
which, at the time of the breach (or another relevant time),
affected the opportunity to make the profits. This process is
adopted in personal injury cases, regarding capacity to work.89
(e) The trial judge had calculated the profits the borrowers would
have made if their "development had been carried out according
to its terms and the events on which it was posited had occurred
as the plan contemplated"90. His Honour then took into
consideration "contingencies apt to affect the carrying out of the
development plan"91. He assessed the likely outcome of each
89 At p.99 of the transcript.
90 Ibid.
91 These contingencies were:
(i) The development's completion date and the sale of the constituent parts.
(ii) The pre-sale of some of the redeveloped properties "off the plan", prior to
completion.
(iii) The development's value at the date of completion.
(iv)The cost of completing the development, which included: "land
development costs, development expenses, construction expenses and
interest", plus whether additional finance would be granted, and on what
basis, if, as seemed likely, the project exceeded the amount of the loan.
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contingency, and reached "a conclusion as to the extent to which
each of them, so assessed should be seen to affect the profit to
be derived from the development. .. "92
If a loan was for a specific purpose, related to a borrower's business,
the bank will, normally, have information about the financial position
of the borrower, its business and its markets. Hence, if the borrower
was unable to purchase stock from suppliers and, thus, supply its
customers, the bank could be liable for the results of this loss of
business, and loss of profits.
In Britain, the lost chance to make profits would have to be "a real or
substantial chance", and not a speculative one93
Higher Interest Rates
If the borrower has to borrow at a higher rate of interest (and this
can be afforded), then the measure of damages will be the difference
between: (i) the new rate of interest, under the substituted loan, and
(ii) the rate, under the breached loan agreement94. If the rate falls,
then there is no loss, and the damages awarded will be nominal.
(v) The borrower's "ability to raise finance".
92 At p. 100 of the transcript.
93 Allied Maples Group Ltd. v. Simmons & Simmons fa firm) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1602
(C.A.).
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Where interest rates have declined, this is beneficial to a borrower,
as it can avoid the original loan contract, and borrow at a lower rate,
which, depending on the difference in interest rates and the amount
of the loan, may be a significant sum of money. In such a case, the
borrower could receive nominal damages for his expectation loss, but
will be better off seeking to recover a reliance loss for the "thrown
away" expenditure, e.g., any costs or fees incurred in having the first
loan arranged.
(b) Wrongful Termination of Term Loan: Overdrafts
Recently, there has been a series of cases95 in which it has been
argued that banks wrongfully terminated term loans, believing them
to be overdrafts.
It is well settled that overdrafts are repayable on demand96, but,
where there are words in the loan agreement or facility letter which
94 A similar view is expressed by Chitty L.J. in The South African Territories
Ltd, v. Wallington [1897] 1 Q.B. 692, at pp.696-697. See also Chitty J. (as he then
was) in Western Wagon and Property Co v. West [1892] 1 Ch. 271, at p.278, cited,
with approval, by Lopes L.J., in South African Territories, supra, at p.695.
95 Crimpfil Ltd v. Barclay's Bank pic, an unreported decision of Judge Hordern
Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), delivered on 20th April, 1994, noted
ri9941 J.I.B.L. (News Section! N-151.
96 Williams & Glvn's Bank v. Barnes [1981] Com. Law Rep. 205, 10 Legal
Decisions Affecting Bankers (1997-1986) 220; Crimpfil Ltd v. Barclays Bank pic,
unreported decision of Judge Hordern Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High Court
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qualify this, then these contradictory terms prevail. For example, a
loan expressed to be by way of an overdraft, but repayable within
twelve months97, becomes a term loan. This loan is repayable in
twelve months time, and can only be accelerated if the borrower
commits an event of default.
In the well publicised case of Crimpfil v. Barclays Bank pic98, the
administrators of Crimpfil sued the bank for breach of contract. By
letter dated 17th July, 1989, the bank granted Crimpfil an
Judge), delivered on 20th April, 1994, noted [1994] J.I.B.L. (News Section! N-151;
Bradford Savings and Loan Ltd. v. Barclays Bank pic, unreported decision of
Judge Kershaw Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), delivered on 30th
March, 1994; Cf. Socomex Ltd. v. Banque Bruxelles Lambert [1996] Lloyd's Rep.
156, where Mance J. (at pp.189, col. 2 and 199, col. 1) refused to imply a term
that a lender ("BBL") would give reasonable notice before it withheld further
margin finance, concerning futures contracts entered into by S to hedge its
position, as, contrary to the normal expectation, the borrower had lost the
lender's confidence.
97 See Robert Goff J. (as he then was) in Titford Property Company v. Canon,
unreported decision, delivered on 22nd May, 1975, and noted in the
Encyclopaedia of Banking (Cresswell, Blair, Wood & Hill), at para.C. 183, on
p.C.71; and Ralph Gibson J. (as he then was) in Williams & Glvns Bank Ltd. v.
Barnes [1981] Com. Law Reports 205, 10 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers
(1977-1986) 220.
98 An unreported decision of His Honour, Judge Hordern Q.C. (sitting as a
Deputy High Court Judge), delivered on 20th April, 1994; noted [199/l] J.I.B.L.
(News Section) N-151.
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"overdraft" facility of £2m for a year. It was argued that the facility
could not be called in earlier than that period by the bank, unless
there had been a breach of the conditions set out in the facility letter.
When Crimpfil lost one of its major customers, the bank was uneasy
about Crimpfil's situation, and called in the loan after six months,
although there had been no default by Crimpfil. The bank argued
that there was an implied term that the overdraft was repayable on
demand.
There was also a medium term loan granted on 30th March, 1990,
which Crimpfil sought to draw down on 23rd April, 1990, but which
the bank did not pay until August, 1990. The bank could not offer
an excuse for this.
As a result of these breaches of contract, the company went into
administration. The administrators sued the bank for £10m.
It was held by Judge Hordern Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High Court
Judge), in deciding the issue of liability, but not quantum, that the
first loan was not repayable on demand, as it had been specified for
a period of twelve months, and this over-rode the on demand nature
of the "overdraft". His Lordship said, "the bank cannot grant a
facility for twelve months with one hand . . . and with the other hand
immediately take away that facility". With regard to the medium
term loan, Crimpfil was held to have established its case.
448
An interim payment of £1.3m was ordered with costs payable
forthwith." The claim was eventually settled for £6.3m.100
What is Claimable?
Whilst Crimpfil confirms the principle of liability under Hadlev v.
Baxendale. unfortunately, because the bank settled the action before
it went to a hearing on the quantum of damages, the court did not
state what can be claimed and upon what basis. For example, did the
loss fall under the general knowledge part of the rule in Hadlev v.
Baxendale. or the specific knowledge part?
1st Limb or 2nd Limb of Hadlev v. Baxendale?
Whether a borrower's loss is recoverable as a result of a lender's
breach of a loan contract will depend on the circumstances and the
knowledge of the lender. Where a loan is granted for a specific
purpose, a lender will have sought detailed information from the
borrower about the borrower, and the proposed purpose of the loan.
Consequently, the losses suffered by the borrower, such as, being
placed into insolvency, will fall within both limbs - as there is not
infrequently an overlap between the two types of knowledge101. It
is submitted that the Crimpfil case has elements of both.
" The Independent, 30th April, 1994, at p. 17.
100 See the article in The Times by Tehan, P., "Barclays pays £6.3m in overdraft
dispute", 31 st July, 1995, at p.46.
101 See Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119, at p. 128,
per Evans L.J.
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As a general proposition, it is arguable that, under the first limb of
Hadlev, the wrongful cancellation of a term loan (i.e., a loss of
finance) is something that a lender would contemplate could cause
the borrower to suffer loss, as the borrower is borrowing money
because it does not have sufficient money of its own to finance a
project or its business102, i.e., it would follow naturally that if a
business' source of finance ceased to exist, then, unless a borrower
could quickly arrange alternative finance, the borrower would be
unable to complete the transaction it was seeking the finance for and
will suffer financial loss. Support for this view is found in a series of
recent cases, concerning recovery of finance/bank charges and loss of
interest, where one party to a JCT building contract was in breach of
the contract, and the innocent party had had to incur overdraft
expenses or extra borrowing costs. It was held that these expenses
or costs were recoverable under the first limb of Hadlev v.
Baxendale103. The basis of the reasoning was that it was agreed that,
in the building industry, cash flow is extremely important; if a
102 Or, it may be that a company's directors are not prepared to commit funds to
the project.
103 See, for example, Ogilvie Builders Ltd v. Glasgow D.C. 1994 S.C.L.R. 546, 1995
S.L.T. 15; F.W, Minter Ltd. v. Welsh Health Technical Services Organisation
(1980) 13 B.L.R. 1 (C.A.); Rees & Kirhv Ltd. v. Swansea Citv Council (1985) 30
B.L.R. 1. (C.A.); Caledonian Property Group Ltd v. Oueensferrv Property Group
Ltd 1992 S.L.T. 738; and Nelson Cladding Ltd v. Murray Williamson (Builders') Ltd
1993 G.W.D. 35-2217. Cf. Rapide Enterprises v. Midglev. The Times, 30th July,
1997 (Outer House of the Court of Session).
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contractor is not paid on time, this "results in the ordinary course of
things in his being short of capital and so having to borrow and use
capital which he would have invested elsewhere"104, e.g., to pay
wages and hire charges.105 Consequently, the loss of interest
suffered by having to pay interest on the money borrowed, and not
being able to receive interest on the money the contractor cannot
invest, was recoverable under the first limb of Hadlev106. By analogy
of reasoning, these cases could be applied to a claim for loss where a
bank failed to lend money in contravention of the terms of a loan
agreement, on the basis that the bank should realise that if a
borrower cannot borrow money quickly, it could suffer loss. Despite
Balfour Beattv. it is suggested, with some reservations, that these
cases would still be good law107
What would not be recoverable under the first limb are damages for
transactions not in the ordinary course of business, or special or
extraordinary transactions, which the bank knew nothing about.
This is consistent with Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v. Newman
104 1995 s.L.T. 15, at p.21A-B. See also F.G. Minter Ltd. v. Welsh Health Technical
Services Organisation (1980) 13 B.L.R. 1, at p.15, per Stephenson L.J.; and
Robert Goff L.J. in Rees & Kirbv Ltd. v. Swansea City Council (1985) 30 B.L.R. 1,
at pp.11 and 23.
105 Miniter's case, supra, at p. 15, per Stevenson L.J.
106 1 995 S.L.T. 15, at p.21 A-C.
107 A similar view is taken by MacQueen, H.L., "Remoteness and Breach of
Contract" 1996 J.R. 295, at pp.302-303.
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Industries Ltd.108, in which it was held that, where there was a
failure to deliver a boiler within time, the plaintiff could recover
general loss of business profits, but not loss of a specific contract for
the Ministry of Supply, which the defendant was unaware of.
It is settled, in England (and the United States)109, that where the
borrower enters a loan contract to borrow money for a specified
purpose, and the lender does not lend the money, the borrower may
recover damages under the second limb of Hadlev v. Baxendale. The
measure of damage is the loss sustained by the borrower because of
the breach by the lender: it is not the amount of money that was
promised to be lent.110 Thus, where there is no special loss, the
108 [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (C.A.).
109 See The South African Territories Ltd. v. Wallington [1897] 1 Q.B. 692 at
pp.696-697, per Chitty L.J., and at p.695, per Lopes L.J. (CA); Western Wagon and
Property v. West [1892] 1 Ch. 271, at p.277, per Chitty J.; and The Manchester
Oldham Bank Ltd v. A. A. Cook and Co. (1883) 49 L.T. 674. See too the Bahamas
dnagua) Sisal Plantation ("Ltd! v. Griffin (1897) 14 T.L.R. 139, at p.140, per
Bigham J. A similar position arises in the United States: see W.C. Shepherd Co.
Inc v. Roval Indemnity Co. 192 F. 2d. 710, at p.717, per Rives J. (Circuit Judge);
Bond Street Knitters Inc. v. Peninsula National Bank (1943) 42 N.Y.S. 2d. 744, at
p.744, per curiam; and Avalon Construction Corpn. v. Holding Co. Inc. (1931)
175 N.E. 651, at p.653, per Kellogg J.
110 Chitty L.J. in South African Territories, supra, at pp.696-697, and Chitty J.
(as he then was) in Western Wagon and Property v. West, supra, at p.277.
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damages are nominal111, i.e., recovery must be under the "second
limb" of Hadlev v. Baxendale. The need to show special loss, because
of the failure to lend arises because breach of a contract to lend
money, does not, by itself, involve legal damage; the reason being
that, although the borrower receives the amount of the loan, the
borrower is obligated to repay the loan (plus interest)112. Thus, there
is a need to show a loss over and above the amount of the loan.
However, in the recent case, of Bradford Savings & Loan Ltd v.
Barclays Bank pic113. Judge Kershaw Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High
Court Judge) said that there could be recovery of damages for loss of
the use of money and the resultant loss of business.
In that case, his Lordship said:
Mr Jarvis drew a distinction, with which I agree, between the
knowledge which is imputed to a defendant facing a "limb 1" (of Hadlev
v. Baxendale) claim and the knowledge which must be proved against a
defendant who faces a "limb 2" claim. However when applying that
distinction to a contract to lend money it is also important to recognise
that the ability of the borrower to obtain a loan elsewhere if the lender
defaults depends not on some special susceptibility to damage of the
borrower at the time when the contract is made but, even assuming no
111 Ibid.
112Avalon Construction Corpn. v, Kirch Holding Co. Inc. (1931) 175 N.E. 651, at
p.652, per Kellogg J.
113 Unreported decision, delivered on 30th March, 1994.
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novus actus interveniens in the shape of a change in the objective
creditworthiness of the borrower, on the attitude of other possible
lenders at some time in the future. Clearly in the usual course of things
credit is sometimes easy to obtain and sometimes more difficult, and
when credit becomes harder to get some potential borrowers are more
attractive than others for what credit facilities are available.
Thus it seems to me that I am free to, and must, make my own decision
upon whether damages can be recovered under the first rule in Hadlev
v. Baxendale for loss of use of borrowed money. The answer, in my
judgement, is yes. I am reluctant to decide that there is any general
rule of law which can affect what is essentially a question of fact: what
may fairly and reasonably be considered when one party enters into a
particular contract with another as arising naturally according to the
usual course of things. Nor do I see any reason to do so. I must,
therefore, decide what might fairly and reasonably have been
considered when the bank gave the facilities to these plaintiffs as
arising naturally according to the usual course of things if the bank
were to break its contract in the light of what the bank was told about
the position of the plaintiffs in the empire114
. . . It follows that in my judgement loss of business through not having
the money which was promised to them is not too remote a loss to be
recoverable by the plaintiffs under the first rule in Hadlev v.
Baxendale."
114 Bradford was a member of a business "empire" owned by a Mr Leaf.
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The case concerned the borrowing of £3 million by Bradford, a loan
company, which would borrow money from a bank (here, Barclays
Bank), and then on lend the money, at a higher rate, to people who
could not obtain loans from banks. A facility letter between
Bradford and Barclays, and a side letter were on demand, but there
was a fetter on this right to demand re-payment, as the bank could
not exercise this right where the borrower breached a covenant
which was remediable; Bradford was given three months to remedy
such a breach. This was held to qualify, in a limited sense, the on
demand nature of the facility. There was also to be a review within
twelve months. Bradford was part of a group of companies "owned"
by a Mr. Leaf. The facility was secured by a debenture. The breach
complained of by Bradford was a failure to lend the £3 million, in
breach of the facility letter, in that the bank capped Bradford's
overdraft facility at £750,000, which was accepted as a fait accompli,
by Bradford and, thereafter, no cheques were presented by Bradford
for payment.
It was held that breaches of the contract only occurred when cheques
were presented and not honoured; the loss was assessed at £10 per
cheque, which totalled £130. Under English law, Bradford had failed
to rescind the contract by its affirming the bank's conduct in
cancelling the facility. The decision seems to be a little misguided. It
was pointless for Bradford to keep presenting cheques knowing that
they would not be honoured. Bradford had presented thirteen
cheques, all to no avail, and it can be argued that at this point, after
the thirteenth cheque was not honoured, that the contract was
rescinded - Bradford no longer regarded itself as having any further
obligations under the contract (and neither did the bank).
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(3) BREACH OF LOAN AGREEMENT BY LENDER : CROSS
DEFAULT CLAUSE AND WRONGFUL ACCELERATION
It has been held, in Australia, that where the repayment of a loan
has been wrongfully accelerated, in breach of the terms of the loan,
with the result that the borrower has had to repay the loan earlier
than he should have, "the only contemplated loss is his loss, if
proved, occasioned by the raising of a loan of similar amount on less
advantageous conditions and the expenses of so doing".115 As a
statement of general principle, this is correct. The position becomes
more complicated when a borrower has loans from several lenders,
with each loan agreement containing a cross-default clause, enabling
the lender to accelerate repayment of its loan, even when it is not
due and owing (i.e., there has been no default) where the borrower
has defaulted on another loan with another borrower. The reason for
this is that if the borrower has defaulted on one loan, which is now
due for immediate repayment (and, in relation to which security may
be enforced), the first lender does not want to wait until there has
been a default under its loan, which may be too late; the first lender
wishes to be able to compete with the other lenders vis-a-vis to
recovery of the sums they have lent, as a default under one loan may
be indicative of a general financial malaise, and may mean the onset
of insolvency is imminent. Thus, it may be that a borrower is not
just dealing with one loan, but several, and he cannot raise finance;
this will also have an effect on the borrower's business.
1 15 Head v. Kelk [1963] S.R. (N.S.W.) 340, at p.350, per Herron J. (as he then was);
McClemens and Brereton JJ., agreeing.
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Consequently, when a lender breaches a loan facility with a
borrower, by wrongfully accelerating it, the other loans will be
accelerated. If the borrower is a company, it will be put into
receivership, either by: (i) the lender in breach (provided it holds a
debenture or floating charge), or (ii) another lender who holds such
security; it is most likely that the former will put the borrower into
receivership. In this situation, the lender in breach should not be
able to recover its debt, on the basis of the principle that a party in
breach of contract cannot benefit under that contract for its
wrongdoing116 - here, the wrongful acceleration - as the debt is
owing, but not yet due. Moreover, if the lender who has acted
wrongfully appoints a receiver, this appointment will be invalid,
because there will be no basis for making a demand for payment as
the debt has not become due and owing117. This will also be the case
if another lender (having a floating charge or debenture) appoints a
receiver, relying on the breach of the cross-default clause, as the
1 16 New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd v. Societe des Ateliers et Chartiers de France
[1919] A.C. 1 (H.L.(E.)), per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, at p. 12, and Lord
Wrenbury, at p.14; and Alghussein Establishment v. Eton College [1988] 1 W.L.R.
857 (H.L.(E.)), noted by Starke, J.G., "Recent Cases" (1988) 62 A.L.J. 732; and
Micklefield v. SAC Technology Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1002. This is similar to the
principle of mutuality in Scots law: see, for example, Graham v. United Turkey
Red Company Ltd. 1922 S.C. 533. It is an application of the principle of
unjustified enrichment. Nonetheless, this principle does not extinguish the
debt - the debt is owing, but not yet due.
117 See Elwick Bav Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Roval Bank of Scotland 1982 S.L.T. 62.
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reason for accelerating its loan, because there is no basis for this.118
If that receiver has already sold assets of the company, so that there
cannot be restitution of the company's assets to it (because an
invalidly appointed receiver has no right to deal with the company's
assets), then, the company may have an action against the lender for
spuilzie under Scots law, or conversion under English law.119
The consequence of such a wrongful action is the collapse of the
borrower, with the wrongful lender being liable in damages to the
borrower for the consequences of the borrower's default under its
various loan agreements. Potentially, this may be a very large
damages claim. As a lender is likely to undertake some form of due
diligence exercise, such as obtaining copies of other loan and security
documentation entered into by the borrower, it will be hard for the
lender to claim the loss is too remote, under the second limb of
Hadlev v. Baxendale. Moreover, it is strongly arguable that there
would be liability under the first limb too, as it is a natural
consequence that a wrongly terminated loan will result in the
activation of cross default clauses, which are standard sub-clauses in
the Events of Default clause in the loan agreement.
A further, but more remote, possibility is that if a borrower is
prematurely put into receivership, the other lenders will not recover
118 If there was a breach of other provisions of this lender's loan agreement,
that would be a different matter.
119 See Goff J. in R.A. Cripps & Son Ltd. v. Wickenden [1973] 1 W.L.R. 944, at
p.957.
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all their money, and so the lender will be the subject of an action in
delict for negligence by these other borrowers, with whom there is
no contractual nexus. The likely result of this is, that there is
insufficient proximity between the parties, and no assumption of
responsibility by the wrongful lender, or any reliance on the
wrongful lender by the other lenders, who may well have lent
money before the wrongful lender did120 , but this is not certain.
For the wrongful lender, being sued by the borrower, unless the
lender quickly realises its mistake and seeks to rectify the situation
quickly, such as, by contacting the other lenders, and paying any
expenses incurred as a result up to that point, the potential losses
payable to the borrower could be very considerable, e.g., cancellation
of contracts, or the collapse of the borrower's business (as in the
Crimpfil case).
1D1 DAMAGES FOR INJURED FEELINGS
Where a bank breaches the general banking contract (e.g., a wrongful
dishonour of a cheque), or wrongfully refuses to provide funds under
a loan agreement to a customer, the customer may not only suffer
financial loss, but also emotional distress. Whilst the customer can
recover for the financial loss he has suffered, due to the breach, can
he recover damages for any emotional distress he has suffered? In
England, it is not possible to recover such damages in commercial
transactions, carried on with a view to profit, which would preclude
120 See the House of Lords in Hedlev Byrne Ltd v. Heller and Partners Ltd
[1964] A.C. 465 and Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 A.C. 145.
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such an award in the case of a commercial loan121. Where recovery
for emotional distress has been allowed, under English law, it has
been where the purpose of the contract is comfort or pleasure, such
121 See Staughton L.J. in Haves v. James & Charles Dodd (a firm) [1990] 2 All E.R.
815, at p.824, noted by Halson, R., "Contract Damages: Expectation, Reliance and
Mental Distress" [1991] C.L.J. 31; Rae v. Yorkshire Bank pic [1988] F.L.R. 1;
McConville v. Barclays Bank pic [1995] 2 Bank L.R. 211. Cf. the House of Lords
in Malik v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (in liq.l [1998] A.C.
20, where M, an ex employee of B.C.C.I., was held, in principle, to be able to
recover damages for financial loss resulting from a loss of reputation, due to
the improper conduct of the bank. In Scotland: see (i) Diesen v. Samson 1971
S.L.T. 49 (Sh. Ct.), where damages for emotional distress were awarded against a
photographer who failed to attend and take photographs of a wedding,
however, the Sheriff (at p.50) said this would not apply to a commercial
contract; (ii) Lord Morison in Watson v. Swift & Co's Judicial Factor 1986 S.L.T.
217, at p.219D-H, a case involving breach of warrandice by sellers in a non¬
commercial conveyancing case, where the breach caused delay and emotional
distress, and it was held the purchasers could recover for this distress and
anxiety; (iii) Lord Gill, in the unreported Scottish case of Brennan v.
Robertson, decision delivered on 21st April, 1995, approving the English
authority on this topic. The case concerned an action for breach of contract
relating to missives for the purchase of heritage; and (iv) Lord Osborne in
Black v. Gibson 1992 S.L.T. 1076, who held claims for emotional distress were
relevant for inquiry, where there was breach of a building contract for a
dwelling house, and the builder was both negligent and in breach of contract.
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as a holiday122, or the avoidance of discomfort, or where there has
been mental distress consequent on physical inconvenience123, i.e.,
the plaintiff has been denied "the fruit of the contract"124. In the
case of a corporate borrower, as it is an artificial legal entity - albeit
one that is run by human agents - it is incapable of emotion. Thus, it
cannot suffer emotional distress - although its officers and
shareholders, who are separate and distinct from the company125,
may suffer anxiety, but they will not be parties to the relevant
contract.126 Hence, a corporation cannot claim damages for emotional
distress127. Moreover, the instances in which recovery has been
122 See Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 233; Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd.
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 1468. For a comprehensive review of the authorities: see
MacDonald, E., "Contractual Damages for Mental Distress" [1995] J.C.L. 134.
123 See Perrv v. Sidney Phillips [1982] l.W.L.R. 1297, and Watts v. Morrow [1991]
1 W.L.R. 142.
124 Bingham L.J, in Watts v. Morrow, supra, at p. 1445.
125 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. 118971 A.C. 22 (H.L.(E.V).
126Cf. the criticisms of the English Courts for not distinguishing between large
impersonal businesses and family businesses: see Rowlands v. Callow [1992] 1
N.Z.L.R. 178, at p.207, per Thomas J., in the case of an individual having to
suffer emotional distress.
127 A similar view to this writer's has been expressed, under English law, by
Owen J., in Firsteel Cold Rolled Products Ltd. v. Anaco Precision Pressings Ltd..
The Times, 21st November, 1994, who held that a company cannot claim
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permitted, on their face, exclude a corporation recovering128 -
especially in a banking context.
Where a customer has sought to sue a bank for, amongst other
things, emotional distress, arising from a breach of contract129, or
negligence130, the customer has failed. For example, in Rae v.
Yorkshire Bank pic,131 the Court of Appeal, held that, where a bank
had wrongfully dishonoured a cheque, the customer, who was a non-
inconvenience or stress, as a result of a breach of contract, by another party,
by attributing the inconvenience, and stress that the company's directors and
employees had experienced to the company.
128 It is conceivable that a corporate outing or weekend away for staff, booked
through a travel agent, could be a disaster, in which case, the company, as the
party to the contract, could see for breach, on the basis of Jarvis v. Swan Tours.
supra, and Jackson v. Horizon Holidays, supra.
129 Rae v. Yorkshire Bank pic [1988] F.L.R. 1; and McConville v. Barclays Bank
pic [1993] 2 Banking Law Reports 211.
130 Box v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Law Rep. 391 (approved [1981] 1
Lloyd's Law Rep. 434); and Verity and Spindler v. Lloyd's Bank [1996] Fam. Law
213, [1995] C.L.C. 1557.
131 [1988] F.L.R. 1 (C.A.), a decision which must now be read in the context of
the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in Kpohraror v. Woolwich
Building Society [1996] 4 All E.R. 119, on the recovery of damages, for loss of
credit and reputation, by a non-trader from its bank for wrongful dishonour
of a cheque, although the issue of damages for emotional distress would not be
decided differently.
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trader, was entitled to nominal damages for breach of contract, but
could not recover damages for the inconvenience and humiliation it
suffered due to the wrongful dishonouring of its cheques; the reason
being that the contract was not one for relaxation, nor was it a
contract in which it was contemplated that a breach would cause
mental distress132. Similarly, in McConville v. Barclays Bank pic, a
customer sued the bank for emotional distress caused by "phantom
withdrawals" from his account, via an automatic teller machine, i.e., a
wrongful debiting of the plaintiffs account, but was denied recovery.
Judge John Hicks Q.C. (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge), applied
Rae's case to hold that the matter did not come within the noted
exceptions to the prohibition on such recovery.133
Distress Caused By Negligence
The position is not different where a claim is brought in negligence.
Verity and Spindler v. Lloyd's Bank pic134 and Box v. Midland Bank
132 At p.3, lines 27-38, per Parker L.J. The reference to contemplation appears
to be a reference to the second limb of Hadlev v. Baxendale: see too his Honour
Judge John Hicks Q.C. in McConville v. Barclays Bank pic [1993] 2 Banking Law
Reports 211, atp.215, col. 2, para.28.
133 [1993] 2 Banking Law Reports 211, at p.215, col. 2, para.29, per Judge John
Hicks Q.C.
134 [1996] Fam Law 213, [1995] C.L.C. 1557. See the discussion of this case in the
chapter on Negligence.
463
Ltd135 were cases involving loss suffered by personal customer, due
to a negligent misstatement by a bank manager, and although
general recovery was allowed under the Hedlev Byrne principle136,
claims for damages for emotional distress against the lenders were
dismissed. In Verity and Spindler. the judge applied the Court of
Appeal's view in Hayes v. James & Charles Dodd (a firm)137 to hold
that there could be no recovery in a commercial transaction. On
principle, the view in the Hayes case (a contract case) must be
correct, as it is not part of a commercial contract to provide pleasure,
generally, but rather, pecuniary gain (which may, of itself, bring
pleasure). No doubt, the ordeal suffered by Verity and Spindler,
when their project collapsed138, plus the ensuing litigation, would
have been extremely distressing.139 Lloyd J. (as he then was), in the
135 [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 391.
136 [1964] A.C. 465. (H.L.(E.)).
137 [1990] 2 All E.R. 815, at p.824, per Staughton L.J.
138They borrowed money to purchase a property, renovate it and sell it at a
profit. Unfortunately, the housing market collapsed.
139 One Australian court has been prepared to acknowledge the stress suffered
by a non-commercial party to litigation, although the court, ultimately, said
that if any claim should be made, in equity, for the respondent's "stress and
anxiety", in defending a claim for Aus $200,000 (which the court doubted), this
was satisfied by the bank waiving its contractual claim for interest: see the
Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Ltd v. Pertrik [1996] 2 V.R. 638, at p.645, referring to the view of
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much earlier case of Box v. Midland Bank Ltd.. dismissed a claim for
distress and anxiety as not being an appropriate head of damage in a
negligent misstatement case140, although the possibility of a claim
under general damages was not ruled out.141
Basis Of Rule Preventing General Recovery For Emotional Distress
There is some debate as to the basis of the rule preventing recovery
for emotional distress: does it lie in: (i) policy142, or (ii) is it an
application of Hadlev v. Baxendale.143
Dawson J., in the High Court of Australia, in Commonwealth v. Verwaven (1990)
170 C.L.R. 394, at pp.461-462, who speaks of the strain of litigation on a natural
person.
140 The case concerned a negligent misstatement by a bank manager to Box,
which led him to believe a loan application would be approved; Box acted in
reliance on this misstatement, but, unfortunately, for Box, the loan was not
approved.
141 [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, at p.402, col. 2. This aspect of the judgement was
approved by the Court of Appeal : see [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 434.
142 See Staughton L.J. in Haves v. James & Charles Dodd [1990] 2 All E.R. 815, at
p.824; and Bingham L.J. (as he then was) in Watts v. Morrow [1991] 1 W.L.R.
1421, at p.1445.
142 See Thomas J. in Rowlands v. Callow [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178; and Wilson J. in
Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1989) 58 D.L.R. (4th) 193,
at p.218. Support for this view is implicit in the judgement of Parker L.J. in
Rae v. Yorkshire Bank [1988] F.L.R. 1, at p.3, lines 33-35, who refers to mental
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It has been said by some judges144 that although mental distress for
breach of contract is, under Hadlev v. Baxendale, reasonably
contemplatable, recovery has been rejected on policy grounds,
because stress is a normal part of commercial or ordinary life.145
The clearest statement of the policy, based on the rationale to restrict
recovery, is found in the judgement of Mason C.J., of the High Court of
Australia, in Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon; The Mikhail Lermontov146,
who says:
". . . as a matter of ordinary experience, it is evident that, while the
innocent party to a contract will generally be disappointed if the
defendant does not perform the contract, the innocent party's
disappointment and distress are seldom so significant as to attract an
award of damages. For that reason, if for no other, it is preferable to
adopt the rule that damages for disappointment and distress are not
stress being contemplated as a result of a breach of contract. See also Lord
Morison in Watson v. Swift & Co's Judicial Factor 1986 S.L.T. 217, at p.219D-H,
and the Alberta Court of Appeal in Kempling v. Heatherstone Manor Corp
(1996) 137 D.L.R. (4th) 12, at pp.25-28, per Picard J.A.
144 See Bingham L.J. (as he then was) in Watts v. Morrow [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1421,
at p. 1445; and Cooke P. (as he then was), in the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in
Mouat v. Clark Bovce [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 559, at p.569 - this issue did not arise on
appeal to the Privy Council: see [1994] 1 A.C. 428.
145 See Cooke, P. in Mouat v. Clark Bovce [ 1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 559, at p.569.
146 (1992-93) 176 C.L.R. 344, at p.365. See too Bingham L.J. in Perry v. Sidney
Phillips r 19911 1 W.L.R. 1421, at p. 1445.
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recoverable unless they proceed from physical inconvenience caused
by the breach or unless the contract is one the object of which is to
provide enjoyment [or] relaxation ... In cases falling within the last
mentioned category the damages flow directly from the breach of
contract, the promise being to provide enjoyment [or] relaxation ..."
Nonetheless, behind this reluctance to allow damages for mental
distress, there appears to be twin difficulties of:
(i) the problem of assessing such damages147, although, in principle,
this should not be a bar to recovery148 , and
(ii) the fear of the floodgates - where would such liability end?
To avoid this last possibility, there would need to be clear proof of
the distress suffered.
Nonetheless, it is suggested that damages for mental distress can be
recovered under Hadlev v. Baxendale, but that they should only be
allowed for individuals, under the second limb, where the other
party knew of the risk that a breach would cause such distress.
When parties contract, they are looking for a benefit from the
contract; if the contract is breached, they will then seek to be
147 See MacDonald, supra, at p. 147.
148 See, for example, Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 K.B. 786, at p.792, per Vaughan-
Willaims L.J. Cf. the position with nervous shock: Alcock v. Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310 (H.L.(E.)), and Page v. Smith [1996] 1
A.C. 155 (H.L.(E.)). In Scotland, see the First Division in Robertson v. Forth
Bridge Joint Board 1995 S.C. 364 (I.H.) (decided before Page v. Smith).
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compensated for the loss of a bargain149; the mental distress of the
innocent party is not something that is regarded as arising naturally,
according to the usual course of things, i.e., it is not something within
the general knowledge of the contract breaker. Whilst claimants are
likely to be upset when a contract is breached, it is the nature of the
contract and the benefit to be obtained from it which needs to be
kept in mind in an award of any damages for emotional distress
under Hadlev v. Baxendale. In a lending situation, it is hard to
envisage a second limb claim for emotional distress being successful.
[E] CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Where a customer, who is the victim of a breach of contract by its
bank, has been negligent, and contributed to its own loss, then, under
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945150, the damages
149 Cf. Lord Diplock's well-known distincition between primary and secondary
obligations in Photoprodnction Ltd. v. Securicor Tranport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, at
p.848.
150 See ss.l(i) and 4 of the 1945 Act. S.l(i) of the 1945 Act provides:
"Where any person suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault
and partly of the fault of any other person or persons . . . the damages
recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the
court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share
in the responsibility for the damage ..."
S.4 defines "fault" as meaning "negligence, breach of statutory duty or other
act or omission which gives rise to a liability in part or would, apart from this
Act, give rise the defence of contributory negligence ..."
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the customer will receive for the breach of contract, may be reduced,
where there is a co-extensive liability in delict/tort. Doubts that the
1945 Act applied to contract as well as delict/tort have been settled
by the Court of Appeal, in England, who have permitted
apportionment where such a co-extensive liability exists151.
However, the Act does not apply to fraud, which is an intentional
delict.152 .
The courts, in England, have classified contractual duties under three
categories vis-a-vis the 1945 Act153 :
(i) where the defendant's/defender's liability is due to the breach of
a contractual provision which is not dependant on a failure to
exercise reasonable care (i.e., negligence);
151 Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher [1989] A.C. 582 (C.A.); Lipkin
Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, (C.A.) - this point did not arise on
appeal in the House of Lords: see [1991] A.C.; and Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic
Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd. [1990] 1 Q.B. 818. There is no
reason to believe these cases would not apply in Scotland.
152 Alliance & Leicester Building Society v. Egelstrop Ltd. [19931 1 W.L.R. 1462.
153 See Hobhouse J. (as he then was) in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v.
Butcher [1986] 2 All E.R. 488, at p.508; O'Connor L.J., in the Court of Appeal, in
the same case: [1989] A.C. 852, at p.862; and Beldam L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v.
Fairclough Building Ltd. [1995] Q.B. 214, at p.228G-H; Nourse L.J., agreeing, at
p.234.
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(ii) where the defendant's/defender's liability is due to an express
contractual provision to take care, but which does not correspond
with an independent duty of care (i.e., negligence); and
(iii) where the defendant's/defender's liability in contract is "the
same as, and co-extensive with,"154 an independent liability in
tort/delict (i.e., the same act gives rise to liability both in contract
and tort/delict, independently of each other).
Of these three categories, the defence of contributory negligence
applies only in relation to the third category.155 This is because the
1945 Act is concerned with liability in delict/tort, and not contract.
For the Act to apply, where there is a contract, a relationship,
independent of the contract, giving rise to liability in delict/tort,
must exist.156
154 Per Beldam L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd. [1995] Q.B.
214, at p.228G-H.
155 See Vesta v. Butcher, supra, and Barclays Bank v. Fairclough Building,
supra, at p.229A-B, per Beldam L.J; Nourse L.J. agreeing.
156 See Hobhouse J. in Vesta v. Butcher [1986] 2 All E.R. 488, at pp.509-510, cited,
with approval, by Simon Brown L.J. in Barclays Bank v, Fairclough Building.
supra, at p.233C-D.
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Consequently, contributory negligence is not a partial defence to a
category (i) case157, nor a category (ii) case158. Negligence cannot
provide a defence to a damages claim based on a "breach of a strict
contractual obligation"159. If the contrary were so, this would
amount to implying into the contract an obligation that was
inconsistent with the express provisions of the contract.160 Moreover,
when contractual liability, arising independently of any negligence
by the defendant/defender, is strict, the imposition of strict liability
is "inconsistent with an apportionment of loss"161
Where a party to a contract (i.e., defendant/defender) wants to
assert that the right of the other party to the contract "to recover
damages for its breach has been lost or diminished", the only
defences open to the defendant/defender are: release, or waiver, or
157 Vesta v. Butcher [1989] A.C. 852, Barclays Bank v. Fairclough. supra, at
p.229C-D, per Beldam L.J., and the cases cited there; Nourse L.J. agreeing. See
also Simon Brown L.J., at p.233.
158 Per Beldam L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd.. supra, at
p.230F; Nourse L.J. agreeing.
159 Per Beldam L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd.. supra, at
p.230G; Nourse L.J. agreeing.
160 Per Beldam L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd.. supra, at
p.230G; Norse L.J. agreeing.
161 Per Simon Brown L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd..
supra, at p.233E-F.
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forbearance. The 1945 Act "was never intended to obtrude the
defence of contributory negligence into an area of the law where it
has no business to be."162
In a banking or lending context, it is unlikely that the 1945 Act, with
its restricted application, will be of much assistance to a lender,
except in the case of contributory negligence by a customer in
relation to cheques.163
TF1 CONCLUSION
The question of recovery by a borrower for breach of a contract by a
lender will depend on the question of remoteness, which, ultimately,
depends on the lender's knowledge. Whilst recovery for a general
loss of business is likely, important business ventures, which are lost
due to the lender breaching a loan agreement and not providing
money, will need to be something the lender has in his contemplation
at the time of contracting. Where a bank has undertaken a thorough
investigation of the borrower, and is carefully monitoring the
162 per Nourse L.J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd.. supra, at
p.243C-D.
163 A customer can be contributorily negligent in relation to cheques: see
Donaldson J. (as he then was) in Lumsden & Co. v. London Trustee Savings Bank
[1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 114, and see now s.47 of the Banking Act 1979, allowing a
defence of contributory negligence, where "proof of absence of negligence
would be a defence in proceedings by reason of section 4 of the Cheques Act
1957".
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borrower's progress, such as in a rescue, the lender will have very
detailed knowledge of the borrower's financial and business affairs.
Consequently, the lender will need to be very careful if it refuses to
provide funds, once a loan agreement has been signed, especially
where other lenders are involved and there are cross-default clauses
in the customer's various loan agreements.
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CHAPTER 11.
THE DUTIES OF A STANDARD SECURITY HOLDER AND A
LEGAL MORTGAGEE OF LAND
The central problem for a secured lender acting as a standard
security holder (under Scots law) or a legal mortgagee of land (under
English law) arises when it exercises its power of sale to recover the
debt owed to it because the debtor/mortgagor has defaulted in
payment, and the heritage or land has been sold at an under value,
with the result that the debtor/mortgagor receives no surplus or an
inadequate surplus from the proceeds of sale; in the former case, the
amount recovered from the sale may not be enough to discharge the
debt owed to the lender1, once it has been applied to the security
holder's debt (which may or may not be satisfied by the sale). In
either case, it has the consequence that the lender might be liable to
pay damages (under Scots law), or make an account in equity (under
English law) to the debtor/mortgagor. (Except where the context
otherwise requires, the term "security holder" will be used to
describe both the standard security holder (under Scots law), and the
legal mortgagee by the way charge over of land (under English law);
likewise, the generic term "debtor" will also be used to describe a
mortgagor.)
1 This is the problem of negative equity, in which the debt owed becomes
greater than the value of the property. This occurred in England during the
recession of the late 1980's and early 1990's. The reason for it was a fall in the
property market. However, a sale at an under value has the same effect.
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In this context, three main issues have arisen: (i) the nature of the
relationship between security holder and debtor; (ii) when can the
security holder sell or realise its security?; and (iii) whether the
security holder is liable for the acts of any agent employed by him in
the selling of the security subject? Other related issues which will be
looked at are: (i) the effect bringing of a counter-claim or seeking an
injunciton/interdict to prevent a sale by the debtor has where the
security holder seeking to sell the security subject; and (ii) whether a
security holder can exclude its liability. Lastly, the common pitfalls
for secured lenders will be examined.
Standard Security - Scots Law
In Scotland, the position of a standard security holder is governed by
the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform Act 1970 (the "1970 Act"), and
the common law. The most relevant section is s.25, which provides:2
"A creditor in a standard security having a right to sell the security
subjects may exercise that right either by private bargain or by
exposure to sale, and in either event it shall be the duty of the creditor
to advertise the sale and to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the
price at which all or any of the subjects are sold is the best price that
can reasonably be obtained."
2 See on this: Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365; noted by Hood, P., "The
Duties of a Standard Security Holder" 1994 J.L.S.S. 257. Cf. Halifax Building
Society v. Gupta 1993 S.L.T. 339 (I.H.); noted by Guthrie, T., "Controlling
Creditors' Rights Under Standard Securities" 1994 S.L.T. (News) 93.
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Legal Mortgage By Way Of Legal Charge - English Law
In England, the position of a legal mortgagee is essentially governed
by equity,3 and the Law of Property Act 1925 ("LPA"). S.87 of the
LPA permits a lender to create a legal mortgage of land "by a charge
by deed expressed to be by way of legal mortgage" with "the same
protection, powers and remedies", such as the right to commence
legal proceedings, and receive rents.4 The alternative of a legal
mortgage by way of demise is not used, because the mortgage has to
be granted for 3,000 years.5
3 See Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation Ltd. [1993] A.C. 295
(P.C.), on the nature of the mortgagee's duties, which arise in equity. A lender
may also take an equitable mortgage of the legal estate in land, but, in practice,
the lender tends to take a legal mortgage by way of charge, using standard
form documents. The equitable mortgage used to be effected by a deposit of the
title deeds to the land, but this has been procedure has been changed by the
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. It is now necessary to
have an agreement in writing executed by both parties to it: see United Bank of
Kuwait v. Sahib [1996] 2 W.L.R. 372.
4 See, however, the legislation concerning the rights of married women and
overriding interests: s.70(l) of the Land Registration Act 1925, and the cases on
them, e.g., Williams & Glvn's Bank Ltd. v, Boland [1981] A.C. 487 (H.L.(E.)); and
Abbey National Building Society v. Cann [1991] 1 A.C. 56 (H.L.(E.)).
5 S.85(1) of LPA 1925.
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(1) The Relationship Between Security Holder and Debtor
The nature of the relationship between a security holder and a
debtor is a fiduciary one6, although it is not one of trustee and
beneficiary7: because the security holder is able to consider his own
position and sell the security subject when he likes8, in order to
repay the debt owed to him9. Also, the trustee qua trustee does not
have any interest in the trust property10, unlike the security holder
Further, a trustee cannot dispossess the beneficiary, as this would be
a breach of trust.11 This is in contradistinction to a standard security
6 See Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365; Farrar v. Farrars Ltd. (1888) 40
Ch. D. 395 (C.A.); Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd. Edn., at
para. 11.43, on p.202.
7 See Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. Mutual Finance Ltd. [1971] 1 Ch. 949 (C.A.); and
Farrar v. Farrars Ltd. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 395 (C.A.).
8 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365 (I.H.); and Bank of Cyprus (London)
Ltd. v. Gill [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51 (C.A.).
9 Cuckmere Brick, supra, at p.969F, per Cross L.J. (as he then was); and Farrar
v. Farrars Ltd.. supra.
10 Cuckmere Brick, supra, at p.973, per Cross L.J.
11 See Cholmondelev (Marquis) v. Clinton (Lord) (1820) 2 Jac & WI; and Farrar
v. Farrars Ltd. (1888) 40, Ch. D. 395, under English law. Under Scots law, this
would be a situation of a trustee being an auctor in rem suam, as he has a
conflict of interests, which he exercised in his own favour, against the
beneficiary: see Wright v. Morgan [1926] AC. 788, at pp.797-798, per Lord
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holder, who has a real right in relation to the security subject and can
sell the property, pursuant to the terms of his standard security, and
the 1970 Act. Similarly, a mortgagee, having a legal mortgage by
way of charge, has rights in relation to the sale of the property, the
subject of the charge, including the right to look to the mortgaged
property for satisfaction of the debt owed to it.12
The debtor, however, under a standard security/mortgage, has a
right of redemption, under Scots law13, or, an equity of redemption,
under English law, which enables the debtor to redeem the secured
property upon discharging the debt owed to the security holder. This
right is important when the question of the duties owed to a debtor
are considered, because it is regarded as wrong that this right should
be affected by the security holder. Consequently, once the property
is sold, the security holder is trustee of the proceeds of sale for the
debtor.14
Dunedin. See too Lord Kyllachy in Town and Country Bank Ltd. v. Walker
(1904) 12 S.L.T. 411, atp.412 (on breach of trust).
12 National Provincial and Union Bank of England v. Charnlev [1924] 1 K.B.
431, at p. 449, per Atkin L.J. (as he then was)
13 See s.18 of the 1970 Act, and Schedule 3, "The Standard Conditions", condition
11. However, this right may be excluded by contract: see s. 18( 1) of the 1970
Act. For a discussion of this subject: see Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities (1991),
at paras.10.11-10.15, on pp.158-161.
14 S.27 of the 1970 Act (Scots law); and Cuckmere Brick, supra, at p.966D, per
Salmon L.J. (as he then was) (English law).
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Under Scots law, a security holder, in exercising his power of sale, is a
"quasi trustee".15 This is because, in exercising his power of sale, a
security holder must "pay due regard to the interests of his
debtor"16, which would include the debtor's redemption rights. The
sale of the security subject is not simply a straight sale under which
the fixed security holder is entitled to receive all the proceeds of sale:
on the contrary, he is required to account to the debtor for any
surplus17.
The position is the same under Anglo-Australian jurisprudence,
which is accurately summarised by Professor Tyler, as follows:18
"Historically, . . . equity imposed a fiduciary obligation on the selling
mortgagee not as onerous as a trustee, but in reality, a quasi-trustee
status. This duty was imposed because equity has always treated a
mortgage in whatever form as merely a security and recognising the
interest of the mortgagor (equity of redemption) as being something
more than a mere right to pay off the mortgage, but as a proprietary
15 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365, approving the views of Professors
Bell and Halliday: see, respectively, Principles (1899) 10th edn. (by W. Guthrie),
at p.912; and The Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (2nd
edn.), at para.5-11, and Conveyancing Law and Practice. Vol. Ill, at para.33-27.
See also Rimmer v. Thomas Usher & Son Ltd. 1967 S.L.T. 7, at p.8, per Lord
Thomson.
16 At p.369, citing Bell's Principles.
17 Rimmer v. Thomas Usher & Son Ltd. 1967 S.L.T. 7.
18 "Enforcing Mortgage Securities" (1981) A.L.J. 559. at p.568
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interest. In exercising the power of sale, that interest had to be
protected. Protection was given by imposing a liability on the selling
mortgagee to account in the event of his failing to exercise the power of
sale properly." (Emphasis added.)
Under English law, as the above quote indicates, the position is no
different to Scots law.
Can a Breach of Duty Give Rise To Liability in Negligence?
English Law - Duty Arises in Equity
After a long running debate as to whether a mortgage's duty to a
mortgagor arises in equity or in negligence,19 it has been settled by a
line of authority20 that a mortgagee's duties arise in equity. The
mortgagee is required to exercise his powers in good faith (i.e., to "act
without fraud and without wilfully or recklessly sacrificing the
interests of the mortgagor"21) for the purpose of seeking
19 This would involve a claim for pure economic loss: see Jackson, I.,
"Mortgagee's Power of Sale and Purely Economic Loss" (1986) 60 A.L.J. 812, at
pp.813-814; and Bently, L., "Mortgagees Duties on Sale No Place for Tort" [1990]
The Conveyancer 431, at p.438.
20 China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.); Parker-Tweed ale
v. Dunbar Bank pic [1991] Ch. 12 (C.A.); and Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First
City Corporation Ltd. [1993] A.C. 295 (P.C.). In the two Privy Council cases, Lord
Templeman delivered the advice of the Board to Her Majesty.
21 Kennedy v. de Trafford [1896] 1 Ch. 762, at p.772, per Lindley L.J. (as he then
was), and in the House of Lords: see [1897] A.C. 180, at pp.184-185, per Lord
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repayment.22 In addition, the mortgagee has to take reasonable care
or precautions to obtain a proper price for the security subject,23
(which "is but part of the duty to act in good faith").24 Whilst a
mortgagee owes duties to a subsequent encumbrancer,25 he is under
no general duty of care when dealing with the mortgaged property.26
Herschell. See also Walsh J. in Forsvth v. Blundell (1972-73) 129 C.L.R. 477, at
p.493 (High Court, of Aust.).
22 Downsview Nominees, supra, at pp.312E-G, and 315B-C. See too Lord Moulton
in McHugh v. Union Bank of Canada [1973] A.C. 299, at p.311; and Sir Donald
Nicholls V.C. (as he then was) in Palk v. Mortgage Services Funding Pic [1993]
Ch. 330, at pp.337G-338D.
23 Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.315C-D, per Lord Templeman, approving
Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. Mutual Finance Ltd. [1971] 1 Ch. 949 (C.A.) on this
narrow point. For a discussion of Downsview Nominees: see Berg, A., "Duties of
a Mortgagee and a Receiver" [1993] J.B.L. 213. The case has been criticised by
Lightman, Sir G., and Moss, G., The Law of Receivers of Companies (1994) 2nd
ed., at para.7-13, on p.122.
24 Per Menzies J. in Forsvth v. Blundell (1973) 129 C.L.R. 477, at p.481. See also
Lindley L.J. in Farrar v. Farrars Ltd. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 395, at p.411, who said that
provided a mortgagee "acts bona fide and takes reasonable precautions to
obtain a proper price", a mortgagor has no claim against him. And see Lord
Templeman in Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1349, at
p. 1356G-H.
25 Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.312A-C, per Lord Templeman, citing
Tomlin v.Luce 118891 43 Ch. D. 191.
26 Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.315 D-E, per Lord Templeman.
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The law of negligence does not supplant equitable principles or the
provisions of a contract27. And it is both unnecessary and confusing
to express the duties that a mortgagee owes to a mortgagor in terms
of negligence.28 Rather, the duty between a mortgagee and a
mortgagor arises out of the relationship between them, as recognised
by equity.29
Scots Law
In Scotland, it has been stated that a plea of negligence under the
general law, adds little to the case under the 1970 Act.30 As a
security holder is a quasi-trustee, it is suggested that this is judicial
short hand, and is a way of dismissing a claim without merit -
especially one which had less chance of success than one under
statute.
Summary
Thus, the two jurisdictions are similar in that they both: (i) impose
quasi-trustee duties on security holders; (ii) require security holders,
in their fiduciary capacities, to exercise reasonable precautions in
27 China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536, at pp.543H-544A; and
Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.316D-E, per Lord Templeman.
28 Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank pic 149911 Ch. 12 (C.A.).
29 China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.); and Parker-
Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank pic [1991] Ch. 12 (C.A.). See too Salmon L.J. in
Cuckmere Brick [1971] 1 Ch. 949, at p.967.
30 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365, at p.369.
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selling the security subjects, owing to the right/equity of redemption;
and (iii) require that the proceeds of sale are held in trust for the
debtor, with any surplus being paid first to a subsequent security
holder (if there is one), and then the debtor, once the debt to the first
security holder and the costs of the sale have been paid off. These
similarities are important when looking at when a security holder
can sell and his liability to the debtor for the errors of the former's
agents.
(2) When A Security Holder May Sell Its Security Subjects.
By being under a fiduciary duty, a security holder has a conflict of
interests when selling the security subjects between: (i) his interests
in selling the property quickly to satisfy the debt owed to him and to
reduce interest accruing, and (ii) his duty to have regard to the
interests of the debtor31.
In response to this conflict, the courts have established that the
security holder may resolve this conflict by considering his own
position first - as that is why he is given the power of sale: to enable
the security holder to obtain repayment of his loan. Consequently, a
security holder is, generally, able to sell when he likes, and does not
have to take a rising or falling market into account32. This is the
position under both Scots and English law.
31 The Lord President (Hope) in the Dick case, supra, at p.369, and Cross L.J. (as
he then was) in Cuckmere Brick, supra, at p.969G.
32 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic, supra, under Scots law; and Cuckmere Brick.
supra: China and South Sea Bank v. Tan, supra: and Bank of Cyprus (London)
Ltd. v. Gill, supra, under English Law. Cf. Halifax Building Society v. Gupta 1993
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Scots Law
The position is well set out in the Dick case33. There, a piece of land
was sold as agricultural land. However, there was no reference in the
advertisement of the sale to the land's "hope value", concerning
further development, although planning permission had previously
been refused. The debtor requested the security holder to wait
before selling, due to a proposal for a by-pass, but the security
holder declined. In dismissing the debtor's claim, the Lord President
(Hope) stated the principle succinctly, as follows:34
"... the creditor is entitled to sell the security subjects at a time of his
own choosing, provided he has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that
the price at which he sells is the best price that can reasonably be
obtained at the time."
S.L.T. 339, under Scots law; and 91(2) of the LPA and Palk v. Mortgage Services
Funding Pic [1993] Ch. 330 (C.A.), under English law. It has been held that,
under English law, the security holder can be actuated by another motive: see
Belton v. Bass. Ratcliffe and Gretton Ltd. [1922] 2 Ch. 449 (in that case, it was
malice). This decision is difficult to reconcile with the duties of good faith and
to obtain a proper price, particularly as the courts are now requiring a higher
standard of care towards debtors from security holders, in order to protect the
interests of the former. See also Halsburv's Laws of England (4th edn.), vol.34,
at para.726, fn.8, on p.334, and the cases referred to therein.
33 1991 S.C. 365. (I.H.).
34 Supra, at p.371.
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His Lordship went on to state35 that the security holder should not
have the threat of challenge over him just because "the subjects may
have had a greater value than was realised by the sale." The critical
matter is "the reality of the market place" at the time of the sale.
Provided all reasonable steps are taken "to attract competition" in the
market, then the property will find its own level.36 A security holder
may only be criticised for not taking further steps to attract a
purchaser where there is evidence to show that such steps would
have resulted in a "better bargain".37
In support of the above, and the decision to dismiss the debtor's
claim, the Lord President took into account four factors:38
(i) any approval for housing development was a matter for the
future, i.e., after the sale;
(ii) at the time of the sale, no decision had been taken favouring
development on the land, nor was there any equivalent statement of
planning policy;





38 Supra, at pp.370-371. See Hood, P., "The Duties Of A Standard Security Holder"
1994 J.L.S.S. 257, at p.258, col. 2.
39 Cf Forsvth v. Blundell (19731 129 C.L.R. 477 (High Court of Aust).
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(iv) there was no proof that anything had been done to the land after
its sale, e.g., selling it for a higher price or obtaining planning
permission, to show the price paid was too low.
The Lord President concluded by saying that the averments of the
debtor were "entirely detached from the reality of the market place
in which the subjects were being exposed for sale at the relevant
time"40. He considered the debtor's approach to be theoretical and
"much influenced by the benefit of hindsight"41. Hence, failing to
show someone willing to pay an enhanced value, and that a price at
the enhanced value could be obtained at the relevant time, was
fatal.42
English Law
A similar market orientated approach was taken by the Privy Council
in China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan43, where a guarantor claimed
relief against a mortgagee when shares, which were security for a
loan by the mortgagee to the mortgagor, had become worthless, and
the mortgagee had sought to enforce the guarantee as a consequence.
The guarantor argued that the shares should have been sold earlier
when they would have covered the debt. Lord Templeman, who
40 1991 S.C. 365, at p.371, per Lord President Hope.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.).
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delivered the advice of the Board, dismissed the claim on the basis
that:44
"If the creditor chose to exercise his power of sale over the mortgaged
security he must sell for the current market value but the creditor must
decide in his own interest if and when he should sell . . . The creditor is
not obliged to do anything . . . The creditor was not under a duty to
exercise his power of sale over the mortgaged securities at any
particular time or at all."
If a creditor remains idle, and the guarantor is concerned, then the
surety can "pay off the debt, take over the benefit of the securities at
any particular time or at all".45 But, if the creditor delays and the
debtor becomes insolvent with the security losing its value and the
guarantor moving overseas, the creditor loses his money: so it works
both ways.46 In such a situation, the creditor can sue the debtor
and/or sell the securities, and/or sue the guarantor in seeking
repayment47. Commercial reality and the practicalities of secured
lending, mean that :48
"[N]o creditor could carry on the business of lending if he could become
liable to a mortgagor and to a [guarantor] or to either of them for a
44 Supra, at p.545D-H, per Lord Templeman.
45 Supra, at p.545H.
46 Supra, at p.545E-F.
47 Supra, at p.545C.
48 Supra, at p.545G.
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decline in value of mortgaged property, unless the creditor was
personally responsible for the decline."
However, where "the security was neither surrendered nor lost nor
imperfect nor altered in condition by reason of what was done by the
creditor"49, it has been held there is no liability.
As a consequence of a security holder being able to sell when he
likes, he is only liable to a debtor if, at the time he sells, the security
holder breaches the duty to take reasonable precautions: a delay in
enforcing security will not; although, causing a decline in the value of
security will, as it is a breach of duty. The reason a delay is not a
breach of the security holder's duties to the debtor, is because
nothing has happened to the actual security subject: it still exists as
before, albeit that its value may have decreased (or increased).50 For
example, in Williams & Glvn's Bank Ltd. v. Barnes.51 Mr. Barnes was
chargee of shares in a company ("NDH"), which he was the main
shareholder in. It was held by Ralph Gibson J. (as he then was) that
the bank, which lent money to NDH, did not owe Barnes a duty as
chargee not to reduce the shares' value, due to alleged breaches of
duty owed by the bank to NDH, because the shares had not been lost
or destroyed and once the loan had been repaid, the share
49 Supra, at p.545C.
50 See Hood, P., "Lender Liability Under English Law": Ch. 2 in Bank's. Liability
and Risk (1995) 2nd edn. (R. Cranston, ed.), at p.76.
51 [1981] Comm. L.R. 205, at p.208; and at pp.361, 364, 368 and 369 of the
transcript. See also Hood P., "Lender Liability Under English Law" : Ch. 2 in
Bank's Liability and Risk (1995) 2nd edn., at p.76.
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certificates could be returned to Mr. Barnes. However, only NDH
could bring an action concerning the loan, and so Barnes could not
sue as pledgor of the shares.
The difficulty is that shares, like properties, fluctuate, and it can be
as much of a risk for a security holder if he sells at the wrong time,
particularly, as was the case in the late 1980's and early 1990's,
when property prices declined.52 The reverse may happen, and the
price increases - in such circumstances, no one complains.
Exceptions To Security Holder Selling When He Wishes
English Law
In England, the Court of Appeal has held that a mortgagor may apply
for an order, under s.91(2) of the LPA53, that the mortgagee sell the
52 Although, there will often be mortgage insurance taken out by the debtor,
which protects the security holder against a potential shortfall when a debtor
defaults. This type of insurance has caused hardship to insurers in recent
years, due to the increase in repossessions because of the recession.
53 This section provides:
"In any action, whether for foreclosure, or for redemption, or for sale,
or for the raising any payment in any manner of mortgage money, the
court, on the request of the mortgagee, or of any person interested
either in the mortgage money or in the right of redemption, and not
withstanding that -
(a) any other person dissents; or
(b) the mortgagee or any person so interested does not appear in the
action;
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property, rather than waiting.54 The court has a discretion to grant
such an order, taking into account all the circumstances. There, the
mortgagee wished to take possession to let the house out, but the
interest saved by selling the house was greater.55
Scots Law
In Scotland, the First Division, in Halifax Building Society v. Gupta56,
indicated that there was a distinction between a court: (i) preventing
a creditor from exercising their powers (under Standard condition 10,
and without allowing any time for redemption or for payment of any
mortgage money, may direct a sale of the mortgaged property, on such
terms as it thinks fit, including the deposit in court of a reasonable sum
fixed by the court to meet the expenses of sale and to secure
performance".
54 Palk v. Mortgage Services Funding Pic [1993] Ch. 330 (C.A.). See also Target
Home Loans Ltd. v. Clothier [1994] 1 All E.R. 439 (C.A.). And see too Cheltenham
& Gloucester Pic v. Krausz [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1558, in which Millet L.J., at p.l567H,
said that Palk established that a borrower could obtain an order for sale, where
the lender had no intention, in the foreseeable future, of realising its security,
even if the sum obtained would not discharge the debt; noted "Banking and
Insolvency Law" section (1996) B.J.I.B.F.L. 543.
55 Cf. under Scots law, Halifax Building Society v. Gupta 1993 S.L.T. 339 (I.H.);
noted by Sellar, D.P., "Commercial law Update: Securities and Insolvency" 1994
J.L.S.S. 178. See also Guthrie, T., "Controlling Creditors' Rights Under Standard
Securities" 1994 S.L.T. (News! 93.
56 1993 S.L.T. 339 (I.H.).
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of Schedule 3 of the 1970 Act), because because he is not entitled to
exercise his powers; and (ii) controlling the manner of exercising of
those powers (where the creditor is entitled to exercise his powers),
which the courts cannot do.57
(3) Liability For Acts of an Agent
The third area of importance is whether a security holder is able to
escape liability for breach of duty to the debtor, where the security
holder employs a competent agent and the actions of the agent, such
as a misdescription of the property in an advertisement for its sale,58
result in the security subject being sold at an under value. As a
matter of agency law, the answer to this question is no. The debtor
would sue the security holder, and the security holder would have a
claim against his agent (which is likely to be consolidated into one
action). However, as this plea has been raised in several cases, it will
be necessary to look at it.
Scots Law
In Scotland, this question arose in the context of s.25 of the 1970 Act
in Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic59. The court, which was dealing with a
plea as to the relevancy, did not discuss the issue in great detail.
57 1993 S.L.T. 339, at pp.345-346, per the Lord President (Hope). Cf. Lord Jauncey
in Armstrong. Petr. 1988 S.L.T. 255, at p.258A-C.
58 See, for example, Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365; Cuckmere Brick.
Co. Ltd. v. Mutual Finance Ltd. [1971] 1 Ch. 949 (C.A.); and Commercial and
General Acceptance Ltd. v. Nixon (1982) 152 C.L.R. 491 (High Court of Aust.).
59 1991 S.C. 365, at p.369.
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Senior Counsel for the bank cited the following passage from
Halsburv's Laws of England, in support of his assertion that the bank
was not liable for the acts of its agents:60
"The mortgagee is entitled to employ agents to effect the sale, and so
long as he selects agents presumably competent, he is not liable for
their errors in matters of detail not seriously affecting the success of
the sale or price realised; but if the agent is guilty of a serious blunder
inducing a failure to sell or a large diminution of the price realised, the
mortgagee is responsible, although he may have a remedy against his
agent."
However, the Lord President (Hope) (with whom Lord Mayfield
agreed) was unwilling to place reliance on the passage without a
more detailed examination of the English cases, upon which this
passage was based. Nonetheless, his Lordship appeared to accept
there could be liability, as he did not regard the debtor's averments
as irrelevant on this point61. Lord Hope went on to state that, whilst
no criticism had been made of the security holder's choice of agents
to advise on the sale of the property, the debtor's averments raised
issues about the security holder's personal responsibility for the
instructions given to its agents, which could not be "answered
sufficiently merely by pointing to the fact that professional advisers
were employed"62. This issue could not be properly examined
60 (4th edn.), vol. 32, "Employment of Agents", at para.729, in the "Mortgage"
section.
61 1991 S.C. 365, at p.369, per Lord President Hope.
62 Supra, at p.370.
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without hearing evidence. Such an issue goes to the heart of the
question of principal's liability for the acts of its agent: the agent's
authority and its instructions63.
Lord Cowie, who agreed with the Lord President generally, dissented
in part on this point, as his Lordship was of the view that the above
passage from Halsburv also represented the law in Scotland.64 With
such a view this writer has no disagreement. Lord Cowie thought it
strange that a person who employed experts to market security
subjects, could be held to have failed to have obtained the best
possible price if no criticism is levelled at the experts65. Whilst this
is accepted, the point raised by Lord Cowie is a different one to the
point the Lord President was dealing with66. Lord Hope was
concerned with the situation where there was no criticism of the
agents appointed, i.e., they were regarded as reputable agents. The
Lord President was addressing the situation of the relationship
between: (i) the security holder and his agent, and (ii) the
instructions imparted to the agent, which is a more fundamental
63 See, for example, Predeth v. Castle Phillips Finance Co. Ltd. [1986] 2 E.G.L.R.
144.
64 1991 S.C. 365, at p.372, per Lord President Hope.
65Ibid.
66 Hood, P., "The Duties Of A Standard Security Holder" 1994 J.L.S.S. 257, at p.258,
col. 1.
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question.67 In the Dick case, the question was whether, as a result of
a letter from the debtor to the security holder, the land should have
been marketed not only as agricultural land, but also reference
should have been made to its development potential. Whilst this was
a different matter to Lord Cowie's point, the result was the same, as
the case was dismissed.
Lord Cowie, echoing the passage from Halsburv. took a different
approach, and stated that in the pleadings, there had been no
criticism of the choice or conduct of the agents - and, in particular
that the agents had not committed "a serious blunder"68. With this
view, it is agreed.
The difficulty with the Dick case is that it does not answer the
question concerning liability vis-a-vis an agent's acts. It is answered
in a negative sense, namely, that as the pleadings were defective, the
matter did not arise.
A useful guide to this question is found in the judgements of the High
Court of Australia in Commercial and General Acceptance v. Nixon69.
There, the court was considering the impact of s. 85 (1) of the
Property Law Act 1974 (Queensland), where agents had failed to
advertise a property properly. This section, which is similar to s.25
of the 1970 Act, provides as follows :
67 Hood, P., "The Duties of a Standard Security Holder" 1994 J.L.S.S. 257, at p.258,
col. 1.
68 1991 S.C. 364, atp.372.
69 (1982) 152 C.L.R. 491. (High Court, of Aust.)
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"(1 )lt is the duty of a mortgagee, in the exercise ... of a power of sale
conferred by the instrument of mortgage or by this or any other Act, to
take reasonable care to ensure that the property is sold at the market
value." (Emphasis added.)
In construing this provision, the High Court of Australia held that the
mortgagee was liable for the acts of his agent. Gibbs C.J. was of the
opinion that the words of the section imposed a higher duty than
merely selecting a proper person to carry out the sale70. This duty
"is one the mortgagee is bound to perform and he cannot escape
liability for a breach of that duty by delegation to another."7 1
Echoing statements in previous cases, Gibbs C.J. likened the care a
mortgagee should take in selling a mortgagor's property to the same
care as he would take in selling his own property.72 The learned
Chief Justice noted that in the later situation, the mortgagee would
not entrust the sale to auctioneers and then take no interest in the
sale thereafter (including the details of the advertisement regarding
the sale)73 .
70 Supra, at p.498.
71 Per Gibbs C.J., supra, at p.495.
72 Ibid. See too Lord Moulton in McHugh v. Union Bank of Canada [1913] A.C.
299, atp.311.
73 (1982) 152 C.L.R. 491, at p.495, per Gibbs C.J.
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Mason J. (as he then was), who adopted an approach which is not
dissimilar to the one taken by the Lord President (Hope) in Dick,
stated:74
"The agent acts in accordance with the instructions of the mortgagee
and has no independent discretion to exercise except in so far as the
mortgagee may choose to leave arrangements for the sale in the hands
of the agent. It is not unfair or unreasonable in this situation that the
mortgagee should have the responsibility for the taking of reasonable
care to ensure that the market value is obtained including the
responsibility for adequate advertising of the sale. He should satisfy
himself that the property has been advertised in accordance with his
instructions - that, after all, is what a prudent vendor would do in the
circumstances."
However, his Honour concluded by saying that it was "not
unreasonable to require mortgagees generally, whether experienced
or not, to bear the responsibility of seeing that adequate steps are
taken to ensure that the property is sold at the market value."75
A slightly different line of reasoning was adopted by Aickin, Wilson
and Brennan JJ.76 on the basis that the statute imposed a duty which
74 Supra, at p. 503.
75 Ibid.
76 See at pp.508 and 515, p.521, and pp.524-525, respectively.
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could not be delegated "so as to relieve the mortgagee from the
statutory duty"77. In this regard, Wilson J. said:78
"It would make nonsense of the right which is conferred upon persons
who suffer loss by reason of the negligent failure to sell the mortgaged
property at market value if the mortgagee could escape liability by
engaging an independent contractor. It is quite clear that the section
gives no right of recourse against anyone but the mortgagee the
exercise of whose power of sale is the occasion of the loss."
Similarly, Brennan J. (as he then was) stated that the statute :79
"... imposes a duty to be performed in the exercise of the power of sale
which has been conferred upon [the mortgagee]. In the event of
breach and consequential damage, he alone is liable. The statute
imposes a duty upon him, not upon his servant, agent or independent
contractor. The mortgagee cannot relieve himself of the duty by asking
another to assume it. Nevertheless, there is no reason why the duty
cannot be performed by the acts of another who is engaged to do what
the duty requires to be done. It is the duty, not its performance, which
is personal to the mortgagee . . . The question is simply whether the
mortgagee has discharged by performance the duty which the statute
imposes upon him."
Applying these statements to the 1970 Act, it is suggested that under
that Act the position is the same, i.e., the responsibility for obtaining
77 Supra, at p.508, per Aickin J.
78 Supra, at p. 521.
79 Supra, at p.524.
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the best price cannot be delegated. Similarly, at common law, a
security holder is liable for the acts of his agents, as the passage from
Halsburv above and the following cases indicate.
English Law
In Tomlin v. Luce80, there was a misdescription of a property being
offered for sale. The purchasers demanded, and received,
compensation, on the discovery of this mistake, and the second
mortgagees, who were, effectively, in the same position as a
mortgagor, sued the first mortgagee, on the basis that, as a result of
the error by the first mortgagee's auctioneers, the price had been
reduced and this reduction should not be allowed in taking an
account between the two mortgagees. At first instance, Kekewich J.
said:81
"But whatever is done by him through an agent must be taken to be
done by himself, and, as between him and the mortgagors, he must be
responsible for any acts and defaults. So long, however, as he selects
agents presumably competent he cannot be made liable for their errors
in judgement or in matters of detail not seriously affecting the success
of the sale or the price realized. On the other hand, I think that if the
mortgagee is guilty, directly or indirectly, of a serious blunder,
inducing a failure to sell, or a large diminution of the price realized, the
mortgagor can hold him responsible for that, and it is no answer for
him to say that the blunder was not of his own, but was that of an agent
80 (1889) 41 Ch D 573 (at first instance); and (1889) 43 Ch. D. 191 (C.A.).
81 (1889)41 Ch. D. 573, at pp.575-576.
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in whom he properly placed implicit confidence. The mortgagee must
in such a case be left to his remedy against his agent."
In the Court of Appeal, where the question of quantum was argued,
as liability was accepted, Cotton L.J. (with whom Bowen and Fry L.JJ.
concurred) was of the opinion:82
"The defence seems really to have been very much, if not entirely,
directed to this, that the first mortgagees, selling under their power,
employed a competent auctioneer, and were not answerable for any
blunder which the auctioneer committed. There they were wrong, and
that point was not, I think, argued before us . . . What we think is this, -
that the first mortgagees are answerable for any loss which was
occasioned by the blunder made by their auctioneer at the sale."
However, where a failure to obtain the true market value is
attributable to the conduct of the security holder, even though he has
used an agent, and the debtor sues the security holder, the security
holder's action against his agent will be unsuccessful. For example, in
Predith v. Castle Phillips83, a security holder had asked a surveyor to
do a "crash sale valuation" of a property (a bungalow), which was
later sold to a Miss K for £6,000 - £250 higher than its valuation.
Miss K immediately put it on the market, and sold it for £10,000 a
few months later. The security holder sued the surveyor, in third
82 (1889) 43 Ch. D. 191, at p. 194. This was supported in Cuckmere Brick, supra,
at p.967, per Salmon L.J., and, at p.970, per Cross L.J., where the issue was the
omission of planning permission for flats in an advertisement for their sale by
experienced agents. The court held the security holder liable for this omission
83 [1986] 2E.G.L.R. 144.
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party proceedings, concerning his valuation. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the security holder's claim. The Court was of the opinion
"that the hard fact is that [the security holder] wanted to sell quickly
and wanted to sell to Miss [K], he wanted to sell at a price which
would enable Miss [K] to make a profit"84, and, as a consequence, the
security holder's "difficulties in this case are not the result of [the
surveyor's] advice. They are essentially of the [security holder's]
own making."85
(4) Counterclaims and Interdicts/Injunctions By the Debtor
What, however, is the position where the security holder has
exercised his power of sale, but the debtor wishes either to halt this
sale, or to have the sale set aside because he has a counterclaim
against the security holder, e.g., for a sum owed to him. The
question, from the security holder's point of view, is: whether a
counterclaim prevents him exercising his power of sale, where the
validity of the security is not being challenged?
English Law
In England and Australia, there is a line of authority86 which makes
it clear that the mortgagee, in such circumstances, is not prevented
84 Supra, at p.l47D, per Fox L.J. (Croom-Johnson and Ralph Gibson L.JJ.
agreeing).
85 Supra, at p. 147J, per Fox L.J.
86 See Samuel Keller (Floldings) Ltd. v. Martins Bank Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 43
(C.A.); and Barclays Bank pic v. Tennet. unreported decision of the English
Court of Appeal, delivered on 6th June, 1984, applying Samuel Keller. See
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from exercising his power of sale. Before a debtor can bring an
action to stop the exercise of the mortgagee's power of sale (i.e., seek
an injunction), and, thus, prevent a mortgagee obtaining the benefit
of his security, there needs to be a safeguard, namely, the debtor
bringing into court an amount sufficient to meet the mortgagee's debt
or paying off the amount outstanding. The reason for this is that,
until the mortgage debt is discharged by actual payment and
acceptance of the sum, the mortgage and the debt it secures remains
in existence, despite any counterclaim (which may, or may not,
succeed)87.
The courts have regarded it as being neither just nor convenient that
a mortgage could be discharged by "the existence or unilateral
appropriation of an unliquidated claim".88 There was no reason why
the debtor should be able to unilaterally "discharge the mortgage
debt by appropriation without payment".89 This applies even if the
claim is liquidated and admitted, because there may be advantages
to one or both of the parties to keep the mortgage and the mortgage
debt alive, for example, the rate of interest, or a new project to be
Inglis v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972) 126 C.L.R. 161 (High
Court of Aust.) and Cunningham v. National Australia Bank (1987) 77 A.L.R. 632.
87 Samuel Keller, supra, at p.47H-48C, per Megarry J. (at first instance),
approved by Russell L.J. (who delivered the leading judgement) in the Court of
Appeal; and by Eveleigh L..J. in Barclays Bank pic v. Tennant. at p.6 of the
transcript (Lexis).
88 Samuel Keller case, [ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 43, at p.48A-B, per Megarry J.
89 Supra, at p.48C, per Megarry J.
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financed making liquid cash preferable to the satisfaction of the
mortgage debt.90 However, the reasoning in the second situation is
flawed. This is because it ignores the reality of the situation. The
lender is seeking to recover its debt because the debtor has
defaulted; consequently, it is unlikely such an arrangement is in the
mortgagee's interests. Also, if a mortgagor has defaulted under one
loan agreement, then the lender is less likely to provide finance for a
subsequent transaction, particularly if the debtor has commenced a
claim against it. Thus, any advantages will be commercial ones, e.g.,
the two parties wish to continue relations going between them.
Consequently, where a debt is liquid and admitted, and it arises out
of the same set of circumstances giving rise to the mortgage, then,
logically, there is no sound reason to disallow such a claim by a
debtor. Alternatively, the debtor may have a right of set-off in
relation to the debt it owes, and the one it is owed.
Nonetheless, concern has been expressed that where the parties have
used a payment system under a contract involving a notional full
payment and a lending on mortgage of a sum, there could be abuse if
the security holder was kept out of his expressly provided for rights
by allegations of a connected cross-claim, which may prove
groundless91.
However, where the counter-claim is questioning the validity of the
mortgage, then - subject to the usual undertaking as to damages -
interlocutory relief may be granted to prevent the security holder
90 Supra, at p.48B-C, per Megarry J.
91 Supra, at p. 5ID, per Russell L.J.
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exercising his power of sale92, because, if the security is invalid, the
right to exercise the power of sale, on default, does not arise. But the
invalidity of the security will not necessarily extinguish the debt
owed to the mortgagee, as this debt will normally arise under a loan
agreement; nonetheless, the debt will be unsecured, and there may
be difficulties under the Limitation Act 198093.
Setting Aside The Sale
Under English law, as a general rule, where a mortgagee has not
exercised the power of sale properly, and the purchaser has not
bought at the best price, the courts will "set aside the sale and
restore to the borrower the equity of redemption of which he has
been unjustly deprived"94. But the debtor will only be awarded
damages where it would be "inequitable, as between the borrower
and the purchaser, for the sale to be set aside."95
As to what constitutes "inequity" is unclear. In Warner v. Jacob96,
Kay J. said that the court will not interfere, even if the sale is very
disadvantageous, unless the price is so low as to "be evidence of
fraud." It would also seem that where a mortgagee has sold to a
92 See, for example, Cunningham v. National Australia Bank, supra.
93 See ss.5 and 6 of the 1970 Act.
94 Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1349, at p,1359H, per Lord
Templeman.
95 Supra, at p. 1360A.
96 (1882) 20 Ch. D. 220, at p.224. Cf. Forsyth v. Blundell. supra.
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company in which it has an interest, and the sale is not an
independent bargain, then the courts have shown they will set the
bargain aside.97 This case does not mean that the courts cannot
prevent a creditor exercising his powers where the exercising of
those powers would mean the creditor was in breach of his duties to
the debtor; but this will be a rare occurrence.98 A company which
the security holder has an interest in, has a separate identity at
law99, and it has been said that a sale by a security holder to a
company in which he holds shares is not necessarily invalid: not that
it is valid100. This is unlikely to arise as a lender will primarily be
concerned with selling the property for as much as he can obtain it,
rather than being involved in transactions with its own subsidiary
undertakings. It is possible that the property division of a lender
may buy it (cheaply) and on sell it at a profit.
97 Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen, supra: and A.N.Z. Banking Group Ltd. v.
Bangadillv Pastoral Co. Ptv. Ltd. (1976-77) 139 C.L.R. 195. Cf. Palk v. Mortgage
Services Funding pic [19931 Ch. 330, at p.337B-C, where Sir Donald Nicholls V.C.
(as he then was) indicated, en passant, that it was possible for the mortgagee to
"take over the [mortgaged property] at its current sale value."
98 Guthrie, T., "Controlling Creditors' Rights Under Standard Securities" 1994
S.L.T. tNewsl 93, at p.96, col. 1.
99 Farrar v. Farrars Ltd. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 395.
100 Per Aickin J. in Bangadillv Pastoral Co.. supra, at p.225.
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Scots Law: Interdict To Prevent A Sale
In Scotland, there has been a reluctance to prevent a sale from
proceeding where it is claimed that a creditor is acting in breach of
s.25 of the 1970 Act.101 In Associated Displays Ltd. fin liquidation)
v. Turnbeam Ltd.102, missives for the sale of property had been
concluded, but there was a large discrepancy between the offer made
and a valuation obtained by the debtor's liquidators. Consequently,
the liquidators sought an interdict against the creditors from
disposing of the property at the agreed price in the missives until the
creditors had satisfied the court that s.25 of the 1970 Act had been
complied with. This action was unsuccessful on appeal before the
Sheriff Principal for two reasons. First, because s.25 does not confer
a right upon a debtor to require a creditor to show he has fulfilled
the duties set out in that section: the onus of proving that the best
price has not been obtained rests on the debtor, and the interdict
asked for sought to invert that onus. Secondly, by the time the
application was made, "the price had already become part of an
enforceable contract of sale."103 This was an interdict ad interim and
101 Cf. Lord Jauncey in Armstrong. Petr. 1988 S.L.T. 255, at p.258A-C; and the
comment on it by the First Division in Halifax Building Society v. Gupta 1994
S.L.T. 339, at pp.345I-346B. See the discussion of these cases by Guthrie, T.,
"Controlling Creditor's Rights Under Standard Securities" 1994 S.L.T. (News) 93.
102 1988 S.C.L.R. 220 (Sheriff Principal, N.D. MacLeod Q.C.). This case was
followed by Sheriff Principal D.J. Risk Q.C. in Gordaviran Ltd. v. Clydesdale
Bank Pic 1994 S.C.L.R. 248.
103 1988 S.C.L.R. 220, at p.222.
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"interim interdict is never granted against what is already done"104.
Consequently, under s.27 of the 1970, the debtor's right, regarding
the proceeds of sale, only extended to the "residue of the money . . .
received", i.e., the price; the debtor's right or interest does not extend
to the property.105 Hence, the debtor had no interest, or title, to seek
to interdict what remained to be completed regarding the sale106. In
such circumstances, not only is interdict ad interim incompetent, but
so is interdict.107 This case does not mean that the courts cannot
prevent a creditor exercising his powers where the exercising of
those power would mean the creditor was in breach of his duties to
the debtor, but this will be a rare occurrence.108
(5) Exclusion Of Liability Bv The Security holder
English Law
Under English law, it is arguable that, subject to the Unfair Contract
Terms Act 1977 ("UCTA"), the duty on the security holder to take
reasonable precautions could be excluded by contract (although this
presupposes that the duty arises in negligence and not equity). Any
attempt to exclude the duty must be express and clear, and in
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid, citing Burn-Murdoch on Interdict, at p. 90.
106 1988 S.C.L.R. 220, at p.222.
107 Ibid.
108Guthrie, T., "Controlling Creditors' Rights Under Standard Securities" 1994
S.L.T. (News) 93.
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unambiguous language. In Bishop v. Bonham109. a mortgage of
shares contained a provision stating that the mortgagee could sell the
shares in such manner and upon such terms and for such
consideration as "he thought fit", and that he would not be liable for
any loss howsoever arising. When the shares were sold at an
apparent undervalue, the Court of Appeal held that this provision did
not exclude negligence and, thus, when the duty to take reasonable
precautions was couched in negligence, the mortgagee remained
liable. Regretably, though, there was no discussion of the position
under UCTA, where a test of reasonableness would have to be
satisfied, as the threshold question had not been overcome.
This case has been criticised110 as "posting] more questions than it
satisfactorily answers"; and as offering a security holder very limited
protection - particularly against claims by third parties (although
they are, as their name indicates, not parties to the security
documentation and so any exclusion clause in it could not be used
against them, or, at worst, it would be construed against the party
relying on it). Also, recent developments in the law of mortgages
mean that a third party, who is not a subsequent security holder,
would not be able to successfully sue a security holder in negligence.
109 [1988] 1 W.L.R. 742 (C.A.).
110 Lawson, M., "The Rights and Remedies of Mortgagees" [1988] J.I.B.L. 251. at
p.258.
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As to the effect of UCTA, it has been argued111 that a mortgage of
land and securities may be excluded under Schedule 1 of UCTA,
which sets out the types of contracts excluded from the Act,
including:
"1(b) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer
of an interest in land, or to the termination of such an interest,
whether by extinction, merger, surrender, forfeiture or
otherwise; and
1(e) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer
of securities or any right or interest in securities."
Scots Law
The Scottish provisions of UCTA, which are framed in an inclusive,
rather than an exclusive, form, provide that UCTA applies to a
contract to the extent that the contract, amongst other things, "relates
to a grant of any right or permission to enter upon or use land not
amounting to an estate or interest in the land."112
Thus, an exemption clause relating to an estate or interest in the land
will not be covered by UCTA. There is no mention of "securities",
which is not a term defined in the Act, but which, it is assumed, will
bear its general meaning, and refer to shares and stocks, rather than
1 11 Thus, an exemption clause relating to an estate or interest in the land will
not be covered by UCTA: see Lawson M., "The Rights and Remedies of
Mortgagees" [1988] J.I.B.L. 251, at pp.257-258.
112 S.15(2)(e) of UCTA.
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encumbrances113; if securities bore the second meaning, then there
would be no need to refer in such detail to land in Schedule 1(b).
Does UCTA Apply To A Security Document?
It can be argued114that a standard security, under Scot's law (which
gives a real right to the security holder)115, and a legal mortgage by
way of charge, under English law, do create interests in land, thus,
taking a properly drafted exclusion clause in a security document
outside UCTA.
Conversely, it can be argued that, strictly construed, Schedule 1(b)
and s.l5(2)(e) of UCTA relate to the purchase or lease of land, or land
held in trust, or the sale of land, or the termination of a lease, or the
dissolution of a trust, however, and do not refer to a right in security.
If read ejusdem generis, the reference to "the termination of such an
interest" (being the interest referred to in Schedule 1(b)) is the
inverse of it. Interestingly, the qualifying words do not refer to
termination by discharge, which would be the way a security would
be terminated; the omnibus phrase "otherwise" may be thought to
cover this, but, if read in context, would not support such a
113 The case of Micklefield v. S.A.C. Technology Ltd. [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1002,
indicates "securities" refers to shares.
114 As Lawson has done, supra.
115 See Cusine, D.J., Standard Securities (1991), at para.4.03, on p.23, who says
that a standard security is not only created over an interest in land, but is itself
an interest in land. See also Reid, K.C.C., The Law of Property in Scotland
(1996), atpara.4-5, on pp.9-10.
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construction. Therefore, the first argument is the better one, with
regard to "securities", this refers to shares, rather than
encumbrances,116 and, hence, is not concerned with a charge (either
fixed (under English law) or floating) over shares.
(6) Pitfalls For Lenders
The two major pitfalls for a lender, regarding the exercise of his
power of sale, are: (i) a failure to advertise the property correctly
(usually it will be his estate agent who will do this, and so the
security holder will be vicariously liable); and (ii) selling the
property privately and not by a public sale117 These are directly
linked to the requirement to take reasonable precautions.
(i) Failure To Advertise Properly
The case law indicates that the main complaint is that some form of
development potential has been overlooked. In Cuckmere Brick118,
despite some "face saving responses" and delay from the debtor
116 Micklefield v. S.A.C. Technology Ltd. 1" 19901 1 W.L.R. 1002.
117 For an exhaustive list of the pitfalls which may befall a security holder: see
Kapnoullas, S., "The Duty of Mortgagees When Exercising The Power of Sale In
Victoria" (1987) Vol. 16 M.U.L.R. 146, at pp.157-161. These pitfalls include: (1)
Independent Purchaser - avoiding conflicts of interests; (2) Sale before
auction; (3) Price; (4) Disclosure of reserve; (5) Setting of a reserve and
obtaining a valuation; (6) Consulting with the debtor; (7) Advertising; (8)
Employment of agents; (9) Timing of sale; and (10) Duty to guarantors and to
other persons.
118 [1971] 1 Ch. 949 (C.A.).
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company's alter ego, a Mr. Fawke, regarding the debtor's financial
position, the failure to mention planning permission for flats
concerning the property by the agents (who were genuinely
pessimistic about flat development in the area) was fatal. This was
despite the court observing that "valuation is not an exact science"119,
and that "careful and competent valuers may differ within fairly
wide limits about the value of any piece of land".120 If it was, or it
should have been, obvious that a site maybe attractive to flat
developers (and it has planning permission for this) then, it is
"imprudent"121 not to mention the planning permission in the
advertisement regarding the sale. But, as the Dick case122 illustrated,
where it is merely hoped that there will be planning/development
permission (or it has yet to be granted), and nothing of this was
known to the security holder, at the time of the sale, then, such an
omission will not be fatal to the security holder.
In the Nixon case123, the question concerned the insufficiency of
advertising, as the property had only been advertised once in a
newspaper (albeit one circulating throughout Queensland, although
the sale was to take place near Bundaberg); and the advertisement
"was published only two days before the sale on a day not normally
119 Supra, at p.959B-C, per Salmon L.J. (as he then was).
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 1991 S.C. 365.
123 (1981) 152 C.L.R. 491.
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favoured for such advertisements, and it failed to sufficiently
identify the location of the property."124 This failure (amongst other
things) was held to constitute a breach of duty.
Conversely, in Scotland, it has been held that a failure to advertise
the sale of heritage in a national newspaper, rather than a local one,
did not amount to a breach of duty by the security holders, as those
would have increased the cost, and there was no evidence that
persons outside the area would be interested in buying the property.
Further, it was held that a failure to refer, in the advertisement, to
the property having planning permission for use as an office, in
addition to use as a shop, was not a breach of duty, as there was no
evidence that the property would be more attractive if it had been
advertised as a shop.125
But the Privy Council has held that Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen
where the first advertisement for a property gave a prospective
purchaser only fifteen days to make a decision and "organise his
finances"126 this was one of a number of matters in that case, which
meant that the exercise of the security holder's power of sale had not
been reasonable.127,
124 Supra, at p.517, per Aickin J.
125 Bank of Credit v. Thompson 1987 G.W.D. 10-341 (Sh. Ct.).
126 Supra, at p. 1357H, per Lord Templeman.
127 Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1349 (P.C.).
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Summary
Thus, the lessons for lenders are that they should :
(a) check the particulars of any advertisement themselves and check
them with the debtor;
(b) advertise the property adequately in relevant newspapers: if
appropriate, both local and national newspapers, depending on
the type of property and the market; and
(c) advertise the property within an adequate time for potential
purchasers to make necessary arrangements and decisions.
(ii) Public Sale or Private Bargain
This is a vexed question for a security holder, as he can sell his
property when he likes and by either of the above methods.
However, in view of the security holder's obligations128 to the debtor,
the security holder should, except in special circumstances, sell the
property by public sale, properly advertised129, where the prospect
of competition is increased, more potential purchasers are attracted,
and, as a consequence, as high a price as possible obtained (although
in a falling market, it may be better to seek to sell privately,
especially if it is known that the debtor is in serious financial
difficulty, rather than the price being increased through competition,
the bidding is low in the hope of obtaining a bargain). In Scotland,
the Inner House has acknowledged that sale by public roup is no
128 See at section (1) in this chapter.
129 Bank Of Cvpais (London) Ltd. v. Gill [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51 (C.A.).
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longer "the best method of testing the market and securing the best
price".130
The difficulty with a private bargain is that it is open to abuse. In
Rimmer v. Thomas Usher & Son Ltd..131 the debtor, who had granted
a security over his hotel, defaulted and became bankrupt. The
security holder entered into a private bargain to sell the hotel.
Under the terms of the security documentation (which was entered
into prior to the 1970 Act), the sale was not advertised. Prior to
submitting his offer, the purchaser arranged with the creditor that
the latter would advance the former the purchase price. The quid
pro quo for this act of generosity was that the purchaser would
continue to purchase his liquor supplies from the creditor, so long as
the advance was unpaid (an indirect charge over book debts or
negative pledge).132 In upholding a claim by the debtor's wife and
the debtor, Lord Thomson was not satisfied that the price paid would
not have been higher had the hotel been advertised.133 In his
Lordship's opinion, the creditor:134
130 Campbell v. Murray 1972 S.C. 310, at p.313, per Lord President Emslie, cited
with approval by an Extra Division in The Miller Group Ltd. v. Tasker 1991
S.L.T. 207, at p.208F, per Lord Weir, giving the judgement of the court.
131 1967 S.L.T. 7.
132 It is not clear from the report whether the debtor had entered into a
similar tied hotel deal, but it seems unlikely.
133 1967 S.L.T. 7, atp.9.
134 Ibid.
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"... was under an overriding obligation to the pursuers to exercise
their power of sale bonafide and with regard to the interests of the
pursuers and take such reasonable steps as they considered necessary to
obtain a full and fair market price for the subjects."
Similarly, in the Australian case of Forsyth v. Blundell,135 a security
holder arranged for an auction to be held with a reserve price, which
was the sum due under the mortgage. Before the auction date was
arranged, a third party expressed interest in paying off the mortgage
debt or bidding in excess of the reserve price. There had been
difficulties with the sale of the property, and so the security holder
sold the property to S, without informing S of the third party's
interest or the third party of S's interest in the property. Prior to the
sale's completion, the debtor sought, and was granted, a declaration
stating that the power of sale had not been exercised properly, and
an injunction restraining the security holder from completing the
sale. On appeal to the High Court, it was held by a majority of two to
one, that the security holder had acted with "calculated
indifference"136 to the debtor's interests, and that it was appropriate
to restrain the sale, notwithstanding S was unaware of the interest
shown in the property by the third party. With respect, this decision
may be criticised on the basis that insufficient credence was given to
the rule that the security holder may sell when he likes.137
135 (1973) 129 C.L.R. 477 (High Court of Aust.).
136 Supra, at p.493, per Walsh J.
137 See the dissenting judgement of Menzies J.
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Nonetheless, it has been stated by the Privy Council138 that "[s]ale by
auction does not necessarily prove the validity of a transaction". And
in Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd. v. Gill139, the Court of Appeal, in
affirming Lloyd J. (as he then was), took the view that the security
holder was quite correct in entering into a private sale after the
debtor's estate agent had failed to sell an hotel at auction (although
there was some interest, it would seem that the asking price was too
high), as, at the relevant time (mid 1970's), the property market was
in a slump.
The question is: which method of sale - a public sale or private sale -
is going to realise the best price in the prevailing market conditions,
so that the interests of the debtor are protected? The answer to this
is that, as a matter of prudence, in most cases, a public sale, properly
advertised, will be the best method, because there will be a greater
exposure to a wider number of potential purchasers, and the
competitive nature of bidding will bring the best price. The key to
this is adequate advertising.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that, although the security holder may sell the security
subject, at a time convenient to him, and not wait until market
conditions improve, he must take account of the debtor's right, or
equity of redemption, and cannot sell at a price which will merely
discharge the debt owed to the security holder. The security holder
138 Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1349, at p,1355G, per Lord
Templeman.
139 [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51.
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is in a fiduciary relationship with the debtor - he is a quasi-trustee -
and must take reasonable precautions when selling that he sells at
the best price that can reasonably be obtained or the true market
value. A failure to do so, will mean that the security holder will be
liable to account to the debtor for the difference between the price
obtained and what should have been obtained. One also senses that
the courts, indirectly at least, look at the fairness of the situation
when deciding whether there has been a sale at an undervalue.
The security subjects should be properly advertised so as to increase
the number of potential purchasers at the sale - preferably public,
rather than a private, sale, unless the market conditions dictate the
opposite. This will normally be done by a (competent) estate agent
or solicitor. If the agent makes a "blunder", rather than an error of
judgement, then the security holder is vicariously liable for this
action of its agent. The reason for this is that the duty to take
reasonable precautions, but not the execution of that duty, when
selling the security subject, is a personal one imposed upon the
security holder, and can not be delegated.
Whilst the property market is more buoyant now than it was a few
years ago, and the risk of negative equity has been reduced, security
holders should, nevertheless, take great care when selling the
property (of any kind) of debtors, so that there can be no recourse
against the security holders, bearing in mind the courts, on the
whole, tend to be more sympathetic to the debtor and his
opportunity to obtain a surplus than they are to the security holder.
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CHAPTER 12
LIABILITY OF LENDERS FOR THE ACTS OF RECEIVERS
THEY APPOINT
[A] Introduction : The Receiver
A receiver1 is an insolvency practitioner2 appointed over the assets
of an insolvent corporate debtor by a creditor of that debtor who
holds a floating charge3. The receiver replaces the directors of the
1 In England, this type of receiver is known as an administrative receiver, and
is a receiver and manager of the property of the insolvent company. In
Scotland, he is called a receiver. For convenience, the term "receiver" will be
used. For a fuller discussion receivers in England: see Lightman, Sir Gavin,
and Moss, G., The Law of Receivers of Companies (1994) 2nd edn., and Goode,
R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990). For a discussion of the
law of receivership in Scotland: see Greene, J.H., and Fletcher, I.M., The Law
and Practice of Receivership in Scotland (1992) 2nd edn.; St. Clair, J.B. and
Drummond Young, J.E., The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland (1992) 2nd
edn., Ch. 5, and Wilson, W.A., The Scottish Law of Debt (1991) 2nd edn., Ch. 9.
2 Only an insolvency practitioner may be appointed: see ss.230(2) and ss.390-
392 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended) ("IA'86"), and the Insolvency
Practitioners (Recognised Professional Bodies) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986 No. 1754).
Such persons are normally accountants.
3 A floating charge is, unhelpfully, described in s.251 of the IA'86 as "a charge
which, as created, was a floating charge. . . " For a judicial definition of a
floating charge: see Re Yorkshire Woolcombers' Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch.
5 1 8
debtor company, and takes over the management and running of the
debtor's business with a view to either: (i) selling the business (or
part of it) as a going concern, or (ii) selling the assets caught by the
floating charge, and applying the proceeds of sale to discharge the
debt owed to the floating charge, or debenture, holder.
(i) Floating Charges Under English Law
In England, the floating charge, pursuant to which the receiver is
appointed4, is normally contained in a debenture5, which will also
contain fixed charges; the receiver - who is a creature originally of
284. at p.295, per Romer L.J. (as he then was), affmd, sub. nom. Illingworth v.
Houldsworth [1904] A.C. 355, at p.358, per Lord Macnaughten. In that case, it
was said that a floating charge was a charge on a class of assets, present or
future, which, in the ordinary course of business, was ambulatory and shifting
in nature, i.e., floating with the property, and which required a further act or
event before the charge fastened on to the asset. Thus, the charge holder does
not exercise control over the asset, unlike the holder of a fixed security holder,
as assets may come in and go out of the charge before it crystallises.
4 In this respect, a receiver is unique, as he is the only type of insolvency
practitioner who can be appointed solely by a secured creditor; unsecured
creditors cannot appoint a receiver
5 Sometimes a lender might have, what is called, an anti-Administration, or
"lightweight", floating charge, in order to be able to block the appointment of
an Administrator, and to allow the floating charge, or debenture, holder to
appoint a receiver. For a discussion of this: see Oditah, F., "Lightweight
Floating Charges" [1991] J.B.L. 49.
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equity and now also of statute - is appointed over "the whole (or
substantially the whole) of" the debtor company's assets.6
(ii) Floating Charges Under Scots Law
In Scotland, the floating charge is not a native of commercial life
north of the border (and, it follows, neither is the receiver).7 The
floating charge was introduced to Scotland in 1961, by statute8, as a
result of pressure from the business community, who saw their
English counterparts being able to borrow at a lower rates of interest
because of the floating charge. The floating charge's introduction has
been criticised9, and although this writer is not opposed to the
6 S.29(2)(a) of the IA'86, as applied by s.251 of the IA '86.
7 The floating charge, under the general law of Scotland, has been held to be
"utterly repugnant to the principles of Scots law", by Lord President Cooper in
Carse v. Coppen 1951 S.C. 233, at p.239. The floating charge was subsequently
described by Lord President Hope in Sharp v. Thomson 1995 S.C. 455, at p.48ID,
as a "concept which is alien to Scots law".
8 See the Companies (Floating Charges) (Scotland) Act 1961. One of the
problems of this legislation was that it did not allow for the appointment of a
receiver; this was rectified by the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers)
(Scotland) Act 1972: see Gretton, G.L., "Floating Charges: The Scottish
Experience" [1984] J.B.L. 255, at p.256. The current law on floating charges, in
England, is contained in ss.462-467 of the CA'85; for receivers in Scotland: see
Chapter II (ss.50-71) of the IA'86.
9 See Gretton, G.L., "Floating Charges: The Scottish Experience" [1984] J.B.L. 255.
On a more general note: see Grylls, M., "Insolvency Reform: Does the United
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Kingdom Need to Retain the Floating Charge?" [1994] J.I.B.L. 391, speaking
against the floating charge in an English context. See also Lord President
Hope in Sharp v. Thomson 1995 S.C. 455, at p.481D; and Lord Clyde, in the House
of Lords, 1997 S.C. 66, at pp.78G-H and 82D-E.
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floating charge10, its introduction, into a different legal system, has
not been seamless.11 The result is that a receiver, in Scotland, is also
wholly a creature of statute, and can be appointed by "the holder of a
10 It is suggested that it is not unreasonable for a lender, which is providing a
large amount of finance to a business - usually by far the largest amount - to
require strong security (i.e., fixed and floating security), and for the parties to
agree to this (on the basis that if the security is not agreed to, there will be no
funding and the borrower's business will collapse). This is particularly so in
view of the anachronistic and commercially unrealistic rules, in Scots law,
prohibiting the granting of fixed securities over moveables. Where this
writer would take issue, is with the three forms of corporate insolvency:
administration, receivership and liquidation, which involve unnecessary
duplication and cost where a company goes into liquidation after being in
receivership or administration, and the receiver or administrator is replaced
by a liquidator; or the unnecessary duplication, in Scotland, where there can
be both a receiver and a liquidator. It is suggested that a single form of
insolvency regime with the insolvency practitioner (who is to deal with the
insolvent company) being appointed by the court and having powers to: (i)
sell a business as a going concern, or (ii) sell its assets, or (iii) to wind it up, is
to be preferred. This would help to overcome the perception - wrong as it may
be - that the receiver is "the bank's man". Such a change would not cause
difficulties for insolvency practitioners, who are used to acting in three
different capacities - they may be a receiver or an administrator one day, and
a liquidator another day.
11 See, for example, Lord Clyde in Sharp v, Thomson 1997 S.C. 66, at p.78G-H,
who said part of the problem in that case was "[t]he introduction of this form
of charge into legal system to which it did not naturally belong".
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floating charge12 over all or any part of the property (including
uncalled capital)13, which may from time to time be composed in the
property and undertaking of an incorporated company . . . 1,14
(iii) Appointment Of A Receiver
Scotland
Under Scots law, the appointment of a receiver is, usually, made
under the floating charge, which allows for the receiver to be
12 A company, in Scotland, which is in debt to a creditor, may "create in favour
of the creditor ... a floating charge over all or any part of the property
(including uncalled share capital) which may from time to time be comprised
in the debtor company's property and undertaking", pursuant to s.462(1) of the
Companies Act 1985 (as amended) ("CA'85").
1 3 The House of Lords recently interpreted the meaning of "property" under
s.462(1) of the CA'85 in the (in)famous case of Sharp v. Thomson 1997 S.C. 66
(H.L.). Their Lordships held, as a matter of statutory construction, that
"property", did not include heritage being sold by the debtor company, where
the missives of sale had been concluded, but the disposition had not been
registered. The decision is wrong, and has been criticised: see Reid, K.G.C.,
"Jam Today: Sharp in The Lords" 1997 S.L.T.fNews) 79; see also Birrell, J.G.,
"Sharp v. Thomson: The Impact on Banking and Insolvency Law" 1997 S .L.T.
tNews) 151.
14 See s.51 (1) of the IA'86. Nb. the differences in wording between the position
in England, under, s29(2)(a) ("the whole (or substantially the whole)" of the
debtor's assets). Cf. part (b) of the definition of "administrative receiver", in
s.251 of the IA'86, concerning Scotland.
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appointed for non payment of a debt, for example; and, on the
appointment of the receiver, the charge crystallises15. Alternatively,
under Scots law, where there are no provisions in the floating charge
concerning the receiver's appointment, s.52 of the IA '86 provides
that a receiver may be appointed where:
(a) a demand for payment of a debt has not been wholly or partially
satisfied within twenty-one days of the demand;
(b) interest payable under the charge has not been paid during a two
month period;
(c) there is a resolution or order to wind up the debtor; or
(d) a receiver is appointed under another floating charge.16
Normally, though, the instrument creating the floating charge
provides that the floating charge holder may, on demand, require the
borrower to pay all sums due and owing, and if the borrower does
not make payment after twenty-four hours, the floating charge
holder is entitled to appoint a receiver.17
15 See ss.51 (1) and 53(7) of the IA '86.
16 In England, the Court of Appeal has said that, in the absence of a provision
in the debenture allowing the appointment of a receiver, a debenture holder
cannot appoint a receiver where it feels the debtor's secured assets are in
jeopardy; nor will a term to such effect be implied: Crvne v. Barclays Bank pic
[1987] B.C.L.C. 548.
17 Greene, J.H., and Fletcher, I.M., The Law of Receivership in Scotland (1992)
2nd edn., at para.1.38, on p.14. For an example of such a clause: see Appendix 1,
Third Clause (Secundo), on p.214.
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England
In England, a demand for repayment of a debt due and owing is the
most common ground for the appointment of a receiver.18 This is
done pursuant to the terms of the debenture, as the Insolvency Act
1986 is silent on this.19 Where a term loan has been breached, the
loan can be accelerated and becomes "on demand"20. The courts have
taken a very strict approach to "on demand", and have held that it
means just that: on demand. There is no concept of a reasonable time
to pay after the demand has been made, as there is in some
Commonwealth countries.21 The debtor is only allowed such time as
18 See Lightman and Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies (1994) 2nd edn.,
at paras.4-10 - 4-11 and Paget's Law of Banking (1996) 10th edn. (by M. Hapgood
Q.C.), at p. 198.
19 Goode R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990), at p.84. See
clause 7.01, in Document 1 (Debenture), in Part IV, "Specimen Security
Documents", of Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn., on
p.356. The opening words provide: "At any time after the Bank shall have
demanded payment of any money. . . hereby secured . . . the Bank may appoint
any person to be a receiver of the Changed Assets". By statute, a receiver has
to be an insolvency practitioner: see ss.230(2) and 390-392 of the IA'86, and the
Insolvency Practitioners (Recognised Professional Bodies) Order 1986 (S.I. 1986
No. 1754).
20 In England, as the demand is for "all moneys and liabilities", the exact
amount due and owing does not have to be specified; whereas in Scotland, it
does: see Elwick Bav Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Roval Bank of Scotland 1982 S.L.T. 62.
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he needs to implement "the mechanics of payment" to discharge the
debt, such as, going to its bankers, or getting the money from a desk
or safe22; the debtor does not have time to seek to raise money to
pay off the debt.23 The time period involved has been held to be as
little as one hour.24 If the money is not paid, a receiver is appointed,
pursuant to the debenture.
(iv) Management of the Company
Once appointed, the receiver replaces the board of directors of the
company and takes over the management of the company and runs
it.2 3
21 See Bunburv Foods Ptv. Ltd. v. National Bank of Australasia Ltd. (1983-84)
153 C.L.R. 491; and ANZ Banking Group (NZt Ltd. v. Gibson [1981] 2 N.Z.L.R. 513.
22 See Goff J. in R.A. Cripps & Son Ltd. v. Wickenden [1973] 1 W.L.R. 944, at
p.955A, and Walton J. in Bank of Baroda v. Panessar [1987] 1 Ch. 335, citing his
own, unreported, decision in Hawkin & Partners Ltd. v. Pugh. delivered on 25th
June, 1975. See too Blackurne J. in Sheppard & Cooper Ltd. v. TSB Bank pic (No.
2) [1996] B.C.C. 965, at p.969G-H.
23 ibid.
24 R.A. Cripps & Son Ltd. v. Wickenden [1973] 1 W.L.R. 944.
2 3 As to whether the directors have any residual powers on behalf of the
company, the position is not clear. The general rule is that they do not.
However, in England, where an asset was outside the debenture, and the
directors said they would indemnify the debtor company, the directors were
allowed to sue the receiver: see Newhart Developments Ltd. v. Co-operative
Commercial Bank Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 814 (C.A.). This case was regarded as an
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(v) Agent of the Company
Also, once the receiver is appointed, he becomes the agent of the
company26. The reason for this is so that the floating charge, or
"exceptional case" by Hoffman J. (as he then was) in Gomba Holdings UK Ltd. v.
Homan [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1301, at p.1307; and Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.C.
(as he then was) expressed "substantial doubts" about Newhart in Tudor Grange
Holdings Ltd. v. Citibank NA [1992] Ch. 53. See also Brightman J. (as he then
was) in Re Emmadart Ltd. [1979] Ch. 540, at pp.544 and 547. In Scotland, there
are two decisions that do not accord completely with each other: see Lord
Grieve in Imperial Hotel tAberdeen) Ltd. v. Vaux Breweries 1977 S.C. 86, who
reached a different conclusion to Shaw L.J. in Newhart. and cf. Lord Weir in
Shanks v. Central Regional Council 1987 S.L.T. 410. The latter decision
(Shanks) has been disapproved of by Lord Hamilton: see Independent Pension
Trustee Ltd. v. Law Construction Co. Ltd. 1997 S.L.T. 1105 (O.H.), see too: Goode,
R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990), at p.92; Meagher,
Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Principles (1992) 3rd edn., at
paras.2848-2851; and Lightman and Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies
(1994) 2nd edn., at para.2-08, on the issue of director's residual powers.
26 See s.57(l) of the IA'86 for Scotland, and s.44(l)(a) of the IA'86 for England.
This is also the position under the instrument appointing the receiver, which
makes the receiver the debtor company's agent, and, in England, under the
common law: see Gosling v. Gaskell [1987] A.C. 575 (H.L.(E.). For an example of a
debenture appointing the receiver as the company's agent: see Lingard, J.R.,
Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn., "Specimen Security Documents", Part
IV, clause 7, in Document 1 (Debenture), at pp.356-358, and clause 8 in
Document 2 (Composite Debenture), at pp.376-379. For an example, under Scots
law: see Greene, J.H., and Fletcher, I.M., The Law of Receivership in Scotland
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debenture, holder will not be liable as principal for contracts entered
into by the receiver, and, in the case of a debenture holder, to
account as a mortgagee in possession.27 This agency is something of
a fiction because it has been held that the receiver's primary duty is
not to the debtor company, but to the floating charge, or debenture,
holder who appointed him.28 It is because of this duty to the floating
charge, or debenture, holder, that the receiver has been described as
being like the Roman God, Janus, which faces both ways29, and,
possibly, the only non-fiduciary agent30. Nonetheless, the receiver
(1992) 2nd edn., Appendix 1, Third Clause (Secundo), at p.214. The right of a
debenture holder (or floating charge holder) to exercise its contractual rights
to appoint a receiver can only be challenged on the basis of bad faith: Shamii
v. Johnson Mattlev Bankers Ltd. [1986] B.C.L.C. 278.
27 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1992) 3rd
edn., at para.2841, on p.707.
28 See Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation [1993] 2 A.C. 295 (P.C.);
Hoffman J. (as he then was) in Gomba Holdings UK Ltd. v. Homan [1986] 1
W.L.R. 1301, at p,1305B-C; and Fox L.J. in Gomba Holdings U.K. Ltd. v, Minories
Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1231, at p. 1233 E-H. In Scotland: see Lord Grieve in Imperial
Hotel (Aberdeen! Ltd. v. Vaux Brewery 1977 S.C. 86, at p.91, citing with approval
Jenkins L.J. (as he then was) in Re Johnson & Co. Ltd. (Builders] Ltd. [1955] Ch.
634, at p.661. The statement by Jenkins L.J., that the receiver has no duty to see
as much as possible is left for others after the sale by the receiver, is doubtful.
29 Goode, R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency (1990), at p.82.
30 Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1992) 3rd
edn., at para.2845, on p.709.
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acts independently of the floating charge, or debenture, holder31, and
can only be removed by a court order.32 In England, this agency
terminates when the company goes into liquidation33; this is not so
under Scots law, as there can be both a receiver and, subsequently, a
liqidator of a company: the former acts for the secured creditors, and
the latter for the unsecured creditors.34
(vi) Powers of The Receiver
To achieve his objective of making sure the floating charge, or
debenture, holder is paid, the receiver is given extensive powers,
31 Goode, R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency (1990) at p.82.
32 See ss.62(l) and 45(1) of the IA'86 for Scotland and England, respectively.
The view expressed by Lord Templeman in Downsview Nominees, supra, at
p.315H, that, if the debenture holder is not satisfied with the receiver's "policy
or performance", the receiver's appointment can be revoked, is not correct.
33 See the wording of s.44(l), which refers to the receiver being agent of the
company "until the company goes into liquidation". At common law: see
Gosling v. Gaskell [1896] 1 Q.B. 669, at p.699, per Rigby L.J. (dissenting), whose
judgement was upheld on appeal: Gaskell v. Gosling [1897] A.C. 595 (H.L.(E.)).
34 See Re Manlev Petrs. 1985 S.LT. 42. NB. the differences in wording between
s.57 (which applies to Scotland) and s.44 (which applies to England) of the
IA'86. Under the former, it is made clear that the receiver may act whilst there
is a liquidator - an odd, and unnecessary, situation.
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under both the floating charge or debenture35, and the Insolvency
Act 1986.36 The powers are of two kinds: (i) those powers which are
"held in right of the [floating charge or] debenture holder", which
derive from the security created by the floating charge or debenture
holder, e.g., the collection in and disposal of assets caught by the
floating charge37; and (ii) those powers "vested in the receiver as
deemed agent of the company", e.g., the power to hire or dismiss
employees38. These powers may overlap39, and there is also an
incidental power.
35 For an example of the powers of a receiver under a debenture: see clause 7
of Document 1 (Debenture), Part IV, "Specimen Security Documents", in
Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn., at p.356-358.
3 6 in Scotland: see s.55 and Schedule 2 of the IA'86; in England: see s.42 and
Schedule 1 of the IA'86.
37 Goode, R.M., Commercial Law (1995) 2nd edn., at p.865. Professor Goode refers
to these as in rem powers.
38 Goode, R.M., Commercial Law (1995) 2nd edn., at p.865. Professor Goode
refers to these as personal powers.
39 For an example of the powers set out in the instrument appointing the
receiver: see Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn., Part IV,
"Specimen Security Documents", Document 1 (Debenture), clause 7.01, on
pp.356-358; and Document 2 (Composite Guarantee and Debenture), clause 8.01,
on pp.377-378.
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(vii) Sale of Secured Assets
English Law
The receiver may sell the debtor company's assets when he wishes.40
However, when he does so, he is under the same duties in equity
(and not in negligence), under English law, as a mortgagee, namely:
(i) a duty to act in good faith41, and (ii) a duty to take reasonable
care, when selling the secured assets of the debtor, to obtain the
market value.42 If the receiver does not obtain a proper price43 for
40 Downsview Nominees Ltd v. First Citv Corp. [1993] 1 A.C. 295 (P.C.) at p.314,
per Lord Templeman; China and South Sea Bank v. Tan Soon Gin [1990] 1 A.C.
536 (P.C.): Cf. s.91 of the (English) Law of Property Act 1925 and the Court of
Appeal in Palk v. Mortgage Services Funding [1993] Ch. 330, allowing a
mortgagor to obtain an order that a mortgagee sell the mortgaged property,
rather than wait, so that the negative equity in it did not increase.
Technically, the Downsview and Tan cases are not binding on English Courts,
as they are Privy Council decisions, but it would be a brave judge who did not
follow them, and it is accepted they represent the law.
41 Lord Templeman rejected the broader duty of care in negligence approach
in Cuckmere Brick Co v. Mutual Finance [1971] Ch. 949, and limited the case to
the proposition stated above in the text. Lord Templeman's statements about
Cuckmere and "good faith" are not completely reconcilable.
42 See Downsview Nominees Ltd v. First Citv Corp. [1993] 1 A.C. 295, at p.315, per
Lord Templeman, delivering the advice of the Privy Council, and approving
Jenkins L.J. (as he then was) in Re B. Johnson & Co. (Builders') Ltd. [1955] Ch.
634, at pp.661-663. See the discussion of Downsview case in the section, in this
thesis, on Standard Security Holders and Mortgagees, and by Berg, A., "Duties of
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the assets caught by the floating charge (or other security)44, the
receiver may be sued by the debtor company45, a subsequent
a Mortgagee and a Receiver" [1993] J.B.L. 213. Lightman and Moss, The Law of
Receivers of Companies (1994), 2nd edn., at para.7-13, on p.122, state that the
reference to "good faith" in Downsview must be confined to "situations where
there is a conflict (and not an identity) of interests" between the debtor
company and the debenture holder. The learned authors go on to state that "if
the immunity goes further, it should be limited to business judgements, e.g.,
whether and how to continue trading, though why immunity from suit in
negligence even in this area should be thought necessary or desirable is
unclear. Such a business judgement could not constitute negligence just
because it is later second-guessed or proved wrong: for this purpose, it must be
one which no competent mortgagee or receiver would take."
43 However, where the receiver has acted in good faith, he will not be liable to
the debtor, even if he could have obtained a higher price and though the
terms are disadvantageous to the mortgagor: see Lord Templeman in
Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.315B-C.
44 If there is a debenture, there will also be a fixed charge over the asset
(unless it is a bank account). Similarly, in Scots law, if the asset is heritage,
there is very likely to be a standard security over it.
45 As the directors of the company are replaced by the receiver, there is
limited scope for them to sue, but it is possible for a liquidator to sue the
receiver under s.212 of the IA'86 for breach of duty to the company. Lord
Templeman in Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.317C-D, said a mortgagee (and,
thus, a receiver) "owes a general duty to subsequent encumbrancers and to the
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encumbrancer46, or a guarantor47, or a liquidator, i.e., parties having
an interest in the equity of redemption. These duties on the receiver
arise in equity: and not, as was once thought, in negligence.48
mortgagor to use his powers for the sale purpose of securing repayment of the
moneys owing under his mortgage and a duty to act in good faith".
46 See Downsview Nominees, supra, and Tomlin v. Luce (1888) 51 Ch.D. 573,
[1889] 43 Ch.D. 191, approved in Downsview Nominees, supra, which supports
the view, in the context of a mortgagee, that the mortgagee (and, thus, a
receiver too) is liable for loss caused to a subsequent secured creditor, i.e.,
selling the secured asset at an undervalue.
47 Any such duty arises in equity: and not in negligence: see China and South
Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan Soon Gin [1990] 1 A.C. 536, and Downsview Nominees, supra.
In China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan Soon Gin [1990] 1 A.C. 536, Lord
Templeman, at p.545, in a guarantee case, referred to the creditor deciding if
and when to sell and that if he did so, "he must sell for the current market
value". This makes cases where guarantors sued receivers in negligence of
doubtful authority in England: see Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. v. Walker
[1982] 1 W.L.R. 1410 (C.A.), and American Express International Banking Corp.
v. Hurlev [1985] 3 All E.R. 564. In Scotland, a receiver has been held to owe a
duty of care in negligence to a guarantor, but this was a plea to the relevancy
and a proof before answer was allowed: see Lord Advocate v. Maritime Fruit
Carriers Co. Ltd. 1983 S.L.T. 857.
48 Similar views have been expressed in relation to a guarantor by Lord
Templeman in Downsview Nominees, supra: China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v.
Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536; and by the Court of Appeal in Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar
Bank pic (No. 11 [1991] Ch. 12, in relation to a mortgagee.
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Scots Law
Under Scots law, there is authority indicating that if a receiver fails
to sell the property for a proper price, then the receiver may be
liable in negligence.49 However, these decisions need to be read with
some caution, as they were delivered when the law of negligence was
in the ascendancy, under Anns v. Merton LBC50. and since then the
law of negligence has been curtailed, with Anns being overruled.51
Recently, the First Division has held that a standard security holder
49 See Lord Advocate v. Maritime Fruit Carriers Co. Ltd. 1983 S.L.T. 357, a case
concerning a guarantee, in which Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. v. Walker.
supra, was applied; and Larsen's Executrix v. Henderson 1990 S.L.T. 498. See too
Lord President Emslie in Forth & Clyde Construction Co. Ltd. v. Trinity Timber
Plywood Co. Ltd. 1984 S.C. 1, at p.11, who said, obiter, that a receiver, in
exercising his power of sale under a floating charge must do so "without
negligence", and "must . . . exercise care to see that he does not realise
company assets for less than the value which might reasonably be expected to
be obtained." For a discussion of this case: see Wilson, W.A., "The Nature of
Receivership" 1984 S.L.T.(News) 105, and Gretton, G.L., "The Floating Charge in
Scotland" [1984] J.B.L. 344. See also Rimmer v. Thomas Usher & Son Ltd. 1967
S.L.T. 7, at p.9 (O.H.), in which it was said that a security holder must exercise
his power of sale bona fide and with regard to the interests of the debtor
company and obtain a fair price. Cf. Lord Templeman in Downsview Nominees.
supra.
50 [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.(E.)).
5 1 See, for example, Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605, and
Murphy v. Brentwood D.C. [1991] 1 A.C. 398, which over-ruled Anns.
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is, at common law, under a duty of quasi-trustee to the debtor to
consider the debtor's interests, when selling the debtor's assets, as
well as its own.52 By parity of reasoning, the same obligation can be
said to arise in relation to a receiver. What is clear is that, the
receiver cannot sell the property at an undervalue. Moreover, as a
receiver, in Scotland, originates from statute, rather than equity, it
can be argued that the debtor company in receivership could bring
an action for breach of statutory duty against the receiver for failing
to realise the best price, contrary to its statutory agency of the
company.53 It would appear, though, that, as in English law, the
receiver can sell at a time of his choosing.54
In Scotland, a catholic security holder55 must take into account the
position of a secondary creditor56 when selling security subjects, and
not injure that secondary creditor. However, where the receiver is
choosing assets to ingather and sell, this rule does not apply, nor is
52 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank Pic 1991 S.C. 365, at p.369, per Lord President Hope.
53 See s.57(l) of the IA'86. Quaere: whether the IA'86 gives rise to a claim in
damages.
54 Dick v. Clydesdale Bank pic 1991 S.C. 365, in relation to a standard security
holder.
55 Being a creditor with security over more than one asset of the debtor: see
Wilson, W.A., The Scottish Law of Debt (1991) 2nd edn., at para.8.6.
5 6 Being a creditor with security over one of the assets that the catholic
security holder has security over: see Wilson, W.A., The Scottish Law of Debt
(1991) 2nd edn., at para.8.6.
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the receiver required "to have regard to the interests of other
creditors in selecting his targets, except as provided by the
[Insolvency Act 1986]".57
LB] Liability Of Lender For Acts Of The Receiver
Because of the fiction that the receiver is the statutory agent of the
debtor company, the company is made responsible for his acts58,
57 Per Lord President Emslie in Forth & Clyde Construction Co. Ltd. v. Trinity
Timber & Plywood Co. Ltd. 1984 S.C. 1, at p.11.
5 8 Except where the receiver enters into contracts involving personal
liability, where that liability has not been disclaimed. In that situation, the
receiver is liable for any breach of those contracts committed by him. The
receiver is also personally liable where he adopts contracts of employment:
ss.57(2) and 44(2) of the IA'86, and the decision in Powdrill v. Watson [1995] 2
A.C. 394. These sections have now been amended by the Insolvency Act 1994,
but it is questionable whether the amendments go far enough. As an agent of
the debtor company, the receiver has a right to an indemnity for its costs,
expenses and liabilities, including personal liability on contracts (see ss.57 and
44 of the IA'86), but not for its negligence or omissions: see Lightman and
Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies (1994) 2nd edn., at para.21-06, on
p.320. Cf. Berg, supra, at p.234, who argues that if the receiver was paid out of
the assets of the debtor company, then, if the receiver is an officer of the
company, this could be struck down under s.310 of the CA '85. In American
Express International Banking Corpn. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R. 564, at p.571h,
Mann J. (as he then was), said that where the receiver was constituted the
agent, the debenture holder may have a claim for an indemnity from the
receiver under an implied term of the agency agreement. This is questionable,
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However, where the lender: (i) gives the receiver directions, or (ii)
interferes with the receiver's conduct of the receivership,59 the
lender will be liable to the debtor company, if it suffer loss because
of the interference in the receivership or the receiver obeying
lender's actions. This is because the receiver ceases to be the agent
of the debtor company and becomes the bank's defacto agent60.
Consequently, the bank becomes liable for the conduct of its agent
acting within the scope of its agency.61 As to whether the receiver
has become the bank's agent, will depend on the circumstances of the
case.62
on the basis that you cannot benefit from your own wrong doing - here,
interference by the lender or giving directions to the receiver.
59 See Standard Chartered Bank v. Walker [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1410, at p.l416A-B, per
Lord Denning M.R.; and Mann J. (as he then was) in American Express
International Banking Corp. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R. 564. The rationale for
liability, based on negligence, in these cases, is no longer sound, in view of
Downsview Nominees, supra, but the points about interference and giving
directions to the receiver remain valid. The correct basis of liability, however,
is agency.
60 A similar view is taken by Goode, R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency
Law (1990), at p. 109.
61 The same principles will apply where the bank, in England, upon the
debtor's liquidation, appoints the receiver as its agent.
62 American Express International Banking Corp. v. Hurlev [1985] 3 All E.R.
564, at p.568, per Mann J. (as he then was).
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This principal and agent based liability for lenders who usurp the
receiver's role is significant in two situations. First, where there has
been a sale of the debtor company's assets at an undervalue, and this
can be attributed to the lender's actions. The typical situation will be
where the lender is concerned to realise its security at a price that
will cover its debt, but which will ensure a quick sale. Thus, where
the receiver is trusted by the bank "to get on with it", there is no
liability.63 However, where there is a sale at a serious under value,
and the receiver is likely to have discussed the sale with the bank or
contacted the bank about it, this may constitute interference and
there may be liability64. Alternatively, it has been held that, where
the lender has played a part in the sale of a security subject by a
receiver it appointed, e.g., placing an advertisement about the sale in
a newspaper, indicating that the asset had "extraordinary potential",
but stating, later, that the "receiver's expectations are set at a
significantly lower level", which had an adverse effect on the
marketing of the asset, by suggesting that it could be acquired below
63 American Express International Banking Corp. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R.
564.
64 Bank of New Zealand v. Ginivan [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178, at p.182, per Casey J.,
giving the judgement of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in an unsuccessful
summary judgement application by the bank against the Ginivans, who were
guarantors that were called upon to pay up under their guarantee, when a sale
by a receiver, appointed by the bank, did not raise sufficient funds to pay off
the debtor's debt to the bank.
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its true value, this could constitute interference, as taking away some
of the receiver's discretion65.
Secondly, a floating charge or debenture holder's instructions or
interference may be relevant where the receiver repudiates an
existing contract of the debtor company's, after his appointments,
and this repudiation has been "instigated" by the lender.
A receiver is not, usually, personally liable in damages to either the
debtor company or the other contracting party when the receiver
terminates a debtor company's contract, or does not allow the
company to perform it, even though the result may well be an
exposure on the company's part, to termination of the agreement or
damages or both.66 There are two reasons why this is so.67 First,
because assets, the subject of a floating charge or debenture, are
likely to be involved, and the floating charge, or debenture, holder is
not required to release such assets. Secondly, because the
management of the business is conferred on the receiver, mainly for
the floating charge or debenture holder's benefit, the receiver must
be free to refuse to perform contracts and shutdown unprofitable
65 Edmonds v. Westland Bank Ltd. [19911 2 N.Z.L.R. 655, at p.661, another
unsuccessful summary judgement case, again involving guarantors.
6 6 Re Newdigate Colliery Ltd. [1912] 1 Ch. 468 (although this was a case
concerning a court-appointed receiver, nonetheless, it is suggested that the
principle is correct).
67 See Goode, R.M., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990), at p.99; see
too: Lingard, J.R., Corporate Rescues and Insolvencies (1989) 2nd edn., at
para.6.24.
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parts of the business if this is in the best interests of the company's
business.
But, where a lender interferes with the performance of a contract, or
instructs a receiver to break such an agreement, which the receiver
does, the lender may be liable for inducing a breach of contract.68
Lenders will seek to rely on the recent decision of the Court of
Appeal, in England, in Edwin Hill & Partners v. First National Corp.
pic69. In that case, it was stated that a mortgagee who interferes
with a contract between the debtor and a third party, where the
mortgagee has an equal or superior right to the third party
concerning the debtor's assets (which are the subject of the
mortgagee's security), will not be liable for inducing breach of
contract. This exception is part of the defence of "reasonable
justification or excuse".70
Where, however, the right was not equal or superior, such as where
an asset was the subject of a prior ranking fixed security, e.g., over
an aircraft or a house, and the receiver sought to terminate a contract
relating to the asset, on the lender's instructions, the lender, as
68 See too Lightman and Moss, The Law of Receivers of Companies (1994) 2nd
edn., at para.7-22, who take a similar view to this writer. See the discussion of
this topic in the chapter on the Economic Delicts in this thesis.
69 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 225. See the discussion of this case in the chapter on the
Economic Delicts in this thesis.
70 Reed, R.J., "Aspects of the Law of Receivers in Scotland" 1984 S.L.T.(News)
229, at p.230.
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principal, is likely to be liable. Moreover, the interference in the
receivership is unlikely to be held to amount to "justification".
Lastly, it may also be argued that a receiver who is obeying the
instructions of one secured creditor (the debenture holder who
appointed him) is not acting in good faith, under English law, and
could be prejudicing the interests of a second encumbrancer to whom
he owes a duty. Whilst the receiver owes a duty to the debenture
holder regarding repayment of the latter's debt, that duty is subject
to two qualifications: (i) the receiver is an independent party, as is
shown by the need to obtain a court order to dismiss him, and (ii) the
duty owed to a subsequent encumbrancer. Hence, it would be
inappropriate to allow the floating charge, or debenture, holder to
interfere in the receivership or give the receiver directions. If he did
so, then, on agency principles, the floating charge, or debenture,
holder is liable.
A floating charge, or debenture, holder who appoints a receiver so
that the receiver will exercise his powers for an improper purpose,
e.g., to frustrate another floating charge, or debenture, holder71, may
be considered as acting in bad faith.72. If so, it might be argued that
the receiver is really the agent of the floating charge, or debenture,
holder, and, hence, the floating charge, or debenture, holder is liable
for breaches of duty by its agent, the receiver. Here, the receiver, is
not independent and objective, and is prejudicing the interests of
other encumbrancers.
71 As occurred in Downsview Nominees [19931 1 A.C. 295 (P.C.).
72 See Lord Templeman in Downsview Nominees, supra, at p.317D-G.
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rCI Conclusion
This is an area where the lender having a floating charge or
debenture can easily avoid liability. The lender is able to appoint a
receiver of its choosing, and should then rely on the skill of its chosen
professional. The lender's concern is to be repaid the debt that it is
owed. Whilst there may be differences as to the strategy involved,
e.g., whether the receiver should seek to hive down the business, or
sell individual assets, i.e., a share or an asset sale, provided the debt
is repaid, the lender can have no reason to interfere. When the
chances of repayment are less certain, and there is a conflict as to
which strategy is the best, the lender must trust the receiver's
judgement. If the lender does not, then the possibilities are more
unfavourable for it: the lender could be liable in damages for
interference with the receivership, which reduces the amount it will
recover, or the company could be put into liquidation, in which case
the liquidator's obligation is to the general body of creditors: not a
floating charge, or debenture, holder.
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CHAPTER 13.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF LENDERS
INTRODUCTION: CONTAMINATED LAND
The critical issue for a lender, in environmental matters, is the
extent to which it will be liable for the costs of cleaning up land
which is found to be contaminated, where the lender has taken
security over the land, and wishes to enter into possession and
enforce its security to recover a debt, i.e., to what extent is the
lender (who has not contaminated the land) liable for the actions
of a defaulting borrower or a previous owner who has
contaminated the land? This is a very difficult question, involving
many finely balanced judgements, e.g., if the legislation is too
severe, then lenders will not lend to certain types of industries, as
happened in the United States1 - the so-called "dirty businesses",
such as, dry-cleaners, printers, big chemical plants, metal bashers
1 This was acknowledged by the previous government: see its two Consultation
Papers: "Contaminated Land Clean-up & Control", March, 1994 and "Paying For
Our Past" (March, 1994), at paras.45 and 4B.19, respectively, and during the
debate on the Environment Bill 1995: see Hansard. H.L., 31st January, vol.560,
col. 1448, per Viscount Ullswater. See also Welch, E., and Parker, A., "A Bank's
View of Lender Liability in Environmental Legislation" [1993] J.I.B.L. 217.
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and farmers2; on the other hand, if lenders contribute nothing to
clean-up costs, and they retain their security, they are obtaining a
windfall, at the taxpayer's expense, when they enforce their
security. In an attempt to explore these issues further, the
previous government had two reviews in 1994 - one in Scotland3
and one in England and Wales4 - whose rationale appears to be,
ultimately, prevention of contamination of land by "encouraging"
or forcing people to conduct environmental surveys or audits.5
The outcome is Part IIA of the Environment Protection Act 1990
("EPA'90"), introduced by s.57 of the Environment Act 1995
2 See "Cleaning-up" and "Where bankers fear to tread", The Economist, 21st
May, 1994, at pp.18 and 107, respectively. A survey in 1993 by the American
Bankers Association of small banks found that almost 90% of a broad sample
had altered their lending policies to try to avoid environmental liability; and
many banks have ceased lending where they feel "their capital could be wiped
out by a single, unexpected claim": see "Where bankers fear to tread", supra, at
p.107.
3 Entitled "Contaminated Land Cleanup & Control", a Consultation Paper
(March, 1994), prepared by the Environment Department of the Scottish Office.
4 "Paying For Our Past", a Consultation Paper (March, 1994), prepared by the
Department of the Environment and the Welsh Office.
5 "Contaminated Land Clean-up & Control", supra, at para.74, and "Paying For
Our Past", supra, at para.4E. 19.
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("EA'95"), which deals with contaminated land6, and places it in
context with other areas of environmental liability, e.g., water and
waste and statutory nuisance7. This legislation has yet to come
into force, and the new Government is deciding whether to enact
its predecessor's legislation and statutory guidance8. Nonetheless,
6 For a discussion of the new contaminated land regime: see Tromans, S., The
Environment Acts 1990-1995 (1996) 3rd edn.; Lee, R.G., "Contaminated Land -
Remediation" [1997] J.B.L. 172; Tromans, S., "Contaminated land : The New
Regime", paper delivered at Environmental Law Lectures, at University of
Edinburgh, February, 1997; Handler, T., and Kurnatowska, M., "Lender Liability
for Environmental Damage" [1996] J.I.B.L. 424; Greenwood, B., "The
Environmental Transaction" [1996] J.P.L. [II] (Occasional Papers, "Bringing the
Environment Down to Earth" - papers from conference held at New College
Oxford, 13th-15th September, 1996); Morgan, M., "Dealing With land
Contamination: The Latest Attempt" [1996] J.P.L. 1004; Lewis, R., "Contaminated
Land: The New Regime of the Environment Act 1995" [1995] J.P.L. 1087; and
Davies, E.A.G., "Contaminated Land Provisions" in larger article "The
Environmental Act 1995" (1996) 52 Scottish Planning and Environment Law
102, at pp. 104-106.
7 The provisions in the EPA'90 (Part III) dealing with statutory nuisance have
been modified so that statutory nuisance no longer deals with contaminated
land (as defined in s.78A(2) of the EPA'90): see ss.79(lA), (IB) of the EPA'90.
8 Draft Statutory Guidance was issued in September 1996. The consultation
period expired on 18th December, 1996. The versions for England and Wales
were issued by the Department of the Environment, and the version for
Scotland was issued by the Scottish Office are the same. As the versions are the
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the proposed legislation represents the latest thinking on
contaminated land clean-up, and, assuming there are no wholesale
changes to the legislation, it indicates the most likely direction that
any subsequent legislation will take. Therefore, the discussion of
lender liability for contaminated land clean-up in this chapter, will
proceed on the basis that the new legislation will be passed in
substantially the same form as it is in, or, that any changes to the
legislation will not be significant. Liability for the cost of cleaning-
up contaminated land is the most important area of environmental
liability, as it has the potential to have the biggest impact on
lenders, and, therefore, will be the main focus of this chapter.
However, issues of water pollution and waste disposal will also be
considered; as will liability under the common law. The new
legislation is characterised by the polluter-pay-principle, and that
the clean-up is to be "suitable for use"9.
Contaminated Land Liability: The United States
In considering what form the legislation for contaminated land
liability should take, the two review committees looked at the
position in the United States under its so-called "Superfund"
same, references here are to the Department of the Environment version. A
decision is awaited from the new Government on Part (II) of the EPA'90.
9 Consultation on Draft Statutory Guidance on Contaminated Land, Sept. 1996,
Vol.1, Department of the Environment, at para.7, on p.l, and Annex A, part.B, at
para.5, on p.6.
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legislation.10 The Superfund, which, like the British legislation, has
as its guiding principle the idea that the polluter must pay,
imposes strict liability on various potential types of polluters -
primarily, owners and operators of contaminated sites. This
liability is imposed regardless of the polluter's guilt or innocence;
it is retroactive in effect, and can extend to contamination caused
before CERCLA came into effect; it is also joint and several and
attaches to either current or past polluters11. A lender who is
merely exercising its security rights will be excused clean-up
liability, in certain circumstances.
Definition of Contaminated Land: Britain
For the purposes of British law, land is contaminated12 if it
"appears to the local authority13 in whose area it is situated, to be
10 The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liabilities
Act 1980 (as amended by, amongst other things, the Superfund Amendments
and Re-authorisation Act 1986 (known as "SARA"), and the Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act 1996) ("CERCLA"). This
is because there is a very large environmental trust fund of approximately U.S.
$8.5 billion for this purpose: see Jarvis J., and Fordham, M.. Lender Liability:
Environmental Risk and Debt (1993), at p. 10. The fund was originally $U.S.
1.6bn.
11 S.101 (20)(A) of CERCLA (as amended).
12 As defined in s.78A(2) of the EPA'90.
13 See s.78A(9) of the EPA'90.
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in such a condition, by reason of substances14 in, on or under the
land15, that -
(a) significant harm is being caused or there is a significant
possibility of such harm being caused; or
(b) pollution of controlled waters16 is being, or is likely to be,
caused ..."
To assist in this determination, guidance will be issued by the
Secretary of State17, which the local authority must take into
account.18
14 "[SJubstance" refers to "any natural or artificial substance", i.e., solid, liquid
or gas or vapour: see s.78A(9) of the EPA'90.
15 "Land" (which is not defined in the EPA'90) would include "buildings and
other structures, land covered with water, and any estate, interest, easement,
servitude or right in or over land": see Schedule 1 of the Interpretation Act
1978.
16 This has the same meaning as under S.30A of the Control of Pollution Act
1974 (as amended) ("COPA"), in Scotland, and Part III (i.e., s.104) of the Water
Resources Act 1991 (as amended) ("WRA"), in England and Wales. This will
include: coastal waters, territorial waters, inland waters, and ground waters.
In Scotland, "ground water" includes: water in wells, boreholes and
excavations; whilst in England and Wales, the definition of inland waters
includes: the bottom, channel or bed of any lakes, ponds or watercourses.
17 Under S.78YA of the EPA'90.
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"Harm" refers to "harm to the health of living organisms or other
interference with the ecological systems of which they form part
and, in the case of man, includes harm to his property".19
Draft Statutory Guidance As To Contaminated Land And Significant
Harm
Under the Draft Statutory Guidance on contaminated land, issued
in September, 1996,20 a local authority needs to assess risk21 and
be satisfied that:
(i) in relation to the land, there is -
(a) "a contaminant" or "a potential pollutant" ("the source") - a
substance in, on, or under land, having potential to cause
harm, or cause pollution of controlled waters.
(b) a receptor ("target") - a living organism, or group of living
organisms, or an ecological system, or property, or controlled
waters, which can be harmed, or, in the case of water,
polluted by the contaminant.
18 S.78A(2) of the EPA'90. See below.
19 S.78A(4) of the EPA'90.
20 See pp.28-30, at paras.6-9. This particular Guidance is issued pursuant to
s.78A(5) of the EPA'90.
21 P.28, para.6 of the Draft Statutory Guidance on Contaminated Land ("the
Draft Guidance"). Risk involves "the probability, or frequency, of occurrence
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(c) a pathway - a route, or means, by which the receptor is
exposed, or risks exposure, to the contaminant.
The relationship between these three elements is a
"pollutant linkage". The identification of each of the
elements is related to the identification of the others - a
pathway needs to be capable of exposing a receptor to a
contaminant, and the latter should be capable of harming (or
polluting, if water) the receptor.
(ii) The pollutant linkage exists and it will cause, or there is a
"significant possibility" it will cause, significant harm to a receptor,
or, in the case of controlled waters, will cause, or is very likely to
cause, pollution.
"Significant harm" means in relation to:
(i) human beings - death, serious injury, cancer, defects or
mutation.
(ii) a protected living organism or ecological system or habitat or
site - "irreversible or other substantial adverse change".
(iii) livestock or other animals - "death, disease or other physical
damage" resulting in "a substantial loss in value".
(iv) buildings - structural failure or damage.22
of a defined hazard . . .", and "the magnitude (including seriousness) of the
consequences to a specified receptor".
22 See table A, in Part B, at para.ll, on pp.30-31, of the Draft Guidance.
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Any other type of harm should be disregarded.23
The local authority is also to prepare and publish a strategic
approach to inspection of sites, a copy of which should be sent to
SEPA or the Environment Agency, as the case may be.24
Issues For Consideration
The "Superfund" (or "CERCLA") raises eight issues, which are
relevant in a British context: (i) what organisation has authority
for administering the legislation?; (ii) joint and several liability;
(iii) who is responsible for the clean-up costs?; (iv) retrospective
liability; (v) strict liability; (vi) what protection is there for
lenders, i.e., a secured creditor exemption; (vii) the unjustified
enrichment of a lender, where a site it has security over is
cleaned-up with public money, and the lender is not liable for the




In the United States, the responsible authority is the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA"), which has the power
to move into a contaminated site and conduct an environmental
clean-up, using moneys from a public trust fund for this purpose.
23 Para. 12, on p.31, of the Draft Guidance.
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The costs of any "clean-up" are then recoverable from "potentially
responsible parties".
(b) Britain
In Britain, the Government agencies responsible for the
environment are: the Scottish Environment Protection Agency
("SEPA")25, and, in England and Wales, the Environment Agency.26
However, it is the duty of local authorities27 to identify
contaminated land28, and to decide whether land is a "special
site"29; if land is a special site, then the Agency (i.e., the Scottish
Environment Protection Agency, or the Environment Agency (as
24 Paras.8 and 9, on p. 14, of the Draft Guidance.
25 Established under Part II (s.20) of the EA'95.
26 Established under Part I (s.l) of the EA'95.
27 See definition of "local authority" in s.78A(9) of the EPA'90.
28 S.78B(l)(a) of the EPA'90.
29 Ss.78B(l)(b) and 78C(1) of the EPA'90. "Special sites" include: (i) Ministry of
Defence land; (ii) land contaminated by to certain chemicals/substances; (iii)
land involved with petroleum refining or explosives manufacture, (iv) land
forming part of a nuclear site; (vi) controlled waters being affected by
contaminated land: see s.2 of the draft of the Contaminated Land (Special Sites)
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appropriate)), is the "enforcing authority"30. Under the Draft
Guidance, the local authority is required to produce and publish a
strategic approach to the inspection of contaminated land.31
Notification (Remediation Notice)
If a local authority decides that land is contaminated, it will issue
a remediation notice to: (a) the appropriate Agency; (b) the land's
owner; (c) an occupier; and (d) any one who appears to be "an
appropriate person" (i.e., the person who should be responsible for
the remediation of the land)32. If land is determined to be a
"special site" by the local authority, the same people are required
Regulations 1997, contained in vol. 2 of Contaminated Land Consultation Paper,
pursuant to ss.78A(3) and 78c(8) of the EPA'90.
30 See the definition of "enforcing authority" in s.78A(9) of the EPA'90. If the
Agency thinks land falls within the description of a special site, it may give
notice of this to the local authority: see s.78C(4) of the EPA'90. If there is a
dispute between the local authority and the Agency regarding whether land is
a special site, there is an appeal to the Secretary of State: see S.78D of the
EPA'90.
31 Para.8, on p. 14, of the Draft Guidance. Under s.108(15) of the EA'95, an
enforcing authority has the power to authorise a suitable person to enter upon
land to perform its duties relating to its "pollution control functions", amongst
other things.
32 S.78B(3) of the EPA'90.
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to be given notice.33 If the Agency considers land is a special site,
it will issue such a notice to the local authority.34 Where land is
designated as a special site by a local authority, the decision takes
effect either twenty-one days after the notice is given, or, if the
Agency gives the local authority notice that it agrees with its
decision, then from the giving of that notice by the Agency.35 The
local authority is to keep a register relating to remediation
notices,36 but matters that affect national security37, or which are
commercially confidential38, are excluded.
There is a right of appeal against a remediation notice.39 If the
notice was issued by a local authority, the appeal is to a Sheriff, by
way of summary application, in Scotland; and to a magistrate, in
33 S.78C(2) of the EPA'90.
34 S.78C(4) of the EPA'90. The local authority is to decide whether the land is a
special site: see s.78C(5) of the EPA'90.
35 S.78C(6) of the EPA'90. See also S.78D of the EPA'90.
36 S.78R of the EPA'90.
37 S.78S of the EPA'90.
38 S.78T of the EPA'90.
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England.40 If the notice was issued by an Agency, the appeal lies
to the Secretary of State.41
The remediation notice will specify what the appropriate person
needs to do by way of remediation and the time period involved.42
Remediation involves assessing the condition of contaminated
land, controlled waters, or adjoining land; taking steps to remedy
or mitigate the affects of significant harm, or pollution of
controlled waters; and making later inspections of the land or
water 43
Qualifications To Remediation Notice
The remediation notice is subject to four qualifications.44 First, the
enforcing authority is to use reasonable endeavours to consult
with the owner, the occupier, the appropriate person and any
person considered relevant concerning remediation, before such a
39 S.78L of the EPA'90.
40 S.78L(l)(b) of the EPA'90. Summary applications are governed by the
Sheriff Court Summary Application Rules 1993 (S.I. 1993 No. 3240).
41 S.78L(l)(b) of the EPA'90.
42 S.78E(1) of the EPA'90.
43 S.78A(7) of the EPA'90.
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notice is issued.45 Secondly, there is to be a three month period
from the identification of the land as contaminated before a
remediation notice is served.46 Thirdly, the requirements of the
notice are to take into account what it is reasonable, having regard
to the cost and the seriousness of the harm or the pollution of the
waters47; in the case of a lender, the cost factor is unlikely to carry
as much weight against remediation as it will for an individual or
a small business. Lastly, there is guidance to be issued by the
Secretary of State, which the enforcing authority is to have regard
to.48
Failure To Comply With Remediation Notice
Failure to comply with a remediation is an offence.49 It is
punishable by a fine on summary conviction not exceeding level
44 Tromans, S., The Environment Acts 1990 - 1995 (1996) 3rd edn., at para.4, on
p.198.
45 S.78H(1) of the EPA'90.
46 S.78H(3) of the EPA'90.
47 S.78E(4) of the EPA'90.
48 S.78(5) of the EPA'90.
49 S.78M(1) of the EPA'90.
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day that the notice is not complied with, prior to the enforcing
authority carrying out the remediation51. If an offence is
committed in relation to a remediation notice concerning
"industrial, trade or business premises", then the person shall be
liable to a fine, on summary conviction, not exceeding £20,000, or
such other sum as the Secretary of State shall substitute by order;
where the person fails to comply with the notice after conviction,
and before the enforcing authority cleans-up the land, he will be
liable to a fine of one-tenth of the above sum (i.e., £2,000 per
day).52 It is a defence to non-compliance with a remediation
notice that other persons who are liable to bear a proportion of the
cost involved either refused or were unable to comply.53
50 S.78M(3) of the EPA'90. This is currently £5,000: see s.225(2) of the Criminal
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, for Scotland; and s.32(9) of the Magistrates
Courts Act 1980 (as amended), for England.
51 S.78M(3) of the EPA'90. The enforcing authority may exercise powers to
clean-up contaminated land under S.78N of the EPA'90: see s.78(3)(c).
52 S.78M(4) of the EPA'90.
53 S.78M(2) of the EPA'90. This seems odd, as there is no reason why the first
person should not pay their contribution and leave it to the authorities to
pursue the others for non-payment of the debt. This indicates that liability is
not joint and several.
557
Standard of Remediation
The aim is that cleaned-up land should be suitable for current
use.54 The standard requirement "is that which is achievable, with
respect to each significant polutant linkage", by using "the best
practicable techniques of remediation" regarding:
(a) "dealing with any" pollutant, pathway and/or receptor forming
"part of the pollutant linkage in such a wa' that the linkage is no
longer a significant pollutant linkage"; and
(b) "remedying the effect of any significant harm or pollution of
controlled waters" resulting, or which has resulted, from the
significant pollutant linkage.55
If (a) cannot be achieved, then, using "the best practicable
techniques of remediation", the standard should be, "as close as
practicable", to that in (b), with arrangements being made to
remedy the future effects of any significant harm or pollution of
controlled waters that may arise because the pollutant linkage is
still in existence.56
If the effects of past or future significant harm or pollution cannot
be fully remedied, then the clean-up standard should be one that
"mitigates as far as practicable the significant harm or pollution"
54 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.III, part B, at para. 10, on p.39.
55 Ibid, at para. 11, on p.40.
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caused, or which may be caused, by the pollutant linkages
"continued existence".57
As to what constitutes "best practical techniques", the authority is
to look at:
(a) what is reasonable and the best combination of:
(b) the effectiveness of the remediation;
(c) the durability of the remediation over the timescale of the
significant harm or pollution;
(d) the practicability: both generally and specifically, concerning
the land or water; and
(e) the efficiency of achieving the results with minimum
resources.58
In determining these questions, the following needs to be
considered by the authority:
(a) the nature and volume of the relevant pollutants;
(b) the timescale;
(c) comparable, successful procedures;
(d) technological and scientific advances.59
56 Ibid, at para. 12, on p.40.
57 Ibid, at para. 13, on p.40.
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The authority, in deciding what are the best practicable
techniques, is to "work on the basis of appropriate and authoritave
scientific and technical advice".60
(ii) Who Is Responsible For The Clean-up?: The
Appropriate Person
Under CERCLA, the USEPA has powers to move into a contaminated
site and clean it up, using moneys from a public trust fund for this
purpose. The costs of the clean-up are then recoverable from
potentially responsible parties, which includes the owner and
operator of a vessel or facility, or a person who at the time
hazardous substances were disposed of was the owner or operator
of the facility.61 "Facility" is widely defined, and includes:
buildings, pipelines landfill, pits, ponds, aircraft, and a site or area
where hazardous waste has been stored or placed.62 "Owner and
operator" is also widely defined to mean someone who owns,
operates, or demise charters a vessel; someone who owns or
operates an onshore or offshore facility; or someone who owned,
58Ibid. at para. 14, on p.40.
59 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.III, Part B, at para. 15, on p.41.
60 Ibid, at para. 16, on p.41.
61 S. 170(a) of CERCLA. There may also be an action for damages, under sub¬
section (C).
62 S.101(9) of CERCLA.
560
operated or otherwise controlled the activities of an abandoned
facility immediately prior to the facility's abandonment.63
The EPA'90, on the other hand, requires that where land is
identified as either contaminated and/or a special site, a
remediation notice be issued by the enforcing authority (normally,
the local authority, unless the SEPA or the Environment Agency
decides land is a special site) to the "appropriate person".
Who Is The Appropriate Person?
An "appropriate person", in the first instance, is a person who
caused or knowingly permitted a contaminating substance, or
contaminating substances, to be in, or under, land.64 Under the
Draft Guidance, this type of "appropriate person" is referred to as
"Class A person".65
The tests of "caused" and "knowingly permitted" are familiar tests.
"Caused" has been interpreted, under previous legislation66, as
meaning "some active operation or chain of operations involving as
63 S. 101 (20)(A) of CERCLA.
64 S.78F(2) of the EPA'90.
65 Draft Guidance, Appendix A, 1996, Draft Ch.IY, Introduction, at para.ll, on
p.53.
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the result"67 the presence of contaminating material in, on or
under land, so that if a person charged has not done such an act,
then he cannot be liable; a common sense approach is to be
adopted, and neither negligence nor mens rea is required68. For a
lender, this provides some comfort, as normal prudence would
dictate that they are unlikely to be involved in such an operation.
As to "knowingly permitted" - which is different from caused69 - it
has been interpreted to involve "a failure to prevent the
[contamination], which failure, however, must be accompanied by
66 See, for example, s.2(l) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 (14
& 15 Geo. 6 c.64).
67 Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824 (H.L.(E.)), per Lord Wilberforce, at
p.834, cited with approval by Lord MacKay of Clashfern L.C. in National Rivers
Authority v. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C. 444 (H.L.(E.)). The
decisions in Price v. Cormack 119751 1 W.L.R. 988 (D.C.); and Wvchavon District
Council v National Rivers Authority [1993] 2 All E.R. 440 (D.C.), requiring a
positive act, were impliedly doubted: see [1995] 1 A.C. 444, at p.452. In a Scottish
context: see Lockhart v. National Coal Board 1981 S.L.T. 161, in which the
Second Division applied Alphacell.
68 Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824 at p.834, per Lord Wilberforce
(H.L.(E.)) and Lockhart v. National Coal Board 1981 S.L.T. 161.
69 See Lord Wilberforce in Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward 119721 A.C. 824, at p.834.
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knowledge".70 Again, a prudent lender is unlikely to fail to stop
contamination he knows about. As to the degree of knowledge
required, it can be argued that the wording of the section and the
reference to "caused" without "knowingly" before it, indicates a
high degree of knowledge (i.e., actual knowledge), rather than a
situation that the lender should have known (i.e., constructive
knowledge); but the House of Lords has indicated that there is no
reason for reading caused as knowingly caused, or for regarding
caused as unaccompanied by knowledge.71 Moreover, constructive
knowledge has been held sufficient in the context of water
pollution72, and "Nelsonian" knowledge has been held sufficient in
the case of knowingly permitting unlicensed entertainments73.
Thus, constructive knowledge is likely to be held sufficient for
liability.
70 Per Lord Wilberforce in Alphacell. supra, at p.834, approved by the House of
Lords in National Rivers Authority v. Yorkshire Water Service Ltd. [1995] 1 A.C.
444.
71 Alphacell. supra, at p.834, per Lord Wilberforce.
72 Schulmans Incorporated Ltd. v. NRA T19931 Env. L.R. D.l (D.C.); available on
Lexis: see the judgement of Leggatt L.J.
73 See Westminster City Council v. Crovalgrange Ltd. [1986] 2 All E.R. 353, at
p.359c-d, per Lord Bridge of Harwich.
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If No One Causing Or Knowingly Permitting: Owner Or Occupier
Appropriate Person
Whilst the EPA'90, in the first instance, seeks to recover clean-up
costs from the polluter, if, after a "reasonable inquiry", no one who
caused or knowingly permitted contamination or pollution can be
found74, the owner or occupier becomes the appropriate person.75
Under the Draft Guidance, this type of appropriate person is
known as "Class B Person".76 "Owner" is defined77 to mean in
relation to land, a person who is entitled to receive the rents, or
who would be entitled to receive rents if the land was let; it
includes a trustee.78 But, "owner" does not include "a creditor in a
heritable security not in possession of the security subjects", in
Scotland; nor a mortgagee in possession, in England and Wales. It
74 It has been said by the previous Government that a company which has
gone into liquidation, or a natural person who has died cannot be found: see
Draft Guidance, Annex A, Part A, at para.24, on p.55.
75 Ss.78F(4), (5) of the EPA'90.
76 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part B, at para.21, on p.55, Sept. 1996,
Department of the Environment.
77 S.78A(9) of the EPA'90. There are two definitions of "owner": one for
Scotland and one for England. These definitions are in similar terms, and
reflect terminological differences, rather than differences of substance.
78 In Scotland, this also includes: a factor, guardian or curator, and for public
or municipal land, the person managing that land.
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is suggested that, in Scotland, this would not be confined to a
standard security holder, or, in England, a mortgagee by way of
legal charge, but would include a creditor who had taken a floating
charge over the land79, either: (i) with a standard security, or as a
debenture (including fixed and floating charges)80, or (ii) by itself,
e.g., as an anti-administration floating charge, allowing the holder
to appoint a receiver. In Scots law, the floating charge does not
create a real right until it crystallises81, so that a floating charge
holder will not be a heritable creditor in security until a real right
is created. Similarly, under English law, a floating charge holder
has an equitable charge on the assets of the debtor company, but
no equitable proprietary interest in them until the charge
79 In Scotland: see s.462(5) of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended), which
provides that a floating charge has effect in relation to any heritable property
it is taken over even though it is not registered under the Register of Sasines
or registered pursuant to the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979.
80 Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgages (1988") 10th edn. (by E.L.G. Tyler),
at p. 132, refers to mortgage debentures creating a floating charge. See also
Buckley L.J. in Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries Ltd. [1910] 2 K.B. 979, at p.999,
who speaks of a floating charge as a floating mortgage.
81 National Commercial Bank v, Telford Grier & Mackav Co. 1969 S.C. 181, at
pp. 194-195, per the Lord President (Clyde).
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crystallises.82 The problem for a lender will be when it goes into
possession of land, unaware that it is contaminated.
Another problem that may arise is: when does a person (i.e., a
lender in possession) who is subsequently notified of the presence
of a contaminant (or pollutant) become someone who has
knowingly permitted the contaminant's or pollutant's presence?83
The view of the previous Government was that the test of
knowingly permitted was only satisfied where the person
concerned had the ability to take steps to prevent or remove that
presence.84 Where a person is notified of contamination, in his
capacity as owner or occupier, does this activate the knowingly
permitted test?85 Again, the government's answer was in the
negative.86 The basis for this is that, first, the legislation drew a
distinction between:87
82 See Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgages, supra at p. 132, fn.q. See also
Goode, R.M.. Commercial Law (1995) 2nd edn., at pp.733-734.
83 Draft Guidance, Annex A Ch.IV, Part B, at para. 17, on p.54.
84 Ibid.
85 Draft Guidance, Ch.IV, Part B, at para. 18, on p.54.
86 Ibid.
87 See ss.78F(3), 78J, and 78K of the EPA'90, which concern "the different
potential liabilities of owners or occupiers as opposed to" those who have
caused or knowingly permitted contaminant to be present.
566
(i) persons who cause or knowingly permit the presence of
contaminant's; and
(ii) persons who are merely owners of occupiers.
Secondly, there is a consultation process with owners and
occupiers to determine what is to be done by way of remediation:
not to determine liability.88 It is said this implies a person who
only owns or occupies the land "does not become a 'knowing
permitter' as a consequence of that consultation alone", because
"the difference in treatment between the two categories" would
not have been continued if Parliament had "intended the process
of notification or consultation to negate any distribution between
them."89 It is stated, though, that, ultimately, this is a question for
the courts.90 With respect, the view about knowingly permitting
is open to question. Once a person has knowledge, they satisfy one
of the criteria in Lord Wilberforce's definition. Thereafter, if they
fail to do anything to stop the pollution or contamination, it can be
88 S.78H( 1) of the EPA'95. See Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part B, at
para. 18, on p.54.
89 Draft Guidance, Ch.IV, Part B, at para. 19, on p.54.
90 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part B, at para. 19, on p.54.
567
argued, it was knowingly permitted, thereby opening up liability
as a class A appropriate person.91
(iii) Joint and Several Liability
Like CERCLA, Part IIA of the EPA'90 allows claims to be made
against more than one polluter, i.e., each may have made a
contribution to the contamination.92 Thus, a lender and another
may be liable together, even if the latter has played the bigger
part in contaminating the land. This liability is subject to three
caveats.93 First, the remedial things to be done by the appropriate
person is to be "referable" to the substances he caused or
knowingly permitted to be on the contaminated land.94 Secondly,
the Draft Guidance issued by (the former) Secretary of State
dealing with whether any one of two or more persons is, or are,
not to be an appropriate person, which the enforcing authority
must follow.95 And thirdly, the Draft Guidance issued by (the
91 A similar view is taken by Lee, R.G., "Contaminated land - Remediation and
Liabilities" (1997) J.B.L. 172, at p.182; and Greenwood B., "The Environmental
Transaction" (1996) J.P.L. 1111. at p.[29],
92 S.78F(2) of the EPA'90.
93 See Tromans, S., The Environment Acts 1990-1995 (1996) 3rd edn., at p. 198,
who refers to two mitigating factors, i.e., he combines caveats two and three.
94 S.78F(3) of the EPA'90.
95 S.78F(6) of the EPA'90. See also S.78J in relation to pollution of controlled
waters, which says that the owner or occupier, where the original polluter can
568
former) Secretary of State on how the proportion of liability of two
or more appropriate persons shall be determined by the enforcing
authority.96
(iv) Retrospective Liability
As with the Superfund Legislation, Part IIA of the EPA'90 also
imposes retrospective liability, as it is contemplated that past
polluters (i.e., those who caused or knowingly permitted
contaminations) will be liable. Also, owners and occupiers can be
liable for clean-up costs (regardless of fault) for contamination
that occurred before they were owner or occupier. Thus, a lender,
if it went into possession, only to discover that the land is
contaminated, and no Class A appropriate person can be found, or
that the borrower was liable, will be liable for the sins of the past
polluters.
(vj Fault or Strict Liability
Liability is a mixture of fault based and strict liability. For a Class
A contaminator, there is no mental element for causing
not be found, is not to be required to do anything extra from what he would be
required to do if the remediation related only to harm to land, i.e., it is to be as
if the pollution of controlled water part of the definition of contaminated land
did not exist. And see s.78J(3) in relation to abandoned mines.
96 S.78F(7) of the EPA'90. See also s.78M(2) of the EPA'90, which does not
impose joint and several liability on a person who does not comply with a
remediation notice, where this non-compliance is due to other persons
refusing, or being unable, to pay their proportion of the costs involved.
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contamination, but there is for knowingly permitting
contamination. Once an appropriate person has either caused or
knowingly permitted contamination, he is liable, so, in this sense,
there is fault, subject to the exemption of the Statutory Guidance.
With regard to Class B appropriate persons, there is no fault
element: they are simply liable because of their status (once no
class A appropriate person is liable); again, subject to the
exemptions in the Statutory Guidance.
(vi) The Secured Creditor Exemption
One of the most controversial aspects of CERCLA is its secured
creditor exemption, which is contained in the definition of "owner
or operator". This exception provides that "owner or operator"
"does not include a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility."97
The cases on the secured creditor exemption have led to three
main issues/problems arising:
(i) what is meant by participation in management?
(ii) is a secured creditor who purchases the secured property after
foreclosure still holding "indicia of ownership"?
97 S. 101 (20)(A) of CERCLA (as amended).
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(iii) should the lender be liable in unjustified enrichment for the
benefit obtained when a property it has security over has had an
environmental clean-up by the USEPA, and has improved in value
or saleability as a consequence; the lender being within the
secured creditor exemption? This third matter will be dealt with
separately.
Participation In Management
The difficulty with the participation in management has been how
far does it go? If the lender is involved in "the nuts and bolts, day
to day production aspects of the business", that is outside the
exception.98 But where a lender is merely involved in "the
financial aspects of the business at the facility", that is within the
exception.99 The real problem came in the celebrated Fleet Factors
case100, where the court applied a capacity to influence the
borrower's management test.101 This caused real concern to
lenders, however, the decision has not been followed in
98 Ibid.
99 U.S. v, Mirahelle 15 Envtl. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 1985 WL 97 (ED Pa.
Sept. 6, 1985), per Newcomer J.
100 U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp. 901 F. 2d. 1550, at p.1557, per circuit Judge
Kravitch (11th Cir. 1990)
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subsequent cases102, which have been concerned with what the
lender did, rather than what it could do. Since then, Congress has
amended CERCLA to make it clear that a lender will not be caught
when enforcing its security.103
101 Cf. a shadow director under British law: see s.251 of the Insolvency Act 1986
(as amended).
102 See, for example, Re Bergsoe Metal Corporation 910 F. 2d. 668, at p.672, per
Circuit Judge Kozinski (9th Cir. 1990), and Z & Z Leasing Inc. v. Graving Real
Inc. 873 F. Supp. 51, at p.55, per Judge Barberra Hackett, who decided such a
narrow interpretation:
"... would largely eviscerate the exemption Congress intended to afford
secured creditors ... To impose liability on the bank in this case for
including these negative convenants in the Reimbursement Agreement
would be to punish the Bank for engaging in its normal course of
business. Such activity does not constitute the requisite participation in
the management of a facility. A secured creditor must be permitted to
monitor any aspect of a debtor's business relating to the protection of its
security interest without incurring liability".
103 See Asset Conservation Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1996, adding a subsection (F) to s. 101(20), which provides, amongst other
things, that participating in management "means actually participating in the
management or operational affairs of a. vessel or facility" and "does not include
merely having the capacity to influence, or the unexercised right to control,
vessel or facility operations". See too contributed article by Messrs Sidley &
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Lender Purchasing Secured Property
A second problem has occurred when the lender has purchased
the property it has security over, as an investment. This is a
questionable practice under British law.104
Plainly, this situation, where an asset is being acquired or
investment made, is different from the situation where a property
is sold to realise a debt, i.e., a right in security is being exchanged
for an investment. The lender is no longer holding indicia of
ownership to protect his security interest, which does not now
exist - he has turned it into full legal ownership. It has been held
that environment liability can arise in these circumstances, and
that it is only when the mortgage is in force that the lender has
indicia of ownership (and, hence, comes with in the exemption).105
Austin, Solicitors, "United States Environmental Law Developments Affecting
Lenders in 1995" [1996] J.I.B.L. 49.
104 See, for example, Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen 119831 1 W.L.R. 1349
(P.C.) and ANZ Banking Group Ltd. v. Bangadillv Pastoral Co. Ptv. Ltd. (1976-77)
139 C.L.R. 195 (High Court of Australia), where bids at auction by the
mortgagee, or a company in which the mortgagee had an interest, were viewed
with great scepticism. It was said that the auction sale had to be an
independent bargain - one in good faith and one in which reasonable
precautions are taken so that conflicts of interests are duly removed.
105 US v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573, at p.578, per Northrop S.J.
(D. Md. 1986).
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No Secured Lender Exemption in EPA'90
The British legislation, by contrast, has not included a specific
secured lender's exemption. The previous Government has stated
that the act of lending money only will not attract liability106 for
knowingly permitting contaminating substances in, on or under,
land. This is because, despite any convenants that may be in the
loan agreement, the lender has "no permissive rights over the land
in question to prevent contamination occurring or continuing".107
But it has said that the lender should be free to abandon secured
property and not enter into possession if the clean-up costs would
exceed its value.108 Concerns that a lender could be in possession
by default where a borrower abandoned the property and sent the
keys back to the lender were rejected.109
106 See Hansard. H.L., 11th July, 1995, Vol. 565, col. 1497, per the Earl Ferrers.
107 Ibid.
108 See Hansard. H.L., 31st January, 1995, Vol. 560, col. 1448, per Viscount
Ullswater; H.L.; 7th March, 1995, Vol. 562, col. 165, per Viscount Ullswater.
109 See Hansard. H.L., 31st January, 1995, Vol. 560, col. 1445, per Lord Jenkin of
Roding; 20th March, 1995, Vol. 562, col. 1040, per The Earl of Kinnoull,
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Several Appropriate Persons/Exclusions: Draft Guidance
Exclusions
The Draft Guidance sets out exemptions for certain persons, where
there are several appropriate persons, who, over time, have
contributed to the contamination of land, i.e., these are appropriate
persons for a significant pollutant linkage, who, collectively, are
called a liability group (either Class A or Class B).110 It can, of
course, be the case that the liability group may constitute one
person.'11 Where several persons are involved, the enforcing
authority needs to begin "by identifying, for each significant
pollutanT. . . ., the persons who would be the appropriate persons. .
for any remediation action referable to that pollutant".112
With regard to Class A persons, six tests are to be applied, in
sequence, concerning exclusions. Also, "no test should be applied
so as to exclude a company if another company is a member of the
liability group in question, and both those companies were
members of a group of companies consisting of a holding company
and its subsidiaries on, or after, the date when the authority first
referring to an earlier statement of Viscount Ullswater; and 7th March, 1995,
Vol. 562, col. 165.
110 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part C, at paras.29 and 30, on p.56.
111 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part C, at para.32(b), on p.56.
112 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part C, at para.30, on p.56.
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served a notice",113 concerning the contaminated land due to a
"significant pollutant linkage."114
Tests For Exclusion
The six tests are:
(1) Excluded Activities;115
(2) Payments Made for Remediation;116
(3) Land Sold With Information Concerning Contamination;117
(4) Changes to Substances;118
113 Under s.78B(3) of the EPA'90.
114 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, para.46(c), on p.60. This does not
mean that a lender cannot incorporate a subsidiary, with limited assets, which
will take-over the security of the land (i.e., become the security holder or
mortgagee), and not have the assets to pay for the clean-up. But, in England,
the enforcing authority may clean-up the land, and take a charging order
over the property, which takes priority over the subsidiary's security.
Charging orders have not been extended to Scotland, and so it would be possible
for a lender to incorporate a subsidiary, but such action would have adverse
public relations consequences.
115 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.48-51, on pp.60-63.
116 Draft Guidance , Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.52-57, on pp.63-65.
117 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.58-62, on pp.65-66.
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(5) Escaped Substances;119
(6) Introduction of Pathway or Receptors.120
Of these tests, the most important is test 1, which says that where
"the person in questions is a member of a liability group by reason
of" amongst other things, making a loan or providing any other
form of credit", the person is excluded from liability.121
If this Statutory Guidance should become law, then this should
provide some comfort to a lender that providing funding is not
enough to result in liability. But, it is clear that a lender will have
to make a choice between: (i) enforcing its security over the
contaminated land122, and possibly being liable for clean-up costs;
or (ii) abandoning security over contaminated land.
For a Class B person involved in a pollutant linkage, the authority
should exclude someone: (a) occupying land under a licence having
no marketable value123; or (b) paying full market rent for the land
they occupy and having no interest in the dominium utile over the
118 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.63-66, on pp.66-67.
119 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.67-69, on pp.67-68.
120 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at paras.70-74, on pp.68-69.
121 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part E, at para.49(a)(ii), on p.66.
122 Interestingly, giving a guarantee is exempted.
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land (in Scotland)124; or (c) paying the rack rent for the land they
occupy and have no beneficial interest in the land.125 Thus, a
lender will only be a Class B person when they go into possession.
Apportionment of Costs
Where there is group liability (which may involve more than one
person) an authority, where it has the necessary information, is to
decide the contribution members of a liability group are to make
towards the costs "in proportion to . . . the relative degree of
responsibility for the presence of [a pollutant] linkage".126 A
distinction is made between Class A appropriate persons and Class
B appropriate persons.
The authority is to consider the extent of each Class A group
members responsibility in relation to:127
(a) their involvment with the pollutant linkage; including whether
they caused or knowingly permitted the entry or presence of a
pollutant,
123 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part F, at para.77(a), on pp.69-70.
124 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part F, at para.77(c), on p.70.
125 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part F, at para.77(b), on p.70. The Draft
Guidance on this topic is issued under s.78F(7) of the EPA'90.
126 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.80, on p.70. The Draft
Guidance on this topic is issued pursuant to s.78(7) of the EPA'90.
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(b) whether the nature of the pollutant was reasonably forseeable,
(c) whether steps could reasonably have been taken to prevent or
control the pollutant or remove it.
In assessing these matters, there is no difference between causing
or knowingly permitting the entry or continued presence.128 The
authority is to look at the seriousness of the harm or pollution (or
what was reasonably foreseeable) and what could have been done
to reduce or prevent the pollution.129
Where different members of the group were in control for
different areas of land (and there is no interrelationship between
the areas) then the members in control of the areas should be
responsible individually for their area.130 Further, the length of
time a person controlled land and/or the area of land that was
controlled are to be considered.131 Where it was more reasonable
to expect a particular person to have knowledge, and a person had
the ability and a reasonable opportunity to take action, then that
127 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.81, on pp.70-71.
128 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.82(a), on p.71.
129 Ibid.
130 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.82(b), on pp.71-72.
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person will be more responsible132 (and bear a greater proportion
of the cost).
For a Class B liability, where a significant pollutant linkage relates
to a particular area, the remediation action should be appointed
amongst those who own or occupy that area of land.133 Otherwise,
liability falls on all members to be apportioned in proportion to
"capital values".134
Two Or More Significant Pollutant Linkages
It may also be the case that there are two or more significant
pollutant linkages, which "may require the same action," or a
"combined remediation scheme".135 Such remediation is a "shared
action".136 It will be either: (i) a "common action"137 (an action
addressing all the significant pollutant linkages which it is
referable to and which would have been part of the remediation
131 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.82(c), on p.72.
132 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.82(d), on p.72.
133 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part G, at para.89, on pp.73-74.
134 Draft Guidance, Annex, A, Ch.IV, Part G at para.90, on p.74.
135 Draft Guidance, Annex, A, Ch.IV, Part H, at para.92, on p.74.
136 Ibid. A shared action is remediation action which is "referable to the
significant pollutant in more than ope significant pollutant linkage": see at
para.94 (b), on p.75.
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package for each linkage if each one had been separately
addressed); or (ii) a "collective action"138 (which also addresses all
significant pollutant linkages it is referable to, but is not part of
the remediation package for every linkage if each one had been
separately addressed, as such action would not be appropriate or
needed to the same extent for one or more linkages or the action is
more economic).
For common action, costs are to be apportioned as follows:139
(a) Where there is a single Class A liability group, it will carry the
full cost - no cost is apportioned to a Class B liability group.
(b) Where there are two or more Class A liability groups, the costs
are apportioned between them - no cost is to be apportioned to a
Class B liability group.
(c) Where there are two or more Class B liability groups and no
Class A liability group, then liability is apportioned between the
Class B liability groups.
The position is the same for collective action, except that the
authority is to make hypothetical estimates of the cost for each
liability group conducting the action "subsumed by the collective
action . . . which would be necessary if the significant pollutant
linkage for which that liability group is responsible were to be
137 Draft Guidance, Annex A, Ch.IV, Part H, at para.97(a), on p.75.
138 Ibid, at para.97(b), on p.75.
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addressed separately"140; and apportion the cost of the collective
action in proportion to "the hypothetical estimates each group
bears to the aggregate hypothetical estimates of all the groups".141
An adjustment can be made if he can show the authority that his
liability is disproportionate.142
(vii) Unjustified Enrichment: Charging Orders
One difficulty of a secured lender exemption is that if a lender,
which retains its security, is not liable for a clean-up when
enforcing its security, the lender obtains a windfall, as its
property's value is increased, at the taxpayer's expense, without
the lender having to make a contribution to it. This issue troubled
one United States Court, which said that143:
"Yet once the property has been cleared at the taxpayer's expense
and becomes marketable, the mortgagee-turned-owner would be in a
position to sell the site at a profit. In essence, the defendant's
position would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for
financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to
the security of loans with polluted properties."
Ibid, at para.98, on p.76.
140 Draft Guidance, Annex A,
141 Draft Guidance, Annex A,
142 Draft Guidance, Annex A,
Ch.IV, Part H, at para.99, on p.76.
Ch.IV, Part H, at para.99, on p.76.
Ch.IV, Part H, at para. 100, on p.77
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It then went on to say that mortgagees can protect themselves by
making prudent loans, by investigating properties they propose to
take security over and that "CERCLA will not absolve them from
responsibilities for their mistakes of judgement."
In its clarifying rule - regarding the interpretation of the secured
creditor exemption144 - USEPA, refers to the issue of unjustified
enrichment of the lender, even, it would appear, when the lender
is within the exemption. The question is: should the lender be
liable for the costs of the clean-up or the amount by which the
value of the property increased due to the clean-up (i.e., the
enrichment itself)? The costs of clean-up will usually be well in
excess of the property's value. Fairly recent figures indicate that
the cost of clean-up in the most urgent cases is approximately $US
30 million per property.145 The result of this is that the lender
143 U.S. v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
144 This rule was introduced to assist the interpretation of the secured creditor
exemption. Whilst the courts have declined to be bound by it (although some
decisions reasoning supports the USEPA view on the exemption), it will be an
indication of when the USEPA will prosecute for clean-up costs and why.
145 See Taber, S.M., "Lender Liability Rules" International Business Lawyer
Jan. 1993, at fn.l on p.21, who say the USEPA estimates the average cost of
hazardous waste clean-ups at US $30-40 million; Buck, W.R., and Crough, M. M.,
"United States Environmental Protection Agency's Secured Lender Rule:
Limitations on Superfund Exposure for Financial Institutions" [1992] J.I.B.L.
262, who say the average cost of clean ups is US$30 million; and Lapper, R., "A
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may decide to write off a loan and not enforce its security, rather
than be liable for clean-up costs, most likely greatly in excess of
the amount of the loan.
Part IIA of the EPA'90 deals with this issue by allowing the
enforcing authority, in certain circumstances, to attempt to recover
the reasonable costs146 of a clean-up it undertakes by way of a
charge over the cleaned-up premises, in England and Wales; it was
clear during the debate of the draft bill that the previous
Government was not going to permit owners of cleaned-up land to
obtain "significant, uncovenanted gains".147 If the enforcing
authority considers it necessary to do something by way of
remediation148 to prevent "serious harm, or serious pollution of
freight train out of control", Financial Times, 13th April, 1992, p.22, where the
cost of cleaning-up each site on a "national priority list" is $US31m. on
average.
The Superfund has also had a huge impact on insurers. One report estimates
that insurers of environmental and asbestos claims will need to make reserves
of US$260bn. to meet claims for the next 15-20 years: referred to in Lapper,
supra.
146 S.78N(1) of the EPA'90.
147 Hansard H.L.. 7th March, 1995, vol. 562, col. 209, per Viscount Ullswater.
148 The authority cannot "do anything .by way of remediation": see S.78N(2) of
the EPA'90. S.78N(4) of the EPA'90 sets out what is appropriate in individual
circumstances.
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controlled waters, of which there is imminent danger"149; or there
has been a failure to comply with a remediation notice150; or
where it would not attempt to recover the reasonable cost of any
remediation it did or only a portion of the cost151, or no
appropriate person can be found152, the enforcing authority may
issue a charging notice to: (i) the owner or occupier of any
premises which consist of, or include, the contaminated land in
question153, or (ii) the person who caused or knowingly permitted
contamination to be on, or under, the land154. The notice is to
specify: (i) the cost which the enforcing authority claims it is
seeking to recover for cleaning-up the premises consisting of, or
including, the contaminated land155, and (ii) the reasonable rate of
interest to be charged by the enforcing authority from the date of
149 S.78N(3)(a) of the EPA'90.
150 S.78N(3)(c) of the EPA'90. See also ss.78N(3)(e) and (f) of the EPA'90, and
s.78F(7) of the EPA'90.
151 S.78N(3)(e) of the EPA'90.
152 S.78N(3)(f) of the EPA'90.
153 S.78P(3)(a)(i) of the EPA'90.
154 S.78P(3)(a)(ii) of the EPA'90.
155 The enforcing authority is to have regard to: (i) the hardship that the
recovery of these costs might cause the appropriate person, and (ii) guidance
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the notice's issue until payment.156 This cost and the interest is to
be a charge on the premises consisting of, or including, the
contaminated land.157 It would appear that this statutory charge
will have priority over a lender's prior security.158 It has been
held, under previous legislation, that a charge on "premises" has
the effect of charging all "the estates and interests in the land", i.e.,
"the whole of the proprietary interests of the premises".159 The
enforcing authority is given the powers of a mortgagee under the
(English) Law of Property Act 1925, such as powers of sale and
lease and to appoint a receiver.160 There is also a right of
issued by the Secretary of State, in deciding to recover costs and how much the
enforcing authority will seek to recover: see s.78P(2) of the EPA'90.
156 S.78P(5) of the EPA'90.
157 S.78N(4)(b) of the EPA'90.
158 See the discussion by Tromans, S., The Environment Acts 1990-1995 (1996)
3rd edn., at p.241.
159 See, for example, Westminster City Council v. Havmarket Publishing Ltd.
[1981] 2 All E.R. 555, per Lord Denning MR, at p.558; Shaw and Oliver L.JJ.
agreeing (C.A.); Paddington Borough Council v. Finucane 119281 Ch. 567, at
p.575, per Russell J. (as he then was): Tendring Union Guardians v. Dowton
[1891] 3 Ch. 265, at p.269, per Fry L.J.; and Birmingham Corpn. v. Baker (1881)
17 Ch. D. 782, at p.786, per Sir George Jessel M.R.
160 S.78P(11) of the EPA'90. The Law of Property Act 1925 does not apply to
Scotland. The receiver is not an administrative receiver under the Insolvency
Act 1986, an administrative receiver qua receiver is excused liability under
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appeal161, and there is a power to make regulations concerning the
appeal.162
No Charging Notices In Scotland
The provisions relating to charging notices do not apply to
Scotland, although the cost recovery provisions do, which is
curious. The rationale for this was that it was thought that it
would involve changing the Scots conveyancing system, and there
were already adequate means to recover such sums under Scots
law.163 However, charging orders are recognised under Scots law,
e.g., the Building (Scotland) Act 1959, Sched. 6, the Housing
(Scotland) Act 1987, Sched. 9, the Public Health Scotland Act 1987
and s.108 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982. The
charge relates to payment of an annual annuity. The result is that
an enforcing authority in Scotland will have greater difficulty in
recovering sums. But once a lender enters into possession, it will
be an "owner", and, thus, liable for clean-up costs, as an
appropriate person.
EPA'90, provided he does not knowingly cause or permit contamination: see
ss.78Z(3) and (4) of the EPA'90.
161 S.78P(8) of the EPA'90. This appeal is to be within twenty-one days from
the date of the notice's service. The powers of the court in dealing with such
appeals are set out in s.78(9) of the EPA'90.
162 S.78(9) of the EPA'90.





In the United States, USEPA attempted to overcome the problems
of the secured lender exemption by providing guidance on: indicia
of ownership, participation in management, and unjustified
enrichment. However, the courts have held that it is not binding
on them, as it is for the courts to decide the extent of liability
under CERCLA: not the USEPA.164
Whilst the courts have rejected the use of the USEPA rule, the rule
may still be used as a guide by the USEPA in deciding to prosecute
matters; it might also be used as a guide by lenders in their loan
management.165
(b) Britain
In Britain, the enforcing authority is to take account of statutory
guidance issued by the Secretary of State.166 Hence, it is
mandatory on the enforcing authority and is a something that the
courts will need to take into account if matters come before them.
164 Kellev v E.P.A. 15 F. 3d. 1100, at p.l 107-1108, per Circuit Judge Silberman,
giving the decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeal; Chief Judge
Mikva, dissented; noted in News Section [1994] J.I.B.L. N-116.
165 A similar view is expressed in News Section [1994] J.I.B.L. N-116.
166 In some cases, this is Guidance to be binding, and in other situations it has
to be considered: see s.78A(2) or (5), 78B(2), or 78F(6) or (7) of the EPA'90.
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[B] OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
As well as incurring possible liability for clean-up costs under Part
11(A) of the EPA'90, a lender may incur environmental liability in
relation to:
(a) the removal of waste, or the reduction of its consequences,
under s.59 of the EPA'90;
(b) water pollution, under s.46 of the Control of Pollution Act
1974, and s. 161 of the Water Resources Act 1991;
(c) the duty of care requirements, contained in ss.33 and 34 of the
EPA'90, regarding waste management; and
(d) the principle of Rvlands v. Fletcher167, in England and Wales.
(a) S.59 of the EPA: Removal of Waste or Reducing Its
Consequence
S.59 provides that an "occupier" may be required by a waste
regulation authority168 to remove waste from land, or take steps
to reduce or eliminate "the consequences of the deposit of
waste".169
167 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
168 In Scotland, this is SEPA; in England and Wales, it is the Environment
Agency: s.30(l) of the EPA'90.
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If a secured lender has moved in to possession of the land, it
would be regarded as an occupier, and the authority could ask him
to remove waste or reduce its consequences. Alternatively, an
authority may forthwith remove waste, and/or try to eliminate, or
reduce, its consequences, where waste has been deposited in, or
on, land, "in order to prevent or remove pollution of" the
environment,170 or "harm to human health"171; this indicates that
the approach which may be taken is of isolating and reducing
pollution.172 After it has cleaned-up a property, the authority
may then recover such costs from the occupier173, unless the
occupier (i.e., here, the lender) can show "he neither made nor
knowingly caused nor knowingly permitted the deposit of
169 S.59(l) of the EPA'90. There is a right of appeal within twenty-one days to:
(i) a Sheriff, in Scotland, or (ii) a Magistrate, in England and Wales: see 59(2) of
the EPA'90.
170 This includes land, water or air: see the definition in s. 1 (2) of the EPA'90.
171 S.59(7)(a) of the EPA'90. The waste authority may also remove, or try to
eliminate, waste, if there is no occupier, or the occupier did not make, or
knowing permit, the waste to be deposited on the land: see ss.59(b), (c) of the
EPA'90.
172 See Hawkins, S., "Clean-up of Contaminated Land: An Assessment of the
Mechanisms Available" (1992) J.P.L. 1119. at p.1124.
173 S.59(8)(a) of the EPA'90. The authority may recover the costs from any
person "who deposited or knowingly caused or knowingly permitted" the waste
to be deposited: s.59(8)(b) of the EPA'90.
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waste"174; where costs have been incurred unnecessarily, they
may not be recovered.175
(b) Water Pollution: Control Of Pollution Act 1974
( "COPA") And Water Resources Act 1991 ("WRA")
If a lender with security goes into possession of a building, e.g., a
factory which emits effluent into controlled waters, and the lender
does not stop this, the lender can incur liability for pollution of
controlled waters.176
(i) Works Notices
Where it appears "that any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter
or any solid waster matter is likely to enter, or to be or to have
been present in, any controlled waters", then SEPA or the
Environment Agency (as appropriate), can serve works notice on a
person who caused177 or knowingly permitted178 the matter to be
present, either at a place which it was likely to enter controlled
174 S.59(8)(a) of the EPA'90.
175 S.59(8) of the EPA'90.
176 In Scotland: see para.II of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (as amended)
("COPA"); and, in England: see the Water Resources Act 1991 (as amended)
("WRA").
177 Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824; and Lockhart v. National Coal
Board 1981 S.L.T. 161.
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waters (in SEPA's/Environment Agency's opinion), or be present in
controlled waters.179 A work's notice requires a person to prevent
matter entering controlled waters, or to remove or dispose of,
matter, or remedy, or mitigate, pollution, or, as far as "reasonably
practicable", restore the waters.180 It may be that work is
required to be done on other "relevant land".181 Such notice is to
state the periods within which the things specified are to be
done182; before a notice is served, the SEPA/Environment Agency
is to use reasonable endeavours to consult with the person, the
subject of the notice;183 and there is a right of appeal within
twenty-one days of service of the notice.184
178 Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward r 1972] A.C. 824, at p.834, per Lord Wilberforce.
179 S.46A(1) of COPA; s,161A(l) of WRA.
180 S.46A(2) of COPA; s,161A(2) of WRA.
181 S.46B of COPA; "relevant land" means land or waters that require "or may
require operations to be carried out" on or land adjoining or adjacent to those
lands S.161B of WRA.
182 S.46A(3) of COPA; s. 161 A(3) of WRA.
183 S.46A(4) of COPA; S.161A(4) of WRA.
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Failure To Comply With Notice
A failure to comply with a works notice is an offence,185 the
penalties for which are:
(a) imprisonment for up to three months and/or a fine of up to
£20,000 on summary conviction, on
(b) imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine on
indictment.186
If a person fails to comply, the SEPA/Environment Agency can do
the work and recover the cost,187 or, where imprisonment and/or
a fine is considered an ineffectual remedy, SEPA/Environment
Agency may seek a court order "securing compliance with the
notice".188 It is unlikely, though, that a lender in possession, which
was the subject of such a notice, would not comply with it.
(ii) Agency Undertaking Clean-up
Alternatively, if the SEPA/Environment Agency considers it
necessary to do so forthwith, or, that, after reasonable inquiry, no
184 S.46C(1) of COPA; s. 161(1) of WRA.
185 S.46D(1) of COPA; s.161D(1) of WRA.
186 S.46D of COPA; s.161D(2) of WRA.
187 S.46D(3) of COPA; s,161D(3) of WRA.
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one can be found upon whom a notice can be served189 the
SEPA/Environment Agency is entitled to carry out work to
remove, dispose, remedy or mitigate any polluting material or
restore the controlled waters.190 The Agency may then recover
the costs of this work from the person who "caused"191 or
"knowingly permitted"192 the matter to be present in controlled
waters, or at a place where it was likely to enter controlled
waters.193
(iii) Criminal Liability
In addition to the civil liability of clean-up costs, there is also
criminal liability for a person causing or knowingly permitting:
(a) "poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste
matter to enter any controlled waters";194
188 S.46D(4) of COPA; s,161D(4) of WRA.
189 S.46(1B) of COPA; s. 161(1 A) of WRA.
190 S.46(l) of COPA; s,161(l) of WRA.
191 See Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward [1972] A.C. 824 (H.L.(E.)); and Lockhart v
National Coal Board 1981 S.L.T. 161.
192 Ibid.
193 46(2) of COPA; s,161(3) of WRA.
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(b) any matter, apart from trade or sewage effluent, "to enter
controlled waters by being discharged from a drain or sewer"195,
contrary to a prohibition;196
(c) any trade or sewage effluent to be discharged into controlled
waters or to be discharged from land in Scotland, or England and
Wales (as appropriate) into the sea, via a pipe outside the seaward
units of controlled water;197
(d) Trade or sewage effluent to be discharged from a building or
fixed plant onto land or into lochs/lakes, or ponds, which are
inland,198 contrary to a prohibition;199
(e) any matter to enter inland waters which will impede the
water's proper flow, which is likely to cause "a substantial
aggravation" of pollution due to other causes or the consequence of
such pollution.200
194 S.30F(1) of COPA; s.85(l) of WRA.
195 S.30F(2) of COPA; s.85(2) of WRA.
196 S.30G of COPA; s.86 of WRA.
197 S.30F(3) of COPA; s.85(3) of WRA.
198 S.30F(4) of COPA; s.85(4) of WRA.
199 S.30G of COPA; s.86 of WRA.
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The penalties for these offences are up to three months in jail
and/or a fine not exceeding £20,000 on summary conviction; or,
on indictment, a fine and/or up to two years in prison.201 In
England and Wales, but not Scotland, it is also an offence to breach
a consent.202
Defences
The following defences are available: (i) a consent to a
discharge,203 or (ii) an emergency to prevent danger to health or
life,204 or (iii) all reasonably practical steps to avoid a discharge
were taken,205 or (iv) details of the discharge or entry were
reported to SEPA/the Environment Agency as soon as reasonably
practicable.206
In England,207 it has been said that it is sufficient, under s.85 of
W.R.A., for a company to be criminally liable for causing pollution
200 S.30F(5) of COPA; s.85(5) of WRA.
201 S.30F(6) of COPA; s.85(6) of WRA.
202 S.85(6) of WRA; this is not referred to in s.30F(6) of COPA.
203 S.30I of COPA; s.88 of WRA.
204 S.30J(l)(a) of COPA; s.89(l)(a) of WRA.
205 S.30J(l)(b) of COPA; s.89(l)(b) of WRA.
206 S.30J(l)(c) of COPA; s.89(l)(c) of WRA.
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if persons immediately responsible on the site, who had admitted
to the pollution, were the company's employees, and they had
been acting within the course and scope of their employment
when the pollution arose; the same reasoning would, it is
submitted, apply to the staff of a lender who caused pollution to a
site the lender had taken possession of as a secured creditor. The
section is also considered to be unambiguous.208 Whether a
defender/defendant has contravened s.85(1) of WRA/s.161 COPA,
is a question of fact for the jury and does not require proof of fault
on the defendant's/defender's part, or proof that the
defendant's/defender's acts were the sole cause of the pollutant's
escape; however, it is a matter of law for the trial judge as to the
identification and, if necessary, delimitation of the question of
fact.209
(c) Waste Management: Duty Of Care
(i) S.33 of the EPA'90
S.33 of the EPA'90 makes it an offence to knowingly cause or
permit the deposit, disposal210 of, treatment,211 or otherwise deal
207 N.R.A. v. Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd. r19941 4 All E.R. 286 (D.C.).
208 Taylor Woodrow Property Ltd. v. N.R.A.. The Times, 14th July, 1994,
Divisional Court, per Steyn L.J. (as he then was).
209 R v. KPC {UK} Ltd.. The Times, 4th August, 1994.
597
with, "controlled waste",212 without a waste management licence,
on land, or to do so in a way which is likely to harm human health
or cause pollution to the environment. The section is, however,
subject to three defences213: (a) that all due diligence was
exercised and all reasonable precautions taken; (b) the person
charged acted under instructions from his employer and had no
reason to believe he was contravening the section; and (c) the
contravention was done "in an emergency to avoid danger to harm
health", and that: (i) all reasonably practicable steps to minimise
the pollution and harm to human health were taken, and (ii)
particulars of the act done were given to the waste regulation
authority as soon as reasonably practicable.
210 "Disposal" means disposal of waste "by way of deposit in or on land": s.29(6)
of the EPA'90.
211 "Treatment" means waste "is subjected to any process, including making it
re-usable or reclaiming substances from it": s.29(6) of the EPA'90.
212 "Controlled Waste" "means household, industrial and commercial waste or
any such waste": s.75(4) of the EPA'90. "Waste" is defined to mean "any
substance or object in the categories set out in Schedule 2B" of the EPA'90,
which is discarded or is intended or required to be discarded by the holder (i.e.,
"the producer of the waste or the person in possession of it"). A "producer" is a
"person whose activities produce waste or any person who carries out pre¬
processing, mixing or other operations resulting in a change" in the waste's
nature or composition: see s.75(2) of the EPA'90.
213 S.33(7) of the EPA'90.
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Criminal Penalties And Civil Liability
Breach of s.33 of the EPA'90 is a criminal offence, carrying of a six
month term of imprisonment and/or a £20,000 fine on summary
conviction, or a two year term of imprisonment and/or an
unlimited fine on indictment.214 There can also be civil liability
for a person who knowingly caused or knowingly permitted waste
to be deposited on land, in breach of s.33(l) of the EPA'90, where
the waste caused damage.215 This is subject to two defences: (a)
where the damage was "wholly the fault" of the person who
suffered the damage,216 or (b) where a person voluntarily
accepted the risk of damage.217 In addition, the defences under
s.33(7) are also available.218
(ii) S.34 of the EPA'90
S.34 of the EPA'90 creates a positive new duty of care to take
reasonable measures regarding waste. This duty applies to
producers, importers, carriers and persons who treat, keep or
214 S.33(8) of the EPA'90.
215 S.73(6) of the EPA'90. Damage includes death and personal injury to a
person (including a disease or mental or physical impairment): s.73(8) of the
EPA'90.
216 S.73(6)(a) of the EPA'90. "Fault" has the same meaning as it has in the Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945: s.73(8) of the EPA'90.
217 S.73(6)(b) of the EPA'90.
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dispose of waste. The duty does not apply to the occupier of
domestic property, namely, for household waste produced on
property.219
The duty is as follows:220
(i) to prevent a breach of s.33 of the EPA'90 by another person221,
i.e., where waste is being treated, kept, or disposed of, to ensure
that it is not being done so without, or in contravention of, a
management licence, or that it is being done in a manner likely to
harm humans or the environment;222
(ii) to stop waste escaping from the person's, or another person's,
control;223
(iii) to ensure that, where waste is being transferred, it is
transferred "to an authorised person"224, or "a person authorised
for transport"225; 226
218 S.73(7) of the EPA'90.
219 S .33(2) of the EPA'90.
220 See also the helpful guidance in the joint circular from the Department of
the Environment, the Scottish Office and the Welsh Office, "Environmental
Protection Act Section 34, The Duty of Care", especially at p.2.
221 S.34( 1 )(a) of the EPA'90.
222 "Environmental Protection Act Section 34, The Duty of Care", supra, at p.2.
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(iv) to ensure that, where waste is being transferred, the written
description of such waste is sufficient to allow the person
receiving waste to avoid breaching s.33 of the EPA'90 and to
comply with the requirement in (ii) above.227
Criminal Penalties
Breach of the duty is a criminal offence, which carries a fine, for a
summary conviction not exceeding the statutory maximum, and an
unlimited fine on an indictment.228 For a criminal offence to be
couched as a positive duty to act is unusual.229 These penalties
apply not just to the company, but also to its officers and
managers.230
223 S.34(l)(b) of the EPA'90.
224 See ss.34(3) and (3A) of the EPA'90.
225 See s.34(4) of the EPA'90.
226 S.34(l)(c)(i) of the EPA'90.
227 S.34 (c) (ii) of the EPA'90.
228 S.34(6) of the EPA'90. See s.73(6) of the EPA'90, which imposes provide civil
liability for polluters who cause damage to others.
229 Harris, R., "The Environmental Protection Act 1990 - Penalising the
Polluter" [1992] J.P.L. 515. at p.522.
230 S. 157 of the EPA'90.
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Guidance: Code of Practice
Guidance as to a person's duty may be obtained from a code of
practice, "Waste Management - The Duty of Care Code of
Practice"231, which is admissible in evidence232 in any proceedings;
there are also regulations concerning transfer notes.233
A Problem For Lenders
The difficulty that the environmental duty of care regime may
cause a lender arises where the lender takes possession of land
(the subject of security in favour of the lender) which is used in
the production, or disposal, of waste, under its security - so as to
be some one who keeps, or disposes of, waste - and an inadvertent
breach of the duty occurs, such as, waste escaping, which causes
harm to human health or the environment.
231 Published pursuant to s.34(7) of the EPA'90. A code of practice issued by the
Department of the Environment, Scottish Office and the Welsh Office in
December, 1991.
232 S.34(10) of the EPA.
233 The Environmental Protection (Duty of Care) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991 No.
2839).
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(d) The Common Law: Strict Liability
In the much publicised case of Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern
Counties Leather pic234, the House of Lords refused to impose
strict liability under the English doctrine of Rvlands v. Fletcher.235
for the escape of chemical pollutants to a neighbouring property's
ground water, as the damage was not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the spillage.
The facts were that a solvent called perchloroethene ("PCE") was
used by ECL to degrease pellets in its tanning works about 1.3
miles away from CWC's borehole. The PCE seeped into the ground
below ECL's works, and was carried in percolating water towards
CWC's borehole. This escape occurred for an unspecified period up
to 1976. Whilst the water was not dangerous to health, the
contaminated water was not wholesome, and, thus, could not
legally be supplied as drinking water.236
234 [1994] 2 A.C. 264 (H.L.(E.)); see the case note by Professor Heuston, R.F.V.,
"The Return of Rylands v Fletcher" (1994) 110 L.O.R. 185; and see "Paying For
Our Past", supra, at para.2.30, on p. 14.
235 (1868) F.R. 3 H.F. 330. The doctrine has no place in Scots law: see RHM
Bakeries Ftd. v, Strathclvde Regional Council 1985 S.L.T. 214, at p.217, per Ford
Fraser of Tullybelton.
236 Under UK Regulations (S.I. 1989 No.1147), and E.C. Directive 80/778 EEC (01
No. F229).
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Lord Goff of Chieveley237 opined that foreseeability of harm was a
prerequisite for liability under Rvlands v. Fletcher and also
nuisance; and that, on the facts, ECL could not have foreseen the
damage that resulted at CWC's borehole. An argument based on
nuisance or Rvlands v. Fletcher, that ECL should be liable for the
continuing escape after the damage was foreseeable, was rejected
because once the PCE had travelled down through the drift and
chalk acquifer below ECL's property, the PCE was no longer within
ECL's control.238
[C] CONCLUSION - WHAT SHOULD LENDERS DO?
Assuming the new regime becomes law, the polluter-pays-
principle (of causing or knowingly permitting contaminants on
land) is very much at the heart of liability for breach of
environmental law. The main cause of concern for lenders will be
civil liability for clean-up costs, although the criminal penalties
can be severe. Whilst the act of lending itself is not going to give
rise to liability, seeking to recover a loan by realising security over
contaminated land, for example, will cause difficulties (i.e., it is the
entering into possession). Lenders have to decide whether to
recover a loan, "walk away" from it, or be content to recover part
of it by relying on security that does not affect land.
237 [1994] 2 A.C. 264, at pp.306A and 301C-D. (Lords Templeman, Jauncey of
Tullichettle, Lowry and Woolf agreed with Lord Goff).
238 Supra, at pp.306-307.
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Environmental liability is something lenders cannot afford to
ignore, in whatever form it may take in the future. To this end, a
lender will need to consider its position with regard to existing
loans and new loans.
(a) Existing Term Loans
With an existing term loan, where there is danger of pollution or
contamination, the lender will want to be able to accelerate the
loan and demand repayment239 - an overdraft, of course, is
repayable on demand.
With an existing loan made prior to the EPA'90 and containing no
environmental covenants, a lender will be limited as to what it can
do by the terms and conditions of the loan and security
documents. In such a situation, the lender may seek to rely on the
following provisions may assist.
(i) Covenant not to jeopardise or diminish or prejudice the value of
the lender's security.
If the borrower is polluting land, which is subject to security in
favour of the lender, then, such an action is likely to mean that the
security is worth less than it was at the beginning of the loan, and
239 See Bryce, A., "Environmental Liability: Practical Issues for Lenders" [1992]
J.I.B.L. 131, at pp.135-136.
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so be a breach of this covenant, which will amount to an event of
default and allow acceleration of the loan.240
(ii) Material adverse change in borrower's condition
If such a clause is included (and a strong borrower will seek to
have it removed), the lender will usually have a discretion to call
in the loan if they are circumstances which cause concern about
the borrower's ability to repay the loan. If a borrower is causing
or knowingly permitting contamination or pollution, this may be a
matter which would justify acceleration.241
(iii) Covenant to maintain any necessary consents or
authorisations.
If a necessary consent or authorisation is revoked, this will be an
event of default, and will allow the loan to be accelerated.242 It is,
240 For examples of such a clause: see Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents.
(1993) 3rd Edn., "Specimen Documents", clause 4.01(k), in Document 1,
(Debenture), on p.353; and clause 5.01 (k), in Document 2 (Composite
Debenture), on p.373.
241 See the discussion of this type of provision in Lingard, J.R., Commercial
Loan Agreements ("19901. at para.16.27, on pp.67-68.
242 For examples of such a clause: see Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents.
(1993) 3rd Edn., "Specimen Documents", clause 1.02(j), in Document 1
(Debenture), on p.347; and clause 2.03(j) in Document 2 (Composite Debenture),
on p.367; and Lingard, J.R., Commercial Loan Agreements (1990) Appendix 2,
("Specimen Lacility Letter"), clause 12.02(j), on p.117.
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however, by no means certain that these provisions would allow
the lender to accelerate its loan, which leaves the lender in some
difficulty where the borrower is polluting, as to whether the
lender will: (i) abandon its security and perhaps prove in a
winding up with the general body of creditors, or (ii) rely on any
guarantees or rights of set-off.
Added to this, there is the question of (adverse) publicity and its
effect on a lender if it is seen to be supporting an "environmental
vandal"243; environmental issues being emotional and charged
with controversy.
(b) New Loans
These provide greater scope for lenders to protect themselves by
having an environmental audit done (if felt appropriate) and
including, as far as possible, suitable provisions in the loan or
security documention.
The problem for a lender is should he request the report (which,
presumably, would be paid for by the borrower) and so have the
benefit of any warranties in it, as environmental consultants are
unlikely to give collateral warranties to lenders, as well as their
own clients, or allow the client to choose a reputable firm of his
243 Jarvis J. and Fordham, M., Lender Liability: Environmental Risk and Debt
(1993), at p.165.
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own.244 The answer would appear to be that, in the absence of
strong reasons to the contrary or agreement, the lender should
choose an environmental consultant, just as he chooses a receiver,
so that the lender is comfortable with the situation. In such
situations, control over events and confidence are important.245
If the audit proves satisfactory, the lender will be wanting to
protect itself, as far as it can, about any future pollution to the
environment which might arise due to the activities or conduct of
the borrower. The key to this is obtaining information from the
borrower as to when this occurs or there is any violation of an
environmental law or regulation so that the lender will have an
opportunity to assess the situation and risk involved at the
earliest possible date. To this end, the lender will need to have
covenants from the borrower (breach of which would be an event
of default) that they will immediately inform the lender of any
matter relating to pollution on any of the borrower's properties (as
this could affect the viability of the borrower's business and its
ability to repay the loan) and that the borrower will comply with
244 Bryce, A., "Environmental Liability: Practical Issues for Lenders" [1992]
J.I.B.L. 131, at p. 136.
245 Bryce notes, supra, at p. 136, that there are two new bodies who are putting
into place accreditation systems for .when there is a European Commission
directive on eco-auditing: the Institute of Environmental Assessment and the
Association of Environmental Consultants
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all environmental laws and regulations.246 The onus should also
be placed upon the borrower to rectify, as quickly as possible, and
according to the law, any environmental problems on its land and
keep the lender informed.247
A lender may decide that it wishes to cease its involvement with
the borrower where contamination or pollution is involved,
particularly at an early stage, so as to minimise any liability it
might have. Thus, it will wish to make "breach of any
environmental law regulation directive or licence applicable to the
[borrower] its business or assets [which] could reasonably be
expected to have a material adverse effect on the financial
condition of the [borrower] [or any of its subsidiaries or on the
value or marketability248 of any of the assets of the [borrower]]"
246 For examples of such clauses: see Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents.
(1993) 3rd Edn., Part IV, "Specimen Documents", clauses 4.01(e), (f)(iii) and f(v)
in Document 1 (Debenture), on p.351-352; and clauses 5.01(e), (f)(iii) and (f)(v)
in Document 2, (Composite Debenture), on pp.371-372.
247 For examples of such clauses: see Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents.
(1993) 3rd Edn., Part IV, "Specimen Documents", clauses 4.01 (f)(iii) and f(v) in
Document 1 (Debenture), on p.352; and clauses 5.01(f)(iii) and (f)(v) in
Document 2 (Composite Debenture), on p.372.
248 This relates to the saleability of a contaminated property.
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an event of default.249 Similarly, it will wish to make it an event
of default if the lender becomes liable for any pollution relating to
the borrower's properties, or it becomes "subordinated to the
claims or rights of any environmental agency"250 - this latter part
relating to the possibility of such an agency obtaining priority over
the lender for clean-up charges in England and Wales.
Ultimately, though, in drafting loan agreements:251
You can write all the liability waivers you like into a new loan
document, but you can't be sure that these will provide full legal
protection a decade from now."
This is the difficulty that lenders face.
249 See Lingard, J.R., Bank Security Documents. (1993) 3rd Edn., Part IV,
"Specimen Documents", clause 1.02 (1) in Document 1 (Debenture), on p.347 and
clause 2.03 (1) in Document 2 (Composite Debenture), on p.367.
250 Ibid.
251 Per Miss Sarah King, Messrs Gouldens, Solicitors, London, quoted in "Where
bankers fear to tread", The Economist, 21st May, 1994, at p. 107.
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CHAPTER 14.
WRONGFUL TRADING - LIABILITY OF LENDERS AS
SHADOW DIRECTORS
INTRODUCTION
When a corporate borrower experiences trading difficulties, such as
where: a valuable customer is lost, a market declines, there are cash
flow problems, or a creditor refuses further supplies1, it is likely that
a lender will wish to monitor that borrower's progress closely,
particularly its receipts and outgoings. This may lead to the lender
deciding to either: (i) put the borrower into receivership, if it
considers the company is not viable, or (ii) support the borrower (or
agree to support it with the borrowers' other lenders), if it considers
the company is viable. Where the lender decides to support the
borrower (and a rescue package is agreed), the lender needs to be
careful as to how far it has a say in the management of the borrower,
especially if the support operation fails and the borrower, ultimately,
goes into liquidation. This is because, under s.214 of the Insolvency
Act 1986 (as amended) ("IA '86"), pertaining to wrongful trading, a
director of a company (including a "shadow director") may be liable
to make "such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the
court thinks proper", where a company continues to trade whilst it is
1 DKG Contractors Ltd. ft9901 B.C.C. 903.
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insolvent.2 A "shadow director" is "... a person in accordance with
whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are
accustomed to act (but so that a person is not deemed a shadow
director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him
in a professional capacity)".3 The reference, in the main part of the
definition, to "accustomed to act" would indicate a regularity of
2 The wrongful trading provision was introduced into the IA'86 as a result of
the Cork Committee Report, Cmnd 8558, June, 1982 - which had as a member,
P.J. Millett Q.C. (as he then was) - because it was difficult to prove a fraudulent
intent in an action for "fraudulent trading" (then under s.332 of the
Companies Act 1948 - now under s.213 of the IA'86). An action for fraudulent
trading by Mr Barnes in Williams & Glvn's Bank Ltd v Barnes f 19801 Com. L.R.
205, 10 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers (1977-1986) 220 - at a time when
there was no "wrongful trading" - was unsuccessful, on the evidence.
The Cork Committee said that wrongful trading will not "attach to anyone
unless that person is actually party to the company carrying on of the
offending business. It will not be sufficient that he is merely privy to it": see
Cmnd. 8558, June, 1982, at para. 1787.
3 S.251 of the IA'86. Shadow directorship is also relevant in the context of
"connected persons" (as defined in s.249 of the IA'86) and setting aside
transactions under ss.238 (transactions at an undervalue, under English law;
see also s.240(2)); s.239 (preferences, under English law); and s.245 (floating
charges).
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conduct4, so that a one-off situation would not be caught. Whilst the
proviso would exclude a lending institution acting in a purely
advisory capacity, it would not exclude the lender acting in a lending
one.5
4 See also Millett J. (as he then was) in Re Hvdrodam (Corbv) Ltd (in
liquidation! T19941 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p. 183; noted by Turing, D., "Lender Liability,
Shadow Directors and the case of Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd" [1994] J.I.B.L. 244.
5 Francis Bartlett, a "company doctor" from Rebuilt Corporate Rescues in
Beaconsfield, Buckinghamshire, England, argues that lenders should be
excluded from the definition of shadow director, as there has been "a break in
trust between bankers and smaller business community in general" during the
last recession. This is because fear of a lender being a shadow director "has
greatly restricted the type of action knowledgeable bankers would have liked
to have taken to assist in preventing company failure". By making lenders
exempt, "bankers would undergo a significant cultural sea change. Bankers
would need to get away from their dependence on traditional 'superior
pawnbroking' as the sole basis of lending on this sector, to one which relies
more heavily on understanding the business lent to, the quality of the
directors and the company's ability to generate cash to service the debt. This
would require a radical retraining of bank managers. Benefits could be a more
European basis of customer/bank relationships, where bank managers can be
involved directly in decision making and in certain situations the banks
actively participate in equity as a matter of policy in lending to established
small mid-corporates. If nothing else this will ensure a longer term view is
taken and the image of the high street banks restored." See '"Shadow director'
- a spectre that haunts the high street banker" Insolvency Law & Practice.
1994, Vol. 10 , No.2, 1994, 52, at pp.52-53.
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An application for wrongful trading can only be brought by the
liquidator of the insolvent company concerned, and is a means of
piercing the so-called "corporate veil" by making the directors of a
company liable for their imprudent behaviour, which affects the
company and its creditors, rather than permitting them to hide
behind incorporation. It is similar to the "Instrumentality Theory"6,
in the United States, under which a lender can be liable where its
control and dominance over a borrower is so substantial as to
indicate that effective control of the borrower's affairs rests with the
lender, such that the dominance causes harm to the borrower or its
other creditors through misuse of the lender's control.
REQUIREMENTS FOR WRONGFUL TRADING
(i) Statutory Criteria
For lenders in Britain, the concern with wrongful trading is the
possibility of being held to be a shadow director of an insolvent
corporate borrower, and, hence, liable to make a contribution to that
borrower's assets (as well as individual employees or officers of the
lender facing the prospect of disqualification as a director7) in its
liquidation. For a director to be liable for wrongful trading, three
criteria need to be fulfilled:8
6 See In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. Inc. 893 F. 2d. (5th Cir. 1990), for example.
See also Bloom, A.. Lender Liability: Practice and Prevention (1989). at pp.73-74
and the cases cited therein.
7 Under s.6 of the Directors' Disqualification Act 1986.
8 S.214(2) of the IA'86.
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(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation (which
means that the company's assets are insufficient to pay its
debts, liabilities and the expenses of the liquidation, not merely
that it is unable to pay its debts9);
(b) that at some time prior to the winding up, the director
knew, or ought to have known, that there was no reasonable
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent
liquidation; and
(c) he was a director of the company at the time referred to in
(b) above.
When the court makes a wrongful trading order, its concern is to
make sure that any depletion in an insolvent company's assets which
can be attributed to the period after the time when its directors
knew, or ought to have known, that there was no reasonable prospect
of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation, "is made good"10 -
during this period, the company's business is being carried out at the
creditor's risk."
If it can be shown, though, that, at the relevant time, the director
"took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the
company's creditors as (assuming him to have known that there was
no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into
9 S.214(6) of the IA'86.
10 Re Purpoint Ltd. (19911 B.C.C. 121, at p,128H, per Vinelott J.
" Ibid.
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insolvent liquidation) he ought to have taken", then that person will
not be liable.12
(ii) What Has To Be Proved
To make out a case of shadow directorship, four things have to be
averred or pleaded, and proven:13
(i) who the company's directors were (whether de facto or dejure)\
(ii) that the defender directed those directors how to act in relation
to the company;
(iii) the directors did so act; and
(iv) "they were accustomed so to act".
In essence,"[w]hat is needed is first, a board of directors claiming and
purporting to act as such; and secondly, a pattern of behaviour in
which the board did not exercise any discretion or judgment of its
own, but acted in accordance with the directions of others."14
12 S.214(3) of the IA 86. Simply ceasing to trade may not bring a director
within the protection of subsection (3), as this does not necessarily minimise
loss to creditors; similarly, resignation by a director may not be enough,
although his resignation should be minuted: see Hanson, C., "Trading on the
brink: the company's and its directors' perspective" Practical Law for
Companies. May. 1991, 25, at p.27.
13 Re Hvdrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation') f 19941 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p,183d-e,
per Millett J., (as he then was); noted by Turing, D., "Lender Liability, Shadow
Directors and the case of Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd" [1994] J.I.B.L. 244.
14 Re Hvdrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation) f 19941 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p.l83d-e,
per Millett J.
616
A shadow director is different, and, indeed, mutually exclusive, from
a de facto director, as the shadow director claims not to be a director,
but lurks in the shadows sheltering behind people he claims are the
only directors of the company.15 The paradigm examples of a
shadow director are a bankrupt who appoints his wife as sole
director of a company, or, where a fraudster uses nominee companies
as his vehicles operated by nominee directors (probably offshore)
who carry out the fraudster's instructions.16 It is the eminence grise
who is not a director, but who wields power in relation to the
insolvent company with the actual directors being his puppets.17 In
contrast, a de facto director claims to act as a director, although not
validly appointed.18
15 Re Hvdrodam (Corby) Ltd (in liquidation) [19941 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p.183, per
Millett J.
16 Fidler, P., "Banks as Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, referring to the
article by Sir Peter Millett, "Shadow Directorship - A Real or Imagined Threat
to Banks". Insolvency Practitioner. Jan.. 1991.
17 Hanson, C., "Trading on the brink: the company's and its directors'
perspective" Practical Law for Companies. May, 1991, 25, at p.26, who gives as
an example of a shadow director, a receiver who incorporates a subsidiary of
the company he is receiver of, as he wishes to hive down the business of the
company in receivership, and who appoints his managers as directors of the
subsidiary.
18 Re Hvdrodam fCorbv) Ltd (in liquidation! f 19941 2 B.C.L.C. 180.
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(iii) Standard of Skill of a Director
In assessing the standard of skill that a director needs to exhibit
under ss.214(2) and (3), s.214(4) provides that the standard to be
applied is that of a reasonably diligent person having both:
"(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same
functions as are carried out by that director in relation to that
company, and
(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that that
director has."
Thus, the test is both an objective and subjective one, with the higher
one, in the circumstances, applying. A director needs to reach the
minimum standard set out in (a), and cannot avoid liability by saying
that he did his best: as his best may not be acceptable.19 The
subjective element in (b) means different standards are expected
from the different categories and types of directors. For example, a
higher standard will be expected from the finance director, who has
19 It used to be assumed, based on one reading of the judgment of Romer J. (as
he then was) in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [19251 Ch. 407, that an
honest, but objectively incompetent, director, who did the best he could, would
not be liable for breach of duty. However, recent authority indicates that the
test for breach of duty by a director is that set out in s.214(4): see Norman v.
Theodore Goddard f 19911 B.C.L.C. 1028 and Re D'Jan of London Ltd. [1993] B.C.C.
646; noted by Hicks, A., "Directors' Liability for Management Errors" (1994) 110
L.Q.R. 390. Cf. the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New
South Wales in Daniels v. Anderson (19951 A.C.S.R. 606.
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access to the daily financial workings of a company and, hence, a
greater appreciation of its financial position than a non-executive
director, who does not have such access; similarly, a high standard
will be expected of a lender appointed nominee to the board of a
borrower.
JUDICIAL GUIDANCE ON S.214 AND SHADOW DIRECTORS
Lenders' fears of possible liability as a shadow director were
confirmed in Re A Company (Number 005009 of 1987): ex parte
Copp20 (which subsequently became Re M.C. Bacon Ltd.).21 where
Knox J., in a striking out application under the Rules of the (English)
Supreme Court22, held that the claim by the borrower's liquidator,
that the steps taken by M.C. Bacon Ltd. to implement the
recommendations of its lender in the lender's report on the company
made the lender a shadow director of the company, was not
"obviously unsustainable", although, his Lordship expressed no
definite opinion on the matter. Nonetheless, the significant factor is
that the claim was not rejected.23 But, at the trial, Millet J. held this
argument was "rightly abandoned" after six days.24 It had been
20 [1989] B.C.L.C. 13.
21 [1990] B.C.C. 78.
22 Order 18, rule 4 R.S.C. This is similar to a plea to the relevancy under Scots
law.
23 Knox J., supra, at p. 21, specifically declined to give reasons so as not to
embarrass the trial judge.
24 Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 78, at p.79.
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anticipated that, in addition to affidavits, there would be oral
evidence supporting the company's case that the lender was acting as
a shadow director. This did not occur, and costs were awarded
against the company on this and other points.25 In that case, a bank
decided to support an ailing company and took very stringent
security (i.e., a debenture).
Since then, a series of cases has given rise to the following issues.26
(i) Defences: S.214 Of IA'86 v's S.727 Of CA'85
S.727(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended), ("CA'85), which
excuses negligence, default, breach of duty or trust where an officer
of a company "has acted honestly and reasonably, and that having
regard to all the circumstances of the case ought fairly to be
excused", either in whole or in part, is inapplicable to any wrongful
trading case.27 This is because ss.214(2)(b), (3) and (4) of the IA'86
are objective, whereas s.727 of the CA'85 imposes a subjective test,
and it is difficult to see how the two sections could be intended to
25 Ibid.
26 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. \ 19891 B.C.L.C. 513; and Re Produce
Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 520: Re DKG Contractors Ltd.
[1990] B.C.C. 903; Re Purpoint Ltd. H9911 B.C.C. 121; and Re Tasbian Ltd. CNo.3)
[1992] B.C.C. 368, noted by Syrota, G., "Insolvent Trading: Hidden Risks For
Accountants And Banks Participating in 'Workouts'" [1993] U.W.A.L.R. 329. The
first Scottish case on s.214 has now been reported: see Dver v. Hislop 1995
S.C.L.R. (Notes) 161 (Sh. Ct.).
27 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [19891 B.C.L.C. 513, at p.518, per Knox J.
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operate together.28 Also, it was "virtually impossible" to look at all
the circumstances of a case and see whether a director has acted
honestly and reasonably in deciding whether that director ought to
be fairly excused and, at the same time, to impute to him some
general knowledge, skill and experience, which he may well not have:
this being a different test.29
Moreover, s.214 specifically relates to wrongful trading, and a fortiori
is intended to cover the field in this area; whilst s.727 makes no
reference to wrongful trading, and appears to apply to situations
other than those involving wrongful trading. This is consistent with
Parliament having included a specific defence to wrongful trading in
s.214(3). If the test was that in s.727 of the CA'85, then s.214(3) of
the IA'86 would be unnecessary. It is unlikely that Parliament
intended two defences for wrongful trading and did not specifically
say so, as s.214 of the IA'86 is an onerous provision.30 The
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Also, if s.727 of the CA'85 had meant to apply to an insolvency situation, then,
as the insolvency provisions of the 1985 Act were removed and inserted in the
1985 and 1986 Insolvency Acts, it is likely that there would be a reference to
s.727 applying, in addition to s.214 of the IA'86. See too the view of LingardJ.R.,
Corporate Rescues and Insolvencies (19891. at para.2.19, on pp.18-19, who
argues that s.214 of the IA'86 is "a proceeding for a declaration that [a] director
make a personal contribution to the company's assets not for 'negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust' and therefore the Companies Act
1985, s.727, which enables the court to excuse the directors who have acted
honestly and reasonably does not apply."
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exemption from liability in each section reflects these differences in
ambit and intention of the sections (and the Acts they are found in).
Moreover, it is suggested that conduct giving rise to a wrongful
trading action (if proved) is unlikely to be held to be reasonable
conduct which ought fairly to excuse a breach of duty.31
(ii) Directors' Standards
The test to be applied by the court is one under which "the director
in question is to be judged by the standards of what can reasonably
be expected of a person fulfilling his functions, and showing
reasonable diligence in doing so"32. Thus, a lower standard is to be
expected from a small company than a larger, more sophisticated
one.33 However, the CA'85 sets out certain minimum standards,
including obligations to keep accounting records and to prepare a
profit and loss account and a balance sheet, as well as to present
copies of the accounts for that year ended to the company in general
meeting, and to deliver a copy of the accounts to the Registrar of
Companies within ten months.34
31 See, for example, the facts of Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. [1989]
B.C.L.C. 513; and see the opinion of Sheriff Stewart in Dyer v. Hislop 1995
S.C.L.R. (Notes) 161 (Sh. Ct.), at p,164A-B.
32 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) f 19891 B.C.L.C. 520, at p.550, per
Knox J.; this is with respect to subsection (a).
33 At p.550, per Knox J.
34 At p.550, per Knox J.; see s.221 (l),(2)(a), s.227(l), (3), 241(1), (3), and s.242(1),
(2) of the CA'85.
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(iii) Directors' Knowledge
The director's knowledge that there is no reasonable prospect of the
company avoiding insolvent liquidation is not limited to the
documentary material available at the relevant time. The reference
in s.214(4) of the IA'86 to facts which a director of an insolvent
company ought to know, and those which he ought to ascertain,
indicates that not only is it information which is actually present that
is to be included, but also information which, given reasonable
diligence and an appropriate level of general knowledge, skill and
experience, is ascertainable by the director'5, i.e., constructive
knowledge.
(iv) Lenders Obtaining Information
For a lender, the obtaining of management accounts and other
financial data from the borrower under the loan documentation
between the borrower and lender56 means the lender is likely -
depending on the accuracy of the documentation provided - to be
fixed with actual knowledge (or, at the very least, constructive
knowledge) of the borrower's financial status; this will be all the
more so where the lender is taking an active interest in, or
monitoring role with regard to, the borrower's business, so as to
protect its loan to the borrower, and has, for example,
representatives on the board of the borrower. Any such lender
35 At p.55, per Knox J.
36 See, for example, Lingard. J. R., Commercial Loan Agreements (1990), at
paras. 11.3 - 11.5, on pp.40-41, and see Appendix 2, clause 11, on p. 115.
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appointed nominee is likely to have a conflict of interests37 between:
(i) the interests of his employers (the lender), to whom he owes
contractual and, in some circumstances, fiduciary duties, and (ii) the
borrower company he is a director of, to whom he also owes
fiduciary duties; although, in the absence of any fully informed
consent (either express or implied) given by the borrower company
to this conflict, it will be the nominee director, and not his employer,
the lender, who will be liable for breach of fiduciary duty.38
37 A similar view is shared by Cain, B., "Rescuing companies on the brink of
insolvency" Practical Law for Companies. May. 1991, 17, at p.21 (Wrongful
Trading); and Hanson, C., "Trading on the brink: the company's and its
directors' perspective" Practical Law for Companies. May, 1991, 25, at p.26 (Who
is a director).
38 It is possible that, in addition to the usual requirements about disclosure of
information under the loan documentation, a nominee director may have the
company's consent to disclose information to the lender, but not be required to
disclose the lender's thinking on a matter to the company. The suggestion of
"Chinese Walls" by Cain, referred to below, would indicate this is not the case:
see also the discussion on conflicts of interest in Chapter 3, "Lenders As
Fiduciaries", and the case of North and South Trust Co. v. Berkeley [1971] 1
W.L.R. 470, referred to therein.
Even so, a director will still be required to make a declaration in terms of s.317
of the CA'85 (as amended). As to the interpretation of this section: see Helv
Hutchison Ltd. v. Bravhead Ltd. [1986] 1 Q.B. 549 (C.A.), and Guinness pic v.
Saunders r 19901 2 A.C. 663 (H.L.(E.)).
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One possible problem is if the nominee director knows in advance
that the borrower company he is a director of is to be put into
receivership39, but does not tell the company so that it can order its
affairs accordingly, or try to seek other forms of finance.40 The
borrower company is unlikely to be pleased to learn that it has
continued trading and incurred liabilities only to find it is to be put
in receivership and that one or more of its directors knew about this.
To prevent such a situation, it is advisable that the nominee directors
of a borrower should be isolated from that part of the lender which
makes decisions on whether to rescue the borrower and the terms of
that rescue.41 As to any action by the borrower company for breach
of fiduciary duty, this can only be brought against the nominee
director, and not the lender - the liability is personal: not vicarious.
The question of lender liability where the lender has nominee
directors on the borrower's board is discussed below.
39 Hanson, C., "Trading on the brink: the company's and its directors'
perspective", Practical Law for Companies. May. 1991, 25, at p.26 (Who is a
director).
40 How successful this is likely to be is questionable.
41 Cain, B., "Rescuing companies on the brink of insolvency" Practical Law for
Companies. May. 1991, 17, at p.21 (Wrongful Trading). See also the section on
conflicts of interest in Chapter 3, "Lenders As Fiduciaries".
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(v) S.214 Of IA'86 Is Compensatory Not Penal - Factors
Relevant In Exercising Discretion To Make Compensation
Order
S.214 of the IA'86 is a compensatory in nature, rather than penal.42
A director is liable for "the amount by which the company's assets
can be discerned to have been depleted by the director's conduct".43
The "very wide words of discretion" mean it is not appropriate to
spell out the limits of this discretion, although, in determining a
director's contribution, it is not wrong for the court to take into
account that there has been no fraudulent intent.44 Other factors
(which are not exhaustive) which may be taken into account are:45
(a) that it was a case of failure to appreciate what should have been
clear, rather than one of deliberate wrongdoing.
(b) that positively untrue statements of fact are to be held against
their maker;
(c) whether there was a warning from the company's auditors, which
was ignored;
42 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd, (No 2) r 19891 B.C.L.C. 520, at p.553, per
Knox J. See also Re DKG Contractors Ltd. f 19901 B.C.C. 903.
43 At p.553, per Knox J.
44 At p.553f, per Knox J.
45 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No 2) 14 9891 B.C.L.C. 520, at pp.553-
554, per Knox J.
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(d) that the lender was substantially, if not fully, secured. If the
court's jurisdiction is to be exercised, it needs to be done in a way
that benefits unsecured creditors.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS: FLOATING
CHARGE HOLDER OR ORDINARY CREDITORS?
One matter that remains to be clarified is whether any contributions
recovered from directors are "pooled" for the benefit of all creditors,
or whether they are subject to any floating charge in favour of the
lender - which is the traditional rule.46 In one case, Knox J. appears
to accept secured creditors have priority, as his Lordship takes into
account a £50,000 guarantee liability of one director ("D") infavour of
the lender, and says the lender held a charge over everything D and
the other director ("M") contributed to PMC's assets, with a
consequential reduction in D's guarantee liability.47 However, Knox J
goes on to state that, if the jurisdiction under s.214 is to be exercised,
"it needs to be exercised in a way which will benefit unsecured
creditors".48 The difficulty is that it is possible for a lender to be
both: (i) a shadow director, making a contribution to the company's
assets, and (ii) a floating charge, or debenture, holder, having a
46 See Bannister, J., "Wrongful Trading: the Courts Speak" (1989) Insolvency
Law & Practice 30, at p.32; and Mitchell, B., "Wrongful Trading Implications for
Bankers", (1989) B.J.I.B.F.L.. June 1989, 251, at pp.251-252, on this.
47 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd, (No 2) \ 19891 B.C.L.C. 520, at p.554, per
Knox J.
48 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No 2") T19891 B.C.L.C. 520, at p.554, per
Knox J.
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floating charge over any contributions that the directors (including
itself as a shadow director) may be ordered to pay. This has the
consequence that, subject to preferential claims, a wrongful lender
has priority over the unsecured creditors on whose behalf the
liquidator (who is the only person who can bring such an action)
acts.49
By allowing a charge over recalcitrant directors' contributions
(including any contributions of a lender as a shadow directors)50,
wrongful trading is being equated with misfeasance, in which it has
been held51 that proceeds from such action must be applied against
the amount due and owing to the floating charge holder.52 This
approach is not correct for two reasons. First, the only person who
can bring a wrongful trading claim is the liquidator of the insolvent
company, who acts on behalf of the company's unsecured creditors.
This is a special statutory right of action, which is not available to a
receiver (who acts on behalf of the floating charge, or debenture,
49 Quaere: whether this might not be a case of the lender benefiting from its
own wrong-doing?
50 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd, (No.2) f 19891 B.C.L.C. 520.
51 Re Anglo-Austrian Printing and Publishing Union f 18951 2 Ch. 891.
52 See Wheeler S., "Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate
Insolvency" [1993] J.B.L. 256, at p.265. See also Hicks, A., "Advising on
wrongful trading: Part 1" (1993) 14 The Company Lawyer 16. at p. 19.
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holder).53 It would be odd for the liquidator to bring an action
primarily for the benefit of the floating charge holder, bearing in
mind the cost of such an action and the expected return to the
unsecured creditors. In theory, such contributions will reduce the
debt to the lender and mean that there is potentially a greater
surplus left after the satisfaction of such a debt for unsecured
creditors. In reality, the unsecured creditors are likely to receive
very little anyway, especially if there are other secured creditors, or
the debt is not covered by the contributions; but if the contributions
are for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, they will receive a
higher dividend. It is more consistent with the nature and duties of
the liquidator for a wrongful trading action to be brought for the
benefit of the general body of creditors, rather than a secured
creditor, whose claims to priority of payment (including those under
a floating charge), a liquidator often seeks to defeat.54 The question
is: are the "powers . . . intended to be exercised so as to enable a
[floating charge] holder to obtain the benefit of the proceedings
brought by the liquidator"?55 The answer to this is no.
53A similar view is taken by Millett J. in Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. (No 2) [1991] Ch. 127,
at p.l37A-B.
54 See ss.238, 239 and 245 of the 1A'86, for example.
55 Per Millett J. (as he then was) in Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. (No.2) [1991] Ch. 127, at
p.l37F, in the context of a preference.
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Secondly,56 s.212 of the IA'86, which concerns misfeasance, refers to
breach of duty, whereas s.214 of the IA'86 refers to "the potential
loss to the company's creditors".57 Thus, the two sections are
different in ambit. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to
apply the same rule, concerning directors contributions for
misfeasance being caught by a floating charge, to wrongful trading
contributions, particularly as the bringing of claims for misfeasance
are not confined to a company's liquidator (who can be the subject of
a misfeasance claim himself)58. Whilst s.214 creates a cause of action
for wrongful trading, s.212 is, essentially, procedural.59 To equate
the two sections would mean there would need to be an implied
56See Wheeler S., "Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate
Insolvency" [1993] J.B.L. 256. at p.265.
57 Which should be interpreted to mean all creditors.
58 See s.212(l) of the IA'86. Cf s.212(3)(b), which refers to the court ordering a
misfeasant director "to contribute such sum to the company's assets by way of
compensation in respect of the misfeasance or breach of fiduciary or other
duty". See also Hicks, A., "Advising on wrongful trading: Part 1" (1993) 14 The
Company Lawyer 16. at p. 19.
59 See Peter Gibson L.J. in Re Farmizer (Products') Ltd. v. Moore [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 589, at
p.596f-g; Potter and Butler Sloss L.JJ., agreeing. Under s.212's predecessors (s. 165 of
the Companies Act 1862 and s.333 of the Companies Act 1948), it has been held that the
section gives a summary remedy, but does not create a new cause of action: see
Liquidators of Citv of Glasgow v, Mackinnon (1881) 9 R. 535, at p.564, per Lord
President Inglis; Lord Advocate v. Liquidators of Purvis Industries Ltd. 1958 S.C. 338, at
p.342, per Lord Guest (O.H.); and Coventry and Dixon's case (1880) 14 Ch. D. 600 (C.A.).
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statutory duty under s.214.60 Whilst there is no express reference to
breach of duty in s.214, which is compensatory, the basis of liability
under s.214 is that a director has not acted with sufficient skill and
care to prevent the company avoiding insolvency - a serious failure,
as the director's task is the stewardship of the company on behalf of
the shareholders, although the director's duties are owed to the
company.
A wrongful trading action is more akin to a preference action61 (in
which it has been held62 that proceeds of recovery go to the general
"Wheeler, S., "Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate Insolvency"
[1993] J.B.L. 256, at p.265.
61 Wheeler, supra . at pp. 265-266.
62 Re Yagerphone Ltd. 119201 1 Ch. 392, on the basis that £240.00 paid by
Yagerphone Ltd. to a creditor (which Yagerphone Ltd's liquidator later
recovered from the creditor as a fraudulent preference (under the old law))
did not, at the time of crystallisation of the floating charge, form part of the
assets of Yagerphone Ltd., as it had been paid to the creditor, and had not, yet,
been recovered by the liquidator; the floating charge applied to all
Yagerphone Ltd's property "whatsoever and wheresoever, both present and
future". See too Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] Ch. 127. In Scotland, cf. Ross v.
Taylor 1985 S.C. 156 (I.H.). There, an asset sold to a creditor prior to the
appointment of a receiver, was returned to the receiver and re-sold; a
liquidator was later appointed. The question was whether the asset was part of
the company's property when the receiver sold it, and thus was attached by
the floating charge, or, if it was not, whether it was re-attached by the floating
charge on liquidation. It was held that the asset was caught by the floating
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body of creditors), than a misfeasance action. This view is consistent
with that of Vinelott J. in Re Purpoint63. who held that the purpose of
wrongful trading is to recoup any loss to an insolvent company in
order to benefit the creditors as a whole, and that the court cannot
direct payment to one class of creditors in preference to another. To
interpret s.214 as permitting wrongful trading contributions to be
caught by a floating charge, is to allow a clawing back, in part, by a
recalcitrant lender, which frustrates the effect of the section and
cannot be what was intended.
The key point with a wrongful trading action is that it is not an asset
of the company prior to liquidation (although the conduct giving rise
to it occurs before then).64 It relates to the conduct of the directors
charge, but that if it had not been, then the charge would have re-crystalised
upon the liquidator's appointment. The decision is open to question on the
second point, and is best confined to its facts. See the case note on it by Sellar,
D.P., "Future assets and double attachments" (1985) J.L.S.S. 242. See also Wilson,
W.A., The Scottish Law of Debt (1991) 2nd edn., at para.9.18, on p.120, who
gently questions the case in relation to re-attachment on liquidation. The case
is also criticised on this basis by Sellar. supra, at pp.243-244.
63 [1991] B.C.C. 121.
M Cf. Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd. (in liq). Ward v. Aitken 119971 1
B.C.L.C. 689 (C.A.), where the court drew a distinction between:
(i) company property in existence at the date of winding up, including rights
of action; and
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of the company, and not to the company's conduct, as would be the
case in a breach of contract action to which the company is a party.
A wrongful trading action is a different type of asset65 from those
caught by a floating charge or debenture, e.g., heritage/land or book
debts, which are accrued in the usual course of the company's
business. Moreover, it is not a claim which the company could bring
itself.66
(ii) property subsequently acquired by the liquidator, due to "the exercise of
rights conferred on him alone by statute", which he holds on statutory trust
for distribution to him: see at pp.699-700, per Peter Gibson L.J.
This case concerned a wrongful trading claim by a liquidator, who agreed to
assign a percentage of the "fruits of the litigation" to a third party, who had
funded the action. It was held this was a champertous agreement and not
within the liquidator's powers, under paras.6 and 13 of Sch. 4 of the IA'86.
65 See Hemsworth, M.C., "Corporate Insolvency - the exclusion of debenture
holders from Insolvency Act provisions - Re Yagerphone Revisited"
Insolvency Law & Practice. Vol. 13, No. 2, 1997, at p.51, who argues, developing
an idea of Millett J. in Re M.C. Bacon (No. 21 [1991] Ch. 127, at p.138, that
"attention needs to be focused upon the nature of the relevant asset rather
than upon questions of timing. The relevant asset is the compay's right of
action and is not to be confused with the fruits of such action which will of
necessity always be treated as company assets once received whenever the
right of action first arose."
66 See Millett J. in Re M.C. Bacon Ltd (No 2) [1991] Ch. 127, at p. 136H; and Peter
Gibson L.J. in Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd. ("in liqL Ward v. Aitken
[1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 689, at p.699i, per Peter Gibson L.J.
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AREAS OF CONCERN TO LENDERS RE SHADOW DIRECTORSHIPS
AND WRONGFUL TRADING: MONITORING LOANS AND LENDER
NOMINEE DIRECTORS
There are two main areas of concern for lenders regarding their
possible liability as a shadow director for wrongful trading: (i) the
monitoring of a loan and attaching conditions for continuing facilities
and/or for new facilities; and (ii) liability for the acts and omissions
for the lender's nominee director 011 the board of the borrower.
(i) Monitoring a Loan
Whilst rescue situations - with their more stringent security and
tighter monitoring - may open the possibility of liability as a shadow
director, generally a lender is unlikely to be liable as a shadow
director, especially where the lender does not go outside the
lender/borrower (or banker/customer) relationship.67 There is a
distinction68 between: (i) monitoring the business of a financially
troubled borrower, which does not give rise to liability, and (ii)
interfering in the borrower's management, such as telling the
67 See especially Fidler, P., "Banks As Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, at
pp.98-99, referring to the article by Sir Peter Millett in "Shadow Directorship -
A Real or Imagined Threat to Banks" The Insolvency Practitioner. Jan., 1991.
68 See Fidler, P., "Banks As Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, at pp.98-99,
referring to the article by Sir Peter Millett, "Shadow Directorship - A Real or
Imagined Threat to Banks" The Insolvency Practitioner. Jan.. 1991. It has been
said this article was the judgement Millett J. wanted to write in M C Bacon Ltd..
[1990] B.C.L.C. 324 supra, where the point was abandoned: see Fidler, P., supra,
at p.98.
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borrower which creditors it can pay and which ones it cannot69,
which may lead to liability. A situation of shadow directorship arises
where the board of an insolvent company, as a whole, abandons its
decision making role and becomes accustomed to following the
directions of someone who is not a director70; it does not encompass
the situation where one person is on the board to do what someone
else wants him to do; the shadow director has conscious intent to
control the decisions of that borrower's board.
For a lender to be constituted a shadow director, it is not enough for
him to attach conditions to its continued financial support of the
borrower - such as, requiring additional security, a reduction in the
borrower's overdraft, the sending in of an investigation team, a call
for (further) financial information, and advice on strengthening
management and seeking new capital.71 Whilst such conditions may
69 Segal, N., "Rehabilitation And Approaches Other Than Formal Insolvency
Procedures" : Ch. 8 in Banks and Remedies (1992) (R. Cranston ed.), at p. 143 and
Re Tasbian Ltd. (No.31 H9921 B.C.C. 358 (C.A.).
70 Fidler, P., "Banks As Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, at pp.98-99,
referring to the article by Sir Peter Millett, "Shadow Directorship - A Real or
Imagined Threat to Banks" in The Insolvency Practitioner. Jan., 1991, and
Millett J. (as he then was) in Re Hvdrodam (Corbv) Ltd. 09941 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at
p.l83d-e; and the Privy Council in Kuwait Asia Bank E.C. v. National Mutual Life
Nominees Ltd. 119911 1 A.C. 187.
71 Fidler, P., "Banks As Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, at p.98, referring to
the article by Sir Peter Millett in "Shadow Directorship - A Real or Imagined
Threat to Banks" The Insolvency Practitioner. Jan.. 1991.
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be commercially sensible, and leave the customer with no practical
choice but to comply if it wishes to continue trading, the critical point
is that it is the insolvent company's directors - and not the lender -
who make the decision as to whether the company continues to
trade.72 If a lender makes such a decision, then it has taken on a
management role and stepped outwith the lender/customer
relationship, and it can be responsible, as a shadow director, to make
a contribution to the insolvent borrower's assets. It was the
participation in the management of a borrower company by a
'company doctor'73 (introduced to the borrower by its lender74) who,
amongst other things, signed the company's cheques (i.e., he
controlled the borrower's bank account via its bank mandate75),
monitored its trading and devised a scheme involving company
72 The directors will be keen to keep the company trading, if possible, owing to
the possibility of disqualification if the company goes into liquidation: see s.6
of the Directors' Disqualification Act 1986.
73 As to a "company doctor": see Re Campbell f 19841 B.C.L.C. 83.
74 A finance company which financed Tasbian Ltd.'s business as a shareholder
and debenture (floating charge) holder; there were two other lenders,
including two major English clearing banks.
75 "This meant that [the company doctor] was concerned with which of the
company's creditors were paid and in which order, and to that extent it would
appear . . . that he was able to control the company's affairs.": see Balcombe L.J.
(who delivered the leading judgment), at p.364C.
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employees to lessen the company's tax76, that led to the company
doctor being found liable as a shadow director in Re Tasbian
Ltd.(No.3).77 The difficult line between being: (i) a "watch dog",
imposed by an outside investor, and (ii) a shadow director78 had
been crossed.
(ii) Lender Liability For Acts Or Omissions Of Its Nominee
Director
The mere appointment by a lender of its nominees to the borrower's
board, without more, is not sufficient to ground liability on the lender
as a shadow director, or at common law. This is because the nominee
directors owe duties to the company they are appointed to: not the
lender. This is clear from the advice of the Privy Council in the New
Zealand case of Kuwait Asia Bank E.C. v. National Mutual Life
76 Other matters relied on to support the claim (which was upheld) that the
company doctor was a shadow director (and so should be disqualified from
acting as a director) included: that the company doctor was appointed and paid
by Tasbian Ltd.; he negotiated an informal standstill with creditors; he
negotiated with the Department of Trade and Industry and the Inland Revenue
and introduced Tasbian Ltd to new factors; and for the most part, the de jure
directors of Tasbian Ltd considered the company doctor as a shadow director,
even a managing director (which, it is suggested, is not inconsistent with his
role): see at pp.362F-G, 363E and 364C-F., per Balcombe L.J.
77 [1992] B.C.C. 358 (CA).
78 See Vinelott J., at the 1st instance, [1991] B.C.L.C. 792, at p.802.
637
Nominees Ltd79, where their Lordships considered the position of two
lender nominee directors of a company in the context of the New
Zealand equivalent of s.251 of the IA'8680, which defines "director"
as:
"A person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the
persons occupying the position of directors of a company are
accustomed to act."
The facts of the case were that a lender (Kuwait Asia Bank E.C.),
through a web of shareholdings, had a 40% beneficial interest in a
company ("AICS"), which was a money broker. AICS had five
directors - two of whom, A and H, were employees of the lender, and
were nominated by the lender to the AICS's board. As part of its
business, AICS took deposits. To protect depositors, there was a trust
deed which appointed National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. ("NML"), as
trustee, pursuant to statute. Under the trust deed, AICS agreed to
provide NML with monthly and quarterly certificates on behalf of the
directors. Certificates were furnished, but these were inaccurate.
This resulted in AICS going into liquidation, and NML settled actions
brought against it by the depositors. NML then sought to sue, inter
alia, the lender (as well as the directors, A and H, personally for
breach of duty) for a contribution.
It was held that the lender was not vicariously liable for the acts and
omissions of A and H. as those appointing directors owe no duty (in
the absence of bad faith or fraud) to see the appointed directors
79 [1991] 1 A.C. 187 (P.C.).
80 S.2(l) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1955.
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discharge their duties, although self interest may dictate that the
appointer checks to see that the directors carry out their duties
properly; and that any breach of duty by A and H was done in their
personal capacity as directors (agents) of AICS, and not as agents of
the lender.81
With regard to whether the lender was a "shadow director", under
the New Zealand equivalent of s.251 of the IA'86, it was said that A
and H constituted only two out of the five directors (which was not a
majority of the board) - the other directors were appointed by the
other major shareholder in AICS; also, there was no allegation "that
the directors in these circumstances were accustomed to act on the
direction or instruction of the [lender]".82 Consequently, no claim
arose. Where the lender has appointed the majority of directors, the
situation may be different.
The general position of a lender is well summarised in the following
passage:
The [lender] never accepted or assumed any duty of care towards the
plaintiff. In the absence of fraud or bad faith on the part of the
[lender], no liability attached to the [lender] in favour of the plaintiff
for any instruction or advice given by the [lender] to [H] and [A], Of
course, it was in the interests of the [lender] to give good advice and see
that [H] and [A] conscientiously and competently performed their duties
81 [1991] 1 A.C. 187 (P.C.), at pp.222-223, per Lord Lowry, delivering the advice
of the Judicial Committee.
82 [1991] 1 A.C. 187, at p.223G, per Lord Lowry. This is similar to Millett J.'s view,
in Re Hvdrodam Corby, supra.
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both under the trust deed and as directors of A.I.C.S. But such advice is
not attributable to any duty owed by the [lender] to the plaintiff, which
was only entitled to the protection which the trust deed provided,
namely quarterly certificates furnished on behalf of all the directors of
A.I.C.S. By the trust deed the directors of A.I.C.S. accepted and assumed
responsibility for the quarterly certificates, and the directors did not
include the [lender]. The [Insolvency Act 1986] cannot alter the
construction of the trust deed or impose on the [lender] a duty assumed
by [H] and [A] but never assumed by the [lender]."83
SUMMARY
When a lender is acting in an orthodox manner - such as setting
down conditions to a corporate borrower for continued lending
facilities,84 or appointing nominees to the board of a borrower - the
likelihood of liability as a shadow director is remote. Whilst personal
liability might arise for the nominee directors, the lender will not be
vicariously liable for their acts or omissions, unless the lender seeks
to obtain "an improper advantage" for itself, or causes the borrower
harm, or interferes with the borrower.
Nonetheless, lenders should avoid "telling" the borrower what to do,
and should couch anything they tell the borrower as advice, or as
something the board of the borrower has to decide. Also, particularly
83 At p. 224 A-C per Lord Lowry.
84 Cf. the position in the U.S.A., in the context of environmental liability under
its Superfund legislation, where the lender goes beyond enforcing its security
and becomes guilty of participation in management, and therefore liable for
clean-up costs.
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in a rescue situation, the lender should seek the most up-to-date
information, and take professional advice at an early stage, so that
the lender can be said to have done everything it could. By taking
such advice, it will be more difficult for a liquidator (and, ultimately,
a court) to say that the lender has not done all that it could have
been done.85
CONCLUSION
Whilst the pronouncements of Sir Peter Millett and the Privy Council
provide some relief for lenders, the time has come for legislative
reform so that lenders are able to assist troubled borrowers more
readily without the uncertainty of wrongful trading action. One
ironic possible side effect of the shadow director threat is that, at a
time when lenders should be seeking to assist troubled borrowers, it
might be responsible for inhibiting rescues.86 This is certainly the
view of one "company doctor", who says that the shadow director
spectre has inhibited lender assistance87.
It is suggested that the proviso in the definition of shadow director
should be amended to include the words "lending or monitoring"
after "in a professional" and before "capacity". However, where a
85 The Institute of Directors has published guidelines to assist company
directors in relation to wrongful trading.
86 Hood, P., "Lender Liability Under English Law" : Ch.2 in Banks - Liability and
Risk (19951 (2nd edn.) R. Cranston ed.), at p.88.
87 Bartlett, F., '"Shadow director' - a spectre that haunts the high street banker"
Insolvency Law & Practice. Vol. 10, No.2, 1994, 52.
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lender participates in the management of the borrower to such an
extent that it, and not the borrower, is making the decisions
concerning the borrower's activities, e.g., such as having a majority of
directors on the board of the borrower, then the lender should be
liable for wrongful trading for the period it participated in the
management of the borrower, like all the other directors - both
present or past. This is consistent with the view of Sir Peter Millett
that a lender is able to monitor its loan, and the view of both the
Privy Council and Sir Peter Millett that ii is the usurping of the role
of the board by the shadow director that is critical. To this end, s.251
of the IA'86 should be amended to read "... a person is not deemed a
shadow director by reason only that the directors act on advice given
by him in a professional, or a lending or a monitoring capacity, unless
that person's conduct goes beyond the aforementioned and amounts
to participation in the management of the company"):88 (Emphasis
added.)
Such a reform would give legislative protection to lenders seeking to
assist troubled borrowers, whilst protecting creditors where the
lender oversteps its role.
A second reform would be to make it clear in s.214(l) that any order
for a contribution made by the court against a director is to be for
the benefit of the general body of creditors and not secured creditors.
The section could be amended by adding the words "for the benefit
of the general body of creditors of the company as a whole and not
88 See the discussion of the concept of participation in management under the
United States Environment legislation in Chapter 13, "Environmental Liability
of Lenders".
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for the benefit of any secured creditor of the company", after "as the
court thinks proper", in the last line. A new sub-section could be
added, stating that: "(9) Any floating charge over the property, assets
and undertaking of the company shall be of no force and effect in
relation to any contribution or contributions ordered under this
section."
These amendments would prevent the purpose of s.214 being
frustrated by a wrongful lender who was a shadow director, whilst,





Lender liability is not a unified concept with an overriding principle,
but rather relates to the conduct of a lender in different situations,
i.e., it remains a collection of pitfalls for lenders, which they need to
be wary of.
With banking having changed greatly since Foley v. Hill1, and banks
being involved in many more activiities, the chances for liability
have increased. Added to this, there is new technology, which, whilst
it brings benefits, also has a downside.
The problems for banks have arisen when they have stepped out of
the debtor/creditor relationship, and entered into a relationship
where a customer or third party has placed reliance on the bank, or
has expectations, which are unfulfilled. Also, problems arise when
the bank has a conflict between its own position and that of the
customer, and the bank prefers its own position.
Another problem for lenders is the so-called "deep pockets"
syndrome, in that a disgruntled borrower, who has lost money on a
transaction, is looking for someone connected with the transaction to
recover their loss from, e.g., the Ginora case.2 Whilst the pursuer
might lose if the case went to court, it is a good tactic to sue the
1 (1848) 2H.L. Cas. 28
2 Unreported decision of Rimer J., delivered on 10th February, 1995.
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lender because there may be embarrassing details which the lender
would not want to be disclosed in open court, so a settlement of some
sort will be entered into; also, the sum of money involved in a
complex matter may not justify management time and the legal costs
involved in defending such an action, so the lender will settle, usually
without any admission of liability.
In the absence of deliberate wrong doing, a lender can avoid alot of
the problems simply by giving greater consideration to the customer,
and, if necessary, subordinating, in part, its interests to those of the
customer. It has been an over-eagerness by banks to recover debts
from borrowers, no doubt caused by pressure to reduce their (the
banks') bad debts, which have led to problems.
If the matter goes to court in Britain, unlike in the United States, the
matter will not be heard by a judge with a jury, but by a judge, who
will, normally, have had significant commercial experience both at
the Bar and on the Bench, and will be judging the matter on its
merits, rather than on emotion.
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nder s 25 of the Conveyancing and Feudal
Reform Act 1970 ('the 1970 Act'), a standard
security holder, in exercising his right to sell a
heritable security subject when the debtor has
defaulted, is under a duty to 'advertise the sale and to take all
reasonable steps to ensure that the price at which all or any of
:he subjects are sold is the best price that can reasonably be
tbtained'.1
The difficulty arises when the debtor does not believe that
:he security holder has obtained the best price and sues for
iamages2 for breach of statutory duty or under the common
aw for negligence. This issue confronted the First Division
n Dick v Clydesdale Bank pic, where s 25 was considered
ully for the first time by the courts.3
In that case, two plots of land—the lesser plot being used
:or commercial purposes and the greater as agricultural
and—which were the subject of a standard security in favour
)f the bank, were sold by the bank as commercial and
igricultural land respectively in exercise of their rights as
teritable creditor. The sale in open market was handled by
professional estate agents on behalf of the security holder,
rlowever, there was no reference in the advertisement of the
;ale of the land, prepared by the bank's estate agents, to the
and's 'hope value',4 regarding the land's future development
potential, planning permission having been previously
efused. Shortly before the proposed sale, the debtor
equested the security holder to wait before selling, but the
iecurity holder declined.
Consequently, the debtor sued for damages on two
grounds:
(i) that the security holder had failed to sell part of the
and at its true or proper value—the measure of damage being
he difference between the 'hope value' and the agricultural
'alue of the land; and
(ii) that the security holder should have instructed his
igents to market the land not only as agricultural land but
ilso by reference to its development potential.
The security holder argued that:
(i) the debtor's averments did not address the question
vhether the price obtained was the best that could have been
>btained at the time of the sale; and
(ii) by employing competent agents, he had done all that
vas required of him.
At the procedure roll, the Lord Ordinary allowed a proof
pefore answer. The security holder reclaimed.
In allowing the reclaiming motion, the First Division had
to deal with four issues:
(i) the nature of the relationship between the security
holder and the debtor;
(ii) whether the security holder is personally liable for a
failure to obtain the best price when he has employed
competent agents;
(iii) when the security holder can sell the security
subjects; and
(iv) whether the best price at the time has been obtained.
The relationship between security holder and debtor
The court held at the outset that, with regard to the nature of
the relationship between a security holder and a debtor, s 25 of
the 1970 Act broadly states the existing principle that the
security holder is in a position of a 'quasi-trustee' towards the
debtor.5 Under the existing principle, the security holder, in
exercising his power of sale, must 'pay due regard to the
interests of his debtor',6 as the debtor has an interest in the
price obtained: namely, he is either entitled to any surplus7 or
is liable to pay any shortfall in the debt not covered by the sale.
While the security holder is trustee of the proceeds of sale
for the debtor,8 it is suggested that he is not a trustee of the
security subjects, although he has a real right in relation to
them.9
As well as the claim under statute, there was also a claim at
common law for negligence. This was regarded by the Lord
President (with whom Lord Cowie and Lord Mayfield
agreed) as adding little to the case under the statute.10 The
difficulty with a claim in negligence by a debtor against a
security holder, it is submitted, is that it is a claim for pure
economic loss:11 where there has been no damage to the
debtor's property, merely a diminution in its value, on the
current state of the authorities such a claim is unlikely to
succeed.12
Liability for competent agents
The pursuer contended that the duty imposed under the
1970 Act was a personal one upon the security holder and,
thus, could not be evaded merely by employing competent
agents.13 While he neither made criticism of the agents'
competence nor claimed that they had made a 'serious
blunder' the pursuer argued that the security holder should
have instructed his agents to advertise the land with reference
to its 'hope value'.14
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In Dick15 the court, which was dealing with a plea as to the
relevancy, did not discuss the issue in great detail. Senior
counsel for the bank cited a passage from Halsbury's Laws of
England entitled 'Employment of Agents' in support of his
assertion that the bank was not liable for the acts of its
agents.16 The effect of this passage was that, provided
competent agents were appointed and they had not made 'a
serious blunder' leading to a failure to sell or a large
diminution in the price, the security holder would not be
liable.
However, the Lord President (with whom Lord Mayfield
agreed) quite correctly was unwilling to place reliance on the
passage without a more detailed examination of the English
cases referred to there.17 None the less, his Lordship
appeared to accept that there could be liability, as he did not
regard the debtor's averments as irrelevant on this point.18
Lord Hope went on to state that, while no criticism had been
made of the security holder's choice of agents to advise on the
sale of the property, the debtor's averments raised issues
about the security holder's personal responsibility for the
instructions given to his agents, which could not be
'answered sufficiently merely by pointing to the fact that
professional advisers were employed'.19 This issue could not
be properly examined without hearing evidence. Such an
issue, it is suggested, is of the essence of a principal's liability
for the acts of his agents: namely, the agents' authority and
their instructions.20
Lord Cowie, who agreed with the Lord President
generally, took a stronger line on this point and was of the
view that the passage from Halsbury also represented the law
in Scotland.21 Lord Cowie thought it strange that a person
who employed experts to market security subjects could be
held to have failed to have obtained the best possible price if
no criticism is levelled at the choice or conduct of the experts,
who had not committed 'a serious blunder'.22
While this is accepted, the point raised by Lord Cowie is,
of course, with respect, a different one from the point the
Lord President was dealing with. The Lord President was
addressing the situation of the security holder and the
instructions he imparted to his agents, which is a more
fundamental question than whether the agents were regarded
as competent.
In the instant case, the question was whether, as a result of
a letter from the debtor to the security holder, the land
should have been marketed not only as agricultural land, but
also by reference to its development potential. However, the
Lord President (with the agreement of the other members of
the court) was of the opinion that the pursuer's averments, on
the question of whether the best price had been obtained,
were 'so unsatisfactory that no good purpose would be served
by allowing [the] case to go to proof before answer'.23 Thus,
even if he had succeeded on the agency point, the pursuer
would not have succeeded on the decisive issue of whether
the best price had been obtained at the time of the sale. And it
is to this question of the best price and the preliminary
question of when the security holder may sell that it is
necessary to turn.
When a security holder may sell the security subjects
By having to take into account the interests of the debtor, the
security holder has a potential conflict of interest when
selling the security subjects. Is he able to sell when he wants,
or is he obliged to wait and sell at a time that might be more
advantageous, price wise, to the debtor?
This potential conflict was resolved by the First Division
holding that the security holdermay consider his own position
first, and sell when he likes. The position is well set out by the
Lord President, who stated the principle succinctly:
'[T]he creditor is entitled to sell the security subjects at a
time of his own choosing, provided he has taken all
reasonable steps to ensure that the price at which he sells is
the best price that can reasonably be obtained at the
time.'24
Consequently, a security holder does not have to take
account of market fluctuations. Furthermore, a delay by the
security holder in enforcing his security will not be a breach
of duty because, it is submitted, nothing has happened to the
actual security subject: it still exists as before. The difficulty
is that the price of properties, like shares, fluctuates and it
can be as much of a risk for a security holder if he sells at the
wrong time, particularly when, as in the late 1980s and early
1990s, there is a decline in the price of properties. The
reverse may happen and the price increases. In such
circumstances, no one complains. Where, however, the
security holder causes an actual decline in the value of
security, this will be a breach of his duty to the debtor.25
Was the best price at the time obtained?
Having settled when a security holder can sell the security
subjects, the court then discussed the crucial issue ofwhether
the best price had been obtained at the time. The Lord
President observed that the security holder should not have
the threat of a challenge over him simply on the theory that
'the subjects may have had a greater value than was realised
by the sale'.26 The critical matter is 'the reality of the market
place' at the time of the sale. Provided all reasonable steps are
taken 'to attract competition' in the market, the propertywill
find its own level. A security holdermay only be criticised for
not taking further steps to attract a purchaser where there is
evidence to show that such steps would have resulted in a
'better bargain'.27 This sensible approach is, with respect,
clearly correct.
In support of the decision to dismiss the debtor's claim,
Lord Hope noted five matters. First, that any approval for
housing development lay in the future, ie, after the sale.28
Secondly, that there was no decision which might favour
development on the land, or any equivalent statement of
planning policy, known to the security holder or his advisers
at the time of the sale. Thirdly, that there was no averment
that there was anyone 'in the market at the timewilling to pay
more than the agricultural value of the land'. Fourthly, that
the pursuer could not show that there was someone, other
than the purchaser, who was willing to pay more for the land.
Lastly, that there was no proof that anything had been done
to the land since its sale, such as enhancing its value or
obtaining planning permission, to show that the purchase
price was too low.
His Lordship concluded by stating that the debtor's
averments were 'entirely detached from the reality of the
market place in which the subjects were being exposed for
sale at the relevant time'. He regarded the debtor's approach
to be theoretical and 'much influenced by the benefit of
hindsight'. Thus, a failure to show a person willing to pay an
enhanced value was fatal.
Conclusion
The practical, market-orientated approach in Dick to the sale
of security subjects is to be welcomed. It provides certainty to
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the lending community that it is able to exercise its rights as
secured creditors when it chooses but also makes it clear that
the position of the debtor must be considered too.
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('On the Brussels Agenda', continued from p 251)
Training policies
The Society is keen to ensure that trainee solicitors are
eligible to participate in Europe-wide mobility schemes
administered and (at least partly) funded by the Commission.
The Brussels Office thus met with representatives from the
Commission's Task Force for Human Resources, Education,
Training and Youth and established that the Commission's
proposal to develop a 'transitional programme of placements
in firms for young university graduates' was not intended to
extend to trainee solicitors and other trainee professionals.
On the basis of this information, the Brussels Office
prepared a brief setting out the arguments in favour of
including trainee professionals, and in particular trainee
solicitors, in the proposed Community-wide mobility
scheme. The briefwas sent to the European Commission and
to a cross-party selection of influential MEPs.
It became clear that the Commission would have signifi¬
cant input in the final text of the proposals to be put to the
Council of Ministers. However, it also became clear that
the Commission's thinking and judgment would be influ¬
enced by the views of the European Parliament. The
rapporteur (an Irish MEP) of the Committee on Youth,
Culture, Education and the Media and the rapporteur (a
German MEP) of the Committee on Social Affairs,
Employment and the'Working Environment tabled the
Society's amendment to the Commission's proposal. This
was overwhelmingly adopted during the May Plenary
Session of the European Parliament, when Commissioner
Ruberti publicly stated that the Commission would accept
the Society's amendment.
Relations with the European Parliament
TheMaastricht Treaty has significantly increased the powers
of the European Parliament, which now has the right to veto
most EU legislation. The Society and the Brussels Office
have therefore been establishing and building close links
with the Scottish MEPs. First, a Presidential delegation
attended the 'Scotland in Europe' week that was held at the
European Parliament in Strasbourg. Second, the President
hosted a dinner for the Scottish MEPs in Brussels. This was
an informal event and was acknowledged by mostMEPs who
attended to be the first time that an organisation had
managed to assemble them all together. We will continue to
build on these contacts when the new Parliament reconvenes
in September.
Conclusion
On a number of important issues the work and contacts of the
Brussels Office, together with the specialist support and
input from Edinburgh, has succeeded in altering the shape of
emerging EU legislation and policies. The Brussels Office
enables the Society to have early access to political and
strategic information and documentation and to meet
regularly with key players in the EU legislative and political
process. With the likely future enlargement of the EU and
the widening of its competencies as a result of the Maastricht
Treaty, there is likely to be an even greater number of
decisions taken at European level which affect the Society
and Scottish solicitors. The increase in powers of the
European Parliament, and in complexity of the EU
decision-making processes, will make Brussels-
based specialist advice and contacts even more
necessary.
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ground. Indeed rules 17 (3) and 21 of the Land
Registration (Scotland) Rules 1980 actually pro¬
hibit the keeper in a Land Register case from
advising the true owner of the existence of an a
non domino disposition which may have been
registered to found a prescriptive title by
possession. It may be that the keeper requires the
presenter of a non domino title to confirm that
attempts have been made to contact the true
owner, but if that happens it is on an informal
basis only.
It is understood that this case may go to the
House of Lords. If so it will be interesting to see
what their Lordships make of it. In the meantime
landowners should be vigilant lest there be a land
rush based on all manner of queer goings on in




Southern Cross Commodities Ltd v
Martin, 1991 SLT 83
Parker Hood,
University of Edinburgh.
The constructive trust has been an underdeveloped
doctrine in Scots law, but Mr Hood argues that its
value has been demonstrated in at least one recent
case.
The application of the constructive trust in
Scotland is somewhat uncertain. This has
prompted one writer to remark that, whilst the
constructive trust is part ofScots law in principle,
it is rarely used in practice: see Gretton, "Unjust
Enrichment in Scotland" [1991] JBL 108. Part of
the reason for this uncertainty appears to be that
Scotland has had a long standing system of
unjustified enrichment, which has been used to
deal with matters that, in England (which does
not have such a long standing tradition), would be
dealt with by constructive trusts — most notably
the "knowing receipt" category of constructive
trust, concerned with liability for, inter alia,
knowingly receiving trust money, or money the
subject of a fiduciary obligation, in breach of
fiduciary duty for a person's own benefit: see for
example, Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch
265 (this point was not discussed on appeal: see
[1991] Ch 547).
In Scots law, such a matter would be dealt with
as a claim for unjustified enrichment (either in
recompense or repetition), and may involve issues
of indirect enrichment: on this last matter, see
Niall R Whitty, "Indirect Enrichment in Scots
Law", 1994 JR 200, and Pt II in 1994 JR Pt 3,
and Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper
No 95, "Recovery of Benefits Conferred Under
Error of Law", Vol 1, at paras 3.118-123 on pp
181-186. This approach, based on unjustified
enrichment rather than constructive trusts, has
been approved by two noted English experts in
the area: Professor Birks, in his article "Trusts in
the Recovery of Misapplied Assets: Tracing,
Trusts and Restitution", in E McKendrick (ed),
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary
Obligations (1992), chap 8; and the hon Mr
Justice Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud"
(1991) 107 LQR 71, at p 82. Further, in Scots
law, the constructive trust appears to have been
confined, primarily, to cases of breach of fidu¬
ciary duty: the law concerning the application of
constructive trusts in Scotland is set out in
Wilson and Duncan, Trusts, Trustees and Execu¬
torship), at pp 78 et seq, and T B Smith's Short
Commentary on the Law of Scotland at p 561.
Southern Cross Commodities
Where recovery of property which has been
purchased with misappropriated money in breach
of fiduciary duty is sought, it is first necessary to
trace the money to the asset so purchased, and
then to establish a valid cause of action — here,
a claim for a constructive trust for breach of
fiduciary duty — as tracing in itself does not allow
recovery: on this last point, see Macdonald,
"Restitution and Property Law", 1988 SLT
(News) 81 at p 84; and Birks, supra, at p 157.
It is in this context — of the application of the
constructive trust in relation to misapplied money
in breach of fiduciary duty — that the fairly
recent decision of Lord Milligan in Southern
Cross Commodities Property Ltd v Martin, 1991
SLT 83, is of interest. The case, which was one
of almost textbook averments, had all the
hallmarks of an adventure novel, involving
allegedly dishonest company officers in Australia,
a Delaware corporation and land in Scotland; but,
curiously, it has received very little attention in
Scotland, although it has been referred to with
approval in an English book on insolvency: see
Rajani, "Equitable Assistance in the Search for
Security" in Rajak (ed), Insolvency Law: Theory &
Practice (1993), chap 2 at p 36.
Briefly stated, the case concerned a claim
brought by an Australian private company (which
had been wound up) and its liquidator against two
officers of the company, who had allegedly mis¬
appropriated company money. It was contended
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that the individuals had breached their fiduciary
duties and were constructive trustees with regard
to the misapplied sums. These sums, it was said,
had been channelled through a Delaware corpora¬
tion, controlled by the two individuals, and used
to purchase heritable property in Dunbarton¬
shire, known as Arden House, in the name of the
corporation (which was joined as a party).
The pursuers, by their court action, sought
relief on three grounds. First, they sought a
declarator that the pursuers were entitled to the
heritable subjects. Secondly, the pursuers asked
for an order that the title to the property be trans¬
ferred to them. Thirdly, they required payment of
the balance of the misapplied moneys (i e value
surviving), after deducting the amount used to
purchase the land.
In the course of his judgment, Lord Milligan,
who accepted the submissions of the pursuers,
laid down four relevant principles (at p 85A-D)
relating to tracing and trust funds, which are of
considerable importance and help to clarify the
law:
(1) Where a person has mixed his own funds
with trust funds, then the mixed funds are all
treated as trust funds, except so far as that person
can distinguish them.
(2) Where part of the mixed fund is used to
acquire other property, that property, at the bene¬
ficiary's election, can be treated as trust property,
at least up to the value of the trust's contribution
to the mixed fund. (This, essentially, places the
onus of proof on the trustee who has breached his
duty to show which funds are his, but the prob¬
lem of identification, discussed below, remains.)
(3) Where there is a dissipation of the balance
of the mixed fund, the property acquired is to be
treated as trust property, at least up to the value
of the contribution of the trust property to the
mixed fund.
(4) Where there is a wilful breach of trust, any
profit on the property acquired accrues to the
trust. (Cf the important recent Privy Council case
of Att Gen for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC
324, in which their Lordships advised that where
a fiduciary had purchased heritable property in
New Zealand, in breach of fiduciary duty, with
money obtained through bribes in Hong Kong,
the fiduciary was liable to pay the difference
between the value of the property and the initial
value, where the property had declined in value
— the property being held on a constructive trust
for the beneficiary.)
Applying these principles, Lord Milligan pro¬
ceeded to pronounce (at p 85F-G) an interim
decree in the terms sought by the pursuers,
referred to above, but superseded extract, pend¬
ing the determination of a counterclaim in pro¬
ceedings in England. His Lordship was not
persuaded that questions of set off could be
categorically excluded in relation to the interim
decree for either the monetary sum or Arden
House, having regard to his treating the Delaware
corporation as, effectively, the first and second
defenders jointly.
Contrast with the Varsada case
The Southern Cross Commodities case can be con¬
trasted with another decision of Lord Milligan,
also in 1990, which was not dissimilar, but in
which a personal claim for value received was
sought, rather than a constructive trust: M & I
Instrument Engineers Ltd v Varsada, 1991 SLT
106.
In Varsada, V purchased a house for his
mistress ("Mrs V"), in her name, for £42,140. He
did so using money — £50,000 in cash — which
he had tricked the pursuers into parting with on
the false basis that he was the representative of a
member of the Saudi Arabian Royal Family and
that he was offering them the chance to invest in
Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, after his release from
prison, V went to live in the house, although it
remained Mrs V's. In an action by the pursuers
to recover the purchase price from Mrs V, Lord
Milligan held (at p 109H-J) that, as Mrs V had
benefited from someone else's fraud without
giving any valuable consideration, she had to
repay the £42,140 — there being no exception for
bank notes or negotiable instruments. This
decision is an application of the rule in Clydesdale
Bank v Paul (1877) 4 R 626 and Thomson v
Clydesdale Bank (1893) 20 R (HL) 59; [1893] AC
282, that a person cannot benefit from someone
else's fraud, unless that person is both innocent of
the fraud and gave valuable consideration. Whilst
the Varsada case was categorised in the headnote
as one of "restitution" (which, it is suggested, is
a misapplication of the English term), it was
probably a case of recompense, as Gretton, supra,
at p 109, and the Law Commission paper, at para
3.8 (fn 3), note. (In relation to V, who was not
worth suing, a claim could also have been
brought in repetition: see Royal Bank of Scotland
pic v Watt, 1991 SLT 138.)
Differences between the two cases
The most obvious difference is that, in the
Southern Cross Commodities case, there was a pro¬
prietary claim for value surviving (Abden House
and the remaining trust moneys) — although,
arguably, a claim for recompense could have been
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brought, if it was thought worth doing; and in the
Varsada case, it was a personal claim for value
received: the purchase price of the house.
It is not known why the pursuers in Varsada
did not want to claim the house: it may have been
that the property had declined in value; or they
did not want to go through the problems of
selling it in a less than buoyant market; or they
simply wanted their money back and felt that Mrs
V was in a position to pay them.
Another possible difference was that in the
Southern Cross Commodities case, the requisite
fiduciary duty needed for a constructive trust was
stronger than in the Varsada case. However, it is
only necessary to have a fiduciary relationship at
the outset; not every participant in the chain
needs to be in a fiduciary relationship with the
beneficiary: see Re Diplock [19481 Ch 465 (CA).
And so, whilst Mrs V was not in a fiduciary
relationship with the pursuers, it is strongly
arguable that V was in such a relationship when
he was "collecting" the money from the pursuers
on the (albeit erroneous) basis that he would be
investing it on their behalf in Saudi Arabia, as he
was acting as their agent. It is possible for a
person to be a fiduciary regarding part of their
activities, but not others: see New Zealand Nether¬
lands Society "Oranje" Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR
1126, at p 1130, per Lord Wilberforce (PC). In
this part of his activities, V was, it is suggested,
a fiduciary to the pursuers — V was acting in a
manner similar to a collecting bank (which is the
agent of its customer), and was required to put
the pursuers' interests ahead of his own (which he
did not do). So, arguably, a constructive trust over
the house could have been claimed, if desired.
Advantages/consequences of seeking a
constructive trust
This difference in approach raises the question,
why seek relief on the basis of constructive trust
if a claim will lie in one of the categories ofunjust
enrichment? The trite answer is that where the
defender is insolvent and there is an asset or fund
over which a trust can be impressed (see Goode,
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, at p 56),
the pursuer (the beneficiary) will receive priority
over any unsecured creditors — a priority which
a personal claim in unjustified enrichment will
not confer.
Normally, for a proprietary claim, or a claim
involving a real right, over an asset to succeed, it
needs to be an in specie one. In this connection,
money poses a difficulty, as it is a fungible and
cannot be the subject of a proprietary claim,
unless it has been specifically earmarked and set
aside: see Bell's Principles (10th ed), at para 1333.
And Scots law has not yet embraced the concept
of the remedial constructive trust, based on
unjustified enrichment, which confers a pro¬
prietary right over money. This concept is
popular in the United States (Re Barry (1906) 147
Fed 208) and Canada (Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117
DLR (3d) 257 and LAC Minerals Ltd v Inter¬
national Corona Resources Ltd (1978) 61 DLR
(4th) 14), and has crept into English law through
the controversial decision in Chase Manhattan
Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd
[1981] Ch 105, a case which Macdonald argues
does not apply in Scots law: see "Restitution and
Property Law", supra. The case has also been
criticised by Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitu¬
tion (4th ed), at pp 131-132. (Cf Re Goldcorp
Exchange Ltd (In Receivership) [1994] 3 WLR 199
(PC), at p 217, where the remedial constructive
trust (or proprietary interest in unjustified enrich¬
ment) is referred to .as "this important new
branch of the law"; and at p 221, where the Chase
Manhattan case, whilst not expressly approved of,
is not disapproved of.)
However, as Burrows notes in his work, The
Law of Restitution, at p 72, where there is a fund
that can be traced, the courts have been
sympathetic to the beneficiary and allowed him to
follow the money into the offending fiduciary's
bank account, under the principles elucidated by
Lord Milligan earlier in this article; this is despite
the fact that, technically, the money has not been
earmarked or set aside and is an incorporeal
moveable — being merely a book entry in the
fiduciary's (current) account (unless the fiduciary
has put the money in a specific account, which is
unlikely), i e, it is suggested, it is something of a
fiction.
Problems of identification of misapplied
money
Nevertheless, the real difficulty for an aggrieved
beneficiary will be not so much whether there is
a right to trace and impose a constructive trust
over the misapplied money, but, rather one of
identification of the money — an asset purchased
with the misapplied money poses less of a diffi¬
culty as it is readily identifiable. For example, if
the fiduciary's bank account is overdrawn, there
can be no tracing of the misappropriated money,
and it does not matter whether the account was
overdrawn at the time of each improper payment
into it or whether the account subsequently
became overdrawn, as there is now no fund to
trace: see Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (In Receiver¬
ship) and Bishopgate Investment Management Ltd
v Homan, The Times, 14 July 1994.
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Similarly, the operation of the rule in Clayton's
case (Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 572: see
Burrows, supra at p 72) may present problems,
particularly if there is a gap between the mis¬
appropriation and its discovery, as it could be
argued that the misappropriated sum has been
paid in and paid out, and that what is left in the
account (which may be more or less than the mis¬
applied sum) does not belong to the beneficiary,
who would only have a personal claim along with
other unsecured creditors. (Cf Barlow Clowes
International Ltd v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22,
where it was held, in relation to a group of
investors regarding a mixed fund in a bank
account, that the rule in Clayton's case did not
apply there, as it was intended to be a common
investment fund, and the investors would share
rateably in proportion to the amounts due to each
investor; also, it was held that the rule will not
apply where it would be impractical or lead to
injustice.)
The most obvious problems, which are self
evident, is if the fiduciary simply flees the juris¬
diction with the money to a friendly country, or
is hopelessly insolvent. Fortunately, none of these
events appears to have occurred in the Southern
Cross Commodities case.
Conclusion
The decision in Southern Cross Commodities
shows that the constructive trust is still alive in
Scotland. It provides guidance to pursuers (par¬
ticularly liquidators) seeking to recover money,
which has been misapplied in breach of fiduciary
duty, and, not surprisingly, mixed with other
moneys or used to purchase an asset. In view of
the number of corporate collapses in recent years,
amid allegations of misappropriation, the con¬
structive trust, with its preliminary procedure of
tracing, will continue to be a potent weapon. To
this end, Lord Milligan is to be commended for
clarifying and illuminating a somewhat obscure






Michael Ewart, currently a deputy director of the
Scottish Courts Administration, has been
appointed chief executive of the new Scottish
Court Service Agency following an open com¬
petition. Mr Ewart will take up appointment as
chief executive designate from 1 September 1994
to lead the development of the new agency, which
is to be launched on 3 April 1995. The appoint¬




As of Monday, 8 August 1994, Greenock sheriff
court has resumed its former location at Sheriff
Court House, Nelson Street, Greenock. The new
telephone number is 0475 787073.
0
New target waiting periods
Following consultation between the Government
and the judiciary, the main targets for waiting
periods for 1994-95 (the period between a trial or
proof being requested or an appeal being received
and the date assigned, expressed in weeks) are set
out below. Similar targets applied in 1993-94 and
national performance for that year is noted in the





Notes of appeal against
sentence and stated cases
(accused in custody) 4 4
Court of Session




(national average as at 31
March 1994)
(a) Civil proofs/debates 12 11.6
(b) Summary criminal trials 12 15.2
In 1993-94 waiting periods of 12 weeks or less
were achieved for civil debates/proofs in 81 per
cent of sheriff courts.
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CHAPTER 2
LENDER LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
"Neither a borrower nor a lender be: for loan oft loses both self and friend ..
INTRODUCTION
Lender liability is a somewhat amorphous concept.2 In speaking of it in its literal
sense, it is necessary to distinguish between: (i) a situation in which a lender is
liable to a borrower for loss caused to the borrower by the lender's (wrongful)
conduct; and (ii) one where the borrower is seeking to avoid liability or its
obligations under a loan or security documentation, so that the lender suffers a
loss through not being able to recover its debt, rather than having to compensate
the borrower—that is to say, there are vitiating factors affecting the validity of
the documentation. It is the former situation which is truly one of "lender
liability"3 and with which this chapter is primarily concerned, although, in
accounting terms, both scenarios impact on a lender's profitability, and so,
where relevant, the other side of lender liability, involving risk to the lender, will
be looked at.4
Lender liability, in its primary sense, involves more than "acting wrongfully"
towards a borrower (in a moral, if not, legal connection): actual loss to the
borrower must result from the lender's conduct, and the lender must be liable to
compensate the borrower as a consequence.5 This view is reflected in the
decision of the Privy Council in China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan Soon Gin,
George (alias George Tan),6 where a guarantor tried to evade liability under a
1. Shakespeare, W., Hamlet I, 3, 1600-1601.
2. Professor R. Cranston, "Lender Liability—Parts I and III" [1990] A.L.J. 653, at 790, refers to
lender liability as "an elastic term" and as "a description, not a concept known in law".
3. Nicolaides refers to it as situations where "courts have found lenders liable—to their customers
and their customers' other creditors—for acting 'wrongfully' to their customers": see C.M.
Nicolaides, "A Survey of Lender liability in the United States" J.I.B.L. 160. See also the definition of
Cranston, supra, at p. 653.
4. Cf. J. Jarvis Q.C. and M. Fordham, Lender Liability: environmental risk and debt (1993)
Cameron May, ("Jarvis and Fordham") Ch. 1, at p. 3, who refer to liability in an environmental
sense of direct liability, but also indirect liability regarding the commercially vital concerns of
increased exposure or vulnerability through environmental law.
5. A similar view is taken by Nicolaides, supra, at p. 168.
6. China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan Soon Gin, George (alias George Tan) [1990] 1 A.C. 536
(P.C.).
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guarantee to a lender on the basis that shares in the principal debtor, which were
mortgaged to the lender to secure the guarantee, had become worthless; and that
the creditor, with knowledge of the decline in the shares' value, should have sold
them before they became worthless. In delivering the Board's advice, Lord
Templeman said7:
"No creditor could carry on the business of lending if he could become liable to a
mortgagee and to a surety or to either of them for a decline in the value ofmortgage part
property, unless the creditor was personally responsible for the decline.'" (Emphasis
added.)
In the United States, until recently, the main "weapon" of borrowers in lender
liability actions has been the covenants of "good faith" and "fair dealing",
which the courts have "incorporated" into loan agreements or security
documents—both at common law (by implication) and under statute.8 At
common law, there was a tendency, which has now been substantially reversed,
to imply these covenants into agreements, where the lender's conduct was
"immoral"9 or "irregular"10; this was in addition to the parties' contractual
rights under them and the more extensive tortious duties imposed in the United
States. The requirement for implying such covenant was whether it could be said
there was a "special relationship" between the parties. Such a "special
relationship" is akin to a fiduciary relationship11 or undue influence—as
opposed to a Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd.n "special
relationship", giving rise to liability in tort for negligent misstatement. The
result was that, where a lender had not dealt in "good faith" or "fairly" with a
borrower—even though the lender may have acted strictly within its rights—
damages awarded by juries (and upheld on appeal) had a strong punitive
element. This mixture of co-existent tort and contract liability, called
"contorts", has been an important area of the lender liability debate in the
United States.
7. Per Lord Templeman, at p. 545. See also Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Coleman
No. C-8272, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557 (1990).
8. Under sections 1.203 and 1.208 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), of which there is
no English equivalent. Section 1.203 imposes duties of good faith and fair dealing in the performance
and enforcement of contracts. Section 1.208 provides that where a lender seeks to accelerate a debt,
it must believe in good faith that its chances of payment are impaired; but the section does not apply
to a demand debt. See also section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which says that
"every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement". And see K.M.C. Co. Inc. v. Irving Trust Co. 757 F.2d 752 (6th circuit 1985).
9. Cf. May L.J. in Bank ofNova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd.
(The Good Luck) [1990] 1 Q.B. 818, at p. 897, who said that "immorality of conduct does not of
itself provide a basis for implying a term in a contract. It serves only as an incentive to the court to
imply the term if, on principle, it is possible to do so."
10. See Robert Goff L.J. (as he then was) in Bank of India v. Transcontinental Commodity
Merchants Ltd. [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 298, at p. 302.
11. See Standard Wire and Cable Company v. Ameritrust 697 F. Supp. 368 (C.D. Cal. 1988) and
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance (1987) 725 S.W. 2d. 165 (Tex.).
12. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.(E.)). See the origin of the special relationship in the speech of Lord
Devlin in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.(E.)) and the
discussion of the fiduciary relationship cases therein.
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These concepts of "good faith" and "fair dealing" are "equitable" remedies,
imposed on a lender for unconscionable dealing. However, whilst English courts
of equity are courts of conscience, they do not attempt to rewrite the parties'
contract. Rather, they may set aside a contract where there has been
unconscionable conduct,13 equitable fraud, or undue influence, or they may
restore to the person so affected the benefits he has lost. If a contract has not been
performed in accordance with its terms, then, if appropriate, damages for
breach will be awarded.
English courts—which have dealt with only one major all-embracing lender
liability action, and this was resolved in the lender's favour14—have a rather
different approach to their United States counterparts. They will look at any
contract between the parties—in. this case, a lender and borrower—and the
primary obligations the parties have sought to impose upon each other under
that contract; and they will be very reluctant to imply terms, unless they are a
matter of "necessity", since the parties are free to determine their obligations.
Covenants of "good faith" and "fair dealing" will not fall within a test of
"necessity". Moreover, under English law, there is no statutory requirement of
"good faith" and "fair dealing" per se in freely negotiated contracts.15 Also,
English courts whilst not imposing greater liability in tort than in contract, when
there is a contract between the parties giving rise to liability,16 are now more
ready to allow concurrent liability, provided the imposition of liability in tort is
not excluded by the contractual structure163 but will rarely award punitive
damages: which are tortious, and not contractual.
Nonetheless, this is not to say that a lender, under English law, does not have
responsibilities towards a borrower. A lender must use reasonable skill and care
13. As to unconscionability: see Burmab Oil Co. Ltd. v. The Governor of the Bank ofEngland,
The Times, 4 July 1981, where, in a rescue situation, shares in BP were sold to the lender at a price
below the Stock Exchange price. This was held not to be unconscionable or against the lender's duty
of fair dealing. Equity would not give relief for an unfair bargain—it has to be an unconscionable
one, the terms of which showed conduct shocking the conscience of the court. There, but for the
lender's interference, a liquidation would have occurred.
14. Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Barnes, a 706 page judgment of Ralph Gibson J. (as he then
was), delivered on 26 March 1980, reported, in part, in [1981] Com. L.R. 205.
15. Nicolaides, supra, who states, at p. 161, that, "... one well-recognised principle of UK
banking law is that a bank owes it customer a duty of skill and reasonable care—a standard very
similar to the duty of good faith and fair dealing and one frequently found breached by US Courts in
holding lenders liable for damages to their customers". Note section 138 of the Consumer Credit Act
1974 and section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (discussed later in the text), which speak of a credit
agreement being extortionate if it is contrary to the principles of "fair dealing"; and section 238(5) of
the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides a defence to having a transaction set aside for being at an
undervalue if the transmission was, inter alia, in "good faith". Cf. Bingham L.J. (as he then was) in
Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 433, at p. 439.
16. See Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Htng Bank Ltd. [1986] A.C. 80 (P.C.). Cf.
Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)j; noted by Mulcahy, L.-A.,
(1994) 15 The Company Lawyer 246.
16a. See Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)) and Spring v.
Guardian Assurance Pic [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.(E.)).
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when dealing with a borrower, and can be liable to a borrower for loss arising
from a failure to exercise such care. For example, where a mortgagee sells a
property at less than the current market value, the mortgagee is liable for the
difference between the proper price17 of the property and the price obtained; or,
where a borrower, upon being told by an officer of a lender that approval by the
lender's credit committee was a mere formality (only to find out later that
approval was not given and was never likely to be), wrote cheques in reliance
upon the officer's statement, it was held that the lender was liable in negligence
for the loss suffered as a consequence by the borrower, who had relied upon the
officer's prediction, which was given without reasonable care.18
The following discussion is in the context of a commercial loan, where the
parties are at arm's length. Questions of undue influence19 and inequality of
bargaining power and the need to obtain independent advice will not be
examined.
NATURE OF BANK AND CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
As in the United States,20 the relationship between lender and customer, under
English law, is one of a debtor and creditor,21 in respect of deposits made by a
customerwith a lender, which changes to one of creditor and debtor when a loan
is made.22 It is not, normally, a fiduciary relationship23—although it can be in
very limited situations discussed later—but is, essentially, one of contract.24
17. Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation Ltd. [1993] A.C. 295 (P.C.).
18. Box v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 391. See also First Energy (UK) Ltd. v.
Hungarian International Bank Ltd. [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (C.A.), concerned with the question
of whether a senior manager, due to his position, had ostensible authority—even though he did not
have actual authority—to bind the lender to provide credit facilities to the borrower ("HIB"), where
the manager confirmed to HIB that head office approval had been given, when it had not been and
was subsequently refused. This refusal left the borrower without finance for three projects. In an
action by HIB that the lender was bound by the manager's statements, it was held that the manager
had ostensible authority to bind the lender due to his position, and there was nothing to indicate he
did not have actual authority. Cf. the Bank of Scotland, whose advertisements state that the local
manager makes the decisions. "
19. On this question: see Barclays Bank pic v. O'Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (H.L.(E.)l and C.I.B.C.
Mortgages pic v. Pitt [1994] 1 A.C. 200, and the article by A. Berg, "Wives' Guarantees—
Constructive Knowledge and Undue Influence" [1994] L.M.C.L.Q. 34.
20. Smith's Cash Store v. First National Bank 149 Cal. 32, 84 p. 663 (1906) and Bank ofMartin v.
England 385 U.S. 99 101 (1966). See the discussion by K. Curtis, "The Fiduciary Controversy:
Injection of Fiduciary Principles Into The Banker Depositor & Banker-Borrower Relationship"
(1987) Loyola L.A. Law Review 795.
21. Foley v. Hill (1842) 2 H.L. Cas. 28 and Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] A.C. 548, at
pp. 573-574, per Lord Goff of Chieveley.
22. Foley v. Hill (1842) 2 H.L. Cas. 28 and Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] A.C. 548 at
pp. 573-574, per Lord Goff of Chieveley.
23. Morrison v. Bank of New Zealand [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 291, at p. 295; Burmah Oil Ltd. v.
Governor of the Bank ofEngland (1981) 125 S.J. 528, The Times, 4 July 1981; James v. Australia
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. (1986) 64 A.L.R. 347; and Waryk v. Bank of Montreal
(1991) 85 D.I..R. (4th) 514.
24. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 K.B. 110 (C.A.), approved by the Privy
Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd. [1986] A.C. 80. A lender has a
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Ordinarily, the terms of the contract between the lender and borrower will be
unwritten and implied25; but, in the context of a commercial loan, with which
this chapter is concerned, the terms will be set out in loan and security
documentation which governs the rights and obligations of the parties, and so
will be express and in writing.
Banker's references: the duty of confidentiality
Part of the duty a lender owes to its customer is to keep the customer's affairs
confidential. This duty of confidentiality arises under the implied contract26
between the lender and its customer, and may also arise in equity.27With regard
to third parties relying on lenders for credit references as to the financial
soundness of a lender's customer, liability may arise in negligence under Hedley
Byrne principles,28 subject to the validity of any disclaimer, which would now be
subject to the reasonableness requirements29 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 ("UCTA").30
Information will be considered confidential if it satisfies three
characteristics31:
(i) the information transferred was not in the public domain;
(ii) the circumstances of the transfer are such that the recipient is under a
duty to the confider with respect to the information; and
duty to act with reasonable skill and care: see Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No.
3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
25. Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 K.B. 110 (C.A.).
26. Tourmer v. National Provincialand Union Bank ofEngland [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.). On the
question of lender's secrecy: see J.McI. Walter and N. Ehrlich, "Confidences—Bankers and
Customers: Powers of Banks to Maintain Secrecy and Confidentiality" (1989) 63 A.L.J. 404 and
Paget's Law of Banking (1989) 10th edn. (M. Hapgood, ed.), at pp. 257-264. See also J.L.
McDougall Q.C., "The Relationship of Confidence": Ch. 8 in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993)
Carswell (D.M.W. WatersQ.C.,ed.). The duty could also beset out in any express contract between
the parties.
27. Seager v. Copydex Ltd. [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923, at p. 931, per Lord Denning M.R. and
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) ("Spycatcher") [1990] 1 A.C. 109
(H.L.(E.)).
28. Such as in the Canadian case of Vita Health Co. (1985) Ltd. v. Toronto Dominion Bank 51
C.P.R. (3d) 72 (Man. Q.B. 1993), noted in [1994] J.I.B.L., at N-73. Cf. Spring v. Guardian
Assurance Pic [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.(E.)).
29. See section 11 of UCTA.
30. See Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831 (H.L.(E.)), which considered a disclaimer by a
surveyor under UCTA.
31. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] R.P.C. 41, at p. 47, per Megarry J. (as he then
was). Approved in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989) 61 D.L.R.
(4th) 14 and Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41. See also
Megarry V.C. in Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd. v. Guinle [1979] 1 Ch. 227, at p. 248E-G; and
Lord Goff of Chieveley in Spycatcher, supra, at p. 28 IB, who said "... a duty of confidence arises
when confidential information comes to the knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances
where he has notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that
it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be precluded from disclosing the information
to others." For a discussion of Spycatcher: see Professor G. Jones, "Breach of Confidence—after
Spycatcher" (1989) C.L.P. 49.
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(iii) the information has been used for a purpose other than that for which
it was intended.
Thus, financial information about a customer would come within this
definition. This rule of confidentiality relating to lenders is not absolute. There
are four exceptions to it32:
(i) where there is a duty under compulsion of law33;
(ii) where there is a public duty to disclose34;
(iii) where the interests of the lender require it35; and
(iv) where disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the
customer.
It is this last category, which is most relevant to lender's references, particularly
when a reference is given without the express consent of the customer. In view of
the recently updated Code of Practice for lenders, entitled "Good Banking",36
which says that, before there is disclosure of a customer's details, the customer's
32. Tournierv. National Provincial and Union Bank ofEngland [1924] 1 K.B. 461, at p. 473, per
Bankes L.J.
33. See, for example, the Companies Act 1985 (as amended); Bankers Book Evidence Act 1879;
Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, Barclays Bank pic v. Taylor [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1666 and case
note on it (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 204; section 39 of the Banking Act 1987; and Robertson v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1493 (P.C.) (concerning a subpoena duces tecum).
34. See, for example, Price Waterhouse v. Bank ofCredit and Commerce International Holdings,
The Times, 30 October 1991; and Canadian Imperial Bank ofCommerce v. Sayori, 83 B.C.L.R. (2d)
167 (BCCA), noted [1994] J.I.B.L., at N-98 (concerning fraud).
35. See Sutherland v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1938) 5 Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers 163; The
Times, 24 &c 25 November 1938. See also Bank of Tokyo Ltd. v. Karoon [1987] 1 A.C. 45
(H.L.(E.)), in which a subsidiary of themain lender passed on information to its parent about K, who
was a customer, and this was held to be a breach of confidence. As Walter and Ehrlich observe, the
case raises a problem for a lender who obtains confidential information in his capacity as a lender
about a company of which he is a director: see "Confidences—Bankers and Customers: Powers of
Banks to Maintain Secrecy and Confidentiality" (1989) 63 A.L.J. 404, at p. 417. The problem also
arises in relation to the lead lender in a syndicate, where it is also lending to one of its customers and
the lead lender obtains information about its customer. There, the lender has a conflict of interests, as
it has a duty to preserve the customer's confidentiality and also has a duty of disclosure to the other
syndicate members. In such a case, the decision of Donaldson J. (as he then was) in North and South
Trust Co. v. Berkeley [ 1971] 1 W.L.R. 470, at pp. 484-486 may be of some assistance, as it provides
that a fiduciary will not be compelled to disclose confidential information to B if it would mean the
fiduciary would be breaching his duty to A, whom the fiduciary had acted for in the first place and
whom B knew the fiduciary acted for: see discussion of it by Professor P. Finn, "Fiduciary Law and
the Modern Commercial World": Ch. 1 in CommercialAspects ofTrusts and Fiduciary Obligations
(1992) Clarendon Press (E. McKendrick ed.), at 25 and case note by M. Kay and D. Yates, "An
Unremedied Breach of a Fiduciary Duty" (1972) M.L.R. 78. Cf. Spectorv. Ageda [1973] Ch. 30, at
p. 48, per Megarry V.C., who said that an adviser is required to put both his skill and knowledge at
his client's disposal and if the adviser is not prepared to divulge relevant knowledge, then he should
not act for the client. Recent cases on solicitors and conflicts of interest have adopted a hard line and
indicated that even "Chinese walls" are not acceptable: see Supasave Retail Ltd. v. Coward Chance
[1991] Ch. 259 and Re a firm of Solicitors [1992] Q.B. 959 (C.A.); and case notes by C. Boxer,
"ChineseWalls: no longer impenetrable", The Lawyer, 15 September 1992, at p. 8. See also ArdenJ.
in Mortgage Express Ltd. v. Bowerman & Partners (a firm), The Times, 19 May 1994; and Kelly v.
Cooper [1993] A.C. 205 (P.C.).
36. Second edition, March 1994, at para. 9.1 Status Enquiries (Banker's References) and the
meaning of "Status Enquiries" in the Definition section.
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consent should be obtained, the scope for lender liability in this area should be
reduced. But, where the lender does make an unauthorised disclosure, the
customer has a cause of action for damages or compensation in equity (or a
constructive trust or an account of profits) against the lender for any loss
suffered.
In England, a recent newspaper report37 indicates that two British businesses
are threatening to sue theUnion Bank of Switzerland after it was alleged that one
of the lender's branch managers gave a reference stating that a customer was
good for "£l8m". However, it is argued that, in Switzerland, the "m" refers not
to millions, but to "mille" (thousands).38 The dispute arose out of the sale of
property in Spain. The lender is denying liability.
Fiduciary duty
Despite the general creditor/debtor nature of the lender and borrower
relationship, in which each party deals at arm's length and looks after its own
interests, there are circumstances when this will not be so, and the lender will be
under a fiduciary duty. By fiduciary duty it is meant that there is a reasonable
expectation on the part of one party (the borrower) that the other party (the
lender) will put the first party's (the borrower's) interests ahead of its own.39 It is
a standard of loyalty,40 in which the borrower "has relaxed, or is justified in
believing he can relax, his self-interested vigilance or independent judgement
because, in the circumstances of the relationship, he reasonably believes or is
entitled to assume that the other is acting or will act in his (or their) joint
interests".41 The key question relates to the role that the alleged fiduciary has
taken with regard to the beneficiary's affairs.42 Thus, a person may be a fiduciary
in relation to some of his activities, but not others,43 which can well be the
position with lenders. Also, for a person to be liable as a fiduciary, with the
higher standard of responsibility involved, it is necessary for a person to either
37. Financial Times, 21 March 1994.
38. It is stated that in Switzerland, "mio" means millions.
39. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, at
p. 40; DHL International (NZ) Ltd. v. Richmond Ltd. [1993] N.Z.L.R. 10, at p. 23; Hospital
Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41; Professor P.D. Finn, "The
Fiduciary Principle": Ch. 1 in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) Carswell (T.G. Youdan, ed.)
("The Fiduciary Principle"), at pp. 46^17, cited with approval in LACMinerals, supra, at p. 29, and
"Contract and the Fiduciary Principle" (1989) 12U.N.S.W.L.J. 76, at p. 93; and the Hon. Mr Justice
J.R.M. Gautreau, "Demystifying The Fiduciary Mystique" [1989] 68 Canadian Bar Review 1, at
p. 7. See also case note on the DHL case by P. Hood, "Fiduciary obligations in a contractual/
commercial context: DHL International (NZ) Ltd. v. Richmond Ltd. [1994] J.B.L. 285.
40. Professor P.D. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle", supra at p. 28 and "Contract and the
Fiduciary Principle", supra, at p. 83.
41. Professor P.D. Finn, "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle", supra, at p. 94.
42. See Professor R.P. Austin, "Commerce and Equity—Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Trust"
(1986) O.J.L.S. 444, at p. 446.
43. N.Z. Netherlands Society "Oranje" Inc. v. Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, at p. 1130, per Lord
Wilberforce (P.C.).
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knowingly accept to be a fiduciary or accept a position, such as trustee, agent or
company director, in which the law imposes a fiduciary obligation.44 Hence, in
Bowkett v. Action Finance Ltd.,Ai when a legal executive, who was acting for the
lender in relation to the execution of loan documentation by an elderly couple,
made it clear to them orally that she was not acting for them, obtained a written
acknowledgement of this from the couple and advised them to take independent
legal advice, it was held the lender was not to be under a fiduciary obligation to
the couple.
Care, however, must be taken in examining a relationship to see if it is
fiduciary in character. Terms such as "reliance", "vulnerability", "trust and
confidence" and "ascendancy" are "characteristics"46 and not explanations of a
fiduciary relationship, and are apt to mislead, as they are prevalent in other types
of legal relationships, such as a contract or tort. For example, in an executory
contract for the sale of goods where the seller has provided goods to the buyer on
credit (without the benefit of a retention of title clause), the seller is reliant on the
buyer to pay the price, and is vulnerable until he has been paid; moreover, he
may have trusted the buyer to pay him and has confidence47 that he will.48
However, in a normal arm's length commercial transaction, like a loan, a
fiduciary relationship will be rare.49 A lender will not be acting in the interests of
another (the borrower) rather than its own. Moreover, there is a "judicial
reluctance" to find such a relationship, except where the application of this
"blunt tool of equity" is really necessary.50 The reason why it is rare is clearly
explained by Kennedy J. (of the Supreme Court of Western Australia), in a
passage cited by Sopinka J. in the Supreme Court of Canada51:
"It would seem that part of the reluctance to find a fiduciary duty within an arm's length
44. Committee on Children's Television Inc. v. General Food Corp. 673 P. 2d 660 (1983).
45. [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 449.
46. Gautreau, "Demystifying The Fiduciary Mystique", supra, at p. 5.
47. See Gibbs C.J. in Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp. (1984) 156C.L.R.41,
at p. 69.
48. For an excellent discussion of the fiduciary concept and its characteristics: see Finn, "The
Fiduciary Principle", supra, qjid "Contract and the Fiduciary Principle", supra-, Gautreau,
"Demystifying The Fiduciary Mystique", supra-, and Professor D. Waters, "Banks, Fiduciary
Obligations and Unconscionable Transactions" [1986] 65 Canadian Bar Review 37.
49. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, at
p. 61, per Sopinka J. See also Hospital Products Pty. Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corp. (1984) 156
C.L.R. 41, where the High Court of Australia refused to find a fiduciary relationship in a commercial
relationship; see the note on this case by Professor R.P. Austin, "Commerce and Equity—Fiduciary
Duty and Constructive Trust" (1986) O.J.L.S. 444.
50. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, at
p. 61, per Sopinka J. (with whom MclntyreJ. concurred and Lamer J. agreed). See comments on this
case by Professor D. Waters, "LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd." [1990]
69 Canadian Bar Review 455; and G. Hammond, "Equity and Abortive Commercial Transactions"
[1990] 106 L.Q.R. 207.
51. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, at
p. 61, citing The Hon. Mr Justice G.A. Kennedy, "Equity in a Commercial Context" in Equity and
Commercial Relationships (1987), The Law Book Company (P.D. Finn ed.)
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commercial transaction is due to the fact that the parties in that situation have an
adequate opportunity to prescribe their own mutual obligations, and that the contractual
remedies available to them to obtain compensation for any breach of those obligations
should be sufficient. Although the relief granted in the case of a breach of a fiduciary duty
will be moulded by the equity of the particular transaction, an offending fiduciary will
still be exposed to a variety of available remedies, many of which go beyond mere
compensation for the loss suffered by the person to whom the duty was owed, equity,
unlike the ordinary law of contract, having regard to the gain obtained by the wrongdoer,
and not simply to the need to compensate the injured party."
A similar view has been expressed by Dawson J. in Hospital Products Pty. Ltd.
v. United States Surgical Corporation52 and by the New Zealand Court of
Appeal in DHL Ltd. v. Richmond."
Furthermore, the imposition of a fiduciary relationship where the parties are
in a contractual relationship must not be inconsistent with the express terms of
that contract,54 as it is not for the court to rewrite the parties' bargain and
impose a higher standard than that contracted for. This requirement of
consistencywith the contract is similar to the implication of terms. In the context
of lender and borrower, the relevant contracts will generally be loan and security
documentation.
When then will a lender be under a fiduciary obligation? The most likely
situation is when the lender takes on the role of an adviser to the borrower, and
is in a position where it has a conflict of interests as a result. It is trite law that a
fiduciary is not allowed to have a conflict of interests,55 and that the fiduciary
must make a full disclosure of material facts to its principal.56
Common instances of this scenario are as follows:
(i) where it is clear that the borrower is relying on the lender for
guidance—this will often be so where the customer is one of
longstanding. The position is well put by the Federal Court of
Australia, who said57:
"A lender may be expected to act in its own interests in ensuring the security of
its position as lender to its customer but it may have created in the customer the
expectation that nevertheless it will advise in the customer's interests as to the
52. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, at p. 147.
53. [1993] N.Z.L.R. 10. See case note on this by P. Hood, "Fiduciary obligations in a
contractual/commercial context: DHL International (NZ) Ltd. v. Richmond Ltd." (1994) J.B.L.
285.
54. Cooper v. Kelly [1993] A.C. 205 (P.C.); Hospital Products Pty. Ltd. v. United States Surgical
Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41; Raymond Harrison & Co's. Trustee v. North West Securities 1989
S.L.T. 718, at p. 722G-I; and In Re Gold Corp. Exchange Ltd. (In Receivership) [1994] 3 W.L.R.
199 (P.C.).
55. Aberdeen Railways Ltd. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq. 461, at p. 471, per Lord Cranworth
L.C. (H.L.(Sc)).
56. Brickenden v. London Loan & Savings Co. [1934] 3 D.L.R. 465, at p. 469, per Lord
Thankerton (P.C.). It is not relevant that the disclosure of material information would not have
altered the principal's action. As to the lender's duty of disclosure: see R. Cranston, "The Bank's
Duty of Disclosure" [1990] J.B.L. 163, especially at p. 164.
57. Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v. Smith (1991) 102 A.L.R. 453, at p. 476.
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wisdom of a proposed investment. This may be the case where the customer
may fairly take it that to a significant extent his interest is consistent with that
of the lender in financing the customer for a prudent business venture. In such a
way the lender may become a fiduciary and occupy the position of ... 'an
investment adviser'58 ..
(ii) where the lender acts for both the vendor and purchaser in a sale
transaction or has them as customers, leading to a conflict of interests,
particularly when the vendor has an overdraft with the lender.59
(iii) where the lender fails to disclose material facts to the borrower/
advisee—this is related to (ii) above. For example, in Standard
Investments Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,60 the
lender failed to disclose to the predator, whom it was acting for in a
takeover, after it found out, that another part of the lender was helping
the target, and that some directors of the lender had bought a stake in
the target to protect it. A fiduciary duty was held to exist as the
predators had relied on the lender for advice and guidance (which the
lender said it would give) and it "had a duty to disclose any conflict of
interests to deal fairly with" the61 predators, which it did not do;
rather, the lender had "practised secrecy and non disclosure while
pursuing its own interests".62
Similarly, in Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v. Smith,63 customers of long
standing (21 years) sought a loan to help purchase the leasehold of an hotel. The
lender's manager took on the role of self-appointed adviser to the borrowers. He
recommended that they purchase a different hotel from the one they wanted—
this hotel was being sold by a borrower of the lender (although there was no
pressure on the vendor from the lender to reduce its overdraft); told the
borrowers not to consult an accountant or hotel broker as he would advise them
and this would save costs; told the borrowers that the transaction was a good
one, and there was no point in seeking to reduce the sale price when the
58. See Catt v. Marac Aust Ltd. (1986) 9 N.S.W.L.R. 639.
59. See for example, Woods v. Martin Bank Ltd. [1959] Q.B. 55; Hayward v. Bank of Nova
Scotia (1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) 758; and McBean v. Bank ofNova Scotia (1981) 15 B.L.R. 296 (aff'd
on appeal), where the same lender manager advised customers of long standing to invest in the
business of another customer who bred exotic cows and who was substantially indebted to the
lender, and was held to be in breach of his fiduciary duties—see discussion byM.H. Ogilvie, "Banks,
Advice-Giving and Fiduciary Obligations" (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 263; Commonwealth Bank of
Australia v. Smith (1991) 102 A.L.R. 453 (Federal Court of Australia); and Standard Investments
Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank ofCommerce (1985) 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410—see article by Professor
D. Waters, "Banks, Fiduciary Obligations and Unconscionable Transactions" (1986) 65 Canadian
Bar Review 37; and Guertin v. Royal Bank of Canada (1984) 1 D.L.R. (4th) 68, where a lender's
manager used confidential information obtained from his customer/borrower to assist a company
owned by the manager's wife to outbid the customer/borrower for a snack bar in a shopping centre.
The manager was held to be under a duty to disclose his interest.
60. (1985) 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410.
61. Ibid., at p. 443.
62. Ibid., at p. 443.
63. (1991) 102 A.L.R. 453 (Federal Court of Australia).
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borrowers queried whether it was not too high; and failed to disclose the lender's
valuation which suggested the borrowers were paying too much for the hotel,
although the value of the hotel was sufficient to cover the lender's security.64 A
valuation obtained a year after the purchase revealed that the property was
worth substantially less than the purchase price.
In an action for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, the court held that the
lender was under a fiduciary duty as the customers had "looked to [the manager]
as their guide in the matter. They evinced complete faith in him and they relied
on him",65 and he had breached that duty. The lender had a clear conflict of
interests; and although the manager had mentioned that he acted for the vendor
and might not be able to disclose some information to the purchasers, this did
not amount to obtaining fully informed consent, which is a question of fact in
the circumstances and for which no precise formula exists. Moreover, there had
been a clear failure to disclose material facts—in this case, relating to the
valuation.
Two final matters need to be mentioned. First, where the borrower exercises
its own independent judgement on a matter, the*lender will not be liable as a
fiduciary.66 Secondly, there is a distinction between a lender providing
information and giving advice.67 It is only in the second situation that a lender
will be liable as a fiduciary.
Where a lender has breached a fiduciary duty, resulting in (economic) loss to
the borrower, the most likely equitable remedy is compensation. Compensation
is designed to put the beneficiary (the borrower) "in as good a position
pecuniarily as that in which he was before the injury".68 Whilst it looks to the
64. There was also an internal memorandum from the manager to his head office, indicating that
the existing lease had four and a half years to run; that the landlord of the hotel indicated that he
would renegotiate the lease, but, as this was unlikely to happen before the settlement, the repayments
of the loan would be set within the existing lease. However, prior to completion, the landlord
indicated that he would consider renewing the lease at the expiration of the old one, but the manager
did not discover whether the extension had been granted. Thus, the lender's valuation was based on
the mistaken view that the lease was for a longer period.
65. ibid., at p. 474.
66. Professor P. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle", at p. 50. See also the American case of Steinberg
v. Northwestern National Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W. 2d. 218.
67. James v. Australia andNew Zealand Banking Group Ltd. (1986) 64 A.L.R. 347, at p. 369, per
Toohey J. See also Royal Bank Trust Co. (Trinidad) Ltd. v. Pampellonne [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 218
(P.C.), where merely providing pamphlets on a particular subject was not enough to impose liability
(in this case, for negligent misrepresentation).
68. Noctonv. Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 923, at p. 952, per Lord Haldane. See also Brickenden
v. London Loan & Savings Co. [1934] 3 D.L.R. 465 (P.C.); McKenzie v. McDonald [1927] V.L.R.
134; Day v. Mead [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 443; Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co. (1991) 85
D.L.R. (4th) 129; Cattv. MaracAustralia Ltd. (1986) 9N.S.W.L.R. 639;Hill v. Rose [1990] V.L.R.
125; and Bennett v. Minister ofCommunity Welfare (1992) 66 A.L.J.R. 550. See also the following
articles: I.E. Davidson, "The Equitable Remedy of Compensation" (1982) 13 M.U.L.R. 349; the
Hon. Mr Justice Gummow, "Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty": Ch. 2 in Equity, Trusts
and Fiduciaries (1989) Carswell (T.G. Youdan, ed.); L. Aitken, "Developments in Equitable
Compensation: Opportunity or Danger?" (1993) 67 A.L.J. 596; and J.D. Davies, "Equitable
Compensation: 'Causation, Foreseeability and Remoteness' ": Ch. 14 in Equity, Trusts and
Fiduciaries (1993) Carswell (D.M.W. Waters, ed.).
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loss to the beneficiary, and so is similar to the tortious measure for damages, the
two are not always the same.69 Compensation looks at whether the loss would
have resulted if no breach had occurred70—it does not ask whether the loss was
caused or flowed from the breach,71 and is not concerned so much with concepts
of "remoteness" and "foreseeability" or "causation",72 being of "a more
absolute nature than the common law obligation to pay damages for tort or
breach of contract".73 Moreover, there is no requirement to mitigate loss,
although "losses resulting from clearly unreasonable behaviour on the part of
the plaintiff will be adjudged to flow from that behaviour, and not from the
breach".74 Nonetheless, "the loss resulting from breach of the relevant duty"75
needs to be ascertained, because compensation is not unlimited.76
Hence, the borrower should be able to recover all he has lost due to the
breach, whether or not it was foreseeable or remote. This means that the actual
loss due to the breach will be assessed with the benefit of hindsight, namely the
value at the date of the trial, rather than the date of the breach, as in tort and
contract.77
THE NATURE OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT: CONTRACTUAL
CONSTRUCTION
When a contract has been negotiated, English courts have been reluctant to go
outside the "four corners" of the contract (or loan documentation) and admit
extrinsic evidence. This is in contrast to the United States, where lender liability
theories permit a borrower to go beyond the "four corners" of the loan or
security document; in this regard, "a course of conduct" may be critical.78
69. Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co. (1991) 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129. Here, the Supreme
Court of Canada, by majority, held that, with the fusion of law and equity, the measure for
compensation in equity should be the same as the measure of damages for tort. With respect, whilst
on many occasions the result might be the same, such an analysis, as McLachlin J. observed in
Canson, ignores the difference that the law attaches to a tortfeasor and a fiduciary (of whom a much
higher standard is expected). A similar view is taken by Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, in their
classic work, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1992) 3rd edn., at para. 263.
70. Re Dawson (Dec'd) [1966] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 211, at p. 215, per Street J. (as he then was).
71. Re Dawson (Deed) [1966] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 211, at p. 215.
72. Hill v. Rose, supra, at p. 144. See also the view of McHugh J. in Bennett v. Minister of
Community Welfare (1992) 66 A.L.J.R., at pp. 557-558, who considers the two actions of
negligence and compensation as being fundamentally different.
73. Commonwealth Bank Ltd. v. Smith, supra, at p. 480.
74. Canson, supra, at p. 163, per McLachlin J. However, La Forrest J., at p. 148, says that
mitigation in equity is based on fairness and justice, which it is submitted is correct.
75. Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, supra, per Lord Haldane.
76. Canson, supra, at p. 160.
77. Canson, supra, at pp. 160-161 and 162.
78. See Joseph Jude Norton "Lender Liability in the United States: A Decade in Perspective", in
Chapter 12 hereof ("Norton") for a discussion of the position in the United States.
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The House of Lords has held that evidence of negotiations relating to the
parties' intentions should not be received in evidence.79 Evidence should be
restricted to the factual background known to the parties before the date of the
contract, including evidence of the genesis and, objectively, the aim of the
transaction.80 Moreover, their Lordships have said that post-contractual
behaviour is not admissible to show the parties' intention.81 Also, it is common
in most loan agreements and security documents for there to be a provision to
the effect that the contract in question constitutes the entire agreement between
the parties (i.e. an "entire contract" clause), that it supersedes all previous




(a) Course ofdealing and prior agreement
However, to these general rules, there are two exceptions. First, evidence is
admitted to prove a custom or trade usage.83 Terms which do not appear on the
face of the document, but which alone give it the meaning the parties wished it to
have, may be relevant where there is a history of dealing between them.84 This
may be particularly so in a commercial loan between a lender and a borrower of
longstanding concerning repayment of a loan.85 Although each case will depend
on its facts, in Morrison v. Bank of New Zealand86 it was held that the clear
79. Prennw. Simmonds[ 1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381,atp. 1385, per LordWilberforce. See also the cases
on deletions referred to in NZI Capital Corporation Pty. Ltd. y. Child (1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 481.
80. Prenn v. Simmonds [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1381, at p. 1385, per Lord Wilberforce. See also Robert
GoffJ. (as he then was) in Ets. Soules & Cie. v. International Trade Development Co. Ltd. [1979] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 122, at p. 133.
81. See Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd. v. James Miller & Partners Ltd. [ 1970] A.C.
583 (H.L.(E.)), and Schuler A.G. v. Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd. [1974] A.C. 235 (H.L.(E.)).
Cf. Hide & Skin Trading Pty. Ltd. v. Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd. (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. 310 and case
note by L. Jones, "Construction—Admissibility of Evidence of Post-Contract Conduct" (1991) 4
Journal of Contract Law ("J.C.L.") 163. See also S. Charles Q.C., "Interpretation of Ambiguous
Contracts by Reference to 'Subsequent Conduct' " (1991) J.C.L. 16. Where, however, post-
contractual behaviour is used to show what was agreed, and not as an aid to interpretation, this does
not breach the rule: see National Bank ofNew Zealand Ltd. v. Murland [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R., 86, at
p. 93, citing Chitty on Contracts, General Principles (1989) 26th edn. ("C/n'tty").
82. See Boyd & Forrest v. Glasgow & South Western Railway Co. 1915 S.C. (H.L.) 20; and see
also Johnson Matthey Ltd. v. A.C. Rochester Overseas Corp. (1990) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 190, and the
cases cited therein on p. 196.
83. See Professor G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract (1991) 8th edn., at pp. 180-183.
84. For a discussion of course of dealing contracts: see J. Swanton, "Incorporation of Contractual
terms by a Course of Dealing" (1993) 6 J.C.L. 223.
85. Cf. CIP Line v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1988) 55 D.L.R. (4th) 308, where a lender had
continued a line of credit for several months although the customer was not complying with certain
loan requirements, but then reduced the credit without notice. It was held that no course of dealing
had arisen between the parties by which the lender was required to give the customer notice.
86. [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 291, at pp. 294-295. Cf. Henry Kendall &Sons v. Williams Lillico & Sons
Ltd. [1969] 2 A.C. 31.
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words of a mortgage could not be modified by a course of dealing. Secondly,
whilst, prima facie, a loan document purports to be a valid record of the parties'
intention, it may have been previously agreed87 to postpone its operation until
the occurrence of a future event, such as the approval of a third party, which has
yet to take place.
(b) Waiver, variation and estoppel
Furthermore, there may well be oral or written representations made before or
after a contract has been executed which alter the parties' obligations under it. In
this respect, three situations are common: waiver, variation and estoppel.
(i) Waiver A waiver occurs when one party to an agreement (in this case, it will
be the lender) by his conduct or words, either expressly or impliedly, represents
clearly to the other party that it does not insist upon its strict legal rights. The
representation—usually by way of a forbearance—is unsupported by
consideration and is acted upon by the other party with the result that the first
party, having made the representation, cannot seek to enforce its strict legal
rights.88 Thus, there is no mutuality.89 For example, a lender may dispense with
the borrower's need to comply with certain conditions precedent in a loan
agreement; or not insist upon a particular payment on the specified date, but
allow a borrower to pay it later. To try to avoid any problems with a possible
waiver, there is normally a clause in a loan agreement preserving a lender's rights
in relation to any waiver it may give, so that its future rights are not
extinguished, even though a waiver does not irrevocably alter the parties' rights.
(ii) Variation A variation is to be distinguished from a waiver in that there is
mutuality between the parties and consideration. The parties agree to change a
loan agreement or security document. The agreement is altered in a manner that
may prejudice or benefit either party—this detriment or benefit provides
consideration for each party's promise.90 For example, there may be a variation
of the security documentation required under a facility letter—instead of taking
a director's guarantee, in addition to a mortgage over an asset of the borrower,
the lender may take a mortgage over another asset of the borrower. Because of
the element of mutuality, there can be no variation if the alteration is for one
party's benefit only.91 A variation is reconcilable with the prohibition on
extrinsic evidence not being-admitted to affect an agreement's terms, as the rule
87. For example, by a side letter.
88. Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim [1950] 1 K.B. 616, at p. 622, per Denning L.J. (as he then
was); Neylon v. Dickens [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 35 (P.C.); W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and
Import Co. [1972] 2 Q.B. 189 at p. 213, per Lord Denning M.R. See also recent decisions of the
House of Lords in MotorOil Hellas (Corinth Refineries) S.A. v. Shipping Corporation ofIndia (The
Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391; and the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth of
Australia v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394.
89. Chitty, at paras. 207, 208 and 1605-1608.
90. See Chitty, at para. 206; and Professor G.H. Treitel, The Law ofContract (1991), 8th edn., at
p. 96 and the cases cited therein.
91. Chitty, at paras. 206 and 1599.
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concerns the parties' original intention, not a later alteration. As a matter of
prudence—whether or not an agreement is required to be in writing92—all
variations should be in writing and acknowledged by the parties, and if there is
doubt about the question of consideration, the variation should be by way of
deed.
(iii) Estoppel The third exception in this group is estoppel. Two types of
estoppel are relevant here: estoppel by representation (or estoppel in pais) and
promissory estoppel93 (a form of estoppel made famous by Lord Denning,94
which is similar to waiver). The elements of an estoppel by representation95 are
that: (a) there is a representation by the lender to the borrower either in words or
by acts or by conduct, or, where there is a duty to speak, by silence or inaction;
and (b) the representation is made with the intention (actual or presumptive),
and has the result, of inducing the borrower, on the strength of the
representation, to alter his (the borrower's) position to his detriment. Thus,
there is reliance and detriment in relation to a representation, and there is a
permanent alteration of the parties' rights. However, estoppel by representation
does not of itself provide a cause of action.
Promissory estoppel, under English law, is "fundamentally" different96 from
the United States form which "developed partly in response to the limiting
effects of the adoption of the bargain theory of consideration" and is not part of
English jurisprudence.97 Before discussing this doctrine in detail, one obvious
difference to note is that in the United States, promissory estoppel founds a cause
of action; in England, it does not.
There are generally considered to be five elements of promissory estoppel
under English law.98 First, there needs to be a clear and unequivocal
92. Chitty, at para. 1600.
93. Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130. The literature
on promissory estoppel is voluminous. In particular, see Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law
(1979), Butterworths; Chitty, at paras. 209-243; and the Hon. Mr Justice G.A. Kennedy, "Equitable
Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573, which contains a comprehensive review of the authorities up to
1984.
94. Ibid.
95. Spencer Bower and Turner, Estoppel by Representation (1977) 3rd edn., Ch. 1.
96. Kennedy, "Equitable Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573, at p. 578.
97. Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387, at p. 402, per Mason C.J.
and Wilson J.
98. See Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1988) 2nd edn., at
para. 1706 (the third edition (1992) has been altered to reflect the Australian position more fully);
Kennedy, "Equitable Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573; Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, 4th edn., Vol.
16, at para. 1071, which lists three factors; and E.M. Heenan, Estoppel; General Principles (1984),
Law Society of Western Australia Seminar on Equitable Remedies and Estoppel. See also the
judgment of Brennan J. in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387, at
pp. 428-429, who outlined six components in equitable estoppel, thus: "[I]t is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove that (1) the plaintiff assumed that a particular legal relationship then existed
between the plaintiff and the defendant or expected that a particular legal relationship would exist
between them and, in the latter case, that the defendant would not be free to withdraw from the
expected legal relationship; (2) the defendant has induced the plaintiff to adopt that assumption or
expectation; (3) the plaintiff acts or abstains from acting in reliance on the assumption or
expectation; (4) the defendant knew or intended him to do so; (5) the plaintiff's action or inaction
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representation or assurance in the form of a promise, which is voluntary, from
the promisor to the promisee. This assurance is given with the intention, or in the
knowledge, that the promisee will alter his legal position in reliance on it. Unlike
estoppel in pais (or estoppel by representation), this promise relates to future
conduct, and does not have to relate to an existing fact.
Secondly, there must be existing legal relations (usually contractual) between
the parties. However, the Privy Council, in Bank Negara Indonesia v. Hoalim,"
has indicated that it is sufficient if legal rights or relations came into existence
upon the promisee changing his position due to the promisor's promise.100 In the
leading case of Combe v. Combe,101 the relationship was not contractual, nor
was it a pre-existing relationship or obligation.102
Thirdly, there must be action or reliance upon the promise or assurance. In
contrast to estoppel in pais, there does not have to be detriment; it is sufficient if
the promisee alters his position in reliance on the assurance103—this can amount
to the promisee being given an extension of time.104 Equity intervenes because it
would be unconscionable for the promisor to resile from his position, not
because of the action of the promisee in reliance upon the assurance.105 Thus, it is
the withdrawal of the promise, not the acting upon it.106
Fourthly, like waiver, promissory estoppel is temporary in its effect. The
promisor may resile from this promise by giving the promisee sufficient notice
that he intends to resume his former position. However, when the promisee has
gone too far in reliance upon the assurance, and cannot resume its former
position, the estoppel becomes permanent,107 although such a situation is,
arguably, a variation supported by consideration.108
Lastly, promissory estoppel is "a shield not a sword"109: it does create a cause
of action.110 But this does not mean that promissory estoppel cannot be used as
will occasion detriment if the assumption or expectation is not fulfilled; and (6) the defendant has
failed to act to avoid that detriment whether by fulfilling the assumption or expectation or
otherwise."
99. [1973] M.L.J. 3.
100. See also Evendenv. Guildford CityAssociation Football Club Ltd. [1975] 2 All E.R.269and
Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd. [1968] 2 Q.B. 839, for cases
where the relationship was not contractual.
101. [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).
102. See Kennedy, "Equitable Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573, at p. 587.
103. See Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130, at
pp. 134-135, per Denning J. (as he then was) and Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, at
pp. 220-221, per Denning L.J. (as he then was).
104. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies (1988) 2nd edn., at para.
1706.
105. Kennedy, "Equitable Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573, at p. 587.
106. Ibid.
107. Ajayi v. R T Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326. This is similar to the change of
position defence in restitution: see Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] A.C. 548 (H.L.(E.)).
108. See Heenan, supra, at p. 27.
109. Per Birkett L.J. in Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, at p. 224.
110. Per Denning L.J. (as he then was) in Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, at p. 221.
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part of an action by a plaintiff, or by a defendant on a counterclaim.111 For
example, in Birmingham and District Land Co. v. Land and North Western
Railway Co.,112 the plaintiff sought an injunction and declaration concerning its
interest in land which was subject to a previous agreement and succeeded in
obtaining the declaration. The doctrine was also used in an attacking fashion in
Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Co.,113 where a lessee sought to defeat an
action for ejectment.114
Whilst it has been a popular plea, promissory estoppel has rarely succeeded.115
Nonetheless, estoppel may be relevant if a lender brings an action against a
borrower for non-payment of a loan, and there has been an oral statement by a
representative of the lender that the borrower does not have to repay it till a later
date, which the borrower relies on to his detriment. For example, the borrower
may alter his position by using the sum that would have been repayable for
another purpose, such as paying another creditor or using it to purchase
equipment or an item of stock. The borrower may be able to raise promissory
estoppel as a defence to a claim for the sum in question and to counterclaim for
damages for breach of contract.116 Also, it may be relevant where the lender has
said it would lend money to the borrower, who, in reliance on this
representation, proceeds to purchase items for its business only to find the lender
later refusing the loan. In such a situation—depending on the nature of the
representation—the lender may be estopped from refusing the loan.117
As a matter of prudence, any representation which may give rise to an
estoppel, waiver or variation should be in writing—even if this amounts to a
confirmatory letter—so that there can be no dispute about it. A common
111. Meagher, Gummow &c Lehane, Equitable Doctrines and Remedies (1988) 2ndedn., at para.
1707.
112. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 268 (C.A.).
113. (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439 (H.L.(E.)).
114. See also Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215 and Argy Trading Development Co. Ltd. v.
Lapid Developments Ltd. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 444. D.J.M. Bennett Q.C. argues that equitable estoppel
could be used as a sword by the simple device of suing upon the state of facts created by the estoppel
and then seeking to strike out the denial: see "Equitable Estoppel and Related Estoppels" (1987) 61
A.L.J. 540, at p. 545. Thus, it is submitted that it may be a question of who sues first. See also recent
Commonwealth authority: Legione v. Hately (1983) 152 C.L.R. 406 (High Court of Aust.);
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387; Foran v. Wright (1989) C.L.R.
385; (1990) A.L.R. 413 and Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394; and Burbery
Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd. v. Hindsbank Bank Holdings Ltd. [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 356 (C.A.)
in which case it was stated promissory estoppel is not limited to dealings between parties having
prior contractual relations.
115. Kennedy, "Equitable Estoppel" (1984) 58 A.L.J. 573, at p. 579. A plea of waiver and
estoppel was unsuccessful in Williams & Glyn, supra; see especially at pp. 303 and 308-311 of the
transcript.
116. See also the Court of Appeal decision in Lombard North Central pic v. Stobart, The Times, 2
February 1990, where a finance company was held to be barred by its undervaluation of a motor car
and was estopped from enforcing its strict legal rights against the purchaser, who had acted upon the
finance company's unequivocal representations.
117. Cf. Winterton Constructions Pty. Ltd. v. Hambros Australia Ltd. (1993) 111 A.L.R. 649.
Cf. also First Energy (UK) Ltd. v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd. [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194
(C.A.).
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example of an estoppel or waiver arises in guarantees, where the lender seeks to
set up an estoppel or waiver of rights against the guarantor by a provision in the
guarantee document stating that the guarantee was not entered into on the basis
of any representation from the lender or its agents.
(c) Implied terms
As stated previously, English courts have shown a strong reluctance to imply
terms in a contract. The sorts of factors (which may overlap)118 that a court will
look at in implying a term into a contract are that:
(i) the term must be reasonable and equitable;
(ii) the term must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so
that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it;
(iii) it must be so obvious that "it goes without saying"119;
(iv) it must be capable of clear expression; and
(v) it must not contradict an express term of the contract.120
The test most frequently used is that laid down by Lord Wilberforce in
Liverpool City Council v. Irwin,121 in which his Lordship said that terms should
only be implied by law "as the nature of the contract itself implicitly requires, no
more, no less: a test, in other words, of necessity".122 This test has been held to be
appropriate to both the implication of terms in fact and the implications of terms
in law.123 The former refers to "an implied term necessary to give business
efficacy to a particular contract"124; the latter refers to the implication of a term
"as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual relationship",125
118. See BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty. Ltd. v. Shire ofHastings {1982) 149 C.L.R. 337 at p. 347
(P.C.), approved by the High Court of Australia in Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail
Authority ofNew South Wales (1981-1982) 149 C.L.R. 337 and Khoury v. Government Insurance
Office ofNew South Wales (1983-1984) 165 C.L.R. 622.
119. It can also be expressed by saying that the both parties would have agreed to it without
hesitation: see Lord Cross of Chelsea in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977] A.C. 239, at p. 258.
120. See the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health Authority
[1992] Q.B. 333. Note the discussion by A. Phang, "Implied Terms in English Law—Some Recent
Developments" [1993] J.B.L. 394 and E. MacDonald, "Express and Implied Terms and
Exemptions" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 555.
121. [1977] A.C. 239 (H.L.(E.)); see also Bowen L.J. in The Moorcock (1889) 14 P.D. 64 (C.A.).
As to implied terms generally: see Chitty, at paras. 901 et seq.
122. At p. 254F. Cf. Lord Salmon in the same case, at p. 262, who referred to a transaction
becoming "inefficacious, futile and absurd"; and Lord Cross of Chelsea, at p. 258.
123. See Lord Bridge of Harwich in Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1
A.C. 294, at p. 307—an employment contract case. See also Ralph Gibson L.J. in Reid v. Rush &
Tompkins Group pic [1990] 1 W.L.R. 212, at p. 220, a non-lending case where there was a refusal to
imply a term in a contract of employment that an employer should insure an employee against the
risk of injury by third parties caused to him while acting in the course of employment. In that case, his
Lordship (who delivered the leading judgment) said that such a term could not be implied under the
test of necessity as being applicable to all such contracts of employment, nor could it be implied as a
term which the parties must have agreed.
124. Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 A.C. 294, at p. 307.
125. Ibid.
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and is based on "wider considerations".126 Nonetheless, the criterion justifying
implication of the second kind "is necessity not reasonableness".127Moreover, it
is suggested that any implementation in loan documentation will be an
implication of fact: not law, as a loan contract is a commercial contract to be
construed according to its terms.128
Clearly, vague notions of "good faith" and "fair dealing" do not fall within
any of the five criteria listed above and terms cannot be said to be "necessary" on
this basis. Examples of the courts' reluctance to imply terms into a loan
agreement are to be found in Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Barnes,119 the only
comprehensive English case on lender liability.
Briefly stated, the facts were that Mr Barnes ("Barnes"), the defendant, was
the chairman, managing director and majority shareholder in Northern
Development Holdings ("NDH"). NDH was involved in property
development. Prior to 1973, NDH had been very profitable. The plaintiff lender
("the lender") had become the principal clearing lender for NDH from 1965,
although NDH had also borrowed very substantial sums from numerous other
sources. In July of 1972, at Barnes' request, the ldnder raised NDH's overdraft
from £2.5m to £6.5m. Whilst the lender felt that NDH's financial needs should
be met by an increase in equity, rather than an increase in borrowings, the lender
did not insist upon this or advise NDH to undertake any additional equity
financing.
In October 1972, Barnes was granted a personal loan of £lm by the lender for
12 months to allow him to buy more shares in NDH. This loan was secured by a
share charge in favour of the lender over Barnes' shares in NDH. It was
anticipated by both parties that the loan would be repaid by Barnes out of
monies owed to him, or to other companies which he controlled, by NDH. The
lender did not want to be repaid out of the sale proceeds of the shares, because it
considered that adverse publicity would result if Barnes sold a large parcel of
NDH shares.
The building boom collapsed in 1973, causing NDH great difficulties. In
August of that year, Barnes sought to increase NDH's overdraft from £6.5m to
£l4m. The lender refused, although from 1966 it had increased NDH's
overdraft, upon Barnes' request, from £20,000 to £6.5m in 1972. A further
difficulty was created in that, since 1971, NDH had also raised money under a
complex system of revolving credits with a secondary lender. This secondary
lender collapsed in December 1973 and NDH found itself liable to repay £3m on
the bills of exchange which it had drawn down or accepted, though it had only
borrowed £l.5m on them. The lender agreed to lend NDH £3m to meet the bills
on the terms of a facility letter, dated 14 January 1974 (the "January facility
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., at p. 307.
128. Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Barnes [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 209.
129. [1981] Com. L.R. 205.
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letter"). Under the January facility letter, NDH's total borrowings from the
lender were increased to £1 lm on a temporary basis.
By June 1974, NDH was unable to pay the interest due on its loan from the
lender. In July 1974, the lender and the other main lenders to NDH entered into
a moratorium agreement under which interest "was rolled up". The lender
issued a new facility letter toNDH in August 1974 (the "August facility letter"),
which expressly made the lender's loans to NDH repayable "on demand". New
security arrangements were also introduced. A further £100,000 was lent
personally to Barnes by the lender in September 1974 to enable him to meet
pressing financial difficulties.
A new moratorium agreement, entitled "the Heads of Agreement", was
entered into in November 1974. Pursuant to the Heads of Agreement, any five or
more parties, who were together owed more than £l0m, could terminate the
moratorium. In June 1974, the parties to the Heads of Agreement made
demands on NDH and appointed a receiver. On 30 May 1975, the parties to the
Heads of Agreement decided to bring the moratorium to an end.
The lender sued Barnes for the sum of £ 1.1m plus interest. Barnes admitted
the loans were due, subject to various defences and counterclaims. Interestingly,
NDH was not a party to the action, as Barnes could not convince the directors to
become involved.
On the basis of these facts, four attempts were made to imply terms into the
various loan documents agreements. The first related to an application of the
principle in the House of Lords' decision in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v.
Shirlaw130 in which it was said that, where a party ("X") enters into an
arrangement which can only take effect by the continuance of an existing state of
circumstances, there is an implied agreement that X shall not do anything to
alter that state of affairs. Barnes argued that repayment of the £lm lent to him
was to be out of monies NDH owed him and that it was an implied term that
repayment should not be made impossible by the lender's breaches of its duty to,
and contract with, NDH.
Ralph Gibson J. (as he then was) held that, in the absence of an express
provision in the loan agreementwith Barnes that the lender would be repaid out
of monies owed to Barnes by NDH, justice did not require such a term to be
implied.131 There was no evidence that Barnes had entered into an arrangement
that only took effect due to a particular state of affairs continuing, namely, the
fund as a source of repayment. If it was shown that the lender's wrongful acts to
NDH had destroyed the fund, Barnes' defence would have succeeded.132
The second issue133 relating to implied terms, concerned the position of the
lender as chargee of Barnes' shares in NDH and whether a duty of care was owed
to Barnes by the lender when the shares significantly decreased in value. In
130. [1940] A.C. 701 (H.L.(E.)).
131. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 206, and especially at pp. 285-286 of the transcript.
132. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 206.
133. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 208.
THE NATURE OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT 35
holding this was an action which NDH alone could bring, Ralph Gibson J. said
Barnes could only sue for damages for alleged negligence and breach of contract
by the lender to NDH if there was an implied term to this effect in the loan
contract or under a rule of law. There was no such rule and no material upon
which a term could be implied.134
The third issue was whether, through a course of dealing, the lender was
obliged to increase NDH's overdraft on request, or to give 12 months' notice of
refusal.135 It was held that such terms could not be implied for two reasons. First,
such terms were inconsistent with the express terms of the facility letter of July
1972; and, secondly, they were not "necessary".136 A contract between a lender
and its customer is an ordinary commercial contract to be construed according
to its terms and in accordance with the basic principle that parties are free to
determine their primary obligations.137
The fourth issue concerning implied terms related to the implication of a term
that a period of reasonable notice should be given for the repayment of NDH
overdrafts. As to this contention, Ralph Gibson J. said, first138:
"... that in the absence of any express agreement providing for the duration of the
facility, or for the date of repayment, the court must consider whether, according to the
ordinary rules for implication of terms into commercial contracts, any term controlling
the duration of the facility or the date of repayment is to be implied. If no such term must
be implied, then money lent under the facility is no more than money lent and is,
therefore, repayable on demand."
His Lordship then rejected a contention that knowledge on the part of a lender
that a borrower intended to spend all or part of the money in a business venture
which would take a long period to develop, could give rise to an implied term
requiring a period of notice for repayment to be calculated by reference to the
probable duration of that business venture.139 Clearly, such a contention would
be folly if the venture suddenly collapsed or looked like collapsing.
But, in construing the January facility letter (which was silent as to duration
and spoke of the "usual banking conditions"), his Lordship said that the express
words in it required that, in order to give "business efficacy" to that facility
letter, the lending thereby agreed was not repayable "on demand", and the
January facility could not be cancelled by the lender when it chose.140
Accordingly, a period of reasonable notice had to be given, which Ralph Gibson
134. Ibid., and at pp. 361 and 364 of the transcript.
135. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 209, and at pp. 491 and 493 of the transcript.
136. See Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977] A.C. 239 (H.L.(E.)) and The Moorcock (1889)
14 P.D. 64.
137. See also Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C.
827, at p. 848.
138. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 210. Cf. Crynev. Barclays Bank pic [1987] B.C.L.C. 548 (C.A.).
See also the case recently brought against Barclays Bank pic by the administrators of a company
called Crimpfil, noted in The Independent, 30 April 1994, on p. 17, The Daily Telegraph, 21 April
1994, and noted in [1994] J.I.B.L., at N-151.
139. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 210.
140. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 210, and especially at pp. 605, 608 and 609 of the transcript.
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J. concluded would have been unlikely to exceed one month.141 His Lordship
stated that this was part of the general rule that "money lent is repayable
without demand, or at latest on demand, unless the lender expressly or impliedly
agrees otherwise".142 In this case, it had been agreed otherwise.
The principle of the Liverpool City Council case has also been applied by the
Court of Appeal in another lending case. In National Bank of Greece SA v.
Pinios Shipping Company (No. 1) (The Maira (No. 3)),U3 the court, in a
"one-off" transaction, refused to imply a term that the lender was under a duty
of care to the borrower to ensure that a third party did not underinsure a vessel
being built by the borrower for which the lender was giving guarantees secured
by a mortgage. This was a specific transaction, and it was not necessary to imply
such a term, which should have been expressly included.
Rationale of general rules
The rationale for these rules and, in particular, the refusal to imply terms,
appears in the House of Lords' decision in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor
Transport Ltd.UA In that case, Lord Wilberforce said: "At the stage of
negotiation as to the consequences of a breach, there is everything to be said for
allowing the parties to estimate their respective claims according to the
contractual provisions they have made themselves .. .",45
Lord Diplock, in his classic speech in the same case, said: "A basic principle of
the common law of contract is that the parties are free to determine for
themselves what primary obligations they will accept." His Lordship went on to
distinguish secondary obligations, such as the payment of damages for
non-performance of a primary obligation146 (which is a breach of contract).
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: LIABILITY IN TORT
AND CONTRACT
Unlike the United States, where courts imply duties of "good faith" and "fair
dealing" in contracts and readily find liability in tort, English courts have in the
141. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 210.
142. Ibid.
143. [1990] A.C. 637, at p. 646, per Lloyd L.J. (as he then was); see case note by D.A. Kingsford
Smith, "Implied Terms in the Banker and Customer Relationship (The Maira (No. 3))" [1989]
L.M.C.L.Q. 40. This case went on appeal to the House of Lords solely on the question of whether a
lender can claim compound interest once the borrower's account has been closed. The Court of
Appeal was reversed on this point, the House of Lords stating that the lender can claim compound
interest: see [1990] A.C. 637 (H.L.(E.)).
144. [1980] A.C. 827 (H.L.(E.)).
145. Ibid., at p. 843.
146. Ibid., at p. 848;seealso B. Dickson, "The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General Law
of Contract" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 451, at p. 463, where it is noted that there are no fewer than 18 cases
in which Lord Diplock sat as a judge containing a reference to the distinction between primary and
secondary obligations.
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last decade, emphasised that liability in tort and contract (the two most fruitful
sources of liability) are separate and distinct. This does not mean that there
cannot be overlapping liability: one possible area of overlap is negligent
misrepresentation, particularly in a precontractual situation.147 But, if there is a
contract between the parties, a party's liability in tort cannot be greater than its
liability in contract. The reason that a contractual analysis has been preferred is
that, in contract, the parties have agreed to regulate their obligations and
liabilities to each other, whereas in tort, duties may be owed to the world at
large.148
This approach is best summarised in the statement of the Privy Council in Tai
Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Cbong Hing Bank Ltd.,149 where Lord Scarman
sounded the following warning:
"Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law's
development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual
relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. Though it is possible as
amatter oflegal semantics to conduct an analysis ofthe rights and duties inherent in some
contractual relationships including that of banker and customer either as a matter of
contract law ... or as a matter of tort law ... their Lordships believe it to be correct in
principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contract
analysis: on principle because it is a relationship in which the parties have, subject to a few
exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to each other, and for the avoidance of
confusion because different consequences do follow according to whether the liability
arises from contract or tort..." (Emphasis added.)
A similar view, regarding the delineation of liability in tort and contract, was
expressed by Lord Bridge of Harwich in D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church
Commissioners for Englandf50
This approach has subsequently been reconsidered by the House of Lords,1503
which has said that, where there is an assumption of responsibility under Hedley
Byrne which is not inconsistent with, or excluded by, an existing
147. SeeEsso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801 (C.A.) cited without disapproval by
the House of Lords in Banque Keyser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (UK) Insurance Co. Ltd. [1991] 2
A.C. 249, at p. 275. See also Oliver J. (as he then was) inMidland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. HettStubbs
and Kemp [1979] Ch. 384, the Court of Appeal in Howard Marine and Dredging Co. Ltd. v.
A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 574 (C.A.), and the House of Lords in Henderson
v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, which approved the Midland Bank Trust Co. case,
supra.
148. See Lord Reid in Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Heron II) [1969] 1 A.C. 350, at p. 386
(H.L.(E.)) who said: "In contract, if one party wishes to protect himself against a risk which to the
other partywould appear unusual, he can direct the other party's attention to it before the contract is
made ... But in tort there is no opportunity for the injured party to protect himself in that way."
149. [1986] A.C. 80, at p. 107.
150. [1989] A.C. 177, at p. 206 (H.L.(E.)). Cf. the American case of Foley v. Interactive Data
Corporation, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988), where the court distinguished between ex delicto and ex
contractu remedies and held there was no cause of action in relation to an implied covenant of "good
faith", albeit in an employment contract, which marked a departure from previous case law.
150a. Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)), per Lord Goff of
Chieveley, with Lords Keith of Kinkel, Browne-Wilkinson, Mustill and Nolan agreeing.
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contractual chain or structure between the parties,150b there can be concurrent
liability in contract and tort, so that the plaintiff may choose the best remedy for
him150c; Tai Hittg Cotton it was observed was a case about whether there could
be a tortious duty of care which was more extensive than the duty of care
provided for in the parties' contract150d: not whether there could be concurrent
liability.
Consistently with the rise of freedom of contract,151 there has been a
narrowing of the duty of care in negligence, which is no longer based upon
reasonable foreseeability under the two-tiered formula of Lord Wilberforce in
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.152 In Peabody Donation Fund
(Governors) v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Company Ltd.,153 Lord Keith of Kinkel
emphasised that Anns should not be treated as being of a definitive character and
that there needed to be a relationship of proximity between the parties in Lord
Atkin's sense154 of a "close and direct relationship". Also, that it must be "just
and reasonable" in all the circumstances to impose a duty of care—mere
foreseeability alone is insufficient.155 These views were repeated and expanded
upon in Yuen Kun-yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong,156 where the
Commissioner for deposit-taking companies in Hong Kong was held not to be
liable in negligence to an investor in one such company (who lost money when
150b. An example of an inconsistent standard contractual structure in a construction matter is
where the sub-contractor has not assumed any responsibility to the building owner, only to the main
contractor under his contract with him: see Lord Goff, at p. 790D-H.
150c. Per Lord Goff, at pp. 778-789. See also Lord Browne-Wilkinson, at pp. 798-800.
150d. Per Lord Goff, at p. 790D-H, agreeing with Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in the Court of
Appeal below.
151. As is emphasised in the speech of Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor
Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827, at p. 848.
152. [1978] A.C. 728, at pp. 751-752. An interpretation which, it is submitted, is erroneous; see
also Gibbs C.J. in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424, at p. 441 and Lord
Keith of Kinkel in Yuen Kun-yeu v. Attorney-General ofHong Kong [1988] A.C. 175, at p. 191.
Anns was recently overruled by the House of Lords in Murphy v. BrentwoodDistrict Council [1991]
1 A.C. 398.
153. [1985] A.C. 210, at p. 240; see case note by S. Todd, "The Liability of Public Authorities:
Divergence in the Common Law" (1£86) 102 L.Q.R. 370.
154. [1932] A.C. 562, at p. 580.
155. See Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410 (H.L.(E.)), who thought
it clear that "foreseeability does not of itself, and automatically, lead to a duty of care".
156. [1988] A.C. 175, at pp. 190-194. See P. Cane, "Economic Loss in Tort: Is the Pendulum out
of Control" (1988) 52 M.L.R. 200. See also Minories Finance Ltd. v. Arthur Young [1989] 2 All
E.R. 105, in which it was held that the Bank of England owed no duty of care to the commercial
lenders it regulated in the United Kingdom. It was neither just nor fair and reasonable to make the
lender assume or share any commercial responsibilities which private lenders owed to themselves to
conduct their commercial dealings prudently and with care so as to make profits and avoid making
losses. Also, the Banking Act 1987, designed to protect depositors, meant the importation of a duty
of care was unsustainable. See the comments thereon by G.A. Penn, in Banking Supervision (1989)
Butterworths, at pp. 20-22; and see also Davis v. Radcliffe [1990] 1 W.L.R. 821 (P.C.). The recent
case law is well reviewed in the following articles: see the Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Cooke, "An Impossible
Distinction" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 46; Professor J. Fleming, "Requiem For Anns" (1990) 106 L.Q.R.
525; I. Duncan-Wallace, Q.C., "Anns Beyond Repair" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 228; and J. Stapleton,
"Duty of Care and Economic Loss" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 249.
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the company collapsed through fraud), because there was a lack of proximity
between the parties.
Moreover, as recently noted by the House of Lords in Caparo Industries pic v.
Dickman,157 there has been a recognition of "the inability of any single general
principle to provide a practical test which can be applied to every situation to
determine whether a duty of care is owed and, if so, what is its scope". Concepts
of "proximity" and "reasonableness", which are in addition to foreseeability,
are "little more than convenient labels" and not susceptible to precise definition.
Rather, there is a trend towards looking "to the more traditional categorisation
of distinct and recognisable situations as guides to the existence, the scope and
the limits of the varied duties of care which the law imposes".158 Novel
categories of negligence should be developed incrementally and by analogy
with established categories, as opposed to large extensions of the duty of
care.159 Finally, in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council,160 the House
of Lords overruled their decision in Anns as being^ inconsistent with the above
principles.
Other examples of the more restrictive approach to questions of a duty of care
are found in several recent cases. In Huxford v. Stoy Hayward & Company (a
firm),ul Popplewell J. held there was no duty of care owed in tort to a company's
directors and shareholders, owing to a lack of proximity, where the company, at
the specific request of its lenders, instructed accountants to undertake an
investigation into the company's financial affairs and report to the directors,
with copies of the report to the lenders. The resulting contract was between the
advisers and the lenders alone, such that the advisers owed no contractual duty
of care to the company or its directors or shareholders or guarantors. In Al Saudi
Banque v. Clarke Pixley (a firm)u2—which was approved by the House of Lords
in Caparo163—Millett J. held that certain lenders who lent money to a company
were owed no duty of care by the company's auditors for negligently audited
accounts which had failed to show the company was insolvent.164
In Williams & Glyn, the question of whether the lender owed a duty to Barnes
157. [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.(E.)). See case note (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 349.
158. Per Lord Bridge of Harwich, at p. 618.
159. See Brennan J. in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 157 C.L.R. 424, at p. 481,
cited with approval in Caparo by Lord Bridge of Harwich, at p. 618 and Lord Oliver of Aylmerton,
at p. 633. See also Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Leigh and Sillwan Ltd. v. Aliaktnon Shipping Co.
Ltd. (The Aliakmon) [1986] A.C. 785, at p. 815, who stated that a duty of care should not be
imposed in cases where it has been repeatedly held there is no duty of care; and that Anns was a case
applying to novel situations.
160. [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.(E.)).
161. [1989] 5 B.C.C. 421.
162. [1990] 1 Ch. 313.
163. See Lord Bridge of Harwich at p. 623; Lord Oliver of Aylmerton at p. 641; and Lord Jauncey
of Tullichettle at p. 662.
164. See also Pacific Associates Inc. v. Baxter [1990] 1 Q.B. 993 (C.A.); Norwich City Council v.
Harvey [1989] 1 W.L.R. 828 (C.A.); Reid v. Rush and Tompkins Group pic [1990] 1 W.L.R. 212 at
p. 235 (C.A.); and Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd. (The Nicholas H) [1994]
1 W.L.R. 1071 (C.A.).
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as a shareholder of the borrower (NDH) was answered in the negative. Ralph
Gibson J. held165 that no duty of care was owed by the lender to Barnes, in his
capacity as shareholder in NDH, not to breach duties which the lender owed to
NDH. (Had NDH been a party, then the lender may have been liable to NDH.)
The only allegations of negligence against the lender could be for giving, or
failing to give, advice, as Barnes did not otherwise fall within the principle in
Donoghue v. Stevenson.166 However, whilst the lender advised NDH as its
customer, it had not asked to advise the shareholders or procure any benefit for
them in their actions for NDH. The lender had no reason to suppose that the
shareholders were relying upon them to advise NDH in the shareholders'
interests, and liability did not arise in tort under the principle in Hedley Byrne167
of an assumption of responsibility and reliance.
Also, the shareholders were not closely and directly affected by the lender's
act, and it would be neither "fair nor just" in the circumstances to impose a duty
of care upon the lender—in fact, there was much to the contrary. Furthermore,
under the rule in Salomon v. Salomon & Company Ltd.,168 the shareholders
were separate legal entities from NDH and it was said that a lender's decision
would be made difficult if a shareholder could claim against it on the basis of a
duty owed to a borrowing company.169 This reasoning is very similar to that
adopted a decade later in Caparo.
Allied with the change in attitude towards the duty of care under Anns, the
decision in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Company Ltd.™ has been eroded. In
that case, their Lordships, on special facts, allowed recovery for pure economic
loss on the basis that the relationship between the pursuer and a sub-contractor
was very close: being akin to contract, except for the absence of privity. But, in a
line of cases171 culminating in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council,172 there
165. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 209, and especially at pp. 332-335 of the transcript. As to the
liability of lenders for giving advice: see the paper by A. Malik, "Giving Advice", delivered at a
seminar by the Legal Studies and Services Group Ltd., entitled "Legal Responsibilities and Liabilities
of Banks", on 27 September 1988, London.
166. [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.(Sc.)).
167. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.(E.)).£ee also Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R.
761 (H.L.(E.)).
168. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.(E.)).
169. See pp. 335-336 of the transcript. Cf. the recent decision of Mervyn Davies J. in Al-Nakib
Investments (Jersey) Ltd. v. Longcroft [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1390, in which it was held that the duty of
care which the directors of a company owed to the company's shareholders regarding a prospectus
issued by the company for a rights issue did not extend to a situation where reliance was placed on
the prospectus by the shareholders for the purpose of buying the shares in the market.
170. [1983] 1 A.C. 520 (H.L.(Sc.)).
171. Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd. v. Greater London Council [1983] 2, A.C. 509, at p. 530
(H.L.(E.)) per Lord Templeman; Muirbead v. Industrial Specialties Tank Ltd. [1986] Q.B. 507
(C.A.); Simaan General Contracting Co. v. Pilkington Glass Ltd. (No. 2) [1988] Q.B. 758 (C.A.);
Greater Nottingham Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Cementation Piling and Foundations Ltd. [1989]
Q.B. 71 (C.A.); D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners for England [1989] A.C. 177
(H.L.(F..)); and see also Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Ltd. (The
Mineral Transporter) [1986] A.C. 1, at p. 25 (P.C.), per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton; and Leigh and
Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Aliakmon) [1986] A.C. 785 (H.L.(E)).
172. [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.(E.)).
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has been a rejection of the opening up of liability for pure economic loss in tort173
and a marginalising ofJunior Books. Recovery for pure economic loss is now to
be based upon the Hedley Byrne principle.
Negligent misstatement
Hedley Byrnewas re-evaluated by the House of Lords in two cases, Smith v. Eric
S. Bush174 and Caparo.17S In Bush, there was a negligent valuation of a house,
which the valuer knew would be relied on by the mortgagor, and probably by
the mortgagee. In holding the valuer to be under a duty of care to the mortgagor,
their Lordships re-examined the concept of voluntary assumption of
responsibility in the speech of Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne.176
Lord Griffiths, who delivered the leading speech, said that voluntary
assumption of responsibility is not a helpful or realistic test for liability and that
"assumption of responsibility" is only meaningful if it refers to circumstances in
which the law deems the maker of a statement to have assumed responsibility to
the person who acts upon the former's advice.177 Echoing Lord Keith of Kinkel
in Peabody and Yuen Kun-yeu (where, ironically, Hedley Byrne was said to be a
case of voluntary assumption of responsibility), Lord Griffiths stated178 that a
person is said to have assumed responsibility (i.e. an adviser owes the recipient
of advice a duty of care) if it is foreseeable that, if the advice is negligent, it is
likely to cause the recipient to suffer damage; that there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity between the parties; and that it is just and reasonable
to impose liability. This approach is similar to the approach taken in Australia,
where the High Court has applied the "neighbourhood principle" to negligent
misrepresentations and, in particular, has emphasised the need for proximity.179
The question whether, on Lord Griffiths' test, a lender has assumed
responsibility (as in Hedley Byrne or Box v. Midland Bank Ltd.no) will be one of
fact. In Royal Bank Trust Company (Trinidad) Ltd. v. Pampellonne,181 the Privy
Council said that a lender was not under a duty of care to a borrower when it
provided the borrower with printed information, but not advice, about certain
investments. It is suggested, however, that the dissent of Lord Templeman and
173. Recovery of pure economic loss is still recoverable in contract.
174. [1990] 1 A.C. 831 (H.L.(E.)). See case note by D. Allen, "Hedley Byrne Revalued" (1989)
105 L.Q.R. 508.
175. [1990] 2 A.C. 605 (H.L.(E.)). Cf.AWA Ltd. v. Daniels (trading as Deloitte Haskins & Sells)
(1992) 7 A.C.S.R. 759 (on the question of the contributory negligence by a company in an action
against its auditors).
176. [1964] A.C. 831, at p. 529. Cf. Lord DenningM.R. in Mclnerney v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. [1974]
1 Lloyd's Rep. 246, at p. 253.
177. At p. 862. See also Lord Roskill in Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605, at
p. 628, who expressed agreement with this statement.
178. At pp. 864-865.
179. San Sebastian Pty. Ltd. v. Minister Administering the Environmental Planning &
Assessment Act 1979 (1986) 61 C.L.R. 340, at p. 355.
180. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 391.
181. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 218 (P.C.).
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Sir Robin Cooke is more compelling. The result in this case is similar to that
reached by Toohey J. in the Federal Court of Australia in ANZ v. James,182 who
drew a distinction between a lender giving advice and merely passing on
information.
Liability for negligent misstatement was further reviewed by the House of
Lords in Caparo, where Lord Bridge of Harwich said183:
"The damage which may be caused by the negligently spoken or written word will
normally be confined to economic loss sustained by those who rely on the accuracy of the
information or advice they receive as a basis for action. The question what, if any, duty is
owed by the maker of a statement to exercise due care to ensure its accuracy arises
typically in relation to statements made by a person in the exercise of his calling or
profession. In advising the client who employs him the professional man owes a duty to
exercise that standard of skill and care appropriate to his professional status and will be
liable both in contract and in tort for all losses which his client may suffer by reason of any
breach of that duty."
After examining the authorities on negligent misrepresentation, which was
regarded as "a relatively narrow corner of the field" of negligence (including
Bush's case, and the "masterly analysis" of the relevant principles by Denning
L.J. (as he then was) in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.184 which required
little, if any, modification or amplification), his Lordship concluded185:
"The salient feature of all these cases is that the defendant giving advice or information
was fully aware of the nature of the transaction which the plaintiff had in contemplation,
knew that the advice or information would be communicated to him directly or indirectly
and knew that it was very likely that the plaintiff would rely on that advice or information
in deciding whether or not to engage in the transaction in contemplation. In these
circumstances the defendant could clearly be expected, subject always to the effect of any
disclaimer of responsibility, specifically to anticipate that the plaintiff would rely on the
advice or information given by the defendant for the very purpose for which he did in the
event rely on it. So also the plaintiff, subject again to the effect of any disclaimer, would in
that situation reasonably suppose that he was entitled to rely on the advice or information
communicated to him for the very purpose for which he required it."
However, it is an entirely different matter when a statement is put into general
circulation and it might "foreseeably be relied upon by strangers to the maker of
the statement f6r any one of a variety of reasons which the maker of the
statement had no specific reason to anticipate".186 Consequently, there is a need
for a limit or control mechanism, because it would be quite unwarranted to
confer on the world at large an entitlement to use the benefit of expert
knowledge or professional expertise which can be attributable to the maker of
the statement. His Lordship noted that, for negligent misrepresentation, an
essential ingredient of proximity is that the defendant knew his statement would
be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual or a member of an
182. (1986) 64 A.L.R. 347.
183. [1990] 2 A.C. 605, at p. 619.
184. [1951] 2 K.B. 164, at pp. 179-184.
185. [1990] 2 A.C. 605, at pp. 620-621.
186. Supra, at p. 621.
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identifiable class, with regard to a particular transaction or type of transaction,
and that the plaintiff would be very likely to rely on it for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to enter into that transaction or type of transaction.187
These remarks have particular significance for lenders as there will be very
close proximity between them and a borrower. Normally, a borrower will rely
upon the statements of the lender in relation to a particular transaction.
Moreover, it is reasonable that they do so.188
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton considered that four factors189 were relevant—
although not conclusive or exclusive—in determining a "special relationship":
(a) the advice is needed for a purpose, which the adviser is aware of;
(b) the adviser knows his advice will be communicated to the advisee, as an
individual or as a member of an identifiable class, so that it will be used
by the advisee for the purpose required;
(c) it is known the advice is likely to be acted on by the advisee; and
(d) the advisee acts upon the advice to his detriment.
His Lordship, whilst stating Smith v. Eric S. Bush had gone further than any
other decision of the House of Lords, felt, like Lord Bridge of Harwich, that
there was need for a control mechanism and said there were "powerful reasons"
against extending liability to find a relationship ofproximity between an adviser
and third parties who may come across the adviser's advice, although this is
strictly unrelated either to the intended recipient or to the purpose for which the
advice is given.190 Lord Oliver went on to conclude that there was nothing in the
statutory duties191 of a company auditor giving rise to a special relationship.
Since those cases, there have been four important decisions of the Court of
Appeal (of which two are discussed below),192 an interesting decision, factually,
by Lord Osborne in the Court of Session in Scotland,193 and two decisions of the
House of Lords.193*
In James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd. v. Hicks Anderson & Co.,194 the
issue concerned the liability of the defendants, a firm of accountants, for: (i)
negligence and breach of duty in the preparation of "final draft" accounts of
their client, a group of companies ("the group"), which the plaintiffs wished to
take over where it was known that the plaintiffs would rely on the accounts in
187 .Ibid.
188. Ibid.
189. Supra, at p. 638.
190. Supra, at p. 642.
191. See sections 221, 227, 235,236,237,240, and 241 and 245 of the Companies Act 1985 (as
amended).
192. James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd. v. Hicks Anderson & Co. [1991] 2 Q.B. 113, and
Morgan Crucible Co. pic v. Hill Samuel & Co. Ltd. [1991] 2 W.L.R. 655 are the two main cases, but
see also Galoo Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Bright Grahame Murray (A Firm) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1560
(C.A.) (on causation) and Marc Rich, supra.
193. Bank ofScotland v. 3iplc [1993] B.C.L.C. 968, a decision delivered on 29 November 1991.
193a. Spring v. Guardian Assurance Pic [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.(E.)), and Henderson v.
Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)).
194. [1991] 2 Q.B. 113 (C.A.).
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deciding whether to acquire shares in the group and at what price; and (ii) an
erroneous statement concerning the group's accounts from a member of the
defendants, in response to a question from the plaintiffs during negotiations.
The defendants were held not liable in negligence, as there was insufficient
proximity between them and the plaintiffs; the defendants could not foresee the
loss the plaintiffs claimed they suffered due to their reliance on the draft
accounts and the answer to the question; furthermore, it was not fair, just and
reasonable to impose a duty of care.
In reaching his decision, Neill L.J., who delivered the leading judgment,195
outlined six factors which should be considered in deciding whether a duty of
care should be imposed for negligence196:
(1) the purpose for which the statement was made;
(2) the purpose for which the statement was communicated;
(3) the relationship between the adviser, the advisee and any relevant third
party;
(4) the size of any class to which the advisee belongs197;
(5) the state of knowledge of the adviser; and
(6) reliance by the adviser.
These six factors were considered helpful by a strong Court of Appeal198 in
Morgan Crucible Co. pic v. Hill Samuel & Co. Ltdin which Caparo was
distinguished on the facts of the case. Morgan Crucible, like James
McNaughton, concerned a takeover, although the takeover was contested.
Allegations of negligence were made against the defendants (the well-known
merchant bank) who acted as advisers to the company taken over by the
plaintiffs ("the target"), the accountants, and the directors of the target. These
allegations related to financial statements made when the plaintiffs were
identified as a bidder. It was claimed these statements were inaccurate and
constituted "continuous representations", as they had not been withdrawn or
corrected. The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's application to amend
their pleadings to include these allegations, as the claim, if it went to trial, was
not bound to fail; there was reliance on the statements, which was intended; and
there was sufficient proximity.
In the Scottish case of Bank ofScotland v. 3i pic,200 the issue was what was the
meaning of the term "commitment" in the context of a venture capital
transaction, where the pursuers continued to lend money to a company on the
basis of a "representation" from the defender that it had firm commitments for
funds. The facts, which are lengthy, can be stated as follows.
The lender ("BS") provided facilities to a company ("IPS") which
195. With which Nourse and Balcombe L.JJ. agreed.
196. At pp. 125F-126G.
197. There is a suggestion of the floodgates argument here.
198. Comprising Slade L.J., Mustill L.J. (as he then was), and Nicholls L.J. (as he then was).
199. [1991] 2 W.L.R. 655 at p. 674G.
200. [1993] B.C.L.C. 968.
TORT AND CONTRACT 45
manufactured semiconductors. 3i led a syndicate who were to provide equity
and loan stock to IPS. In 1987, negotiations took place between IPS and 3i
regarding the issuing of convertible loan stock, which was considered necessary
before IPS's share capital could be sold; security for this was to be taken over
IPS's intellectual property.
BS became concerned at the amount IPS was borrowing from it. Also, the
lender had departed from certain conditions on which it had previously agreed
IPS's overdraft. Consequently, there was a series of letters and meetings between
3i and others, and BS. One of the managers of BS, M, wrote to 3i on 20 August
1987, saying that M understood 3i were looking for "firm commitments" from
the next week, and M asked that 3i keep M informed. On 1 September,W, from
3i, telephoned M and said 3i had commitments of up to £l.l55m, and that if
there was no increase, 3i would make up the difference.
But, in September, difficulties arose in relation to the taking of security over
IPS's intellectual property, which was important in the context of the loan stock,
as a lender with a floating charge refused to conserft to the security. BS were not
aware of this, but, itwas held, they were not entitled to assume that these matters
had been resolved.
On 1 October, another manager of BS was advised by another executive of 3i
that 3i were having problems regarding the arranging of loan stock and that the
lender should watch its exposure. As a result of the stock market crash later that
month, 3i and the other potential investors did not subscribe for the loan stock.
Subsequently, the lender was invited by IPS to appoint a receiver.
However, in between this time, BS had lent IPS £l.34m from 1 September
until the receiver being appointed, doing so on the basis of its interpretation of
the conversation of 1 September concerning "commitment", which it
interpreted as meaning the syndicate was under a binding legal obligation to
subscribe for the loan stock. The lender sued for negligent misrepresentation on
three grounds:
(i) 3i owed BS a duty of care regarding the call of 1 September and the use
of the word "commitment";
(ii) that that duty had been breached by 3i using the word "commitment",
which signified a legally binding obligation; and
(iii) that the misrepresentation about the commitment had led to the lender
suffering loss, as it had relied on it to advance further funds to IPS.
It was held, applying Caparo and ]ames McNaughton, that:
(i) no duty of care was owed, due to a lack of proximity;
(ii) no breach of duty had occurred anyway; and
(iii) the call on 1 October operated as a novus actus interveniens, and broke
the chain of causation between that call and the subsequent advances
by the lender.
With regard to the question of a lack of proximity, Lord Osborne highlighted
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three factors. First, that 3i were entitled to conclude that they were dealing with
a lender which was not seeking to enforce its strict lending policy. Secondly, that
BS never made it clear to 3i that the end of August was the lender's deadline for
new funds. And thirdly, that on 1 September M and W were at cross purposes.
W was merely satisfyingM's request for further information, and was not, as BS
contended, telling BS that the funds were committed (in the sense of being legally
boupd), thus inducing BS to alter its position. Also, his Lordship felt itwould not
be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.
As to the second matter, of breach of any duty of care, if one had been found to
be owing, Lord Osborne said that this had not been breached by the conver¬
sation on 1 September. In his view, 3i's evidence that amongst venture capitalists
"commitment" did not mean a legally enforceable obligation was correct.
The case emphasises four matters, although it was one lending institution
versus another, and not borrower versus lender. First, the approach to the duty
of care question, as with James McNaughton and Morgan Crucible, is based on
that of Lord Griffiths in Smith v. Eric S. Bush201 and Lord Keith of Kinkel in
Yuen Kun-yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong,202 which is not entirely
consistent with the incremental approach in Caparo (although a lack of
proximity is crucial). Secondly, the strictness of the requirement of proximity is
emphasised, although it is likely that a borrower will be sufficiently proximate.
Thirdly, it shows the value of seeking written confirmation of something as
important as commitments to a project. A letter from BS, seeking to confirm that
there were firm (binding) commitments, would have emphasised to 3i that they
were dealing to cross purposes. The problem seems to have really been that the
lender had made an internal decision about lending, which coloured its
judgement, but had not communicated it to 3i. Also, it would seem self-evident
that "commitment" or even "firm commitment" does not mean binding
commitment, as someone can be committed to something, but events can
occur—as here—which, before they bind themselves, cause them to change their
mind. Lastly, the case confirms other authority203 that it is not appropriate to
rely on a telephone conversation in seeking to establish a duty of care.
The position as to pure economic loss (for negligent misstatement) has,
however, been very recently re-appraised by Lord Goff of Chieveley in two
cases: Spring v. Guardian Assurance Pic,203' and Henderson v. Merrett
Syndicates Ltd.103b (in which case his Lordship delivered the leading speech).
201. [1990] 1 A.C. 831 (H.L.(E.)).
202. [1988] A.C. 175, at pp. 190-194.
203. L. Shaddock and Associates Pty. Ltd. v. Paramatta City Council (1981) 150 C.L.R. 225; and
HowardMarine & Dredging Co. Ltd. v. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 574 (C.A.).
203a. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.(E.)), concerning a negligent reference. Lord Lowry agreed with
Lord Goff, whilst Lords Slynn ofHadley and Woolf followed the foreseeability, proximity and fair,
just and reasonable test; Lord Keith of Kinkel held no duty of care arose.
203b. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)), relating to claims by Lloyd's names against underwriting
agents they did not have a contract with. Lords Keith of Kinkel, Browne-Wilkinson, Mustill and
Nolan agreed with Lord Goff.
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In his speeches, Lord Goff goes back to Hedley Byrne and analyses what that
case actually decided and upon what basis recovery for pure economic loss was,
for the first time, allowed. His Lordship concludes that for there to be liability,
there needs to be: (i) an assumption of responsibility20311; and (ii) reliance on the
exercise of reasonable skill and care by the defendant2033; he also refers to
"special skill", which is to be interpreted widely to include knowledge.203" Lord
Goff acknowledges the incremental approach that the House of Lords has
adopted, but said it was always clear that recovery was allowable under Hedley
Byrne2031; and his Lordship said also that liability could be imposed under the
Hedley Byrne principle using the analogy approach or, as he favoured, by the
application of the broad principle. Lord Goff further said that once there has
been an assumption of responsibility, there is no need to enquire whether it
is "fair, just and reasonable" to impose liability for pure economic loss.203g
The emphasis is now on the relationship between the parties and not how it
arose.203h
The implications of the negligence cases for lenders are, thus, threefold. First,
where there is liability in tort and contract, a lender's liability in tort cannot be
greater than its liability in contract and the matter will be governed by contract,
although liability in negligence may still arise for negligent misstatement where
this is not inconsistent with the contractual matrix. Secondly, unless there is an
effective disclaimer, a lender is likely to fall within Hedley Byrne (as
re-examined) for any negligent advice it gives to a borrower, since there will be
an assumption of responsibility and reliance is intended. Thirdly, a lender,
generally, will not be liable to the individual shareholders of a corporate
borrower for a negligent misstatement, since there will be no assumption of
responsibility to them, only one to the company.
Standard of care
In seeing whether there has been a breach of any duty of care, one has to have
regard to the standard of care that is exercised by a lender.204 The test in this
203c. Spring, at p. 369; Henderson, at pp. 775H and 782A.
203d. Spring, at p. 369; Henderson, at pp. 776C and 782A.
203e. Spring, at p. 369; Henderson, at p. 776C.
203f. Henderson, at p. 778.
203g Henderson, at p.776H.
203h. See Oliver J. (as he then was) in Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd. v. Hett Stubbs & Kemp
[1979] Ch. 348, approved by Lord Goff in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R.
761, at pp. 783-787. See also Lord Oliver in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 A.C.
398, at p. 486A, who spoke of the relationship of the parties (which he also said was called
proximity).
204. See, for example, Lord Bridge of Harwich in Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C.
605, at p. 619.
The plaintiffs could have undertaken their own due diligence to check the position of the group,
which would have been the prudent thing to do—obtain independent advice.
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context is that a professional person is required to exercise the reasonable skill
and care of a person of that calling205: thus, the notion of "the reasonable
banker" referred to by the Court of Appeal in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale
Ltd.106 This concept of the standard of care is becoming increasingly important
and is a factor in not allowing recovery for pure economic loss, which is what a
lender's claim will be for.207
Lending practice: imprudence of borrowing
A corollary of the relationship between lender and borrower, being one of
creditor and debtor, is that the lender is not under a duty to advise the borrower
of the prudence of any transaction which the borrower is entering into and for
which the lender is providing finance.208 For liability to arise, there would need
to be an express or implied contract; or a relationship giving rise to liability for
negligent misstatement; or a fiduciary duty. In Williams & Glyn,209 it was held
that no duty of care fell upon a lender either to consider the prudence of lending
from a customer's point of view, or to advise with respect to it. The
"neighbourhood principle"210 could not be extended to a lending transaction
where the lender lent money as requested. The lender merely did what it was
asked: it lent the money. As neither NDH nor Barnes were required to borrow
money, it was impossible to sustain the view that the lender, which was dealing
with a competent businessman, without its advice being sought, would assume
responsibility or must consider the prudence of borrowing from the customer's
point of view. As it was stated by the learned judge, when giving his abridged
reasons for judgment in open court: "Banks and their customers are entitled to
take commercial risks; indeed, they must do so."211
This question of advising customers on the commercial wisdom of
205. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, at p. 586, per
McNair J., approved by the House of lords in Stdaway v. The Board ofGovernors ofBethlem Royal
Hospital [1985] A.C. 871 (H.L.(E.)).
206. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340. This notion was not overturned on appeal: see [1991] 2 A.C. 548
(H.L.(E.)).
207. See the dissenting speech of Lord Brandon of Oakbrook in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi
Company Ltd. [1983] 1 A.C. 520 (H.L.(Sc.)), and the majority speech of Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
in the same case. See also Sir John Donaldson M.R. (as he then was) in Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v.
Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Aliakmon) 11985] Q.B. 350, at p. 368, approved by the House of
Lords [1986] A.C. 785, at p. 818; and see also Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. v. Maloco [1987] A.C.
241 (H.L.(Sc.)).
208. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at pp. 207-208, and at pp. 351-353 of the transcript. See also May
L.J. in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1356, who said: "There is
nothing [in the contract between lender and customer], express or implied, which could require a
lender to consider the commercial wisdom or otherwise of the particular transaction." (Emphasis
added). See also Redman v. Allied Irish Bank pic [1987] 3 F.T.L.R. 264, at p. 266 per Saville J. (as he
then was); Weitzman v. Hendon (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 525, at p. 547, per Robins J.A.
209. [1981] Com. L.R. 205.
210. See Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.(Sc.j).
211. At p. 8 of the Lexis transcript of the abridged reasons for judgment, delivered in open court,
on 26 March 1980.
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transactions was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Lloyds Bank pic
v. Cobb,112 where the position is well summed up by Scott L.J., who said:
"The ordinary business of a High Street bank is to hold on current account terms the
funds of its customers, to make arrangements for overdrafts on current accounts and to
make loans to customers. The ordinary business of a High Street bank does not include
giving advice to customers on the wisdom of commercial projects for the purposes of
which the bank is asked to lend money.
In my judgment, the ordinary relationship of bankers and customers does not place on
the bank any contractual or tortious duty to advise the customers on the wisdom of
commercial projects for the purpose ofwhich the bank is asked to lend money. If the bank
is to be placed under such a duty, there must be a request from the customer, accepted by
the bank, or some arrangement between the customer and the bank, under which the
advice is to be given.
If a customer applies to the bank for a loan for the purposes of some commercial
project, and the bank examines the details of the project for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to make the loan, the bank does not thereby assume any duty to the
customer. It conducts the examination of the project, for its own prudent purposes as
lender and not for the benefit of the proposed borrower. If the borrower chooses to draw
comfort from the bank's agreement to make the loan, that is the borrower's affair. In
order to place the bank under a duty of care to the borrower the borrower must, in my
opinion, make clear to the bank that its advice is being sought. The mere request for a
loan, coupled with the supply to the bank of the details of the commercial project for
whose purposes the loan is sought, does not suffice to make clear to the bank that its
advice is being sought ..."
After rejecting the plaintiff's claim, on the evidence, his Lordship continued:
"People who engage in speculative commercial ventures must accept the consequences of
the failure of their ventures just as theywill enjoy the consequences of their success. They
cannot be allowed to transfer the burden of the failure of their ventures on to the
shoulders of a bank lender which was never asked to and never assumed to give advice on
the wisdom of the venture."
To this general rule there is a possible caveat. Ralph Gibson L.J. suggested in
Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd. v. Barnes213 that if it can be shown that a lender
knew of the imprudence of the borrowing, what the money was to be used for,
and the likelihood of damage to the borrower, then it may be possible to say that
there is an implied representation by the lender that it was a safe venture and that
it was reasonable for the borrower to rely on it, having regard to the type of
advertisement lenders use.214 It is suggested though that the facts would need to
be very specific, and that this caveat is one of limited application.
Foreign exchange contracts
In Australia recently, borrowers have sought to sue lenders where the borrower
has entered into futures contracts and has lost money. They have argued that the
212. Unreported decision, delivered on 18 December 1991. Noted in [1992] J.B.L. 419.
213. At p. 353 of the transcript.
214. At p. 353 of transcript in Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Barnes, per Ralph Gibson L.J. See also
Brightman J. (as he then was) in Bartlettv. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd. [1980] Ch. 515, at p. 534 in
relation to lender advertisements and holding out; and also E. Andrew, "Customer Care and
Banking Law" [1989] J.I.B.L. 101, at p. 104.
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lender should have explained the risk involved to them and advised them to have
"hedging contracts". In most cases,215 the borrowers have been unable to
recover their losses because the nature of the contract was speculative, and
because they were commercial men, who knew, or ought to have known, of the
risk involved.216
OTHER TORTIOUS REMEDIES
In this section, it is proposed to look at tortious remedies—apart from a claim in
negligence—available to a borrower, most notably the economic torts in which
the claim is for pure economic loss, due to damage or harm caused to the
borrower's economic interests.
(1) Fraud/deceit
In Derry v. Peek,217 the House of Lords outlined a three-pronged test for fraud.
In a well-known passage, Lord Herschell said218: "fraud is proved when it is
shown that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." The
measure of damages under English law for fraud or deceit is a tortious measure,
that is to say, it is reliance based and seeks to put the victim of the fraud (the
borrower) in the position he would have been in if the fraudulent representation
had not have been made219: not in the position he would have been if the
representation had been proved.220
215. Cf. Fotiv. BanqueNationale de Paris (1990) Aust. Torts Reports 67, 835—a case decided on
special facts. The plaintiffs, who were Italian migrants, wanted a loan denominated in Swiss francs
to purchase a shopping centre. It was held that the lender was liable. (Claims are also being brought
under the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 for deceptive and misleading conduct.) The position
is discussed more fully by P. Nankivell, in Chapter 11 hereof. See also J. Nested, "Bank's Liability to
Foreign Currency Borrowers" (1990) 64 A.L.J. 776, and Lloyd v. Citicorp Australia Ltd. (1986) 11
N.S.W.L.R. 286.
216. E.P. Ellinger, "Banker's liability for advice respecting currency transactions: the Australian
experience" (1989) J.B.L. 499.
217. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337'(H.L.(E.)). This is similar to the position in the United States: see
National Bank ofEl Paso v. Farab Manufacturing Company Inc. 678 S.W. 2d 661, at p. 681 (Tex.
App. 1984)—a case with bizarre facts.
218. Ibid, at p. 374, per Lord Herschell.
219. Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. [1969] 2 Q.B. 158 (C.A.), at p. 167 per Lord Denning
M.R.; at p. 168, perWinn L.J. and per Sachs L.J., at p. 171; this case was cited with approval by the
Court of Appeal in Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Long [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1, and East v.
Maurier [1991] 1 W.L.R. 461, at pp. 464-465 (in which a loss of profits element was included as
flowing from the deceit); this latter case is noted by J. Marks, "Loss of Profits in Damages for Deceit"
(1992) 108 L.Q.R. 386; Royscott Trust Ltd. v. Rogerson [1991] 2 Q.B. 297, at pp. 305 and 309,
noted (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 547; see S. Evans, "Two Cases on Damages in Deceit" (1993) 5 J.C.L. 73.
See also Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. [ 1994] 1
W.L.R. 1271 (C.A.).
220. This is the same measure as for negligent misrepresentation: both at common law for tort and
under section 2( 1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (with its fiction of fraud in respect of contracts
entered into on the basis of misrepresentation).
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Whilst the elements are clear, difficulty arises with regard to statements of
intention by a lender (such as stating an intention to make a company insolvent
and padlocking its doors, as in National Bank of El Paso v. Farah
Manufacturing Company Inc.221). Under English law, a representation must be a
statement of fact, past or present, as distinct from a statement of opinion or
intention. But, as Bowen L.J. said in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice212:
"There must be a misstatement of an existing fact: but the state of a man's mind is as
much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the
state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact
as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man's mind is, therefore, a
misstatement of fact."
Thus, if the state of a person'smind can be ascertained, and that state indicates
an intention to make a false statement, fraud may be proved.223 A statement of
intention may be one of fact if the statement is false, so that the person
expressing an opinion did not hold it, or, on his'knowledge of the facts, could
not have honestly held the opinion.224 For example, a statement by a lender
("X") as to one of its customers ("Y"), in response to an enquiry by another
lender ("Z") on behalf of oneof its customers, that Y was "agood creditrisk" or
"would be a most satisfactory person to do business with", when, in fact, Y was
overdrawn and in difficulty, may be regarded as a false statement of fact and
would entitle Z to relief against X if, as result of that statement, Z contracted
with Y and suffered loss.22S
In Farah's case226 the lenders stated ambiguously (although falsely, as it later
turned out) to the board of directors of the borrower that reinstating a former
officer of the borrower would breach a management change default clause in the
loan agreement (which permitted the loan to be accelerated if a management
change occurred), resulting in the lenders accelerating the loan and making the
company insolvent.
In addition to intention, it is also necessary to show that the misrepresentation
was material and that it induced the recipient to enter into the contract.227 For
example, a statement by a lender, as chargee of shares, to a potential purchaser,
that there were other parties interested in purchasing the shares, when there
were not, induced the potential purchaser to buy the shares and suffer loss due to
an unrelated fraud by another party.228
221. 678 S.W. 2d 661, at p. 682 (Tex. App. 1984).
222. (1885) 29 Ch. D. 459, at p. 483.
223. Pleading fraud is something counsel must not do lightly.
224. Chitty, at para. 414.
225. Ibid.
226. 678 S.W. 2d. 661.
227. See Smith v. Chadwick (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187 at p. 190, per Lord Selbourne; Oliver J. (as he
then was) in Nautamix BV v. Jenkins of Retford Ltd. [1975] F.S.R. 385, at p. 394, citing Spencer
Bower and Turner's Actionable Misrepresentation (1974) 3rd edn., at paras. 99 and 115 on pp. 118
and 132; and Millett J. (as he then was) in London pic v. Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1, at p. 6.
228. See Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. [ 1994]
1 W.L.R. 1271 (C.A.). The false statement of the lender was unrelated to a subsequent fraud and fall
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Moreover, in certain circumstances, this representation, inducing a contract,
does not have to be a positive one: it can be by silence. In the Canadian Case of
Sugar v. PeatMarwick Ltd.,129 S had invested money in DF, which purchased the
assets of DFD and continued to trade. DF failed and S sued Canadian Investment
Banking Corporation ("C.I.B.C.") and its agents, Peat Marwick Ltd. ("Peats"),
whom the lender appointed as receivers of DFD, on the basis that they knew of
substantial falsification of the records of DFD, by its then owners (the Ks),
concerning accounts receivable and had not warned her husband, SS, a person
experienced in turning companies around. It was not until after the purchase by
S that SS discovered the fraud, although the lender (which had financed the
paper part of the purchase) had known about this a month earlier.230 Moreover,
all the documentation was not available to SS, and even if it had been, it was not
up to date and not accurate. SS did have accounts receivable on which, it was
found, SS relied on documents from Peats and the lender regarding validity of
the accounts receivable when deciding to purchase DFD.
The judge found that the lender was aware of the falsification over a month
before the sale and the amount of the falsification may have been up to
$200,000; that the lender did not inform either Peats or the Ss (its customer),
although it knew it was not mistaken about the falsification; and S relied on
documents from Peats and the lender regarding validity of the accounts
receivable when deciding to purchase DFD. Accordingly, it was held that
C.I.B.C. was liable for fraudulent misrepresentation231 to the Ss through Peats,
its agents.
The lender knew that the documents provided and the oral statements made
by their agents, Peats, whilst accurate as far as they went, did not disclose the full
position; the lender thus made a representation of fact, which it was intended the
Ss would act on, which they did.
(2) Economic duress
Under English law, there are two bases for economic duress: one is the coercion
in share price of the company concerned (Ferranti International Signal pic). In that case, the lender,
which was chargee of shares in*a company it had made a loan to, wished (and needed) to sell the
shares at a certain price. It had a standby facility with a broking subsidiary to help it realise the
security at a certain price.
229. (1989) 66 O.R. (2d.) 766; noted by M.H. Ogilvie, "How Banks Engage in Fraudulent
Misrepresentations: Sugar v. Peat Marwick Ltd." Case and Comment (1989-90) 5 B.F.L.R. 88.
230. As a matter of prudence, a lender should be concerned that the purchase price is not too high,
as it will mean its loan will be repaid more easily.
231. Afinding that the lender did not owe Mr and Mrs S a fiduciary duty is open to question, as it
would appear that the Ss had a reasonable expectation the lender would act in their interests and
make full disclosure.
232. It was not relevant, owing to the lender's fraud, that Mr and Mrs S may have been negligent
in not making a full disclosure; Mr and Mrs S were not estopped due to their delay in telling the
lender of the false entries in the accounts—they were correct to try to redeem the situation by seeking
to revive DF; and the lender, by giving further credit, took a similar approach. Cf. Redgrave v. Hurd
(1881)20 Ch. D. 1. (C.A.).
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of the will of the victim and the other is the application of illegitimate
pressure.233 The first theory found acceptance due to two opinions of Lord
Scarman. In Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long234—a case involving non-performance of
an agreement to purchase shares, when the price had decreased, instead of
increasing—his Lordship, in delivering the advice of the Privy Council, stated,235
"there is nothing contrary to principle in recognising economic duress as a factor
which may render a contract voidable, provided always that the basis of such
recognition is that itmust amount to coercion of the will, which vitiates consent.
It must be shown that the payment made or the contract entered into was not a
voluntary act." And in Universe Tankships Inc. ofMonrovia v. International
Transport Workers' Federation (The Universe Sentinel),236 a case of industrial
blackmail, before the House of Lords, Lord Scarman said: "there must be
pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion or the absence of choice ...
The classic case of duress is, however ... the victim's intentional submission
arising from the realisation that there is no practical choice open to him."237
The other theory surrounding economic duress, which is gaining support, is
that of illegitimate pressure. The House of Lords recently doubted the validity of
the coercion of will theory238 and referred, obiter, to illegitimate pressure
constituting a significant cause inducing the victim to enter into a contract; and
in Enimont Overseas AG v. RO Jugotanker Zadar (The Olib),139 Webster J. did
not apply the coercion ofwill theory. The illegitimate pressure theory is found in
the minority advice in Barton v. Armstrong,240 There, a strong minority,
comprising Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale, said the basis of
economic duress is that there is no true consent in that consent is not
voluntary.241 Absence of choice does not negate consent, because in life,
including commerce and finance, acts are done under great pressure, so that the
person who did them can be said to have no choice.242 Economic duress will not
necessarily be present in normal commercial contractual situations where the
233. Cf. the position in the United States in Farah's case 678 S.W. 2d. 661, at p. 684.
234. [1980] A.C. 614 (P.O.)
235. Ibid., at p. 636.
236. [1983] 1 A.C. 366, at p. 400 (H.L.(E.)). See also Barton v. Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104 (P.C.).
237. [1983] A.C. 366, at p. 400. Interestingly, in the same case, Lord Diplock (at p. 384) said of
economic duress: "the rationale is that his apparent consent was induced by pressure exercised on
[the victim] by that other party which the law does not regard as legitimate ..."
238. Dimskal Shipping Co. SA v. International Transport Workers Federation (The Evia Luck)
[1991] 1 A.C. 152, at pp. 165G-166B, citing with approval the decision of the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19
N.S.W.L.R. 41, and the minority advice in Barton v. Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104 (P.C.). The
overborne will theory is contrary to the House of Lords' decision in DPP for Northern Ireland v.
Lynch [1975] A.C. 653 (a criminal duress case).
239. [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 108. See discussion by A. Phang, "Economic Duress—Uncertainty
Confirmed" (1991) 4 J.C.L. 147.
240. [1976] A.C. 104. Although it is agreed that the minority and majority reached the same
conclusions on the law, but differed on the facts: see Pao On v. Lau Yiu Lang [1980] A.C. 614, at
p. 635, per Lord Scarman.
241.(1976] A.C. 104, at p. 121.
242. Ibid.
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parties are seeking to obtain the best deal for themselves, as commercial
pressure, by itself, is not enough. This is because where one party is in a stronger
bargaining position than another (and this may often be the case with a lender)
there will always be commercial pressure.243 What needs to be established is
pressure which is not regarded as legitimate.244 This involves showing two
things:
(i) the use of some illegitimate means of persuasion; and
(ii) a relationship between the illegitimate means and the course of action
followed.245
It was accepted that duress does not need to be "the reason, nor the
predominant reason nor the clinching reason" why the victim acted as he did:
duress can be a reason. Once it is established pressure was exerted, the onus is on
the person applying it to show it did not contribute to the victim contracting.246
With regard to the overborne will theory,247 the will is not destroyed, but
deflected,248 and a person "subject to duress usually knows only too well what he
is doing", however, he decides "to submit to the demand or pressure rather than
take an alternative course of action".249
The most likely form of duress to confront a borrower is where a lender
refuses to enter into, or renegotiate, a loan facility which is critical to the
borrower, except on certain terms favourable to it or very onerous ones to the
borrower, rather than the lender threatening not to perform an existing
contractual obligation. This, of course, is to be distinguished from a bad
bargain, where the lender obtains favourable terms through strong negotiation
(or a change of circumstances). It may be, as Ralph Gibson J. pointed out,
243. Per Lord Diplock in Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. International Transport
Workers' Federation (The Universe Sentinel) [1983] 1 A.C. 366, at p. 384.
244. Barton v. Armstrong, supra, at p. 121, per Lords Wilberforce and Simon of Glaisdale.
245. Ibid. See the test, in similar terms, of McHugh J. (delivering the leading judgment) in
Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R. 41, at
p. 46A, who said there were two questions to ask: (i) whether any pressure induced the victim to
contract, and (ii) whether the pressure went beyond what the law regards as legitimate; pressure was
illegitimate if it involved unlawful threats or unconscionable conduct. Noted by Professor P. Birks,
"The Travails of Duress" [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 342; and P. Ridge, "Duress and Undue influence:
Recent cases" (1989) 63 A.L.J. 504. See also the three point formulation ofWebster J. in The Olib
[1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 108, at p. 114 col. 2: (i) commercial pressure was exercised on the victim; (ii)
the pressure was not legitimate; and (iii) the victim "was coerced by that pressure into doing
something because he had no practical alternative than that of submission to the pressure so that he
is to be regarded as not having given his true consent to that act".
246. Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R.
41, at p. 46D-E, per McHugh J.
247. Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R.
41, at p. 46D-E, per McHugh J.
248. Citing DPP for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653. See P.S. Atiyah, "Economic
Duress and The Overborne Will" (1982) 98 L.Q.R. 197; and see also D. Tiplady, "Concepts of
Duress" (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 188 and P.S. Atiyah, "Duress and the OverborneWill Again" (1983) 99
L.Q.R. 353.
249. (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R. 41, at pp. 45^16.
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(iii) the lender is aware of the borrower's personal financial circumstances
(which will most certainly be the case); and
(iv) a prompt repudiation of the transaction by the borrower once the
threat is removed.
The most relevant of these are the "no alternative test",257 which the courts have
interpreted to mean that there should be no "reasonable alternative",258 and
prompt repudiation. In their classic work, The Law ofRestitution, Lord Goff of
Chieveley and Professor Jones state that, as the law currently stands, an English
court may not regard it as "legitimate" that a person (a lender), in making a
threat (amounting to duress) believed that it was commercially reasonable to
make a new demand (on the borrower).259
In a series of recent cases, the courts have set contracts aside for economic
duress where there has been "no reasonable alternative". Examples of this have
included a refusal to carry goods by road, unless payment was increased260; the
payment of additional expenses concerning cargo being shipped under a bill of
lading owing to fear that the cargo might be delayed or dumped and as the cargo
was needed urgently261; and a refusal to erect stands for a very important "one
off" exhibition, unless there were very favourable redundancy terms.262
Hence, where there has been an element of "commercial blackmail", the
courts have accepted that the weaker party had "no practical alternative" and
have set aside the agreement. The correct basis for doing so is that there was lack
of true consent.263 Therefore, in the renegotiation of a loan a lender must be
careful, and act reasonably, in dealing with borrowers, so that the borrower has
257. See Atlas Express Ltd. v. Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 833 and case
note by P.A. Chandler, "Economic Duress: Clarity or Confusion" [1989] L.M.C.L.Q. 270. Also see
Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. International Transport Workers' Federation (The
Universe Sentinel) [1983] 1 A.C. 366 (H.L.(E.)). Cf. North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai
Construction Co. Ltd. (The Atlantic Baron) [1979] Q.B. 705; and see the case note on this in (1979)
95 L.Q.R. 475.
258. B & S Contracts and Design Ltd. v. Victor Green Publications Ltd. [1984] I.C.R. 419, at
p. 428 per Kerr L.J.; see also North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd. (The
Atlantic Baron) [1979] Q.B. 705; and Hobhouse J. in Vantage Navigation Corporation v. Suhail &
Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 138, at pp. 150-151; and
see case note by P.A. Chandler, supra.
259. Goff and Jones, The Law ofRestitution (1993) 4th edn., at p. 267.
260. Atlas Express Ltd. v. Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd. [1989] Q.B. 833. Noted by A.
Phang, "Whither Economic Duress? Reflections on Two Recent Cases" [1990] 53 M.L.R. 107; J.G.
Starke Q.C., in "Recent Cases" (1989) A.L.J. 791; and P.A. Chandler, "Economic Duress: Clarity
or Confusion" [1989] L.M.C.L.Q. 270. For a discussion of the law of economic duress: see
E. MacDonald, "Duress Threatened by Breach of Contract" (1990) J.B.L. 460; and C. Battersby,
"Economic Duress" (1989) 133 Solicitors' Journal 1424.
261. Vantage Navigation Corporation v. Suhail & Saud Bahwan Building Materials LLC (The
Alev) [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 138. See comments by A. Phang, "Whither Economic Duress?
Reflections on Two Recent Cases" [1990] 53 M.L.R. 107.
262. B & S Contracts and Design Ltd. v. Victor Green Publications Ltd. [1984] I.C.R. 419.
263. See, for example, Webster J. in The tilth, supra, at p. 114 col. 2.
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no recourse against the lender by saying that he had "no reasonable alternative"
but to accept the loan, or renegotiate the loan on very onerous terms.264 If
something goes wrong and the borrower defaults and seeks to avoid liability, it
is likely that the plea of economic duress will only be raised when there are
difficulties with repayment, and not shortly afterwards, therefore failing to
satisfy the fourth criterion outlined above.
This will be particularly so, for example, in the circumstances envisaged by
Ralph Gibson J. (as he then was) in Williams & Glytt,265 where the borrower is in
economic difficulties and is unable to seek alternative finance. In these
circumstances, it is not unreasonable for a lender to insist upon stricter security
arrangements, as they are the only source from which the borrower will be able
to obtain funds. In Williams & Glyn, it was held that there was no economic
duress in relation to discounting of bills of exchange where the borrower
proceeded on a misunderstanding of the system by which money was raised.266
Moreover, courts will be reluctant to set aside a contract which has been
allowed to continue and only later, when it has become disadvantageous to the
borrower, has there been a protest. In Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil
Circuit Britain Ltd.,267 Millett Q.C. (as he then was), sitting as a deputy High
Court judge, refused to set aside a lease to the defendants and lease-back to the
plaintiffs of the plaintiffs' garage, the purpose of which was to assist the
plaintiffs who were in financial difficulty, where the period between signing
the lease and objecting was 10 years.
Similarly, in the unreported Western Australian case of Westfarmers v.
Duffy26* Duffy had sought to set aside various security documents relating to
renegotiated loans for his farming operations well after the event, and Kennedy
J., in a carefully reasoned judgment (of approximately 400 pages), held that
there was no economic duress. This was because, at the time of the contracts,
Duffy's financial plight (like that in Alec Lobb) was of his own making; Duffy
had taken legal advice and had threatened proceedings; the agreements had been
signed without protest; no complaint was raised till several months later and
only when things had once again started to go wrong; and Duffy acted as if the
agreement was valid for a long period of time and took the benefit of the
contract.269
264. See, for example, Crescendo Management Pty. Ltd. v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988)
19 N.S.W.L.R. 41, and Shivas v. Bank ofNew Zealand [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327.
265. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 209.
266. See especially at pp. 514, 515 and 575 of the transcript, where it was said no threat was made
to Barnes when the lender explained to him the effect of not paying the bills of exchange from the
secondary lender.
267. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 89, revs'd in part [1985] 1 All E.R. 944 (C.A.).
268. Judgment was delivered in the Supreme Court ofWestern Australia on 6 February 1984. For
a summary of this case: see the paper by T.E. O'Connor, in Equitable Remedies and Estoppel Law
(1984) Law Society of Western Australia.
269. As to affirmation of the contract once the threat has been removed: see Occidental
Worldwide Investment Corporation v. Skibs A/S Avanti (The Siboen and the Sibotre) [1976] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 293.
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These cases emphasise that a borrower cannot blame his own financial
incompetence or misfortune on a lender, who merely wishes to protect its
position, where the only other alternative is insolvency and the borrower is
aware of this. In Duffy and Alec Lobb, the "solutions" came from the borrower.
Economic duress is now an established part of English law, although actions
to set aside contracts for it are not common, nonetheless, it may be that a
borrower will use it as one method of vitiating a loan agreement—perhaps on a
counterclaim.
(3) Tortious interference with contract
Like economic duress, this tort involves the application of commercial pressure
by a lender upon a borrower. In Edwin Hill & Partners v. First National
Corporation pic,270 Stuart-Smith L.J. outlined the following five elements of this
(i) a direct interference with a contract (contract B) between the borrower
and a third party by the lender;
(ii) a sufficient knowledge on the lender's part that the lender's conduct
will interfere with contract B;
(iii) an intention to bring contract B to an end;
(iv) the lender's interference caused damage to the borrower; and
(v) the interference must not have been justified.
Where liability is made out, the damages are the same as for unlawful
interference with business and conspiracy—being damages at large (by which it
is, apparently, meant th^t no proof of special damage is required).272 But the
measure of damages in interference with contract cases is not always the amount
which the victim "might have recovered for breach of contract", although, in
many cases, the plaintiff can be compensated properly by giving him the amount
he "might have recovered from the contract breaker".273
270. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 255 (C.A.). For a discussion of this case and the defence of justification: see
R. O'Dair, "Justifying an Interference with Contractual Rights" (1991) 11 O.J.L.S. 277.
271. Ibid., at pp. 227-228. Cf. Hoffman L.J. in Law Debenture Trust Corp. pic v. Ural Caspian
Oil Corp. Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 138, at p. 150G, who said there were "three elements to the tort: (1)
a right to the plaintiff (2) violated by an actionable wrong (3) procured by the defendant"; and the
position in the United States, where a valid contract known to the defendant and an unjustified and
intentional interference contract resulting in damage to the plaintiff need to be shown: see In re
Quality Processing Inc. 9 F.3d. 1360 (8th Cir. 1993).
272. See Brooking J. in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Australian
Federation ofAir Pilots (No. 2) [1991] 2 V.R. 636, at pp. 645-646 and the cases cited there.
273. Ansett (No. 2), supra, at p. 646.
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In Edwin Hill, the lender—who was a mortgagee—interfered with the
borrower's contractual rights with a third party (architects) since it sought to
make the borrower's change their architects for a building project to one
considered more prestigious. The court held, applying the above criteria, that
the interference was justified, as the lender (as mortgagee) had an equal or
superior right274 upon the borrower's default.
However, in the Canadian decision of Thermo King Corporation v.
Provincial Bank ofCanada,275 a lender wrongfully refused to issue a draft on its
customer's instructions, knowing that the failure to issue the draft would cause
the customer to breach a contract with the intended payee of the draft. In these
circumstances, the lender was held liable for inducing breach of contract and the
loss caused to the intended payee. The court said that a lender may only put its
interests ahead of its customers if it has a right to do so—here, it did not.
As to what constitutes justification is unclear276; although the authorities
indicate that where the interference is by unlawful means, the defence is not
applicable.277 Ultimately, it will depend on the facts (including the parties'
conduct) so that, for example, an attempt merely to increase profits may not be
justified.278 Nonetheless, from a lender's point of view, Edwin Hill provides
useful guidance in the context of enforcing security.279
Apart from the enforcement of its security, a lender will be concerned to
preserve the priority of its security, which it will seek to do by means of a
negative pledge clause in the security documentation prohibiting the creation of
further security without that lender's consent280; it may also include a further
assurance clause, under which the debtor agrees to execute such further
274. See also Read v. Friendly Society ofOperative Stonemasons ofEngland, Ireland and Wales
[1902] 2 K.B. 732; and Smithies v. National Association ofOperative Plasterers [1909] 1 K.B. 310
on this point. See also Dellabarca v. Northern Storemen and Packers Union [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 734
at p. 753, per Smellie J.
275. (1981) 130 D.L.R. (3d) 256. See also O'Dair, supra. The most commonly cited statement of
justification is that of Romer L.J. in Glamorgan Coal Co. Ltd. v. South Wales Miners Federation
[1903] 2 K.B. 545, at pp. 573-574, who said regard might be had to the following factors: the nature
of the contract broken; the position of the contractual parties; the grounds for the breach; what was
used to procure the breach; the relationship of the tortfeasor to the contract breaker; and the aim of
the person in procuring the breach.
276. See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts [1989], 16th edn., at para. 15-12.
277. Read v. Friendly Society ofOperative Stonemasons [ 1902] 2 K.B. 732; and Ansett Transport
Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Federation ofAir Pilots (No. 1J [1991] 1 V.R. 635, at
p. 677, per Brooking J. See also Building Workers' Industrial Union ofAustralia v. Odco Pty. Ltd.
(1991) A.L.R. 735, at p. 771, per Full Court of Federal Court of Australia.
278. See Nourse L.J. in Edwin Hill, supra, at p. 235.
279. Cf. The Myrto [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243 and the case of Banco do Brasil SA v. The
Alexandros G. Tsavliris [1992] 3 FC 735, where, in a shipping context, a lender held a mortgage
over a ship and the shipowner (themortgagor), who had time-chartered the ship to a third party, had
defaulted under the mortgage; it was held that the lender's conduct was justified, and that TheMyrto
did not form part of Canadian law. See also Port Line Ltd. v. Benline Steamers Ltd. [1958] 2 Q.B.
146; and Swiss Bank v. Lloyds Bank [1979] Ch. 548.
280. It is the practice to refer to a negative pledge on the Form M395, relating to registration of
Charges.
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documentation as is (reasonably) required. It is not uncommon for a borrower
to seek funds from several sources, each of which will probably require security.
Therefore, if a debtor has granted security over an asset to lender A and there is a
negative pledge in the security documentation, and the borrower later seeks
further finance from another source, lender B, who wants security, then, if
lender B demands security from the borrower in breach of lender A's negative
pledge, lender B is likely to be liable for inducing breach of contract,281 as it is
very likely to have sufficient knowledge of the pledge (and will have, as a matter
of prudence, done a company search).282 In such a case, there would, it is
submitted, be no justification: as there is no equal or superior right—it is a
simple case of breach and should be actionable.
Another scenariowhich could entail liability is as follows. Lender A is granted
security over an asset of the borrower's with a negative pledge and further
assurance clause; but, lender A subsequently consents to lender B taking security
over the same asset, which is not to rank ahead of its own,283 and lender B has a
negative pledge to protect its position. Lender A now requires further security
over more of the borrower's assets, some of which lender B has taken security
over. Before executing the additional security, the borrower points out lender
B's negative pledge. Nonetheless, lender A insists on execution and lender B sues
for inducing breach of contract—this will be particularly important if the
borrower becomes insolvent. In such a situation, it is suggested that lender A is
protected for two reasons. First, on the basis that, arguably, it has an equal or
superior right by virtue of its further assurance clause. Secondly, Buckley L.J. in
Smithies v. National Association of Plasterers284 regarded it as sufficient
justification if a defendant (lender A) was doing no more than requiring
performance of another contract made with the party to both contracts (the
borrower), albeit that this contract is inconsistent with the one being breached.
Nonetheless, prudence would dictate that lender A should first seek to obtain
lender B's consent to avoid any difficulties.
(4) Unlawful interference with trade or business
Whilst this tort—concerned with an intention to directly or indirectly harm or
have an "adverse impact"285 on another's business or commercial interests,
unlawfully or wrongfully, outside the bounds of normal competition—has been
popular in the United States, it is still a developing one, of "uncertain ambit", in
281. For an excellent discussion of this issue: see J.B. Stone, "Negative Pledges and the Tort of
Interference with Contractual Relations" [1991] J.B.L. 310.
282. Even though commercial law is opposed to constructive notice, sufficient knowledge would
seem to indicate some type of constructive, as opposed to actual, knowledge. It would appear to
encompass up to category (4) of Sir Peter Gibson's list of types of knowledge: see section on
Constructive Trusts.
283. See Stone, supra, at pp. 318-319.
284. [1909] 1 K.B. 310, at p. 337.
285. J.K. Bertil, "Improper Interference With Another's Business" [1993] J.B.L. 519, at p. 523.
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the United Kingdom,286 although its existence is not in doubt after the decision
of the Court of Appeal in Lottrho pic v. Fayed.2*7
This is a significant case, from a lender's point of view, arising out of the
takeover battle for the House of Fraser pic (including Harrods department store)
between the Fayed brothers and Lonrho pic. The significant aspect is that
Lonrho pic sued not only the Fayed brothers, but also the Fayeds' merchant
bank and one of its former directors for, inter alia, conspiracy and unlawful
interference with their business, alleging that they (Lonrho pic) had
consequently lost a chance of bidding for the House of Fraser pic.
It was alleged that the defendants had made fraudulent misrepresentations
about the commercial standing and worth of the Fayeds to the Secretary of State,
which had influenced him not to refer their bid to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission. It was not alleged that the lender or its former director knew that
the facts told to them by the Fayeds were, allegedly, false. Rather, it was pleaded
that they had a duty to satisfy themselves as to their truth, and this they failed to
do. Accordingly, it was to be inferred that the advisers had acted recklessly or
carelessly as to whether what they were told was true or false and, therefore, had
acted fraudulently in that sense. Interestingly, and significantly, no distinction
was made as to the position of the Fayeds and the bank and its former director.
The Court of Appeal, in discussing the striking out application, said that, in
order to establish the tort of wrongful interference with trade or business, it is
not necessary to prove a predominant purpose to injure the plaintiff—which is
now like conspiracy, where the competitors use unlawful means to harm the
victim.288 A predominant purpose is not required when there is wrongful
interference with a third party's contract with the victim, or where a third party
is instrumental in the victim's destruction, and it should not be required where
there is fraud on a third party, aimed at the victim. Nor is it necessary that there
is a complete tort between the tortfeasor and the third party against whom the
tort is committed. However, the unlawful act (in this case, the alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation) has to be directed against the plaintiffs, or be intended to
harm the plaintiffs.289
286. Lonrho pic v. Fayed [1990] 2 Q.B. 479, at p. 491, per Dillon L.J.; at p. 491, per Ralph Gibson
L.J.; and at p. 493, per Woolf L.J.
287. [1990] 2 Q.B. 479 (C.A.) and see the cases referred to by the court. The matter went on
appeal to the House of Lords on the issue of conspiracy. Conspiracy (and the question of
predominant motive) was the main focus of the appeal before the Law Lords. However, it was said
that the two issues—of unlawful interference with business and conspiracy—stood to fall together:
see Lonrho pic v. Fayed [1992] 1 A.C. 448, at p. 470, per Lord Bridge of Harwich delivering the
majority speech (Lords Brandon of Oakbrook, Goff of Chieveley and Jauncey of Tullichettle
agreeing). Cf. Lord Templeman (at p. 471) who felt that "the ambit and ingredients of the torts of
conspiracy and unlawful interference might... require further analysis and reconsideration by the
courts."
288. [1990] 2 Q.B. 479, at p. 489, per Dillon L.J. (Ralph Gibson and Woolf L.JJ. agreeing. This is
now the position with conspiracy: see Lonrho pic v. Fayed [1991] 3 W.L.R. 188 (H.L.(E.)).
289. Per Dillon L.J., at p. 489, with whom Ralph Gibson and Woolf L.JJ. expressed agreement.
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The court, nonetheless, stressed that it was not deciding the merits of the case,
which were properly to be decided at trial on the evidence led. Woolf L.J. (as he
then was), who agreed the claim should not be struck out, nevertheless
expressed two reservations as to whether the fraud was sufficiently direct to
amount to interference with Lonrho's business. First, that the alleged fraud
related to the virtues of the Fayeds: and not Lonrho pic's deficiencies. Secondly,
that the Secretary of State was, allegedly, influenced not to take action against
the Fayeds, rather than take, or not take, action against Lonrho, and hence it
was arguable whether the business asset supposedly damaged was capable of
being a business interest for the purposes of this tort.290
Unlawful interference with business is a comparatively new tort, the
boundaries of. which are to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and, it is
submitted, is not one likely to occur frequently, in the absence of, for example, a
personality clash291 or fraud. Fiowever, in determining those boundaries, the
factors292 to be considered will include: first, the nature of the intention needed
to satisfy the requirement that the conduct be directed against the victim—
especially where there is a fraudulent misrepresentation by X about himself to Y
to cause Y to act in a manner in which X obtains or maintains a commercial
advantage over Z or deprives Z of a commercial advantage293; secondly, the
nature of the business interests, with respect to which the victim has to show he
has suffered damage; thirdly, whether a sufficient nexus or directness of impact
and consequence exists between the unlawful means used and the alleged
damage causing the effect on the victim; and, fourthly, whether there is sufficient
damage for there to be a cause of action.294
Normally, a lender's conduct will not be directed towards harming a
borrower's business, since it is in the lender's interest that the borrower's
business continues so as to service the loan. Furthermore, if a lender acts
prudently, and in accordance with the terms of its loan and security documents,
there is little likelihood that this tort (and, indeed, many other remedies) will be
available to a borrower (or even a third party). Difficulties may arise where the
party claiming to have been harmed is not the borrower, but a rival of the
borrower, such as was alleged in the Lomho case. As to what constitutes
unlawful conduct is not clear—certainly intimidation, interfering with a
contract, making fraudulent statements about a rival, are included; beyond that,
the terrain is uncharted, although Dillon L.J. did suggest that merely breaching a
statutory prohibition might not be enough, and that the complainant would
have to show the breach "gave rise to a civil remedy".295
290. Ibid.
291. K.M.C. Co. Inc. v. Irving Trust Company, 757 F.2d. 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
292. Per Ralph Gibson L.J. at p. 492.
293. Itwould, arguably, be different and a clearer case if, in the example in the text, the fraudulent
statements by X were about Z: see Ralph Gibson L.J., at p. 492, and Bertil, supra, at p. 531.
294. Per Ralph Gibson L.J., at p. 492.
295. [1990] 2 Q.B. 479, at p. 488.
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The significance of the Lonrho case is that a lender, acting as a "merchant
bank and adviser",296 was identified with its client's alleged act.What this means
is that, in general, lenders must, as in the case of liability as a constructive trustee
for knowing assistance discussed below, be careful in assessing the actions of
their clients, although no view either way is expressed on the Lonrbo case.
(5) Conspiracy
It has now been settled by the House of Lords297 that there are two types of
conspiracy:
(i) where lawful means are used, but the aim is an unlawful end; and
(ii) where unlawful means are used.298
And that in the second type (where the means used are themselves illegal) it is
not necessary, unlike the first type, to have the predominant motive of hurting
the plaintiff.299
In the ordinary course of events, it is unlikely that a lender will be liable in
damages for conspiracy, which are damages at large,300 as its prime concern will
be to get its loan repaid,301 and it will not be interested in harming the borrower.
However, there may be circumstances where a lender is very closely associated
with a "Napoleonic figure", who is the major shareholder in private and public
companies which have accounts with the lender, and this figure misappropriates
money from the public companies into his own private companies, and the
lender is regarded as having conspired with him. This seems to have been the
situation in the Canadian case of Claiborne Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of
Canada,302 where the lender was found to have conspired with its customer
("B") in approving transfers from the plaintiff (a public company, which had
several subsidiaries) to B's private companies without proper authority from the
public companies; these transfers were for the benefit of B and the lender, and to
the detriment of the public companies. Also, the release by the lender of security
to the plaintiff, which was subsequently taken by B via his private companies,
was entwined with the general conspiracy; as was the later acquisition of
undervalued security in the plaintiff by the lender, which gave it a controlling
interest in the plaintiff.
296. Per Dillon L.J., at p. 486.
297. Lonhro pic v. Fayed [1992] 1 A.C. 448. See article on it by H. Cohen, "Conspiracy,
Intentional Harm and Economic Loss" [1991] J.I.B.L. 478.
298. At p. 464, per Lord Bridge of Harwich, citing Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard [ 1964] A.C.
1129, at p. 1204 (H.L.(E.)).
299. At pp. 465-466.
300. Lonbro pic v. Fayed (No. 5) [1994] 1 All E.R. 188 (C.A.).
301. In the much publicised Laker litigation, an allegation of conspiracy was raised against
various lenders, but the Court of Appeal refused to permit an English liquidator to bring proceedings
in the United States under their anti-trust laws, as it would have been unconscionable to do so: see
Midland Bank pic v. Laker Airways Ltd. [1986] Q.B. 689.
302. (1989) 59 D.L.R. (4th) 533. The possibility of the lender being liable as a constructive trustee
was not considered after the finding of conspiracy.
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Whilst the test used in Canada is slightly different to England—being
engagement in a common design to commit an unlawful act which the
participants should have known was likely to injure the plaintiff and it did-—the
circumstances, albeit briefly sketched, do show the dangers of trying to please
charismatic borrowers and becoming too involved in their affairs, rather than
retaining the traditional debtor/creditor relationship.
(6) Prima facie tort theory: intentional harm
Under this theory in United States law, four factors are required:
(i) a lawful act by the defendant;
(ii) an intent to cause injury to a plaintiff;
(iii) injury to the plaintiff; and
(iv) the absence of any justification for the defendant's action.303
This involves a process of balancing: (i) the nature and seriousness of the harm;
(ii) the interest promoted by the perpetrator's conduct; (iii) the character of the
means used by the perpetrator; and (iv) the perpetrator's motive. Whilst there
are elements of the economic torts, discussed above, present304 and English law
does recognise damage for intentional physical harm to person, land and
goods,305 Clerk and Lindsell306 conclude, after an examination of the relatively
few cases on this subject, that there are no signs of adopting a general principle
of liability for intention to injure. With these views it is respectfully agreed, and
it is submitted that the prima facie tort theory is not part of English law. Also, in
a lender liability situation, the loss will be purely economic—as no physical or
property damage is involved—which is generally difficult to recover for under
English law.307
303. Bronfman v. Centerre Banks of Kansas City, 705 S.W. 2d 42 (Mo. App. 1985).
304. See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.(E.)).
305. Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, a case of physical harm caused by a practical joke,
where Wright J. (as he then was) said at pp. 58-59: "The defendant has ... wilfully done an act
calculated to cause harm to the plaintiff—that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personal safety,
and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her. That propositionwithout more appears to me to
state a good cause of action; there being no justification alleged for the act." See also Janvier v.
Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316; Bunyan v. Jordan (1937) 57 C.L.R. 1; Street on Torts (1988) 18thedn.,
Chapters 2 to 5; Winfield &Jolowtcz (1989) 13th edn., at pp. 68-71; and Clerk & Lindsell on Torts
(1989) 16th edn., at para. 1-76, who state that no general principle has been laid down and itwould
seem there is a reluctance to do so.
306. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (1989) 16th edn., at para. 1-76.
307. Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd. v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. (The Mineral
Transporter) [1986] A.C. 1 (P.C.); Leigh and Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. (The
Aliakmon) [1986] A.C. 785 (H.L.(E.)); D. & F. Estates v. Church Commissioners for England
[1989] A.C. 177 (H.L.(E.»; Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 A.C. 398 (H.L.(E.));
and Department of the Environment v. Thomas Bates and Sons Ltd. [1991] 1 A.C. 499 (H.L.(E.)).
Cf. Spring v. Guardian Assurance Pic [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 (H.L.(E.)) and Henderson v. Merrett
Syndicates Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.(E.)), allowing recovery for pure economic loss under the
Hedley Byrne principle.
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THE LENDER AS A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE: KNOWING
ASSISTANCE & KNOWING RECEIPT
In its ordinary business of paying and collecting cheques, and a fortiori of the
debtor/creditor relationship with its customer, a lender will not be too
concerned at the source of its customer's funds or to whom cheques are made
out.308 Thus, it will not be under any fiduciary obligation as a trustee to its
customer or any third party. But there are circumstances where there has been
mala fides by, for example, a lender's customer, and the lender is sufficiently
aware of it or connected with it, such that the lender may be liable to the victim
of this conduct, as a constructive trustee, for the loss suffered by a third party.
These circumstances are set out in the judgment of Lord Selborne in Barnes v.
Addy,309 where his Lordship, in a well-known passage, says, in the context of
agency, that strangers to a trust:
"... are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of
trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions perhaps of which a Court
of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some
part of the trust property, or unless they assist with the knowledge in a dishonest and
fraudulent design on the part of the trustees."
There are thus two types of liability,310 as defined by Lord Selborne, although
care needs to be taken not to read his Lordship's pronouncement as if it was an
Act of Parliament311:
(a) agents (i.e. lenders) who receive and become chargeable with some part
of the trust property—this is called "knowing receipt", and is receipt
based liability312; and
(b) agents (i.e. lenders) who assist with knowledge in a dishonest and
fraudulent design on the part of the trustees—this is called "knowing
assistance", and is fault based.313
308. There are exceptions for lenders, where they suspect money is drugs related. See also Part V
of the new Criminal Justice Act 1993, concerning money laundering.
309. (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244, at p. 251 (Court of Appeal in Chancery). James and Mellish
L.JJ. concurred.
310. Thomas J. in Powell v. Thompson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597.
311. A similar view is expressed by Peter Gibson J. (as he then was) in Baden Delvaux and Lecuit
v. Societe Generate pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de I'lndustrie en France S.A.
("Baden") [1983] B.C.L.C. 325, at p. 404, also reported subsequently in [1992] 4 All E.R. 161, at
p. 232; Professor P.B.H. Birks, "Trusts in the Recovery of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts and
Restitution" (Misapplied Assets"): Ch. 8 in Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary
Obligations (1992) (E. McKendrick, ed.), at p. 152; and C. Harpum, "The Stranger As Constructive
Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 114 ("Harpum Part I"), at p. 145.
312. Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 292, perMillett J. (as he then was); this
case, at first instance, is noted by C. Harpum, "Liability For Money Laundering" [1990] C.L.J. 217
and by Professor P.B.H. Birks, "Misdirected Funds Again" (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 528. Similar views are
expressed by Sir Peter Millett, writing extra judicially, in "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991)
L.Q.R. 71, at pp. 72 and 80-81. An appeal against the decision of Millett J. was dismissed: see
[1991] Ch. 547. The appeal was concerned, inter alia, with dishonesty in knowing assistance and
adds little to the decision at first instance.
313. The Hon. Mr Justice Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71, at pp. 72
and 83.
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An example of the former is where a lender receives money from a customer,
which it knows has been obtained by the customer in breach of trust, but the
lender uses the money to reduce the customer's overdraft.314 An example of the
latter is where there is a breach of section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 (as
amended), relating to financial assistance, by a customer, and the lender qua
lender has a sufficient degree of knowledge of this breach to be regarded as
having knowingly assisted by lendingmoney for this acquisition of shares by the
customer.315
Liability is, generally, personal,316 as it will be a claim for the value received by
the lender because the money will not, subject to the rules of tracing,317 be
identifiable; where it is still in the possession of the lender, then a proprietorial
claim is available.318 The guiding principle is that, where there is a breach of
trust, the trustee is required to put the trust in the same position it would have
been in had there been no such breach, i.e. a liability to compensate the trust.319
Consequently, an intermeddler in a trust (a lender) is required to "either
relinquish an improper gain that he has made in his self-assumed fiduciary
capacity role, or to make good a loss suffered as a result of his actions".320 The
lender is to compensate the victim for the loss it (the lender) helped to inflict
through its conduct.
It is proposed to look at the two types of liability separately, commencingwith
"knowing assistance".
(a) Knowing assistance
There are three common scenarios for knowing assistance:
(i) where it is claimed that the lender has assisted a trustee to commit a
breach of trust, such as honouring a cheque drawn on a trust account
or transferring money321;
314. Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L.(Sc.)), 1893 20 R. (H.L.) 59, where the
vital element of knowledge was absent; and Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2
N.Z.L.R. 41, where it was not.
315. Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555; and
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 1) [1979] Ch. 250.
316. Paget's Law ofBanking (1989) 10th edn.,at p. 232. Scott L.J. in Polly Peck International pic
v. Nadir [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, at p. 247 col. 1.
317. See A. Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (1993), at pp. 57-76; Goff and Jones, The Law of
Restitution (1993) 4th edn., at pp. 75-93.
318. See Professor P.B.H. Birks, "Misdirected funds: restitution from the recipient" [1989]
L.M.C.L.Q. 296, at pp. 297-298 and 311-312; and T.G. Youdan, "The Fiduciary Principle: The
Applicability of Proprietary Remedies": Ch. 3 in Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989) Carswell,
(T.G. Youdan, ed.).
319. Birks, "Trusts in the Recovery ofMisapplied Assets: Tracing, Trust, and Restitution": Ch. 8
in Commercial Aspects ofTrusts and Fiduciary Obligations (1992) (E. McKendrick, ed.), at p. 154;
and Paget, at p. 232.
320. Harpum, "The Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 114, at p. 118.
321. Harpum, "The Stranger As Constructive Trustee" (Part I) (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 114, at p. 148.
See the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 on this.
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(ii) where the lender provides finance for the acquisition by the company
of its own shares in contravention of section 151 of the Companies Act
1985 (as amended)322; and
(iii) the emerging area of money laundering.323
The basis of liability, under this head, is "nothing more than a formula for
equitable relief... [through which] a court of equity says that [the lender] shall
be liable in equity, as though he were a constructive trustee.324 [The lender] is
made liable in equity as trustee by the imposition or construction of the court of
equity. This is done because in accordance with equitable principles applied by
the court of equity it is equitable that he should be held liable as though he were a
trustee."325
The constituent elements for liability for knowing assistance are as follows326:
(i) The existence of a trust—although it is enough if there is a fiduciary
relationship327; and it is not necessary for the trust property to have
been received.
(ii) A dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee. There is
no real difference328 between the words "dishonest" and "fraudulent",
which are to be given their normal meaning329—being more than
"morally reprehensible" conduct.330 However, mere negligence or
322. Ibid., at p. 150.
323. See, for example, Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265; and on appeal, [1991] Ch.
547 (C.A.); Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe Generate pour Favoriser le Developpement du
Commerce et de I'lndustrie en France S.A. ("Baden") [1983] B.C.L.C. 325, also reported
subsequently in [1992] 4 All E.R. 161.
324. Cf. the views of Sir Peter Millett and Professor Birks, who argue that the accessory (the
lender) is not a trustee, and his personal liability does not depend on there being any trust; also, the
accessory will hold nothing which can be described as trust property: see, respectively, Introduction
to Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, supra, and "Tracing the Proceeds of
Fraud", supra, at p. 83; and "Trusts in the Recovery of Misapplied Assets: Tracing, Trusts, and
Restitution", supra. With respect to two such distinguished jurists, their comments appear not to
give sufficient weight to the fact that, in knowing assistance cases, the money is obtained in breach of
fiduciary duty, e.g. where a director has misapplied company money, or see the facts of the Agip
case—and the law, rightly, it is submitted, treats such money differently from that not obtained in
breach of fiduciary duty owing to the special nature of a fiduciary and the high standards expected of
him; added to this, the accessory (the lender) has by his conduct implicated himself in the fraud. The
critical point is not what happens when the accessory is solvent, but what happens when he becomes
insolvent. If there is a constructive trust, then the defrauded beneficiary will be paid in priority to the
ordinary body of creditors: see on this A.G. for Hong Kong v. Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324, at p. 331, per
Lord Templeman. But if it is merely a personal claim in restitution, as this would be, then the
beneficiary will not receive any priority. As the money has been taken in breach of fiduciary duty, it
seems fair that the true owner of that money should receive priority over the general body of
creditors.
325. Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock [1968] 2 All E.R. 1073, at p. 1097H-I.
326. Baden, supra, at p. 232j, cited with approval in Re Montagu's Settlement Trust [1987] Ch.
264, and in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340 (C.A.).
327. Baden, supra, at p. 233; and Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265.
328. Belmont Finance Corp. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 1) [ 1979] 1 Ch. 250, at 267D-E and
Baden, supra, at p. 234c-d.
329. Harpum Part I, supra, at p. 146 fn. 7, and Paget, at p. 233.
330. Baden, at p. 234g-h.
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carelessness is not sufficient to constitute liability,331 although it was
once thought it was.332
(iii) Assistance by the stranger or accessory to the trust (the lender) in the
dishonest and fraudulent design. There must be actual participation,
with knowledge, by the accessory,333 so that the fraudulent design can
be imputed to him,334 i.e. the accessory must be implicated in the
trustee's fraud335; if there is not, then the accessory (the lender) will not
be liable. In the end, it is a question of fact as to whether the accessory
has assisted or not.336 The phrase "want of probity"337 has been used as
a touchstone in some cases. Its usefulness is questionable, as it is
submitted that the real test, as suggested byMillett J. in his penetrating
analysis of knowing assistance (both judicially338 and extra¬
judicially339), is whether there h^s been a lack of honesty by the lender.
(iv) The accessory (i.e. lender) must have knowledge of the three matters
listed above, as fraud and dishonesty involve questions of intention. As
to the type of knowledge—either actual or constructive—there has
been a debate, but for knowing assistance, as opposed to knowing
receipt, the knowledge required is actual knowledge,340 of which there
are varying degrees.
The types of knowledge applicable in both knowing assistance and knowing
receipt are helpfully set out by Peter Gibson J. in Baden Delvaux and Lecuit v.
Societe Generate pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de
I'Industrie en France S.A. ("Baden"),341 although these categories are not
331. See Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 293; and Tipping J. in
Marshall Futures Ltd. v. Marshall [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 316, at p. 326.
332. See, for example, Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R.
1555; Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Burden (No. 2) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602; and Rowlandson v. National
Westminster Bank Ltd. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 798.
333. See Jacobs P. (as he then was) in D.P.C. Estates Pty. Ltd. v. Grey [1974] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 443,
at p. 458.
334. See Vinelott J. in Eagle Trust pic v. SBC Securities Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C. 438, at p. 449. This
view was approved by the Court of Appeal in Polly Peck International pic v. Nadir [ 1992] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 238, at p. 243.
335. Harpum Part I, supra, at p. 116.
336. The Hon. Sir Peter Millett, "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71, at p. 84.
337. Per Edmund-Davies L.J. (as he then was) in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co.
[1969] 1 Ch. D. 296, at p. 301; this was used in Re Montagu's Settlement Trust, supra, and Lipkin
Gorman v. Karpnale [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340 (C.A.).
338. Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 293.
339. "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud", supra, at p. 84. Cf. Paget, at p. 233.
340. Belmont Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 1) [1979] 1 Ch. 250 (C.A.);
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340; Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch.
265.
341. [1983] B.C.L.C. 325, at p. 407. Also reported subsequently in [1992] 4 All E.R. 161, at
p. 235.
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"necessarily comprehensive"342 nor rigid.343 There, his Lordship outlined five
types of knowledge, namely, that the lender:
(i) has actual knowledge; or
(ii) wilfully shuts its eyes to the obvious; or
(iii) wilfully and recklessly fails to make such enquiries as an honest and
reasonable man would make; or
(iv) has knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an
honest and reasonable man; or
(v) has knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and
reasonable man on enquiry.
Of these types of knowledge, the first three constitute actual knowledge and
the last two constitute constructive knowledge.344 In cases such as Selangor
United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock (No. 3)345 and Karak Rubber Company
Ltd. v. Burden (No. 2),346 constructive knowledge was held to be sufficient and,
on this basis, negligence, rather than dishonesty, by the accessories (i.e. the
lenders) resulted in them being held liable. However, in more recent authority,347
the courts have declined to impute constructive knowledge to an accessory and
consequentially have refused to uphold claims where the accessory was
negligent, rather than fraudulent. This is because if negligence was sufficient to
constitute a fraudulent and dishonest design, then a lower standard would be
required of the accessory than the offending trustee348 (who was the perpetrator
of the original breach of trust, and who, as a trustee, is subject to very high
342. Fqx L.J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v.Jackson (1991] Ch. 547, at p. 567 (with whom Butler-Sloss
and Beldam L.JJ. agreed), who regarded the list as "an explanation of the general principle".
343. Scott L.J., delivering the leading judgment in Polly Peck International pic v. Nadir [1992] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 238, at p. 243 col. 2, who felt that one category may merge into another.
344. See D. Petkovic, "The Banker as Constructive Trustee" [1989] J.I.B.L. 88, at p. 89. See also
Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v.Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, and his Lordship's article, "Tracing the
Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71.
345. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555.
346. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602.
347. Carl Zeiss Stiftungv. Herbert Smith & Co. (No. 2) [1969] Ch. 276 (C.A.); Slade L.J. inNihill
v. Nihill, unreported, 22 June 1983 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division)), cited with approval in Lipkin
Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340 (C.A.); Millett J. (as he then was) in Agip (Africa)
Ltd. v. Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 1) [1979] 1 Ch. 250 (C.A.); Belmont Finance Corpn. Ltd. v.
Williams Furniture Ltd. (No. 2) [1980] 1 All E.R. 393; Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch.
264; Westpac Banking Corpn. v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41; Barclays Bank pic v. Quincecare
[ 1992] 4 All E.R. 363 (decision delivered on 24 February 1988); Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd. v.
Eagle Trust pic [1991] B.C.L.C. 1045; Eagle Trust Ltd. v. Eagle Trust pic [ 1991] B.C.L.C. 438; Polly
Peck International pic v. Nadir [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238; and Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd. v.
Hawkins [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 700.
348. PL Norman, "Knowing assistance—a plea for help" (1992) Vol. 12 Legal Studies 322, at
p. 334. See also Edmund-Davies L.J. in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co. (No. 2) [1969] 2
Ch. 276, at p. 301.
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standards of conduct349); also, one can be negligent but not dishonest,350 and it is
the dishonesty which is the critical thing and the accessory's knowing
participation in it. The position is well put by Harpum,351 who says that "the
fraudulent design assisted and the stranger's knowledge of it must be integrally
connected. The stranger is made liable because he is implicated in that fraud. If
constructive notice of the design sufficed, the moral quality of the trustee's act
would be irrelevant."
Added to this, English courts have narrowed the duty of care for liability in
negligence and pure economic loss,352 which is what a claim against an accessory
would be; and are disentangling law and equity. If an accessory has merely
been negligent—and not dishonest—he should be sued as a tortfeasor in
negligence,353 and not as a constructive trustee.
A further factor taken into account in rejecting constructive knowledge is the
commercial effect that it would have on lenders who are paying and collecting a
tremendous number of cheques each day.354 Lenders are not required to play the
"amateur detective",355 and it would be both undesirable and "commercially
impracticable".356 The courts have also warned against the "unjustified wisdom
of hindsight"357 and imposing liability simply on the basis of "the sheer scale of
payments"358 made by the trustee. If at the time the lender has no reason to
349. See the judgment of McLachlin J. in the Supreme Court of Canada in Canson Enterprises
Ltd. v. Boughton and Co. (1991) 84 D.L.R. (4th) 129, where, in the context of equitable
compensation, the differences between liability for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence are
referred to and the different standard of conduct required of a fiduciary and a tortfeasor noted.
350. A similar view is expressed by Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at
p. 293; and Tipping J. in Marshall futures Ltd. v. Marshall [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 316, at p. 326.
351. Harpum Part I, supra, at p. 147.
352. See the discussion in the section on negligence. Note also the approach of the Privy Council in
China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536 and Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First
City Corporation Ltd. [1993] A.C. 295, which rejected trying to bring claims in negligence which
properly belong in equity.
353. Cf. the Scottish case of Weir v. National Westminster Bank pic [1994] S.L.T. 1251, where
the lender, who had cashed cheques for a dishonest agent ofW, was sued in negligence and the claim
was not struck out.
354. May L.J. in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1356E-H. His
Lordship felt that it was only when circumstances were such that any reasonable cashier would
refuse to pay a cheque immediately and refer it to his superior that a cheque should not be paid upon
presentation. And it would be rare for a manager to instruct staff to refer all cheques of a customer to
him before paying them.
355. Alliott J. in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 987, at p. 1006; Peter Gibson
J. (as he then was) in Baden, supra, at p. 245; and Wylie J. in Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd. v.
Hawkins [1991] 3 N.Z.L.R. 700, at p. 739. See also Millett J., at first instance, in El Ajou v. Dollar
Holdings pic [1993] B.C.L.C. 735, at p. 758i, who said, in the context of knowing receipt, that a
recipient of misapplied assets "is not expected to be unduly suspicious".
356. Dunn L.J. in Nihill v. Nihill [1983], unreported decision of the Court of Appeal C.A.
transcript 276; and see Wallace J. in Lankshear v. A.N.Z. Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.
[1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 489, at p. 495.
357. Polly Peck International pic v. Nadir [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, at p. 244, per Scott L.J.
358. Ibid. In that case, the scale of payments was 127 transfers of funds in the sum of £44.9
million from one lender through another. The group's annual turnover in the years 1987-1990 (first
half) was, respectively: £380m, £967m, £1,162m, and £880m,with pre-tax profits of £84m, £l44m,
£l60m, and £l60m for the said period.
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suspect any misapplication of funds or to be wary of the trustee, then, if events
later turn out to indicate that the trustee has allegedly misapplied funds, the
lender cannot be liable, particularly where the beneficiary was a successful
business. Mere curiosity is not sufficient to satisfy the test of putting the
honest and reasonable banker on enquiry359; neither is a mere possibility
of wrongdoing: it must be at least "a serious or real possibility, albeit
not amounting to a probability"360 of the lender's customer being
defrauded.361
Lastly, the relationship between the lender and its trustee customer is one of
contract under which the lender agrees to honour (and collect) the customer's
cheques, and it is not, generally, for the lender to consider the nature of the
transaction involved—its role is largely mechanical, and, save in exceptional
circumstances, the cheque should be honoured.362 One such exception is when
payment of the cheque would expose the lender to liability as a constructive
trustee.363
Consequently, as a result of this contractual relationship, a lender could not
be liable as a constructive trustee, unless it was also liable for breach ofmandate
for failure to perform its duty to pay cheques, subject to the qualification that
this must be done without negligence.364 The Court of Appeal has recently
observed that the distinction between liability of a lender as a constructive
trustee and for breach of mandate is "frequently blurred or unconsidered".365
359. Polly Peck International v. Nadir, supra, at p. 244 col. 2. See also Parker L.J. in Lipkin
Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1378.
360. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1378, per Parker L.J. Cf. Slade
L.J. in Nihill v. Nihill, supra, who referred to the probability of fraudulent breaches of trust being
comrrirtted.
361. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1378, per Parker L.J.
362. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1356A-C, per May L.J. See
also: Barclays Bank pic v. Quincecare [ 1992] 4 All E.R. 363, at pp. 375-376, per Steyn J. (as he then
was), judgment delivered on 24 February 1988; Gray v. Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at p. 1; and
Alliott J., at first instance in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 987, at p. 1006, cited
with approval in Quincecare.
363. Manus Asia Co. Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, a decision ofCrudden D.J. of the Supreme
Court of Hong Kong, delivered on 22 September 1988. The case is noted by Professor E.P. Ellinger,
"New Cases on the Bank as Constructive Trustee" [1989] J.B.L. 255, at pp. 257-259, and by N.
Clayton, "An Update on Banks as Constructive Trustees" [1990] J.B.L. 125. In this case, the lender
had to balance competing claims for the same money. On the one hand, the US Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") had obtained judgment for a certain sum against L for insider
dealing and was demanding this sum, being the proceeds of L's illegal activities; on the other hand, L
was demanding payment of the sum to his lawyers in Hong Kong. The money was shown as a credit
in L's account with the lender in Hong Kong, but was held in the lender's nostro account in New
York. It was reluctantly paid to the SEC. There was a danger the lender may have had to pay out
twice. An argument that payment of the sum in the Hong Kong account would expose the lender to
liability as a constructive trustee to L's creditors was successful. It is suggested that if the lender had
been required to pay out to L also, L would have been unjustly enriched and would have benefited
from his own wrongdoing. See also Piners (a firm) v. Miro [1991] 1 W.L.R. 35 (C.A.).
364. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1340, at p. 1376, per Parker L.J.
365. Ibid., at p. 1373.
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Furthermore, there is a distinction between knowledge and notice of a fact or
matter.366 Thus, a person may have seen a document, and so have notice of it, but
no knowledge of it, as it has not been read thoroughly; or, he may have read it,
but forgotten what it is about.367 Consequently, in the ordinary course of
business, a lender will have notice of cheques paid in and honoured, but, in most
cases, it will have no knowledge of what they relate to, so there will be no
knowledge of, or participation in, a dishonest scheme. Moreover, the general
prohibition on constructive notice in commercial matters368 has been applied to
knowing assistance369; and it would be inconsistent with the requirement of
actual knowledge to impose liability based on constructive notice; mere notice
would not be appropriate in knowing receipt cases.
Ultimately, despite what terminology is used, the real question is whether the
lender has been honest or dishonest.370 A failure to make an enquiry does not, of
itself, result in liability: it is a failure to act honestly which imposes liability, i.e.
misapplying funds.371 But, a failure to make enquiries which honest men would
have made does impose liability, as this goes to the question of honesty.372
In summary, unless a lender pays a cheque actually knowing that it represents
misapplied trust property it will not be liable. The courts have realised the task
facing lenders in policing every cheque drawn on a trust (or other) account, and
that contractually, the lender is obliged to honour (or collect) its customer's
cheques, except in rare circumstances. Thus, in the absence of clear participation
in the fraud, a lender should not be held liable, as it was the trustee—not the
lender—who perpetrated the original fraud.
(b) Knowing receipt
This head of liability is based on unjust enrichment,373 being receipt based
liability.374 As with knowing assistance, knowledge is critical to founding
366. Sir Robert Megarry in Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch. 264, at pp. 271-272,
276-277 and 285. See also Vinelott J. in Eagle Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C.
438, at p. 447.
367. As with the will in Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, supra.
368. Per Lindley L.J. (as he then was) in Manchester Trust v. Furness [1895] 2 Q.B. 539, at p. 545.
369. Vinelott J. in Eagle Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C. 438, at p. 459. See also
Millett J. in El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings pic [1993] B.C.L.C. 735, at p. 758g, who felt it
inappropriate, in a knowing receipt case, to base liability on constructive notice in a "conveyancing
sense ... where it is not the custom and practice to make inquiry".
370. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 293. This view was not
disagreed with on appeal: see [1991] Ch. 547, at pp. 569-570. It was cited with approval in Eagle
Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C. 438, at p. 446.
371. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 295G-H.
372. Ibid.
373. Gray v. Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at p. 14, per Lord Westbury; see also, Thomas J. in
Powell v. Thompson [1991 ] 1 N.Z.L.R. 597, at pp. 606-607; and Wallace J. in Lankshear v. ANZ
Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd. [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 489, at p. 496.
374. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 292, and in "Tracing the
Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71, at pp. 72 and 80-81.
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liability,375 although, in knowing receipt, knowledge can be either constructive
or actual,376 as dishonesty is not an essential element of liability—the breach of
trust can be fraudulent or innocent.377 Knowing receipt is not a single category,
and the different situations, of which the two main ones are as follows, need to
be distinguished.378
First, where a person receives trust property for his own benefit, which has
been transferred in breach of trust, with actual or constructive knowledge that
the property is trust property and has been transferred to him in breach of
trust—or, where the property is received without knowledge of such a breach,
but the breach is subsequently discovered—the recipient is liable to account as a
constructive trustee from the time of receipt in the first instance and the time of
knowledge of breach in the second.379
Secondly, where a person (usually a trustee's agent) lawfully receives trust
property—not for his own benefit—and subsequently misappropriates the trust
property, or deals with it in a manner inconsistent with the trust,380 such a
recipient will be "liable to account as a constructive trustee",381 provided he
knows the property is trust property, even if he was not aware of the trust's
precise terms.
The key to the first class of case is that there is beneficial receipt by the
accessory, in the sense of using the trust property for his own benefit by setting
up title to it.383 In a lending context, the most common situation will occur when
the lender (mis)uses the trust property (money) to reduce the indebtedness of the
trustee (who is a customer) to the lender by applying the trust property in
reduction of the trustee's overdraft. Thus, a lender will not be liable for knowing
receipt merely by paying or collecting cheques: as it will not be setting up title to
375. Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd. [1893] A.C. 282 (H.L. (Sc.)), 1893, 20 R. (H.L.) 59.
376. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at pp. 292-293, argues that as
the basis of liability of knowing receipt and knowing assistance is different, then so should be the
types of knowledge. Cf. the more "restrained" approach of his Lordship in El Ajou v. Dollar Land
Holdings pic [1993) B.C.L.C. 735, at p. 758i.
377. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 291, and in "Tracing the
Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71, at p. 80; see also Harpum Part I, at p. 116 and Vinelott J. in
Eagle Trust pic v. S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C. 438, at p. 451. It could be argued that the
receipt of trust property in the circumstances set out in this section amounts to dishonesty. Cf.
Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41, where it was said that the receipt and
misappropriation almost amounted to fraud.
378. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 291.
379. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 291; see also "Tracing the
Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71, at p. 80.
380. Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 291, per Millet J.; Baden [1992] 4 All
E.R. 161, at p. 231; Polly Peck International pic v. Nadir [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 238, at p. 243 col. 2,
per Scott L.J.; and Eagle Trust, supra, at p. 451, per Vinelott J.
381. Millett J. in Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265, at p. 291.
382. Ibid.
383. Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 41; Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson
[1990] 1 Ch. 265, at pp. 291-292; and "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) L.Q.R. 71,
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the money, but merely acting as its customer's agent.384 Also, a lender will not be
liable for knowing receipt where it merely acts as a conduit or agent for its
customer and passes on the trust property to its customer, even if it had
knowledge of the breach of trust—the receipt in this instance is ministerial,385
with the agent merely acting in accordance with his instructions; however,
although it is arguable that the receipt and the loss are not related, the agent
could be liable for knowing assistance.386
From a lender's point of view, its concern is paying out twice: once to the
recalcitrant trustee (who will have absconded or be insolvent or both and from
whom there is little chance of recovering its money); and also to the beneficiary,
who will be seeking to sue the lender because it is unlikely to recover from the
trustee. In this situation, the lender will be paying out the beneficiary from the
lender's own profits, and not from the money in the trustee's account. Thus, it
becomes a situation of lender liability.
From the beneficiary's perspective, in knowing receipt (and knowing
assistance) cases, itwill be trying to find a nexus by which it can make the lender,
with whom it has no relationship in relation to the misappropriated trust
money, liable for its loss. Ordinarily, as agent (i.e. the lender) will be liable to its
principal (the rogue trustee), and not the cestui que trust387 composed of the
beneficiaries. Any beneficiarywill only have a personal claim against the trustee
for breach of trust (although the trustee would have an action against the agent).
at pp. 82-83. Barnes v. Addy (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244 also supports this. See also Hoffmann L.J.
in El Ajou v. Dollar Holdings pic [1994] B.C.L.C. 464, at p. 478b (C.A.), who outlines three
elements in knowing receipt: (i) a disposal of the beneficiary's assets in breach of fiduciary duty; (2)
beneficial receipt of the assets by the accessory which are traceable as representing the beneficiary's
assets; (3) knowledge by the accessory that the assets received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary
duty.
384. Millett J. in Agip, supra, at p. 292, and "Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud", supra, at p. 83.
385. See Brightman J. (as heathen was) in Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Burden (No. 2) [1972] 1
W.L.R. 602, at pp. 632-633, and Birks, "Misdirected Funds", supra, at pp. 303-304.
386. See Birks, "Misdirected Funds", supra, at p. 304. This view of ministerial receipt and the
requirement of beneficial use is disagreed with by Y.L. Tan, "Agent's liability for knowing receipt"
[1991] L.M.C.L.Q. 357. He argues cogently that setting up title to property as determining receipt is
against authority and is only recent. With respect, this is not so; see Barnes v. Addy (1874) 9 Ch.
App. 244, at pp. 254-255 and the reference there to the defendant Duffield not using money for his
own benefit; Gray v. Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, at p. 14, per Lord Westbury (cf. Lord Cairns
L.C., at p. 11); Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank pic [1893] A.C. 282, at pp. 292-293 (H.L.)(Sc)); 1893,
20 R. (H.L.) 59, at p. 63, per Lord Shand; Coleman v. Bucks and Oxon Union Bank [1897] 2 Ch.
243, at p. 254, per Byrne J.; and the more recent cases of Belmont finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Williams
Furniture Ltd. (No. 2) [1980] 1 All E.R. 393, at p. 407, perGoff L.J., who said becoming chargeable
with the trust property means "receiving trust funds in such a way as to become accountable for
them"; and El Ajou v. Dollar Holdings pic [1993] B.C.L.C. 735 at p. 757, per Millett J. and on
appeal by Hoffmann L.J.: see El Ajou v. Dollar Holdings pic [1994] B.C.L.C. 464, at p. 478b.
387. See Y.L. Tan, "Agent's liability for knowing receipt" [1991] L.M.C.L.Q. 357, at pp. 361 and
363.
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This nexus between a beneficiary and the agent (the lender) will occur when the
latter ceases to act as its principal's agent by setting up his own title to the trust
property, i.e. the agent goes beyond its agency and so has a greater connection
with the misdirected trust property: by receiving trust property and becoming
chargeable with it (or, by participating in a dishonest and fraudulent scheme
with the trustee in relation to it and becoming linked with the principal's
fraud388).
DUTY OF LENDER AS MORTGAGEE TO BORROWER/
MORTGAGOR
It has recently been reaffirmed that, under English law, when a mortgagee
exercises his power of sale with regard to the mortgaged property in order to
satisfy the debt owned to him, the mortgagee must do so in good faith389 (by
which it is meant that the mortgagee is not to "fraudulently or wilfully or
recklessly to sacrifice the property of the mortgagor",390 who has an equity of
redemption) and for the purpose of repayment. This duty of the mortgagee to the
mortgagor arises in equity, due to the relationship of the parties, and not in
tort.391 If it arose in tort, the claim would be for pure economic loss, which, on
the current state of the authorities, would not be permitted.392 The same duty of
good faith in equity is owed to a subsequent encumbrancer, who is entitled to
any balance of the proceeds of sale after the mortgagee's debt has been
satisfied393; and, with regard to a guarantor, the mortgagee owes him a duty in
394
equity too.
Although the mortgagor has a right of redemption, the mortgagee is not a
trustee of the power of sale. If there is a decline in value of the mortgaged
property (due to market forces) and the mortgagee delays in foreclosing, the
mortgagee is, generally, not liable to the mortgagor or a subsequent
encumbrancer or a guarantor.
388. Cf. Conspiracy.
389. Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation [1993] A.C. 295 (P.O.); and see
A. Berg, "Duties of a Mortgagee and a Receiver" [1993] J.B.L. 213.
390. Kennedy v. De Trafford [1897] A.C. 180, at p. 185, per Lord Herschell.
391. See Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank Pic [1991] Ch. 12 (C.A.), where the Court of Appeal
rejected expressing the duties owed by a mortgagee to a mortgagor in terms of negligence. Rather,
the duty was recognised by equity as arising out of the particular relationship between them. Any
duty owed to a surety arose in the same way: see China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan Soon Gin,
George (alias George Tan) [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.).
392. See section on Negligence.
393. Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation [1993] A.C. 295, at pp. 311-312, per
Lord Templeman.
394. China and South Sea Bank Ltd. v. Tan [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.), at pp. 544-545, per Lord
Templeman (P.C.).
76 LENDER LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
In the South China Sea case395 and in Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank pic,396
delays in foreclosing in similar circumstances did not result in liability.397 Also,
in Williams & Glyn,in Ralph Gibson J. held that the lender owed no duty to
Barnes, in his capacity as chargee of his shares in NDH, not to reduce their value
by breaches of duty owed to NDH. The shares had not been lost or destroyed
and the share certificates were always available for return to Barnes upon
repayment of the loan. Barnes could not bring an action as pledger of the shares,
as any such action regarding the loan could only be brought by NDH. In such
situations the mortgagor has not, physically, lost anything. He has his property
or his shares: they are now worth less, but may increase to be worth more than
before. His loss is thus purely economic.
The above comments, concerning the timing of selling, now need to be read in
the light of the recent Court of Appeal decision in Palk v. Mortgage Services
Funding pic,399 in which it was held that a mortgagor could apply to the court for
an order, under section 91 of the Law of Property Act 1925, that the mortgaged
property be sold, even though the mortgagee did not want to sell.
Whilst it has been said that as a result of the duty of good faith there can be a
sale at a lower price than might have been reached, nonetheless, it is clear on the
authorities400 that a mortgagee owes the mortgagor a duty to obtain a proper
price when selling the mortgaged property as a result of a foreclosure. If the
mortgagee does not obtain such a price, then he is liable for the difference
between the price obtained and what is the proper price of the property.401
Three other issues arise in this context. First, when a lender employs
competent agents, such as real estate agents, to sell the mortgaged property on
his behalf, and the agent breaches its duty to the mortgagee or makes "a serious
blunder"402 by, for example, misdescribing the property for sale in an
advertisement,403 with the result that the property did not sell, or did not sell for
395. [1990] 1 A.C. 536 (P.C.).
396. [1990] 2 All E.R. 877 (C.A.).
397. 762 S.W. 2d 243 (Tex. App. El Paso 1988).
398. [1981] Com. L.R. 205, at p. 208, and pp. 361, 364, 368 and 369 of the transcript. See also
Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd. v. Gill [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51 (C.A.).
399. [1993] Ch. 331.
400. See Warner v. Jacobs (1882) 20 Ch. D. 220, at p. 224, per Kay J.; Kennedy v. De Trafford
[1896] 1 Ch. 762, at p. 762, per Lindley L.J. and [1897] A.C. 180, at p. 185, per Lord Herschell;
Farrars v. Farrars Ltd. (1889) 40 Ch. D. 395, at pp. 410-411, per Lindley L.J.; McHugh v. Union
Bank ofCanada [1913] A.C. 229 (P.C.); and Tomlin v. Luce (1889) 41 Ch. D. 573, not reversed on
appeal: see (1889) 43 Ch. D. 191. Indeed, itmay be that the reference to good faith is merely a way of
asserting that the mortgagee's duty to the mortgagor arises in equity: and not in negligence.
401. See, for example, Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. Mutual Finance Ltd. [1971] Ch. 949 (C.A.).
See also Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank pic [1991] Ch. 12 (C.A.) and Downsview Nominees Ltd.
v. First City Corporation [1993] A.C. 295 (P.C.).
402. Kekewich J. in Tomlin v. Luce (1889)41 Ch. 573, at pp. 575-576; and see on appeal (1889)
43 Ch. D. 191, at p. 194 (C.A.). This phrase was cited by Flalsbury's Laws ofEngland (4th edn.), vol.
32, "Mortgages", at para. 729. The lender/mortgagee is not liable for errors of detail by the agents
not affecting the sale or price realised: see Halsbury, supra.
403. See, for example, Tomlin v. Luce, supra, and Commercial and General Acceptance Ltd. v.
Nixon (1982) 152 C.L.R. 491 (High Court of Australia).
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as much as it should have, and loss resulted to the mortgagor or, indeed, a
subsequent chargee, the mortgagee is liable, although he would have a cause of
action against the agent.404 Where, however, the failure to obtain the proper
price is the fault of the mortgagee, and not the agents, then the mortgagee's
action against the agents will be unsuccessful.405
Secondly, if the mortgagor seeks to halt the proposed sale of its mortgaged
property or have it set aside, as he has a monetary counterclaim against the
mortgagee for a debt—as opposed to challenging the validity of the mort¬
gage406—then, before such an action can be brought, the position of the
mortgagee needs to be safeguarded by the mortgagor either paying off the
amount due and owing in relation to the mortgaged property or paying into
court an amount that would meet the mortgagee's debt.407 The rationale for this
rule is that until the debt secured by the mortgage is satisfied, the mortgage and
the debt remain valid, despite any claim the mortgagor may have (which claim
may be successful or unsuccessful); the courts take the view that it would not be
just or convenient to allow, in effect, a unilateral discharge of the mortgage and
appropriation of the underlying debt without payment.40"
Thirdly, if a mortgagee seeks to exclude liability for itself and any receiver it
may wish to appoint, the position is unclear with regard to the application of the
Unfair Contract Term Acts 1977 ("UCTA").409
In such situations, the attempt to exclude liability or breach of duty will need
to be in clear and unambiguous language. This was a problem in Bishop v.
Bonham,410 where there was a mortgage of shares containing a provision which
allowed the mortgagee to sell the shares as "he thought fit", and said he would
not be liable for any loss howsoever arising. In an action on the basis that the
shares were sold at an undervalue, the Court of Appeal held that the provision
did not specifically exclude negligence; consequently, the mortgagee was still
liable for the undervalue.
404. Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd (The Muncmaster Castle)
[1961] A.C. 807 (H.L.(E.)). If the mortgagee became insolvent, then the mortgagor could proceed
against the agent personally, rather than against the mortgagee vicariously.
405. See Predeth Castle v. Phillips Finance Co. Ltd. [1986] 2 E.G.L.R. 144 (C.A.), where the
mortgagee asked a surveyor to do a "crash sale valuation" of the mortgaged property, which the
surveyor interpreted as meaning a more rapid sale than a forced sale valuation. The Court of Appeal
upheld this interpretation and the mortgagee only had himself to blame when he sought to sell the
property to a Miss Keeping, who sold it a few months later for nearly twice the price she paid for it.
Fox L.J. opined "the hard fact is that Mr Phillips wanted to sell quickly and wanted to sell to Miss
Keeping, he wanted to sell at a price which would enable Miss Keeping to make a quick profit." The
mortgagee's problems were of his own making, not the result of the surveyor's advice.
406. Cunningham v. National Australia Bank (1987) 77 AYR. 612.
407. Samuel Keller (Holdings) Ltd. v. Martins Bank Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 43 (C.A.); Barclays
Bank pic v. Tennet (unreported decision of the Court of Appeal, delivered on 6 June 1984); and
Inglis v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1972) 126 C.L.R. 161 (High Court of
Australia).
408. Samuel Keller, supra, at p. 48A-C.
409. For examples of such a clause: see J.R. Lingard, Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn.,
Specimen Documents, Document 1, clause 7.05, and Document 2, clause 8.05.
410. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 742 (C.A.).
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The difficulty with the case is that there was no reference to UCTA, which
would impose a test of reasonableness; and the duty of a mortgagee and receiver
is now based in equity, and not negligence.411
If it was sought to defeat the exemption clause using UCTA, then it has been
argued that, under Schedule 1, a mortgage of land and shares would be excluded
from the Act's ambit.412 The relevant provisions provide:
"1(b) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of an interest in land, or
to the termination of such an interest, whether by extinction, merger, surrender,
forfeiture or otherwise ...; and
1 (e) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or any right
or interest in securities."413
With this view it is agreed. Taking security over land or shares would amount to
the creation or transferring of an interest in either of them. Consequently, a
mortgagee may well be able to exclude a breach of duty.
Receiver's duties
Like a mortgagee, a receiver414 is under duty of good faith to a mortgagor (or a
subsequent encumbrancer).415 Thus, if a receiver sells the secured assets at lower
than a proper price, he may be sued for an account in equity. (However, this is to
be distinguished from a mortgagee's right to exercise his contractual rights to
appoint a receiver, which is only challengeable on the ground of bad faith.416)
By statute,417 and under both the common law418 and the instrument
appointing him,419 a receiver is made the agent of the mortgagor company. The
receiver's agency, which is the key to the lender being liable, has been described
as the only non-fiduciary agency420; and the receiver has been likened to the
Roman god Janus,421 who faces two ways, as a receiver owes duties to both the
411. Downsview Nominees, supra.
412. M. Lawson, "The Rights and Remedies of Mortgagees" [1988] J.I.B.L. 251, at p. 257. Cf.
Berg, supra, at pp. 233-234.
413. Lingard rather ambiguously writes thatUCTA "applies to contracts of guarantee though not
to 'contracts relating to securities' see Bank Security Documents, supra, at para. 13.57 on p. 249.
This seems to suggest that the reference to securities is the plural of security, i.e. mortgage or charge.
If this is so, then, with respect, it appears to be inconsistent with the scheme of the Schedule; see also
Penn, Shea and Arora, The Law Relating to Domestic Banking (1987), at para. 15.16 on p. 165.
414. By receiver it is meant an administrative receiver, who is normally appointed by a debenture,
or floating charge, holder. Section 29(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 defines an administrative
receiver as a receiver over all, or substantially all, of the debtor's assets.
415. See Downsview Nominees, supra-, and Berg, supra. See also Dr S. Robinson, "Lenders' (and
Receivers') Liability when Selling: The Need to Resort to Basic Principles" (1994) 68 A.L.J. 206.
416. Shamji v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd. [1986] B.C.L.C. 278.
417. Section 45 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
418. Gosling v. Gaskell [1897] A.C. 575 (H.L.(E.)).
419. See, for example, J.R. Lingard, Bank Security Documents, supra, Specimen Documents,
clause 7 in Document 1 and clause 8 in Document 2.
420. Meagher, Gummow and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (1992) 3rd edn., at para.
2845 on p. 709.
421. Professor R.M. Goode Q.C., Principles of Corporate Insolvency (1990), at p. 82.
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mortgagor company and the debenture holder appointing him. But this agency
is something of a fiction in order to protect the debenture holder, as the courts
have repeatedly held that the receiver's prime duty is to pay off the debt owed to
the debenture holder.422
By the receiver being the agent of the company, it is the company in
receivership which is liable for the acts and omissions of the receiver, not the
debenture holder which appointed him. However, where the debenture holder
interferes with the nature or conduct of the receivership, then the debenture
holder is liable for the acts of the receiver (which can include a claim by
guarantors)—for example, that the receiver sold the company's assets at an
undervalue and called their guarantee into operation.423 Liability is imposed on
the debenture holder (the lender) on the basis that,424 where the debenture
holder interferes with the conduct of the receivership and issues instructions to
the receiver, then, if the receiver acts in accordance with those instructions, he
ceases to be the agent of the company in receivership and becomes the agent of
the debenture holder, who, as principal, becomes liable for the acts of its
agent.425
422. Downsview Nominees Ltd. v. First City Corporation [1993] 2 A.C. 295 (P.C.); Gomba
Holdings UK Ltd. v. Homan [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1301, at p. 1305, per Hoffmann J.; and Gomba
Holdings UK Ltd. v. Minories Ltd. [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1231, at p. 1233E—H, per Fox L.J.
423. Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. v. Walker [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1410 (C.A.); and American
Express International Banking Corp. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R. 564.
424. See American Express International Banking Corp. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R. 564, at
p. 571g, per Mann J. (as he then was). This was a curious case involving a company being put into
receivership and subsequently going into voluntary liquidation with the receiver continuing to act
after the liquidator was appointed. A claim was brought by a guarantor (who was also a director of
the company) that the receiver had sold the company's assets at an undervalue. It was also sought to
make the lender liable on the basis that it had constituted the receiver as its agent from the
liquidation. In one part, the learned judge says, "there was constant communication between the
bank and the receiver and the latter sought the former's approval to such actions as he proposed to
take", although there is no real evidence in the judgment to support this: see at p. 568; but later (at
p. 572), his Lordship found "that at no time either before or after the liquidation of the company did
the bank direct or interfere with the receiver's activities. As [the receiver] put it, the bank 'trusted me
to get on with it'." These two statements are somewhat difficult to reconcile with the view of the
judge that the lender constituted the receiver as its agent after the liquidation (a matter which is not
elaborated on).
425. In this situation, the lender, as debenture holder, would be unable to claim under the
indemnity in the debenture, as this relates to acts and omissions done in "exercise or purported
exercise of the powers contained [in the receivers' clause in the debenture]", i.e. in the ordinary
course of the receivership: not where this agency arrangement has been breached. For an example of
such a clause: see Lingard, Bank Security Documents, supra, Document 1, at clause 7.06 and
Document 2, at clause 8.06. Cf. Berg, supra, at p. 234, who says that if a receiver is considered to be
an officer of the company, then, in view of section 310 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended), any
indemnity to the receiver from the company's assets may be struck down. However, where the
debenture holder has constituted the receiver as its agent, the debenture holder may have a claim
against the receiver for an indemnity under an implied term of the agency agreement: see American
Express International Banking Corp. v. Hurley [1985] 3 All E.R. 564, at p. 571 h, per Mann J. (as he
then was).
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WRONGFUL TRADING—SHADOW DIRECTORS
In United States law, a lender may be liable under what is called the
"Instrumentality Theory",426 where his control and dominance over a borrower
is so substantial as to indicate that effective control of the borrower's affairs
rests with the lender, such that the dominance causes harm to the borrower or its
other creditors through misuse of the lender's control. A related concept is found
in English insolvency law under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986
concerning wrongful trading, which says that a director may be liable to make
"such contribution (if any) to [a] company's assets as the court thinks proper"
where a company continues to trade whilst it is insolvent.
In this context, a director includes a "shadow director", who is "... a person
in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the
company are accustomed to act (but so that a person is not deemed a shadow
director by reason only that the directors act on advice given by him in a
professional capacity)".427 The definition of shadow director (which will be
discussed below) is of potential concern to lenders, as it may apply where they
seek to have input into the management of a borrower in difficulty. An
application for wrongful trading may be brought by a liquidator on a winding
up if, under section 214(2), the following criteria are fulfilled:
(a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation (by which it is meant
that the company's assets are insufficient to pay its debts, liabilities
and the expenses of the liquidation, not that it is unable to pay its
debts428);
(b) the person, at some time prior to the winding up, knew, or ought to
have known, that there was no reasonable prospect that the company
would avoid going into insolvent liquidation; and
(c) the person was a director of the company at the time.
What the court is concerned with when making a wrongful trading order is to
ensure that any depletion in a company's assets, which are attributable to the
period after the moment when its directors knew, or ought to have known, there
was no reasonable prospe'ct of avoiding insolvent liquidation—namely, while
the company's business is being carried out at the creditors' risk—"is made
good".429
However, under subsection (3), if it can be shown that, at the relevant time,
the person "took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the
company's creditors as (assuming him to have known that there was no
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent
liquidation) he ought to have taken", then that person will be excused.
426. See In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. Inc. 893 F.2d. (5th Cir. 1990), for example.
427. Section 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
428. Section 214(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
429. Re Purpoint Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 121, at p. 128H, per Vinelott J.
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If the words of section 251 are applied literally, it is possible that a lender, in
seeking to protect its position under various security arrangements, may fall
within the definition of a "shadow director". It is suggested that the proviso in
the definition of "shadow director" would exclude professional advisers acting
in that capacity, but does not exclude lenders.430 Moreover, a lender with
security who has, for example, appointed one of its officers as its nominee on the
board of the borrower, may find it difficult to come within section 214(3); in
addition, the officer is very likely to have a conflict of interests.431
For a case of shadow directorship to succeed, four things have to be
established: (i) who the company's directors were (whether de facto or de jure)-,
(ii) that the defendant directed those directors how to act in relation to the
company; (iii) the directors did act as directed; and (iv) the directors "were
accustomed so to act".431a Thus, there needs to be "first, a board of directors
claiming and purporting to act as such; and secondly, a pattern of behaviour in
which the board did not exercise any discretion or judgment of its own, but
acted in accordance with the directions of others. "431b
In the first case on section 214, Re A Company (Number 005009 of 1987); ex
parte Copp,432 which subsequently became Re M.C. Bacon Ltd.,433 Knox J., in a
striking out application under Order 18, rule 19 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, held that the claim by the borrower's liquidator, that the steps taken by
M.C. Bacon Ltd. to implement the recommendations of its lender in the lender's
report on the company made the lender a shadow director of the company, was
not "obviously unsustainable", although his Lordship expressed no definite
opinion on the matter. Nonetheless, the significant factor is that the claim was
not rejected.434 But, at the trial before Millett J., this argument was held to be
"rightly abandoned" after six days.435 It had been anticipated that, in addition to
affidavits, there would be oral evidence supporting the company's case that the
430. See Perm, Shea and Arora, The Law Relating to Domestic Banking (1987), at para. 28.42;
and Totty and Jordan, Insolvency, at B3.14.
431. This might expose him to an action for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to make a full
disclosure, unless some form of consent is agreed at the time of his appointment. If found liable, the
officer may then seek an indemnity from his principal (the lender) but this would depend on the
circumstances.
431a. Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation) [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p. 183d-e; noted by
Turing, D., "Lender Liability, Shadow Directors and the case of Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd." [1994]
J.I.B.L. 244. The difference between a shadow director and a de facto director is explained byMillett
J.: see Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation), supra, at p. 183.
431b. Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation) [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at p. 183d-e, per
Millett J. For examples of the classic shadow director: see Sir Peter Millett, "Shadow
Directorship—A Real or Imagined Threat to Banks", Insolvency Practitioner, Jan. 1991, cited by
Fidler, P., "Banks as Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97.
432. [1989] B.C.L.C. 13.
433. [1990] B.C.C. 78.
434. Knox J., at p. 21, specifically declined to give reasons so as not to embarrass the trial judge.
435. Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 78, at p. 79.
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lender was acting as a shadow director. This did not occur, and costs were
awarded against the company on this and other points.436
The wrongful trading provision was introduced into the Insolvency Act 1986
as a result of the Cork Committee Report437—which had as a member, P.J.
Millett Q.C. (as he then was)—because it was difficult to prove a fraudulent
intent in an action for "fraudulent trading".438 The Cork Committee said that
wrongful trading will not "attach to anyone unless that person is actually party
to the company carrying on the offending business. It will not be sufficient that
he is merely privy to it."439 But, where a lender is actively involved in the
management of a borrower company in order to protect its (the lender's)
position, it may be liable—the critical factor is the degree of involvement in
440
management.
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 has, however, as referred to
previously, been considered primarily in a non-lending context by Knox J. in Re
Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd.441 and Re Produce Marketing Consortium
Ltd. (No. 2).442 These decisions have provided guidance for subsequent cases.443
The facts were that Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. ("the company")
carried on business as agents with regard to the importation of fruit. Whilst the
business was initially successful, the number of directors, its turnover and its
profitability subsequently diminished. By 1981, there were only two directors: a
Mr David and a Mr Murphy.
Owing to a failure to keep up-to-date accounts and to check their books to
ascertain the extent of trading losses sustained, coupled with an unfounded
belief in the prospect of an imminent turnaround of the company's fortunes,
Messrs David and Murphy did not—but should have—realised that by July
1986 there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvency.
Nevertheless, they allowed the company to continue trading with a foreign firm
called "Ramona", and to exceed its overdraft with the company's lender. This
overdraft was guaranteed by Mr David up to £50,000.
In February 1987, a warning from the company's auditor that the directors
might be liable for fraudulent or wrongful trading under the Insolvency Act
1986 was ignored.444 Ultimately, in October 1987, the company went into a
436. Re M.C. Bacon Ltd., supra, at p. 79.
437. Cmnd. 8558, June 1982.
438. Then under section 332 of the Companies Act 1948—now under section 213 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. An action for fraudulent trading by Barnes in Williams & Glyn [1980] Com.
L.R. 205—at a time when there was no "wrongful trading"—was unsuccessful on the evidence.
439. Cmnd. 8558, June 1982, at para. 1787.
440. See, for example, Re Tasbian Ltd. (No. 3) [1992] B.C.C. 358, where a company doctor
involved in signing company cheques and a tax scheme was held to be a "shadow director".
441. [1989] B.C.L.C. 513; also called Halls v. David andMurphy, The Times, 18 February 1989.
442. [1989] B.C.L.C. 520.
443. Re DKG Contractors Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 903; Re Purpoint Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 121; and Re
Tasbian Ltd. (No. 3) [1992] B.C.C. 358, and see case note by G. Syrota, "Insolvent Trading: Hidden
Risks for Accountants and Banks Participating in 'Workouts' " [1993] U.W.A.L.R. 329.
444. Such a warning is normally critical, and a failure to heed it, fatal (as it was for Messrs David
and Murphy).
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creditors' voluntary liquidation and a liquidator was appointed. The liquidator
wrote to the directors seeking an explanation as to why the company had
continued to trade whilst insolvent, and applied, under section 214, for an order
requiring the directors to contribute the sum of approximately £108,000 to the
assets of the company on the ground of wrongful trading.
In the first action, the directors sought to avoid liability on the basis of section
727( 1) of the Companies Act 1985,which purports to excuse negligence, default
breach of duty or trust where an officer of a company "has acted honestly and
reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case ought
fairly to be excused", either in whole or in part.
This plea was unsuccessful, and the section was held445 inapplicable since
sections 214(2)(b), (3) and (4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 are objective, whereas
section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 imposes a subjective test. Consequently,
it was difficult to see how the two could be intended to operate together. Also, it
was "virtually impossible" to look at all the circumstances of a case and see
whether a director has acted honestly and reasonably in deciding whether that
director ought to be fairly excused and, at the same time, to impute to him some
general knowledge, skill and experience, which he may well not have: this being
a different test.
Moreover, it is suggested that section 214 specifically relates to wrongful
trading and a fortiori is intended to cover the field in this area, whereas section
727, on its wording, makes no reference towrongful trading. Section 727would
appear to apply to situations other than wrongful trading, which is consistent
with Parliament having included a specific defence in section 214; if the test was
that in section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended), then section
214(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 would be irrelevant. The exemption from
liability in each section reflects these differences in ambit and intention of the
sections. But, even if section 727 was applicable, it could not be said that the
directors, in this case, had acted reasonably, and that, in all the circumstances,
they "ought fairly to be excused".
Having disposed of this preliminary defence, the main issue, of the
construction of section 214, was heard in Re Produce Marketing Consortium
Ltd. (No. 2).M6 It was held that the test to be applied by the court is one under
which "the director in question is to be judged by the standards of what can
reasonably be expected of a person fulfilling his functions, and showing
445. [1989) B.C.L.C. 513, at p. 518.
446. [1989] B.C.L.C. 520. For a discussion of section 214 and wrongful trading: see S. Gillespie,
"Wrongful Trading Policy and Practice" [1989] J.I.B.L. 269; J. Bannister, "Wrongful Trading: the
Courts Speak" (1989) Insolvency Law & Practice 30; E. Jacobs, "Putting Flesh on Wrongful
Trading" [1989] International Banking Law 22; B. Mitchell, "Wrongful Trading Implications for
Bankers" (1989) Butterworth's Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, June 1989,
251; S. Rajani, "Adjustment of Prior Transactions and Malpractice" (1989) Insolvency Law &
Practice 38; and A. Hicks, "Advising on Wrongful Trading Parts 1 and 2 (1993) 14 The Company
Lawyer 16 and 55.
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reasonable diligence in doing so".447 Thus, a lower standard is to be expected
from a small company than a larger, more sophisticated one.448 However, the
Companies Act 1985 (as amended) sets out certain minimum standards,
including an obligation to keep accounting records and to prepare a profit and
loss account for a balance sheet, as well as to present copies of the accounts for
that year ended to the company in general meeting and to deliver a copy of the
accounts to the Registrar of Companies within 10 months.449 Also, different
standards of skill are to be expected of different directors, so that a higher
standard in questions of wrongful trading will be required of a lender (or the
finance director) than of a director with less financial acumen—"the man on the
Clapham omnibus".
The director's knowledge—either actual or constructive—that there is no
reasonable prospect of the company not going into insolvent liquidation is not
limited to the documentarymaterial available at the relevant time. The reference
in section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 to facts which a director of a
company not only ought to know, but also ought to ascertain—such wording
does not appear in subsection (2)(b)—indicates that not only is information
actually present to be included, but also information which, given reasonable
diligence and an appropriate level of general knowledge, skill and experience, is
ascertainable by the directors.450
Consequently, on the evidence, it was held Messrs Murphy and David knew
that the year prior to January 1987 had been a very bad one. They had a close
and intimate knowledge of the business and knew when turnover was up or
down. A large decline in turnover meant a substantial loss, and hence a
substantial increase in the deficit of assets over liabilities. This was the directors'
actual knowledge. With regard to the knowledge and matters they should have
ascertained, Knox J. concluded that, once the loss in the year ending 30
September 1985 was incurred, the company was in an irreversible decline and
the directors ought to have concluded at the end of July 1986 that there was no
reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation, and that the
question of minimising loss was inapplicable.
From a lender's perspective, requests for management accounts and other
financial data under a loan agreement amount to constructive (if not actual)
knowledge of a company's financial status where a lender is taking a more than
passive interest in a borrower's business so as to protect its loan, and has
undertaken an active management role by having its own representatives on the
borrower's board.
447. At p. 550—this is with respect to subsection 214(4)(a).
448. At p. 550.
449. At p. 550; see sections 221(1) and (2)(a), 227(1) and (3), 241(1) and (3) and section 242(1)
and (2) of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended).
450. At p. 550.
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Section 214451 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is a compensatory, rather than
penal, provision.4" A director is liable for "the amount by which the company's
assets can be discerned to have been depleted by the director's conduct".453 The
"very wide words of discretion" chosen by Parliament meant, in Knox J.'s view,
it was not desirable to spell out the limits of such discretion, although, in
determining a director's contribution, it is not wrong to take into account that
there has been no fraudulent intent.454
In exercising his discretion under section 214(1), Knox J., in Re Produce
Marketing, considered the following factors relevant:
(a) this was a case of failure to appreciate what should have been clear,
rather than of deliberate wrongdoing;
(b) that where statements of fact are made which are positively untrue, this
is to be held against the maker;
(c) the ignoring of the auditor's warning in early February 1987;
(d) thatMr David had given a guarantee to the lender, limited to £50,000.
The lender had a charge over anything which Mr David orMr Murphy
contributed, pursuant to the order of the court. Pro tanto, this would
relieve Mr David from his guarantee liability;
(e) the lender was substantially, if not fully, secured. If the jurisdiction of
the court is to be exercised, then it needs to be exercised in a way that
will be of benefit to unsecured creditors; and
(f) there was unclear evidence regarding the disappearance of debtors
from the statement of affairs.455
Taking all these matters into account, the two directors were ordered to
contribute £75,000.
Various commentators have questioned whether any contributions recovered
are "pooled" for the benefit of all creditors, or whether they are subject to any
floating charges (which is the traditional rule).456 At one point, Knox J. appears
to accept secured creditors have priority, as he takes into account Mr David's
£50,000 guarantee liability to the lender and says the lender held a charge over
everything Messrs David and Murphy contributed to the company's assets, with
a consequential reduction in the former's guarantee liability. However, his
Lordship went on to state that, if the jurisdiction under section 214 is to be
exercised, "it needs to be exercised in a way which will benefit unsecured
creditors".457 It is to be hoped this potential uncertainty will be clarified in
subsequent decisions, as it is possible for a lender to be both a shadow director
451. At p. 553.
452. See also Re DKG Contractors Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 903.
453. Ibid.
454. At p. 553f.
455. At pp. 553-554.
456. See Bannister, supra, at p. 32, and Mitchell, supra, at pp. 251-252.
457. At p. 554.
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and a secured creditor, with a resultant contribution and distribution.458 It
would seem that the debenture holder's interests would prevail under the
normal order of priorities. Nonetheless, it would be unusual for a liquidator,
who is the only person who can bring such a claim, and who acts on behalf of the
unsecured creditors, to bring an action for the benefit of the floating charge
holder, bearing in mind the question of cost of such an action. It is more
consistent with the nature and duties of the liquidator for such an action to be
brought for the benefit of the general body of creditors, rather than a secured
creditor, whose claim to priority of payment (including those under a floating
charge) a liquidator often seeks to defeat.4S9
The approach of Knox J. in Re Produce Marketing Consortium,460 of
equating wrongful trading with misfeasance, is, with respect, open to doubt,461
as section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, unlike section 212, does not refer to
breach of duty, but looks at "any potential loss to the company's creditors462; in
misfeasance actions, it has been held that proceeds from such an action must be
applied against the amount owing to the debenture holder.463 Wheeler464 argues
that a wrongful trading action is more akin to a preference action (in which it has
been held465 that proceeds of recovery go to the general body of creditors), as
both are only triggered by liquidation and only apply to liquidators.
This is also consistent with the view of Vinelott J. in Re Purpoint466 that the
purpose of wrongful trading is to recoup any loss to the company in order to
benefit the creditors as a whole, and that the court cannot direct payment to one
class of creditors in preference to another.
Since Re Produce Marketing,467 and the dismissal of the shadow directorship
claim in Re M.C. Bacon,468 there has been judicial support for the view that it is
very unlikely that lenders will be shadow directors.
First, Sir Peter Millett, writing extra-judicially,469 has said the possibility of a
lender being a shadow director is very remote and the lender would have to go
outside the normal lender/customer relationship. His Lordship distinguished
between monitoring a financially troubled borrower's business, which is
permissible, and interfering in its management or seeking to manage it, which is
458. Quaere: whether this might not be a case of the lender benefiting from its own wrongdoing?
459. See sections 238, 239, and 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986, for example.
460. [1989] 5 B.C.C. 399.
461. See S. Wheeler, "Swelling the Assets for Distribution in Corporate Insolvency" [1993] J.B.L.
256, at p. 265.
462. Which should be interpreted to mean all creditors.
463. Re Anglo-Austrian Printing [1985] 2 Ch. 891.
464. Supra, at pp. 265-266.
465. Re Yagerphone [1920] 1 Ch. 392.
466. [1991] B.C.C. 121.
467. [1989] B.C.L.C. 520.
468. [1990] B.C.C. 78.
469. "Shadow Directorship—A Real or Imagined Threat to Banks", The Insolvency Practitioner,
Jan. 1991, noted by P. Fidler, "Banks as Shadow Directors" [1992] J.I.B.L. 97, at pp. 98-99. It has
been said this article was the judgment Millett J. wanted to write in M.C. Bacon Ltd., supra, where
the point was abandoned: see Fidler, supra, at p. 98.
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not. The concept of shadow directorship relates to the situation where the board
as a whole abandons its decision-making role and becomes accustomed to
following a third party's orders; it does not refer to the situation where one
person is on the board to do what someone else wants him to do. The shadow
director is consciously controlling the mind of the company via board
decisions.4693 It is not enough for the lender to be constituted a shadow director
for it to attach conditions to continued financial support—e.g. further security, a
reduction in the borrower's overdraft, the sending in of an investigation team, a
call for (further) financial information and advice on strengthening capital—
which conditions may be commercially sensible and leave the customer with no
option if it wishes to continue trading. The critical point is that it is the
company's directors—and not the lender—who make the decision regarding
whether the company continues to trade. If the lender makes the decision, then it
has stepped out of the lender/customer relationship to take on a management
role, and so is responsible as a shadow director. It was the participation in the
management of a borrower company by a "company doctor", who signed
cheques and devised a scheme involving company employees to lessen the
company's tax, that led to him being found liable as a shadow director in Re
Tasbian Ltd. (No. 3).470 The difficult line between being a watchdog imposed by
an outside investor and a shadow director471 had been crossed.
The second development is the advice of the Privy Council in Kuwait Asia
Bank E.C. v. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd.,472 where their Lordships
considered the position of two lender nominee directors of a company in the
context of, inter alia, section 2(1) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1955 (as
amended) which is similar to section 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and defined
"director" as: "A person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the
persons occupying the position of directors of a company are accustomed to
act."
The facts of the case were that a lender was beneficially interested in a
company (AICS) which carried on the business of a money broker. The company
had five directors—two of whom, A and H, were employees of the lender and
were nominated by the lender to AICS's board. Under a trust deed, the plaintiff
was appointed the depositors' trustee and AICS agreed to provide the plaintiff
with monthly and quarterly certificates on behalf of the directors. Certificates
were furnished, but these were inaccurate. This resulted in AICS going into
liquidation, and the plaintiff settled actions brought against it by the unsecured
creditors. The plaintiff then sought to sue, inter alia, the lender (as well as the
directors A and H personally for breach of duty) for a contribution.
Their Lordships advised that the lender was not vicariously liable for the acts
469a. See Millett J. in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. (in liquidation) [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180, at
p. 183d-e.
470. (1992) B.C.C. 358 (C.A.).
471. See Vineiott J., at first instance [1991] B.C.L.C. 792, at p. 802.
472. (1991] 1 A.C. 187 (P.C.).
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and omissions of A and H, as those appointing directors owe no duty (in the
absence of bad faith or fraud) to see they discharge their duties, although
self-interest may dictate that the appointer checks to see that the directors carry
out their duties properly; and that any breach of duty by A and H was done in
their personal capacity as directors (agents) of AICS, and not as agents of the
lender.473
On the main issue in this context, whether the lender was a "shadow director"
under the New Zealand equivalent of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Judicial
Committee dismissed this claim too. Their Lordships opined that A and H
constituted two out of the five directors (the others being appointed by the other
major shareholder in AICS); and there was no allegation (which was inherently
unlikely) "that the directors in these circumstances were accustomed to act on
the direction or instruction of the [lender]".474 Consequently, no claim arose.
The position is well summarised in the following passage:
"In the absence of fraud or bad faith on the part of the [lender], no liability attached to the
[lender] in favour of the plaintiff for any instruction or advice given by the [lender] to [H]
and [A]. Of course, it was in the interests of the [lender] to give good advice and see that
[H] and [A] conscientiously and competently performed their duties both under the trust
deed and as directors of A.I.C.S. But such advice is not attributable to any duty owed by
the [lender] to the plaintiff, which was only entitled to the protection which the trust deed
provided, namely quarterly certificates furnished on behalf of all the directors ofA.I.C.S.
By the trust deed the directors of A.I.C.S. accepted and assumed responsibility for the
quarterly certificates, and the directors did not include the [lender]. The Companies Act
1955 [for which one may read the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK)] can not alter the
construction of the trust deed or impose on the [lender] a duty assumed by [H] and [A] but
never assumed by the [lender]."475
Itwill be seen that, as a result of the views ofMillett J. and the Privy Council, the
great fear of lenders of liability as shadow directors when acting, normally, in
either of two scenarios476—setting down conditions for continued lending
facilities or appointing nominees to the board of the borrower—is now much
more remote. It would seem that, whilst personal liability might arise for the
nominee directors, the lender will not be vicariously liable unless it seeks to
obtain "an improper advantage" for itself or causes the borrower harm or
interferes with the bowower; or, when simply imposing conditions on a
borrower, the lender goes beyond monitoring the company and starts to be
involved in the management of the company.
One possible side effect of lenders being held to be shadow directors is that it
may inhibit rescue attempts of companies in difficulties who, ironically, will seek
and need a lender's assistance. Ironically, this would be against the spirit and
intent of the Cork Committee and the Insolvency Act 1986.
473. At pp. 222-223.
474. At p. 223G. This is similar to Millett J.'s view.
475. At p. 224A-C.
476. Cf. the position in the USA, in the context of environmental liability, where the lender goes
beyond enforcing its security and becomes involved in management.
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To avoid being regarded as giving directions or instructions, prudent lenders
should couch all discussions as advice. But the danger remains that a director
may say on oath that he felt he was being told what to do by the lender.477
PREFERENCES: SECTION 239 OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT
1986
The provision in the United States' Federal Bankruptcy Laws stating that a
90-day preference may be extended to one year where a person has "insider
status", is similar to the extension of a preference period from sixmonths to two
years under section 239 and section 240(1 )(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, where
a preference is given to a "connected person". A person is "connected with a
company" if he is a director478 or shadow director479 or an associate480 of the
company. It is being connected with a company as shadow director which is of
most relevance and concern to lenders, as mentioned above. Section 239,
relating to preferences—which also applies when a transaction is at an
undervalue, pursuant to section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986—was originally
considered in Re M.C. Bacon Ltd.4Si (as was section 238). In a very carefully
reasoned judgment, Millett J. examined the meaning of "preference", as defined
in section 239(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. That section provides:
"For the purposes of this section and section 241, a company gives a preference to a
person if—
(a) that person is one of the company's creditors or a surety or guarantor for any of
the company's debts or other liabilities, and
(b) the company does anything or suffers anything to be done which (in either case)
has the effect of putting that person into a position which, in the event of the
company going into insolvent liquidation, will be better than the position he
would have been in if that thing had not been done."
Subsection (5) goes on to state that the company which gave the preference
had to be "influenced in deciding to give it by a desire to produce in relation to
that person the effect mentioned in subsection (4)(b)".
Millett J. noted that this was the first case under the new section and
attempted to provide some guidance.482 His Lordship was "emphatically"
against the citation of cases under the previous legislation, as the language of the
477. Penn, Shea and Arora, The Law Relating to Domestic Banking (1987), at para. 28.42. In a
striking out application before Knox J. in Re A Company (No. 005009 of 1987); ex parte Copp
[1989] B.C.L.C. 13, itwas hoped oral evidencewould provide the key to a claim that the lenderwas a
shadow director (although this proved not to be the case: see Re M.C. Bacon Ltd., supra, at p. 79).
478. Section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
479. Section 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
480. Section 435 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
481. [1990] B.C.C. 78. See case notes by M. Taylor, "Bacon—Well Done" (1990) B.J.I.B.F.L.
212; and Professor I.F. Fletcher, Insolvency Section [1990] J.B.L. 70.
482. At p. 87A.
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statute had "been so completely and deliberately changed".483 Under the new
legislation, the court is to enquire whether the company's decision was
"influenced by a desire to produce the effect mentioned in subsection (4)(b)",
not whether there was "a dominant intention" to prefer a creditor. This is a
"completely different test" involving "at least two radical departures". First, "a
dominant intention to prefer" does not have to be established—it is "sufficient
that the decision was influenced by the requisite desire"484 to improve a
creditor's position in an insolvent liquidation. Secondly, there has to be a desire
to produce the effect mentioned in subsection (4)(b), rather than an intention to
prefer.485 This is a subjective test,486 whereas the previous test was objective,487
and, it is suggested, entails a higher threshold as far as the lender is concerned. In
the case of a connected person, the burden of proof is shifted so it rests on the
connected person.488
Hence, a transaction will only be set aside under the new legislation if "the
company positively wished to improve the creditor's position in the event of its
own insolvent liquidation".489 Evidence of this does not have to be direct, it can
be inferred. Nonetheless, the requisite desire alone is not enough. The desire has
to be influenced by the decision to enter into the transaction. This desire will
only be one of the factors operating on directors' minds—it does not have to be
the sole, or even the decisive, factor. If it were, then this would be too high a
test.490
On the facts of the case, Millett J. found that the director of the company who
was dealingwith the lender was "not actuated by desire to improve the [lender's]
position as a creditor in the event of the company's liquidation".491 The director
was responsible for ensuring the company did what he told the lender it would
do, namely, give the lender a debenture492 (which, of itself, involves more
stringent security than a mortgage, and the power to appoint an administrative
receiver).
483. At p. 87D. See also Re Beacon Leisure Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 213, at p. 215, per RobertWright
Q.C. (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) and Mummery J. in Re Fairway Magazines Ltd. [1992]
B.C.C. 924, at p. 927H.
484. Ibid., at p. 87E.
485. Ibid. See also [1991] B.C.C. 213, at p. 216B.
486. In Re Maxwell Communications Corp. pic (No. 2) [1992] B.C.C. 757, at p. 760H,
Hoffmann J. (as he was), whose judgment was approved on appeal (see same reference), said liability
for a preference depended on "the subjective intentions of the person who made the payment" and
cited Re M.C. Bacon Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 78.
487. At p. 87F. This distinction between an intention (which is objective) and a desire to influence
(which is subjective), made by Millett J. in Re M.C. Bacon, supra, was said by Robert Wright Q.C.
(sitting as a deputy High Court judge) in Re Beacon Leisure, supra, at p. 216C, to be a distinction
which might be small in many cases.
488. Section 239(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986; and see Re Fairway Magazines Ltd. [1992]
B.C.C. 924, at p. 929E and Re Beacon Leisure Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 213.
489. At p. 88A.
490. At p. 88C.
491. At p. 91G.
492. At p. 91F.
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Since ReM.C. Bacon Ltd., two other cases have come before the courts493 and
in both instances it was decided that there was no intention to prefer. In the
second of these cases, Re Fairway Magazines Ltd.,494 the facts were not
untypical. A company in financial trouble was given a loan by one of its
directors. In return, the company granted a debenture. The loan was to be repaid
in instalments to its lender in reduction of the company's overdraft with the
lender; this overdraft was guaranteed by the director, who increased the limit of
this guarantee. The company made two payments to the lender, the effect of
which was to reduce the director's exposure under his guarantee.
Five months later, the company went into voluntary liquidation and the
debenture was challenged by the liquidator.
Mummery J. held that the presumption of an intention to prefer under section
239(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986 had been rebutted, as the company's purpose
in granting the debenture was a commercial one so it could raise money from a
source other than its lender, who was wanting the overdraft repaid, so that the
company could keep trading.
His Lordship, after reviewing the authorities,495 laid out the following
propositions496:
(1) The new test under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is whether
the decision to give security was influenced by a desire to improve the
position of the creditor in an insolvent liquidation, and is "completely
different" from the previous position.
(2) This desire is subjective and, thus, there may be "no direct evidence" of
the giver's state of mind, although it may be inferred from the
circumstances.
(3) If security is granted for "proper commercial considerations" and not
by a "positive wish" to improve the position of a creditor in an
insolvent liquidation, the security is valid. But, that such a wish is
sufficient to invalidate the security because the intention to prefer
"does not have to be the sole or decisive influence on the decision".
(4) The relevant time is not the date of execution of the security, but the
time when the decision to grant it was made (i.e. at a board meeting) or
in negotiations.
What is now clear is that, when a lender takes a debenture from a borrower in a
493. Re Beacon Leisure Ltd. [1991] B.C.C. 213, and Re Fairway Magazines Ltd. [1992] B.C.C.
924. See also National Bank ofKuwait v. Menzies [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 306, at p. 319, per Balcombe
L.J.
494. [1992] B.C.C. 924.
495. Re M.C. Bacon, supra, and Re Beacon Leisure Ltd., supra.
496. At pp. 929G-930A.
92 LENDER LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
rescue situation, the lender's security is unlikely to be successfully challenged,
and the lender will not be exposed to the risk of being unsecured.
TRANSACTIONS AT UNDERVALUE: SECTION 238 OF THE
INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
Under section 238(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986, a transaction is at
undervalue—and can be set aside under section 241—if:
"(a) the company makes a gift to [a] person or otherwise enters into a transaction with
that person on terms that provide for the company to receive no consideration, or
(b) the company enters into a transactionwith that person for a consideration the value
of which, in money or money's worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or
money's worth, of the consideration provided by the company."
To come within the section, six requirements need to be fulfilled:
(i) the transaction was entered into by the company;
(ii) for a consideration;
(iii) the value of which measured in money or money's worth;
(iv) is significantly less than the value;
(v) also measured in money or money's worth;
(vi) of the consideration provided by the company.497
Thus, there must be a comparison between the value the company obtained for
the transaction and the value of the consideration the company provided. These
values have to be measurable in "money or money's worth" and are to be
regarded from the company's point of view.498
Applying this criteria to the facts of Re M.C. Bacon Ltd., Millett J. held that
granting a debenture was not a gift and it was not without consideration: the
consideration being the lender's forbearance from calling in the overdraft and its
honouring cheques and making fresh advances to the company during the
period of the lender's facility.499 Creating a security over a company's assets does
not deplete them or diminish their value and does not fall within section
238(4).500
The charging of assets appropriates them to meet liabilities agreed to the other
secured creditors and adversely affects the rights of other creditors in a winding
up. The right to redeem and to sell or remortgage the charged assets is retained.
What the company loses is its ability to apply the proceeds for a purpose
497. At p. 92C-D.
498. At p. 92E.
499. Ibid.
500. At p. 92E. Cf. the view of N. Segal, "Rehabilitation and Approaches Other Than Formal
Insolvency": ch. 8 in Banks and Remedies (R. Cranston, ed.) (Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., 1992),
at p. 157.
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otherwise than satisfying the secured debt. It is not something capable of
valuation in monetary terms and is not usually disposed of for value.501
Upon this basis, Millett J. concluded that no loss was suffered as a result of
granting the debenture. Rather, once the debenture was demanded, the
company was not able to sell or charge its assets without applying the proceeds
in reduction of its overdraft. If it had tried to do so, then it would have called in
the overdraft. By granting the security, "the company parted with nothing of
value, and the value of the consideration which it received in return was
incapable of being measured in money or money's worth".502
As the transaction did not fall within subsection (4), it was unnecessary to
consider the defence in subsection (5)503 of entering into the transaction in good
faith and believing it would benefit the company, which, it is submitted, would
apply to most lenders.
The decision, on both sections 238 and 239, will be welcomed by lenders
because merely taking a debenture will not, on,a liquidation, mean that the
lender will have its security set aside or dealt with under section 241 of the
Insolvency Act 1986. For borrowers, it means that a lender will be more likely to
lend them money since it can be secured, and the fear of a security going back for
a period of two years being set aside under section 240 is reduced.
One matter not addressed in the M.C. Bacon case, which still has to be tested
judicially under section 238, is the question of "upstream guarantees" (where a
subsidiary guarantees its parent's obligations).
INADVERTENT PARTNERSHIPS
It is less likely that there will be an unwitting partnership between a borrower
and a lender under English law than under United States law, as the terms of a
loan facility letter will normally clearly express the relationship between the
parties as being lender and borrower—sometimes containing a provision stating
that there is no partnership between the parties, though this is not conclusive.
They will not be two or more persons carrying on business with a view to profit,
as outlined in section 1 (1) of the Partnership Act 1890 and the case law.504 There
is no mutuality between the parties. Also, unlike partners, they will not be in a
fiduciary relationship. Moreover, even if there is a loan to a business to be repaid
out of profits, this does not give rise to a partnership, and is expressly exempted
501. At p. 92F.
502. At p. 92G.
503. At p. 92H.
504. See also Cox v. Hickman (1860) 8 H.L. Cases 268; and Davis v. Davis [1894] Ch. 393. See
also the High Court of Australia in Canny Gabriel Castle Jackson Advertising Pty. Ltd. v. Volume
Sales (Finance) Pty. Ltd. (1974) 131 C.L.R. 321.
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by section 2(3)(d) of the Partnership Act 1890. Consequently, the lender will not
be jointly liable for the borrower's debts under section 9 of the Partnership Act
1890.
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT BARGAINS/EXCLUSION CLAUSES
There are two matters to be discussed here briefly: (1) extortionate credit
bargains and (2) the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, as they may affect a
lender's liability or position in relation to a borrower.
(1) Extortionate credit bargains: section 138 of the Consumer Credit Act
1974 and section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986
Under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 ("CCA"), if a credit bargain is
extortionate, the credit agreement may be reopened.505 However, a commercial
loan is unlikely to be affected, as the CAA only applies to transactions up to
£15,000, and does not apply to companies. A credit bargain is extortionate,
under section 138(1) of the CCA, if it: (i) is grossly exorbitant; or (ii) otherwise
grossly contravenes the ordinary principles of fair dealing.
In assessing whether a credit bargain is extortionate, a court will look at
factors such as the prevailing interest rate in the marketplace; the amount of
credit sought; the term of the loan; the equity available; the speed with which the
loan is required; the availability of other sources of finance; and the personal
financial circumstances of a borrower (an individual).506
But, sums are not "grossly exorbitant" merely because they are greater than
what the court would regard as "fairly due and reasonable".507 And, just
because a transaction is unwise or imprudent, does not mean it is
extortionate.508
Cases falling within section 138 would be those approaching undue
influence.509 In Coldunell Ltd. v. Gallon,510 the Court of Appeal held—in a claim
for equitable relief by way of avoidance of a charge where a son had exercised an
influence over his parents—that, as there was nothing unusual about the loan
because the rate (20 per cent) was not unreasonable and the lender had acted in
the way an ordinary commercial lender would be expected to act, the lender had
discharged the burden of proof and the agreement was not extortionate within
the meaning of section 138(1 )(b) of the CCA.
505. As defined in section 9 of the CCA; see L. Bentley, and G.G. Howells, "Judicial Treatment of
Extortionate Credit Bargains" [1989] The Conveyancer 164 and 234.
506. Section 138(2)—(5) of the CCA. On this area: see generally, Professor R. Goode, Consumer
Credit Law (1989), Ch. 32.
507. First National Securities Ltd. v. Bertrand (1978), unreported decision of the County Court.
508. Willis v. Wood, The Times, 24 March 1984.
509. See Lord Denning M.R. in Avon Finance Company Ltd. v. Bridget [1985] 2 All E.R. 281, at
p. 286.
510. [1986] Q.B. 1184 (C.A.).
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A similar, and more relevant, provision in the context of a commercial loan is
section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986—although the case law on the CCA
should be used as a guide. Pursuant to subsection (3), a transaction is
extortionate if either it: (a) requires "grossly exorbitant payments to be made";
or (b) "otherwise grossly contravene[s] ordinary principles of fair dealing". The
section goes on to say there is a presumption that the transaction is extortionate,
if an application is made. The section applies when the party to a transaction is
involved in the provision of credit to a company.511 The court may make an
order with respect to a transaction if the transaction is exorbitant, and may go
back for a period of three years from the date of an administration order or
liquidation.512 This will have serious repercussions for a lender. An order under
this section may include setting aside the transaction513; varying the terms of the
transaction or any security514; and repayment of any sums paid.515
As to what will constitute an extortionate ratd" is not fully clear, as it is to be
decided on a case by case basis. In cases under section 138 of the CCA, rates of
42 per cent per annum secured and 25.78 per cent per annum secured have been
held not to be extortionate.516 Also, Sir Gordon Borrie Q.C., when he was the
Director General of the Office of Fair Trading, said that he was not in favour of
capping interest rates in credit transactions, so that rates of 100 per cent or more
should not be outlawed, provided they were freely entered into.517
(2) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
Its basic thrust concerns attempts by one party to a contract to exclude or limit
its liability for negligence or breach of contract to the other party. There is a
requirement of "reasonableness" which any limitation or exclusion must
meet.518 The Act would apply to disclaimers by lenders (such as the one in
Hedley Byrne) for customer references519; or where a lender is advising a client
and seeks to exclude or limit its liability—this will be particularly so in large
transactions.
In Smith v. Eric S. Bush,520 the House of Lords considered the effect of a
disclaimer clause in relation to a negligent valuation of a property by a surveyor.
Lord Griffiths521 listed four factors which should be considered in determining
511. Section 244(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
512. Section 244(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
513. Section 244(2)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
514. Section 244(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
515. Section 244(2)(c) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
516. See Woodstead Finance Ltd. v. Petrou, The Times, 23 January 1986; and Davies v.
Directloans Ltd. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 823, respectively.
517. The Times, 28 September 1991.
518. See sections 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 11; and see section 11 regarding reasonableness. For a full
treatment of this Act: see Chitty, at paras. 982-1029.
519. A lender must be careful not to defame a customer.
520. [1990] 1 A.C. 831 (H.L.(E.)).
521. [1990] 1 A.C. 831, at p. 858.
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whether a disclaimer is reasonable, although these are not exhaustive. First,
whether the parties are of equal bargaining power. If it is a "one-off" situation
between parties of equal bargaining power (such as a lender and a large public
limited company), the requirement of reasonableness will be more easily
discharged than where the borrower has no effective power to object. Secondly,
whether it is reasonably practicable to obtain advice from an alternative source,
taking into account considerations of cost and time. Thirdly, the difficulty of the
task to be undertaken for which it is sought to exclude liability. If the
undertaking involved is very difficult or dangerous, with a high risk of failure,
this is an indication of the reasonableness of excluding, or limiting, liability as a
condition of doing the work. Thus, work at the lower end of a person's
professional expertise is less likely to be excluded. Fourthly, the practical
consequences of the decision on the question of reasonableness. This involves
the sums of money potentially at stake and the ability of the parties to bear the
loss involved through insurance. Normally, professional men insure themselves
and so the availability and cost of insurance is a relevant factor in considering
which of the two parties should bear the risk of the loss.
Lord Griffiths did not believe that it would be unreasonable in all
circumstances for professional men to exclude or limit their liability for
negligence. Where a transaction involves "breathtaking sums of money",522
which may turn upon professional advice for which it would be impossible to
obtain adequate insurance cover and which would ruin the adviser if held
personally liable, it may be reasonable to give advice on a no-liability basis or to
limit liability to the extent of the adviser's insurance cover.523
The last observation will be particularly relevant to lenders advising on, for
example, takeovers, mergers or flotations, where "breathtaking sums of
money" are involved.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
The primary concern for English and Welsh lenders who have taken security
over the borrower's land, is being made liable for an environmental clean-up,
owing to the land being contaminated, when they seek to enforce their security
and become a mortgagee in possession after the borrower has defaulted. This
concern is based on the situation in the United States under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 1980 ("CERCLA" or
the "Superfund legislation"), which was resulted in environmental clean-up
liability for lenders.524
522. At p. 859.
523. Ibid.
524. Environment in this contextmeans any of the medium of land, air and the sea: see section 1 of
the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
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United States position
In the United States, under the Superfund, liability is retrospective and is not
dependent on guilt; it is joint and several and applies to persons who are owners
or operators of contaminated sites; and is guided by the polluter pays principle.
However, there is an exemption—known as the "secured creditors'
exemption"—for those who hold the "indicia of ownership",525 but do not
participate in management of the debtor.526 Thus, secured creditors who are
seeking to enforce their security are exempt.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA") has a fund
for the purposes of clean-ups estimated at approximately US$1.8bn, but seeks to
recover a contribution from "potentially responsible parties", i.e. owners and
operators (which includes lenders), particularly as the cost of clean-ups is
estimated to be approximately US$31m for each'site.527
The main problems in the United States have occurred when a lender has gone
outside the normal loan monitoring process and either has sought to participate
in the management of the borrower or has tried to purchase the property it had
security over.528 The lender is thus acquiring an asset: not enforcing its security.
Case law has indicated that where a lender merely monitors a borrower's
financial progress, it is not participating in the borrower's management, and
comes within the exemption.529 However, the decision in the celebrated case of
U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp.,530 in which the court applied a test, in relation to
participating in management, of the "capacity to influence", caused
consternation in lending ranks.531 Thus, a lender could be liable if its
525. This phrase refers to "evidence of interest in real or personal property held as security for a
loan or other obligation, including title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure
or its equivalent", and includes: mortgages, liens, hypothecs, conditional sales, trust receipt
transactions, factoring agreements, certain assignments, which are regarded as bona fide security
interests: see United States Environmental Protection Agency Rule on the interpretation of
CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,334 (29 April 1992).
526. Section 101(20)(A).
527. Financial Times, 13 April 1994, at p. 22.
528. Such a case is US v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mid. 1986). This is
highly questionable under English law, which requires that an auction has to be an independent
bargain, in good faith and one in which reasonable precautions have been taken: see Tse Kwong Lam
v. Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1349 (P.C.) and the High Court of Australia in ANZ Banking
Group Ltd. v. Bangadilly Pastoral Co. Pty. Ltd. (1976-77) 139 C.L.R. 195.
529. See US v. Mirabile 15 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst) 20,992WL 97 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6,1985), in
which a distinction was drawn between: (i) limiting participation to financial aspects of
management; and (ii) participating in the "nuts and bolts, day to day production aspects of the
business"—the latter being outside the statute, the former being within it; and Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating and Manufacturing Co. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
530. 901 F.2D 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). See the discussion of this case in "Cleaning up the Debris
after Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest Exemption" (1991) Notes
section, 104 Harvard Law Review 1249; and P. Shively, "An Alternative Analysis of Lender
Liability and The Fleet Factors Decision: Practical Policy or Pariah?" (1991) Wisconsin Law Review
743.
531. Ibid., at p. 1557.
98 LENDER LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
involvement with the debtor/borrower was "sufficiently broad to support the
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
chose".532 Whilst the decision to impose liability was correct on the case's
facts—there was a factoring agreement which allowed Fleet Factors to approve
the goods which were shipped and set their price; also, it could supervise office
administration, taxation forms and redundancy, as well as control access to the
loan facility—the wide test used by the court had potential problems for the
lending community.
The position was later rectified somewhat in Re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,533
where the court said it was what the lender actually did which was important:
not what it could do. Thus, investigating a borrower prior to granting a loan
facility and retaining a right to re-enter the borrower's premises and foreclose
upon default, were held to be essential steps in normal lending practice; it was
said that the secured lender exemption would be meaningless if these steps were
considered "participating in management". But, when Fleet Factors went on
appeal to the Supreme Court, the court let it stand.534
The USEPA, aware of these difficulties, has issued a Rule,535 which whilst not
having judicial or legislative effect, may control the threshold question of the
number.536 The Rule seeks to clarify what is regarded as monitoring a loan's
progress and participation in management, as well as setting a timetable for
selling secured property so that a distinction can be drawn between lenders who
hang on to property awaiting a pick up in the market and those who are seeking
to acquire the property.
The other issue that the USEPA raised was the question of unjust
enrichment537when the lender has the benefit of a cleaned-up property, although
the lender is not guilty of any polluting, and the result is that the property is
likely to have increased saleability and at a higher price. The amount of the
enrichment is not spelt out, but it is submitted that the correct measure
532. Ibid., at pp. 1557-1558.
533. 910 F.2d. 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
534. Cert, denied 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
535. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (29 April 1992) ("USEPA Rule"). For a discussion of this rule: see A.K.
Obermann and R. Arnold, "Environmental Regulation—EPA Proposed Rule Clarifying Lender
Liability" [1991] J.I.B.L. 371; W.R. Buck and M.M. Drough, "United States Environmental
Protection Agency's Secured Lender Rule: Limitations to Superfund Exposure for Financial
Institutions" [1992] J.I.B.L. 262; S.M. Campbell and F.J. Quinn, "Lender Liability in the US for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup: New Proposed Rule Concerning Secured Creditor Exemption"
International Business LawyerOct. 1991,448; L.S. Zimmerman, J.B. Ruhl and J.L. McQuaid, "The
US EPA Moves to Protect Financial Institutions from Superfund Liability" UKELA JournalWinter
1992-93, 53; and S.M. Taber, "Lender Liability Rules" International Business Lawyer Jan. 1993,
19.
536. In Kelly and Chemical Manufacturers Association v. E.P.A., the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that the USEPA Rule was not binding on the courts, who were responsible for
statutory interpretation: judgment delivered on 4 February 1994; noted [1994] J.I.B.L. N-116. See
other cases and comments referred to in [1994] J.I.B.L. N-116.
537. Ibid., at p. 1116. See also US v.Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
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is the difference between the price of the property before clean-up and the price
after.
The Superfund legislation and its cost—particularly for lenders and
insurers—has been criticised and there are proposals for reform.538
English law
With this in mind, the British Parliament has not brought into force section 61 of
the Environmental Protection Act 1990 ("EPA") imposing liability to pay the
costs of an environmental clean-up on "the owner for the time being" of
contaminated land; it has also commissioned Consultation Papers by the
Department of the Environment in England and Wales entitled, "Paying For
Our Past",539 and a separate, but parallel, review by the Scottish Office, called,
"Contaminated Land Clean-up & Control", both of which reported in March
1994.540
Section 61 of the EPA
With regard to section 61 of the EPA, the perceived difficulty was that the key
concept of "owner for the time being" was not defined, in contrast to the
predecessor Act,541 in which "owner" had been defined in terms of someonewho
would be entitled to receive the rack rent for the property either on their own
behalf or for another person.542 There was, therefore, uncertainty whether
"owner" was to be a wider concept543 than before, and whether itwould include
a mortgagee in possession (which it is felt it would do).544
This problem seems to have been recognised in "Paying For Our Past".545 The
538. See Financial Times, 4 May 1994, at p. 21 and The Economist, 21 May 1994, at pp.
107-108.
539. This paper has been commented upon in Financial Times, 9 March 1994, and 4 May 1994 on
p. 21. See also The Economist, 21 May 1994, pp. 107-108.
540. For a fuller discussion of environmental law: see W. Jarvis Q.C., M. Fordham and D.
Wolfson, infra, Ch. 10 hereof, Jarvis Q.C. and Fordham, Lender Liability: environmental risk and
debt (1993, Cameron May), Chapter 5; S. Troman, "The Relevance of Environmental Law for
Banks" [1990] J.I.B.L. 433; A. Bryce, "Environmental Liability: Practical Issues for Lenders" [1992]
J.LB.L. 131; and M. Redman, "Environmental Law for Bankers and Insolvency Practitioners"
[1993] J.LB.L. 85. For a lender's perspective: see E. Welch and A. Parker, "A Bank's View of Lender
Liability in Environmental Legislation" [1993] J.LB.L. 217.
541. The Control of Pollution Act 1974. See also the Water Act 1990.
542. As Bryce notes, this is a common definition in Planning and Public Health Acts: see A. Bryce,
"Environmental Liability: Practical Issues for Lenders" [1992] J.LB.L. 131, at p. 134.
543. See Jarvis Q.C. and Fordham, supra, at Ch. 9.
544. See Jarvis Q.C. and Fordham, supra, at p. 143; A. Bryce, "Environmental Liability: Practical
Issues for Lenders" [1992] J.LB.L. 131, at p. 134; and M. Redman, "Environmental Law for
Bankers and Insolvency Practitioners" [1993] J.LB.L. 85, at p. 87.
545. At para. 3.21, but note that there is reference to "a similar, long established term" in section
81(4) of the EPA. In the Scottish Review, at para. 92, it is stated that section 61 of the EPA required
amendment and a transfer of responsibilities and should not become law until this was done. See also
para. 88.
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Government has said that it does not want to have the problems of the
Superfund,546 but feels that there will be circumstances when it will be
appropriate for the lender to contribute to the cost of clean-ups. However, not
surprisingly, in view of the Consultation Papers, this view has yet to be spelt out.
An indication of the Government's thinking is to be found in paras 4B 23-25 of
"Paying For Our Past", where it is stated that those responsible for pollution,
even if indirectly, should pay towards the cost of clean-up—there is a specific
reference to lenders and financial institutions. It is also stated that liability
should not be based on financial resources, as this would not be fair and would
be damaging if lenders were made to pay an amount disproportionate to their
loan; and that any limitations would need to be practical and be considered with
regard to their effect on public finances. The idea of proportionality, referred to
in the Consultation Paper,547 appears to be part of Government thinking,548 and
seems to be a reference to the so-called "deep pockets" syndrome sometimes
associated with the Superfund legislation—a consequence of which has been
that lenders have turned down applications for loans from certain types of
companies which are considered risky environmentally.549 The Government is
also in favour of the land being put into a state where it is "suitable for use",
rather than into a pristine one.550 And the polluter pays principle will be at the
heart of the environmental regime.
In the meantime, whilst the legislation on clean-ups is being considered, there
are certain things that lenders can do to try to protect themselves, as it seems
clear that therewill be some form of legislation imposing environmental liability
(which may or may not include a secured lender exemption, such as that in the
United States). For example, there should be a provision in new loan
documentation stipulating that if there is a potential environmental problem,
then, the loan becomes repayable immediately,551 and covenants relating to the
environment. In the case of both old and new loans in situations where the
borrower might be an environmental risk, the lender should seek regular
environmental information. With new loans, the lender should commission an
environmental audit prior to lending.552
546. See the statement of the then Environment Minister,Mr Tim Yeo, in October 1993, cited in
Journal of Environment Policy and Law 24/1 [1994] February, 34.
547. At para. 49.
548. See the statement of the then EnvironmentMinister, Mr Tim Yeo, in October 1993, cited in
Journal ofEnvironment Policy and Law 24/1 [1994] February, 34.
549. See the statement of the British Bankers' Association, cited in Journal ofEnvironment Policy
and Law, 24/1 [1994] February, 34, who observed that in the United States companies in risky
industries environmentally, such as chemical companies, are being refused loans.
550. At para. 2.12.
551. See, for example, J.R. Lingard, Bank Security Documents (1993) 3rd edn., Specimen
Documents, Document 2, at clauses 1.01 and 2.03.
552. See the useful suggestions by Jarvis Q.C. and Fordham, Lender liability: environmental risk
and debt (1993, Cameron May), Ch. 10, "Safe Lending", at pp. 169ff.
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Duty of care: section 34 of EPA
This section places upon a personwho "imports, produces, carries, keeps, treats
or disposes ofcontrolled waste or, as a broker, has control of such waste", a four
part duty, which carries a criminal sanction, to take all reasonable steps to make
sure that:
(i) section 33 of the EPA is not breached by a third party,553 i.e. where
waste is being treated, kept or disposed of, that it is not being done so
without, or in contravention of, a management licence, or that it is
being done in a manner likely to harm humans or the environment554;
(ii) that waste does not escape from the person's control555;
(iii) where waste is being transferred, it is transferred "to an authorised
person" or "a person authorised for transport", as defined in
subsections (3) and (4)556;
(iv) the written description ofwaste which is being transferred is sufficient
to allow the person receiving the waste to avoid breaching section 33
of the EPA and to comply with the requirement above regarding the
escape of waste.557
The penalty for breach of these duties is criminal and not civil, with a
maximum fine of £20,000 on indictment for a summary conviction and an
unlimited fine on an indictment.558 However, the penalty does not just apply to
the company, and officers (which would include a shadow director) and
managers of the company can be liable also.559
The difficulty that a lender faces with this duty of care is if it enters into
possession under a mortgage over land on which waste is being produced or
disposed of, and there is an inadvertent breach of the duty.
To assist persons in the performance of their duties, a Code of Practice560 has
been published561 which is admissible in evidence562; and regulations563 have
been published in relation to transfer notes, so guidance is at hand.
553. Section 34(1 )(a) of the EPA. See also the helpful guidance in the joint circular from the
Department of the Environment, the Scottish Office and the Welsh Office, "Environmental
Protection Act Section 34, The Duty of Care", especially at p. 2.
554. "Environmental Protection Act Section 34, The Duty of Care", at p. 2.
555. Section 34(1 )(b) of the EPA.
556. Section 34(l)(c)(i) of the EPA.
557. Section 34(l)(c)(ii) of the EPA.
558. Section 34(6) of the EPA. See also R. Harris, "The Environmental Protection Act
1990—Penalising the Polluter" [1992] J.P.L. 515, at p. 516.
559. Section 157 of the EPA.
560. WasteManagement: The Duty ofCare, a code of practice issued by HMSO, December 1991.
561. Pursuant to section 34(7) of the EPA.
562. Section 34(10) of the EPA.
563. The Environmental Protection (Duty of Care) Regulations 1991.
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Environmental liability other than under the EPA
Whilst the EPA is, at present,564 the main source of environmental law in the
United Kingdom, the Water Resources Act 1991 ("WRA") provides565 that the
National Rivers Authority ("NRA") (at present) is able to recover clean-up costs
from a person who "caused or knowingly permitted" noxious or polluting
matter to be present at a place, which, in the NRA's opinion, is likely to enter any
controlled waters or who "caused or knowingly permitted" the matter in
question to be present in any controlled waters.565" In this regard, if a lender has,
for example, exercised its security rights and moved into possession of an
industrial factory, and noxious substances are flowing from the factory into
controlled water, which the lender knows about but does nothing to stop, then
the lender may be liable for clean-up costs. The question to be answered by the
courts is whether the knowledge required is actual or constructive knowledge. It
is suggested, on the wording of the section and the reference to "caused", that
the knowledge required will be actual knowledge.
Under the common law, the decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge
Water Company v. Eastern Counties Leather,566 in which Lord Goff of
Chieveley delivered the leading speech, held that the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher567 did not apply in relation to a chemical solvent which had seeped into
a neighbour's water supply.
DAMAGES IN CONTRACT AND TORT
The last matter to be discussed in this chapter—and, in practical terms, the most
significant one once a lender's liability has been established—is the question of
the measure of damages that may be recovered by a borrower against a lender in
contract and tort. It is proposed to look at the measure of damages for breach of
564. It is likely that the European Union will play a role in this area and issue a directive or
directives: see, for example, the Directive for Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste (Com (91)
219).
565. Section 163 of the WRA. See also section 161 of the Act. A criminal offence exists on the
same basis under section 85: see National Rivers Authority v. Alfred McAlpine Homes East Ltd.
[1994] 4 All E.R. 286.
565a. As to the meaning of "caused" and "knowingly permitted": see Alphacell Ltd. v.
Woodward [ 1972] A.C. 824 (H.L.(E.)); and Wychavon District Councils. N.R.A. [1993] 2 All E.R.
440 (D.C.).
566. [1994] 2 W.L.R. 53 (H.L.(E.)). See case note by Professor R.F.V. Heuston, "The Return of
Rylands v. Fletcher" (1994) 110L.Q.R. 185.
567. (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
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contract, contributory negligence, and punitive damages in tort, which have
been so prevalent (and large) in United States cases. The measure of tortious
damages, which has been discussed elsewhere in this chapter, is reliance based
and is aimed at placing the victim of the tort in the position he would have been
in had the tort not been committed. Contractual damages are more complex and
require further examination since they will be a borrower's prime source of
damages, unless there is liability under Hedley Byrne. The basic measure of
damages for breach of contract is an expectation loss for lost profits,568 and it
seeks to place the injured party in the position he would have been in, so far as
money can, if the contract had not been breached.569
(a) Contractual damages
If a lender refuses to lend money to a borrower after notice of draw-down, and
the borrower suffers damage due to the lender's breach of a loan agreement, the
borrower will be able to sue the lender for breach of contract. For example, in a
very recent case,570 the administrators of a borrower brought an action against a
lender who had provided the borrower with an overdraft of £2m for 12 months;
this arrangement being formalised in a facility letter. The difficulty was that the
letter did not contain the usual provision that the overdraft was repayable on
demand, so the overdraft was, effectively, a term loan. The lender, erroneously,
called in the overdraft after six months after one of the borrower's major
markets had collapsed. The learned judge dealing with the matter held that the
lender had been instrumental in the borrower's demise. It is expected that
damages will be fixed at £4.56m; the £1.3m still outstanding on the loan will be
deducted from the final award. But an interim payment of £l.3m was made,
being half the proposed award, with costs payable forthwith. A refusal to lend
prior to notice of draw-down, in the absence of a breach by the borrower of the
loan agreement, will be an anticipatory breach571 of the agreement. Unless the
borrower is unable to comply with the terms and conditions of the loan
agreement, when the loan is refused, the borrowerwill have an election either to
rescind and sue for breach, or to wait until just before the expiry date for
draw-down and to issue the draw-down notice and sue for breach.
568. The victim may, however, seek merely to recover expenditure outlaid, which is a reliance
loss: see later.
569. Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Ex. 850, at p. 855, per Parke B., 154 E.R. 363.
570. Crimpfil pic (In Administration) v. Barclays Bank Pic, The Independent, 30 April 1994, at
p. 17; The Daily Telegraph, 21 April 1994; and noted [1994] J.I.B.L., at N-151.
571. Hochesterv. De la Tour( 1853) 2 E. & B. 678, which decided that the party not in breach has
an election either to accept the breach and sue for damages, or not to accept the breach and to wait
till the contract is due to be performed and then to sue damages for breach of contract. See also
Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A.C. 367 (H.L.(E.)).
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(i) Remoteness
In order to substantiate its claim for breach of contract, a borrower must prove
that its loss is not too remote. A loss is considered not too remote if it:
(a) may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, i.e.
according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract
itself, or
(b) may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of the contract.572
Where there are special circumstances which will affect the measure of
damages, these should be communicated to the other party, so that they are
within that party's contemplation. For example, if the loan is for a special
purpose, or it has consequences for the borrower with third parties.
The principles in Hadley v. Baxendale, set out above, particularly the second
limb, have been considered in several cases, although they have, arguably,
received comparatively little judicial examination by the higher courts.573 The
effect of these decisions on the second limb may be synthesised into the
proposition that, in order to substantiate its claim, a borrower must prove that
its loss, as a result of a breach of contract by a lender, is not too remote, in that
"if, at the time of contracting (and on the assumption that the parties actually
foresaw the breach in question), [the loss] was within [the parties'] reasonable
contemplation as a not unlikely result of that breach".574
An important recent decision by the House of Lords, on the first limb, arose in
the Scottish case of Balfour Beatty Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish
572. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854)' 9 Exch. 341, at pp. 354-355, per Alderson B.
573. See A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker v. Monarch Steamship Co. 1949 S.C. (H.L.) 1; Victoria
Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1949] 2 K.B. 528 (C.A.); Koufos v.
C. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Heron II) [1969] 1 A.C. 350 (H.L.(E.)); and Parsons (H) (Livestock) Ltd. v.
Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 791 (C.A.). See also the decision of Hobhouse J. in The
Forum Craftsman [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 81, at p. 85, where his Lordship says: "Remoteness of
damage in contract cases is not to be decided on an all or nothing basis. The contemplation that some
loss of profit might result from a breach of contract did not require that all profits lost must
necessarily be recoverable. The liability in damages for breach of contract was a contractually
assumed liability. The first and second rules in Hadley v. Baxendale limited the extent of that liability
having regard to what was or must be taken to have been in the contemplation of the contracting
parties that made the contract, and to the natural and probable consequences of a breach of a
contract."
See also the recent decision of the House of Lords in the Scottish case of Balfour Beatty
Construction (Scotland) Ltd. v. Scottish Power pic, 1994 S.L.T. 807.
574. (1854) 9 Exch. 341.
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Power pic.575 That case concerned damage to a concrete pour for a concrete
aquaduct, which had to be abandoned and recommenced; the cause of the
damage was the rupturing of fuses provided by the defender in their electricity
supply system. The pursuer, who was the main contractor for the construction
of a major road works in Edinburgh, entered into an agreement for the
temporary supply of electricity with the defender. Pursuant to that contract, the
pursuer sought to recover the cost of the demolition and reconstruction of the
concrete pour. It was held that there could be no recovery under the first limb of
Hadley v. Baxendale,576 and so the claim failed. The leading speech was
delivered by Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle,577 and is notable for several things:
(1) His Lordship's citing without disapproval of the statement as to the first
limb of Hadley v. Baxendale by the Lord Ordinary, Lord Clyde,578 who said:
"I am content to leave the quantification [of the damages] as being limited to the loss
which the defenders might reasonably have contemplated at the time of the contract,
subject to the explanation that it is sufficient that the type of loss be of a type which might
have been so contemplated. That it was actually of an unforseeable scale is not relevant."
Lord Clyde went on to hold that the defenders should only have anticipated the
kind of damage flowing naturally from the breach (i.e. under the first limb), and
that the damage claimed went beyond that.
(2) Lord Jauncey felt the critical finding was that the defenders were not aware
of the need to preserve a continuous pour for the construction of the aqueduct,
and consequently the Inner House (Second Division) were not correct to impute
to the defenders, at the time of entry into the contract, technical knowledge of
the details of concrete construction which the pursuer had not provided.
(3) Whilst LordWright had said in A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker v. Monarch
Steamship Co.579 that the court assumes that the parties as businessmen will
have a reasonable acquaintance with each other's business, this was not a
general rule that in all cases contracting parties will be presumed to have
knowledge of each other's business.
(4) But when the pursuer's activities involved complicated construction or
manufacturing techniques, there was no reason why the defender, who supplied
a commodity for use by the pursuer in those techniques, should be aware of all
the techniques undertaken by the pursuer and the effect of any failure of, or
deficiency in, the commodity merely because of the order for the commodity.
Thus, it is submitted, in the current context of lender and borrower, that a
575. 1994 S.L.T. 807. The reference to "defender" in the text is a reference to Scottish Power pic's
predecessor, South of Scotland Electricity Board ("SSEB"), whose liabilities Scottish Power
succeeded to.
576. Chitty at para. 1793. See also Sir Robin Cooke, "Remoteness of Damages and Judicial
Discretion" [1978] C.L.J. 288.
577. Lords Keith of Kinkel, Bridge of Harwich, Browne-Wilkinson and Nolan, agreeing.
578. 1992 S.L.T. 811, at p. 813A. Lord Jauncey also cited, for the purposes of the appeal, the
dictum of Lord Reid in The Heron II [1969) 1 A.C. 350, at p. 388E, that an event has to be "not
unlikely to occur".
579. 1949 S.C.(H.L.) 1, at pp. 19 and 21.
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lender will not be presumed to have a specialised knowledge of its clients'
business necessarily, although, as a matter of prudence, it should have some
knowledge or understanding of a borrower's business anyway so that it is able to
make reasonably well informed lending decisions. For example, if a lender
decides to lend a borrower money for a particular construction project, but
certain special circumstances or expectations concerning third parties are not
revealed to the lender, then it is likely that the lender would not be liable for
anything other than nominal damages in this regard.580
One situation where it is arguable that a lender ("X") would be liable for
damages occurs where there is a cross default clause in a loan agreement ("loan
B") between the borrower and another lender ("Y"), and X, knowing that the
borrower has other loan facilities containing cross default clauses (or very likely
to contain them), wrongly accelerates its loan with the borrower ("loan A"),
leading to loan B being accelerated as well. Also, it would not be open to benefit
from its wrongful acceleration of loan A.581
As to the measure of damages recoverable by a borrower because of a lender's
failure to lend when it agreed to, the borrower is put to an election whether to
recover the profits lost (an expectation loss) or wasted expenditure (a reliance
loss).582 The rationale of this rule is that the borrower should not be in a better
financial position as a result of the breach of contract by the lender than itwould
have been if the contract had been performed.583 The important consideration is
the nature of the loss suffered. If the borrower584—who is under a duty to
mitigate any loss by going into the marketplace and trying to obtain alternative
funding585—is able to obtain another loan more cheaply because interest rates
fall, then the borrower will be claiming for any wasted expenditure, and not for
an expectation loss, unless there are "special circumstances". However, if
interest rates rise in the meantime, the borrower will be able to obtain the
difference between the price of the old loan and the price of the new loan. If the
borrower is unable to procure new funds because, for example, it has an
unfavourable credit rating or its share price has fallen, the lender may, arguably,
580. Although the borrower may be in breach of its loan agreement for non-disclosure.
581. See New Zealand Shipping Company Ltd. v. Societe des Ateliers et Chantiers de France
[1919] A.C. 1 (H.L.(E.)), stating that a party to a contract cannot take advantage of its own
wrongdoing: see Lord Finlay at p. 6; Lord Atkinson, at p. 9; Lord Shaw of Dumfermline, at p. 12;
and Lord Wrenbury, at p. 14; and Alghussein Establishment v. Eton College [1988] 1 W.L.R. 587
(H.L.(E.)), noted by J.G. Starke, Recent Cases (1988) 62 A.L.J. 732.
582. Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed [1972] 1 Q.B. 60 (C.A.) and C.C.C. Films (London) Ltd. v.
Impact Quadrant Films Ltd. [1985] Q.B. 16 (C.A.).
583. MacGregor on Damages (1987) 15th edn. at para. 50, citing the much criticised case of
Cullinane v. British Reme Manufacturers Co. Ltd. [1954] 1 Q.B. 292 (C.A.). See MacLeod [1970]
J.B.L. 19 and Stoljar [1975] 91 L.Q.R. 68. Cf. the High Court of Australia in Industrial (T.C.) Plant
Pty. Ltd. v. Robert's (Queensland) Pty. Ltd. [1964] A.L.R. 1083; and see their recent decision in The
Commonwealth v. Amann Aviation Pty. Ltd. (1992) A.L.J.R. 223; noted by Professor G.H. Treitel
Q.C., "Damages for Breach of Contracts in the High Court of Australia" [1992] 108 L.Q.R. 226;
and J. Swanton (1992) 66 A.L.J. 460.
584. See Ackner L.J. (as he then was) in C. & P. Haulage v. Middleton [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1461.
585. See, for example, Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders [1919] 2 K.B. 581 (C.A.).
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be liable for all the consequences flowing from the decision not to lend, which
may be breach of contractwith third parties (assuming these are known) and the
resulting economic loss (which is not recoverable in tort), although the lender
will use the fact that other lenders will not lend to the borrower as part of its
defence and will construe the terms of the loan agreement very closely.
Moreover, unlike the United States, a borrower under a commercial contract
cannot claim damages for emotional distress caused by a breach. English courts
have distinguished between contracts involving comfort or pleasure, for which
damages for emotional distress can be recovered in certain circumstances,586 and
contracts for profit (i.e. purely commercial contracts) for which they cannot.587
Similarly, in tort, the law will compensate for nervous shock, but not for
emotional distress.588 Hence, a borrower may only recover in contract his
economic loss—either as lost profits or as wasted expenditure—but not
damages for any stress he may have suffered as a result of the lender's breach.
(ii) Contributory negligence in contract
One way in which a lender might seek to reduce his liability for breach of
contract, is to claim that the borrower was contributorily negligent and thus
have damages apportioned under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act 1945 (the "1945 Act"). For a long time there was doubt whether this Act
applied to breaches of contract. But the law was finally settled by the Court of
Appeal in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher,589 where it was held, in
relation to a reinsurance contract, that, where liability in tort and contract are
the same, the Act can apply. This decision was reaffirmed and applied by the
586. See, for example, jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd. [1973] Q.B. 233; see Jackson v. Horizon
Holidays Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1468. Cf. Perry v. Sydney Phillips &Son [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1287 and
Watts v. Morrow [1991] 4 All E.R. 937, concerning damages for distress caused by negligent
valuations; later case noted by Professor M. Furmston (1992) J.C.L. 64. Cf. Branchett v. Beaney,
The Times, 14 February 1992.
587. Hayes v. James & Charles Dodd (A Firm) [1990] 2 All E.R. 815, at p. 824, per Staughton
L.J.; noted by R. Halson, "Contract Damages: Expectation, Reliance and Mental Distress" [1991]
C.L.J. 31. See also Firsteel Cold Rolled Products Ltd. v. Anaco Precision Pressings Ltd., The Times,
21 November 1994; Rae v. Yorkshire Bank pic [1988] F.L.R. 1 (a case of wrongful dishonour of
cheques); Bliss v. South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1987] I.C.R. 700 (C.A.); and Box
v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 391, where a claim for anxiety and distress brought
about by the negligence of the lender was rejected. For a discussion of the cases: see A. Burrows,
"Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Contract" (1990) N.L.J. 596. See also the High Court of
Australia in Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1992-93) 176 C.L.R. 344. In
that case, Mason C.J. (at p. 365), after saying that "the innocent party's disappointment and distress
are seldom so significant as to attract an award of damages", continued: "For that reason, if for no
other, it is preferable to adopt the rule that damages for disappointment and distress are not
recoverable unless they proceed from physical inconvenience caused by the breach or unless the
contract is one that the object of which is to provide enjoyment, relaxation or freedom from
molestation". Noted S. Hetherington, "Passengers' Damages For Disappointment and Distress"
[1993] L.M.C.L.Q. 289; and J. Swanton (1992) 67 A.L.J. 379.
588. McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1981] 1 A.C. 410 (H.L.(E.)). See also Hill v. Chief Constable of
West Yorkshire [1989] A.C. 53 (H.L.(E.)).
589. [1989] A.C. 852 (H.L.).
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Court of Appeal in Lipkin Gorman,590 where a claim of contributory negligence
against the plaintiffs was upheld, as the plaintiffs' senior partner knew C had
been dishonest about certain travel expenses. However, it is inapplicable to a
case of fraud—either personally or vicariously—being an intentional tort.S91
Similarly, the Court of Appeal592 has recently, and sensibly, sought to limit the
application of the 1945 Act by holding it does not apply "where a party's
liability arose from breach of a contractual provision which did not depend on a
failure to take reasonable care".593 In such a situation, contributory negligence
cannot be a partial defence.594 Thus, contributory negligence is not a defence for
a damages claim based on breach of a strict contractual obligation. In the case in
question, the contract and obligation undertaken did not impose on the plaintiff
any duty in their own interest to prevent the defendant from committing
breaches of the contract.595 Where there is a breach of a strict contractual
obligation, the only breaches available are release, waiver, or forbearance. It
was never the intention that the 1945 Act is "to obtrude the defence of
contributory negligence into an area of the law where it had no business to
be".596
Thus, the gap opened in Vesta v. Butcher is beginning to be closed. Its ambit
can only ever have been intended to be limited, bearing in mind the advice in Tai
Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd.,597 and so a lender seeking
to apportion blame, in part, to a borrower for the lender's breach of loan or
security documents, in which there is no requirement to take reasonable care, is
unlikely to be unsuccessful.
(b) Tort punitive damages
One clear point of distinction between United States law and English law, with
regard to lender liability, is that in the United States juries award very high levels
of damages—especially punitive damages.598 This is particularly so where the
conduct of the lender has been viewed as reprehensible and has made a poor
590. [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 19.
591. Alliance & Leicester Building Society v. Edgestrop Ltd. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1462.
592. Barclays Bank Pic v. Fairclough Building Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 1057 (C.A.), relating to a
building contract (Nourse and Beldam L.JJ. and Simon Brown P.).
593. Barclays Bank Plcv. Fairclougb Building Ltd. [1994] 3 W.L.R. 1057 (C.A.), per Beldam L.J.,
Nourse L.J. and Simon Brown P. agreeing.
594. Beldam L.J., supra. See, for example, Bank ofNova Scotia v. Flellenic Mutual War Risks
Association (Bermuda) Ltd. [1990] 1 Q.B. 818, at p. 904.
595. See Beldam and Nourse L.JJ., supra.
596. Per Nourse L.J., supra.
597. [1986] A.C. 80. (P.C.).
598. See, for example, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511
(1985), where US$4,000 were awarded for wrongful debiting of an account and US$100,000
punitive damages for breach of the implied covenants of "good faith" and "fair trading"; and
Kruse/Jewellv. Bank ofAmerica, 201 Cal. App. 3d. 354 (1988), where US$61 million were awarded
as part of aUS$6m judgment. A report in the Financial Times, 10 May 1994, p. 11, indicates that the
United States Supreme Court will be reviewing high awards of punitive damages.
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impression upon the jury, and it is sought to award damages against the lender in
excess of the normal measure.
In England, punitive damages—which are tortious and not contractual599—
will very rarely be awarded600 (and usually only in defamation cases).601
Moreover, lending cases are conducted before a single judge—and not a
jury—in the High Court of Justice.
To obtain punitive damages, a borrower must show that a lender's conduct
has been calculated to make a profit for the lender which may well exceed the
compensation payable to the borrower.602 Punitive damages are to "teach a
wrongdoer that tort does not pay". By awarding punitive damages, the court is
admitting into the civil law a principle which logically belongs to the criminal
law.603
It is highly unlikely, except where the conduct of a lender is reprehensible—as
in Farah's case, concerned with fraud and economic duress—that punitive
damages will be awarded in a lending case. A borrower will usually only recover
damages for his actual loss.
Whether a borrower can sue for punitive damages for deceit by a lender is
rather doubtful. In Archer v. Brown,604 Peter Pain J. (as he then was) held that,
inter alia, the plaintiff—who was the victim of fraud concerning the sale of
shares in a company, which had already been sold—was not entitled to punitive
damages (even though they could be awarded in deceit) because of the principle
that a person must not be punished twice for the same offence. It would be
wrong to award punitive damages when the defendant had already been in
prison. However, as a matter of general principle, his Lordship appeared to have
no objection about awarding punitive damages for deceit.605
599. Addison v. Gramophone Co. Ltd. [1909] A.C. 488 (H.L.(E.)), where the House of Lords
held that punitive damages could not be awarded in contract.
600. This view is also expressed by Neill L.J., at p. 519, in Bradford CityMetropolitan Council v.
Arora [1991] 2 Q.B. 507, Russell and Farquharson L.JJ. agreeing. (It would seem that the result in
this case was treated as per incuriam by Stuart-Smith L.J. in A.B. v. South West Water Services Ltd.
[1993] 2 W.L.R. 507, although the point concerning the rarity of such cases remains valid.)
601. For example, State National Bank ofEl Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W. 2d 661
(Tex. App. 1984). See also A.L. Fey, "Punitive Damages in the United States" [1992] J.I.B.L. 198;
and B. Feldthusen, in Notes of Cases (Voris v. Insurance Corporation ofBritish Columbia) [1990]
Canadian Bar Review 169, at p. 172 fn. 13, who says that research of punitive damages awards in
the United States shows that awards of $1 million or more, whilst "by no means typical, are far from
uncommon". Cf. recent English jury libel awards, e.g., Mr Jeffrey Archer, £500,000, and Lord
Aldington, £l million.
602. Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, at pp. 1226-1227, per Lord Devlin, as explained by
the House of Lords in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027 (H.L.jE.)).
603. Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.(E.)).
604. [1985] Q.B. 401. Cf. Metall und Rohstoff A.G. v. ACLl Metals (London) Ltd. [1984] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 598 (C.A.) and Sachs L.J. in Mafo v. Adams [1970] 1 Q.B. 548.
605. See the Canadian Case of Claiborne Industries Ltd. v. National Bank of Canada (1989) 59
D.L.R. (4th) 533, where Can.$5 million (approx.) were awarded against a lender which was
involved in fraud and conspiracy by the major shareholder of the plaintiff, although this is really an
application of restitutionary principles.
110 LENDER LIABILITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW
Further doubt about the awarding of punitive damages for deceit has been
caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gibbons v. South West Water
Services Ltd.,606 following dicta in Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd.,60' that before
there can be an award ofpunitive damages, the tort for which such an award was
sought to be made must have been one in which such an award was made prior
to 1964. With respect, such an arbitrary cut-off point—the date of the decision
in Rookes v. Barnard—is hard to support logically and is against the notion of a
dynamic common law,608 but it is welcome news to lenders, whose conduct
normally would not warrant punitive damages anyway.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Under English law, liabilitywill primarily be governed by the terms and
conditions of any loan agreement negotiated between the parties: the
courts will not imply terms favourable to either party, particularly the
borrower, as the parties are deemed to have negotiated their primary
obligations.
2. However, there can now be concurrent liability in tort, except where
this is inconsistent with the obligations negotiated between the parties.
3. Themain area where a lender is likely to be sued by a borrower is where
the borrower has suffered loss when a transaction has failed, and the
borrower feels he had been badly advised or misled by the lender. This
will involve questions of the nature of the parties' relationship, what
was said or written and what were the parties' expectations—this can
lead to liability in negligence and/or for breach of fiduciary duty.
4. Where there is a diminution in the value of a security, due to a delay by
the lender (or a receiver) in realising it or to market forces, this will not
usually result in liability. This is because, ordinarily, the lender may sell
the secured property when he likes, subject to the Law of Property Act
1925.
5. Lenders should—despite the absence of notions of "good faith" and
"fair dealing"—act reasonably towards a borrower at all times and
exercise reasonable care, as they are required to do, even to the extent
of slightly favouring the borrower so that there is no recourse against
them by the borrower in the courts, with the resultant publicity and
cost. This is so where there may be circumstances giving rise to
insolvent liquidation and the spectre of the lender being liable as a
606. (1993) 2 W.L.R. 507. This was a case of public nuisance; noted by A. Burrows, "The Scope
of Exemplary Damages" (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 359; and R.G. Lee, "Exemplary awards and
environmental law" [1992] J.B.L. 287; and G.S. Pipe, "Exemplary Damages After Camelford"
(1993) 57M.L.R. 91.
607. [1972] A.C. 1027, at p. 1076, per Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone L.C.; at p. 1036, per
Lord Reid; at p. 1114, per Lord Wilberforce; and at pp. 1130-1131, per Lord Diplock.
608. A similar view is shared by Lee, supra, and Pipe, supra. Cf. Burrows, supra.
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shadow director arises (although this is not so great a fear as it once
was); or, when the lender is enforcing its security by a sale, it should
obtain a "proper price": not just a price thatwill pay off the debt owed
to it.
6. Allied to this, problems may arise where lenders seek to go beyond the
provisions of loan and security documentation and the creditor/debtor
relationship, and seek to have a management or advisory, rather than a
monitoring, role; they start to increase the risk that they will be
associated with the borrower and its failings.
7. It is extremely unlikely that there will be any punitive element in the
damages awarded and a lender will only be liable to a borrower for loss
the lender actually caused.
8. Williams & Glyn still remains the major case, under English law, on
lender liability and covers all the major issues. However, it did to some
extent turn upon its facts, as NDH, who was the lender's customer and
the proper plaintiff, was not a party to the proceedings; also, the
decision was not tested on appeal. Nonetheless, the case is indicative of
the attitude of the courts to implying terms and imposing tortious
duties of care on lenders who—in the absence of a vitiating factor such
as economic duress—are seeking to protect their loans by imposing on
a borrower more onerous conditions in a rescheduling than before. In
Williams & Glyn, these matters were decided in the lender's favour.609
PARKER HOOD
609. Except for the question of reasonable notice in relation to the January facility letter—
although it was held that, in principle, all loans are repayable on demand.
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removed as a possibility by the combined effect of the English case of F v Wirral
MBC33 and, in Scotland, McKeen vChiefConstablefor Lothian and Borders Police.39
So why did the Orkney council pay up? Most likely because they realised that a
simple assertion of no liability—though clearly defensible in law—would be
insupportable in terms of public feeling and local community relations. Their action
is in itself another contribution to the policy debate which underlies X v Beds. What
message does it send to the public as "clients" in this age of Citizens Charters if
social work (and educational) authorities are given a specific immunity from actions
for negligence? It should give us cause to think, at least, when an authority is prepared
to acknowledge financial responsibility at the very same time that the courts are trying
to give it immunity. Perhaps the best balance of public and private interests might
have been achieved by maintaining the existing high standard for imposing liability
on public bodies, rather than by adding an unwanted—and perhaps ultimately




38 [1991] Fam 69.
39 1994 SLT 93.
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Remoteness of Damage in Contract Revisited:
Balfour Beatty v Scottish Power
The so-called two limbs ofHadley v Baxendale1 are well known, and provide that, to
recover damages for a breach ofcontract, the loss suffered by the victim of the breach
must be "such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either [i] as arising naturally,
that is according to the usual course of things from such breach of contract itself, or
[ii] such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of
it."2 Thus, the first limb relates to the general or direct damage flowing from the
breach, and is objective in nature,3 whereas the second limb concerns damages for
1 (1854) 9 Exch 341.
2 At 354 per Alderson B. This formula for remoteness of damage is taken from Pothier's Traite des
Obligations: see R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian
Tradition (1990), 829-830. Professor James Gordley, in the second annual W A Wilson Memorial
Lecture, University of Edinburgh, 8 May 1996, stated that Pothier's views were, in turn, derived
from Molina: see also Zimmermann, Obligations, 829. For an interesting historical account of Hadley
v Baxendale and its civilian influences (mainly Pothier), see F Faust, ' Hadley v Baxendale: an
understandable miscarriage of justice" (1994) 15 Journal of Legal History 41-72, which notes that
the case was not in fact a contract one (the contract aspect having being abandoned), but one in tort
concerning a common carrier's breach of its duty of care to deliver goods within a reasonable time.
3 This is the same as for ss 51(2) and 53A(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) concerning
damages for non-delivery, and the measure of damages for breach of contract, respectively, under
the Act.
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special circumstances which the parties contemplated when they contracted, and is
subjective; in both instances, it is a question of fact whether a claim comes within the
above "formula".4 However, although the test in Hadley is over 140 years old, its
application in practice has proved difficult, and attempts in subsequent cases by the
courts to interpret or reformulate it have led one judge to say that such cases have
provided "a bewildering variety ofdifferent and sometimes inconsistent expressions".5
This difficulty in the application ofHadley is apparent from the recent Scottish case
of Balfour Beatty Construction (Scotland) Ltd v Scottish Power pic,6 which provided
the House of Lords with its first major opportunity to re-examine Hadley since Koufos
v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II)7—decided some twenty-seven years earlier.
The facts of Balfour Beatty were that a concrete pour for an aqueduct had to be
abandoned and redone. This resulted in economic loss (i.e. the cost of the remedial
work) to the pursuers, who were the main contractors for the construction "of the
roadway and associated structures of the Sighthill section ofthe Edinburgh city bypass"
under a contract with the former Lothian Regional Council ("the construction
contract").8 The cause of the damage was the rupturing of fuses in a temporary
electricity supply system provided to the pursuers by the South of Scotland Electricity
Board ("the SSEB", to whose liabilities the defenders succeeded9) under, and in
breach of, a separate agreement between them ("the supply contract"); it was this
latter contractwith which the case was concerned. The electricity in question was to
be supplied by the SSEB to a batching plant near the construction project. As there
had not been a continuous pour of concrete, owing to the rupturing of the fuses, the
aqueduct could not be constructed to the standard necessary (i.e. watertight) under
the construction contract. Consequently, the aqueduct was demolished and rebuilt.
The pursuers, at one stage, had considered cutting back the concrete already poured
to a face which might form a construct joint, in an attempt to mitigate their loss, but
this was rejected, and it was accepted, in a joint minute of both parties, that the
pursuers had "no reasonable alternative" but to rebuild the aqueduct.10
The Lord Ordinary (Lord Clyde) found there had been a breach of the supply
contract (which was not challenged on appeal), but disallowed the pursuers' claim to
recover the cost of the demolition and reconstruction of the aqueduct, under the
first limb in Hadley, as the defenders did not have sufficient knowledge of the pursuers'
project and what it involved. After hearing submissions from counsel, Lord Clyde
4 See Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350 at 397 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-
Gest, approving Lord du Parcq in A/B Karishamns Oljefabriker v Monarch Steamship Co 1949 SC
[HL] 1 at 28; [1949] AC 196 at 232
5 Balfour Beatty Construction (Scotland) Ltd v Scottish Power pic 1993 SLT 1005 at 10151 per Lord
Morison. Similarly, in The Heron II at 383B Lord Reid said: "[M]any different interpretations of
that rule [in Hadley v Baxendale] have been adopted by judges at different times." Two commentators
have said that Hadley has now outlived its usefulness: see Sir Robin Cooke, "Remoteness of damage
and judicial discretion" (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal (CLJ) 289-300 at 289, and M A Eisenberg,
"The principle of Hadley v Baxendale" (1992) 80 Californian LR 563, who argues that the rule
should be replaced by one based on "proximate cause, contractual allocation of loss and fair disclosure".
6 1994 SLT 807 (HL).
7 [1969] 1 AC 350, a case in which Lords Mustill and Lloyd of Berwick, who did not sit in Balfour
Beatty, were, respectively, junior counsel for the respondents and senior counsel for the appellants.
8 1994 SLT 807 at 808E-F.
9 See 1992 SLT 811 at 811F. Scottish Power pic were substituted as defenders in place of the SSEB.
10 1992 SLT 811 at 812 I-J.
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decided not to make an award of nominal damages.11 This decision was overturned
by the Second Division of the Inner House, which thought that the defenders should
have realised that if the concrete pour was interrupted by a power failure, "remedial
work would be necessary", and, hence, the pursuers could recover the cost of this
work as damages.12 The court seemed to be influenced by—and to take judicial notice
of—the quick setting time of concrete, which made a continuous pour necessary.13
When the matter reached the House of Lords, their Lordships reversed the Second
Division and decided that there could be no recovery under the first limb of Hadley,
because the SSEB lacked knowledge about the pursuers' project. It is submitted
that, although the result may seem somewhat harsh, the decision is correct, as is the
reasoning for it, and that the case emphasises the "all or nothing" nature ofcontractual
damages awards.14
A. REASONS FOR THE DECISION: SPEECH OF LORD JAUNCEY
The leading speech was delivered by Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle,15 and is notable
for its discussion of four issues.
. 0
(1) The significance of absence of knowledge
Lord Jauncey began by citing without disapproval the view of Lord Clyde, who said,
in relation to liability under Hadley:16
I am content to leave the quantification [of damages] as being limited to the loss which the
defenders might reasonably have contemplated at the time of the contract, subject to the
explanation that it is sufficient that the loss be of a type which might have been so
contemplated. That it was actually of an unforeseeable scale is not relevant.
In coming to his decision, Lord Clyde held that the defenders "should only be
taken to have anticipated the kind of loss arising naturally in the ordinary course
from the breach" of the supply contract (i.e. under the first limb); and that the
demolition and reconstruction costs involved in rebuilding the aqueductwent beyond
this.17 Developing this approach, Lord Jauncey held the critical finding to be that the
SSEB were not aware "of the need to preserve a continuous pour for the construction
of the aqueduct". Consequently, the Second Division was not correct to impute to
the SSEB, at the time of its entering into the supply contract, technical knowledge of
the details of concrete construction which the pursuers had not provided.18
Lord Jauncey concluded by saying that although he accepted that, "as a matter of
general knowledge, the [SSEB] would have appreciated the poured concrete would
harden", he did not consider that the SSEB should have been "aware of the importance
11 1992 SLT 811 at 813B, F and K-L per Lord Clyde. It is understood that the question of remoteness
of damage was first raised by the Lord Ordinary during the hearing in the Outer House.
12 1993 SLT 1005 at 1011C-D per LJC Ross
13 1993 SLT 1005 at 1007L per LJC Ross, 1014C-D per Lord Murray, and 1016C-D per Lord Morison.
14 Cf Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v Lerax Shipping Co ofPanama (The Forum Craftsman)
[1991] 1 Lloyd's Reports 81 at 85, col 2, per Hobhouse J, who says: "Remoteness of damage in
contract is not to be decided on an all or nothing basis."
15 Lords Keith of Kinkel, Bridge of Harwich, Browne-Wilkinson and Nolan agreed with Lord Jauncey.
16 1994 SLT 807 at 809A, citing 1992 SLT 811 at 813A-B.
17 1994 SLT 807 at 809A-B, citing 1992 SLT 811 at 813B.
18 1994 SLT 807 at 810F.
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of the time involved in the hardening process, nor of the consequences of adding
freshly poured concrete to that which had already hardened".19 In some ways, Balfour
Beatty had only themselves to blame for their failure to recover because they did not
disclose their requirements, and the reasons for them, in greater detail to the SSEB,
and, consequently, bring the matter within the second limb of Hadley.
(2) One rule and "very substantial degree of probability"
Secondly, Lord Jauncey, after commenting that Alderson B s dictum in Hadley "has
been subject to much dissection and interpretation in subsequent cases", chose to
refer only to the view of Lord Reid in The Heron II20 in assessing the impact of these
later decisions.21 Addressing the first limb of the Hadley test, Lord Reid opined that22
it is generally sufficient that that event would have appeared to the [defender] as not
unlikely to occur. It is hardly ever possible in this matter to assess probabilities with any
degree ofmathematical accuracy. But I do not find [in the cases] anywarrant for regarding
as within the contemplation of the parties any event which would not have appeared to the
[defender], had he thought about it, to have a very substantial degree of probability.
The citation of this passage shows two things. First, Lord Jauncey is confirming
the tendency of the courts to treat the two limbs of Hadley as one rule.23 Thus,
"probable" in Alderson B s dictum is regarded as covering both parts of the rule,24 as
is "contemplation", although, as a matter of construction of his Lordships famous
words, it can be argued that "probable" and "contemplation" belong to the second
limb only. The crucial matter in this approach is "the information available to the
[defender] when the contract was made".25 Secondly, Lord Jauncey sheds light upon
the controversy about the meaning of "probable", and the various expressions used
by Asquith LJ in Victoria Laundry2Rto explain its meaning, namely: "liable to result",
"likely so to result", "serious possibility", "real danger", or "on the cards". It appears
from Lord Jauncey s speech that "probable" means "not unlikely to occur" or "a very
substantial degree of probability", albeit that these two phrases do not appear to
correlate precisely, as the latter would seem to indicate, or require, a stronger degree
of certainty regarding the damage's occurrence than the former.
(3) Acquaintance with business of other party
Thirdly, although Lord Wright had said in AJB Karlshamns Oljefabriker v Monarch
Steamship Co27 that the court assumes that the parties, as businessmen, will have a
19 Ibid.
20 [1969] 1 AC 350 at 388E.
21 1994 SLT 807 at 809H.
22 Ibid.
23 See e.g. Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 (CA); The
Heron II; Satef-Huttenes Albertus SpA v Paloma Tercera Shipping Co SA (The Pegase) [1981] 1
Lloyd's Reports 175 at 182, col 2, per Robert Goff J. However, some lower courts still refer to a
"single principle" which has "two parts or branches", and it is submitted that this form of judicial
shorthand is a not inappropriate method ofdistinguishing between the general and specific knowledge
of the defender.
24 The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350 at 410 per Lord Hodson.
25 The Heron II at 385G per Lord Reid.
26 [1949] 2 KB 528 at 540.
27 1949 SC (HL) 1 at 19 and 21; [1949] AC 196 at 222 and 224.
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reasonable acquaintance with each others' business, Lord Jauncey held there to be
no general rule that contracting parties will be presumed to have knowledge of each
other's business.28 In support of this, he also referred to the comment of Lord Upjohn
in The Heron II,29 that, although businessmen "must be taken to understand the
ordinary practices and exigencies of each other's trade", their degree of knowledge
of the other party's business can vary. For example, a carrier of goods and a consignor
of goods do not carry on the same trade, and may have limited knowledge of the
other's business, whereas a buyer and a seller of goods will, probably, have a greater
knowledge of each other's business.30
Lord Jauncey, in an important clarification and explanation of the view expressed
in the Monarch Steamship case, went on to state:31
It must always be a question of circumstances what one contracting party is presumed
to know about the business activities of the other. No doubt the simpler the activity of
the one, the more readily can it be inferred that the other would have reasonable
knowledge thereof. However, when the activity of A involves complicated construc¬
tion or manufacturing techniques, I see no reason why B who supplies a commodity
that A intends to use in the course of those techniques should be assumed, merely
because of the order for the commodity, to be aware of the details of all the techniques
undertaken by A and the effect thereupon of any failure of or deficiency in that
commodity. Even if the Lord Ordinary had made a positive finding that continuous
pourwas a regular part of industrial practice itwould not follow that in the absence of any
other evidence suppliers of electricity such as the [SSEB] should have been aware of the
practice.
Lord Jauncey regarded the question to be determined as, what was in the SSEB's
reasonable contemplation at the time of the contract?32 He noted that the Lord
Ordinary had not found that the remedial work consequent upon the power supply's
failure was within the SSEB's contemplation, and concluded that there was nothing
to indicate to the SSEB that the consequences of the fuses rupturing "would have
had a very substantial degree of probability".33
Generally speaking, the SSEB, which supplied electricity to many different
businesses, would have had little or no knowledge of each of those businesses, and so
the argument was rightly rejected. It would not have been realistic to say that, in the
absence of specific information to the contrary, the SSEB should have detailed
knowledge of the pursuers' (not inconsiderable) business.
(4) Declining to approve Parsons v Uttley Ingham: what kind of loss is
recoverable?
The last matter of importance is that Lord Jauncey declined to saywhether H Parsons
Livestock Ltd v Uttley Ingham ir Co Ltd34 "correctly stated the law".35 This arose in
response to an argument (which was not determined) that, as the SSEB must have
28 See 1994 SLT 807 at 810J.
29 [1969] 1 AC 350 at 424C. See also Victoria Laundry [1949] 2 KB 528 at 537 per Asquith LJ.
30 [ 1969] 1 AC 350 at 424C.
31 1994 SLT 807 at 810K-811A. Lord Jauncey considered that the Lord Ordinary had "correctly
interpreted" what Lord Wright had said in the Monarch Steamship case: see 1994 SLT 807 at 811A.
32 At 811A.
33 At 811B.
34 [1978] QB 791 (CA).
35 1994 SLT 807 at 811A.
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contemplated "some remedial work" being done to remedy the concrete already
poured, owing to the interruption of the "continuous pouring", the SSEB must "have
contemplated demolition and reconstruction which differed only in degree from other
remedial work, such as the insertion of a construction joint involving cutting back the
concrete", and so, based on Parsons, the pursuers should recover.36
In Parsons, a pig farmer bought a bulk food storage hopper which was incorrectly
installed owing to the defendants' failure to unseal a ventilator on the top of the
hopper. This caused pignuts stored in the hopper to become mouldy and contami¬
nated with E-coli bacteria, owing to a lack of ventilation, with the consequence
that over 250 pigs which ate the nuts died. The farmer sued for breach of contract
regarding the loss of the pigs and lost profits. The issue in the case was whether the
farmer could recover his losses as not too remote, or merely recover the cost of extra
feed.
It was held by the Court of Appeal (upholding the decision of Swanwick J)
that the farmer could recover for his loss of profits and the loss of his pigs- Scarman
LJ delivered the leading judgment (with which Orr LJ agreed)37 and found for the
farmer on the basis that, at the time the contract was made,38 the parties "con¬
templated as a serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the
specific consequence, that ensued upon breach".39 In other words, it is not the
particular damage in question which has to be contemplated "but merely the
type of" damage, and although "illness in the pigs could reasonably have been
contemplated as a serious possibility, it was irrelevant that the specific injury in
question, E-coli, could not".40 One may have sympathy with the farmers position
(as the Court ofAppeal appeared to), but the difficulty with the majority's analysis is
that there is no correlation between (i) the loss that occurred, owing to the breach of
contract, and (ii) what the parties would have contemplated as flowing naturally
from the breach, i.e. had they considered the matter, what damage did the parties
think was "not unlikely to occur", or had "a very substantial degree of probability" of
36 1994 SLT 807 at 811C-D.
37 Lord Denning MR delivered a separate judgment, reaching the same result as Orr and Scarman
LJJ, but by different reasoning. He found it hard "to draw a distinction between what a man
'contemplates' and what he 'foresees'", and that the better distinction, in remoteness of damage
matters, was between cases of loss ofprofits and physical damage: see at 802. Pardons, Lord Denning
MR said, was a physical damage case, and so the test of remoteness was similar to delict. As there
was a slight possibility that the pigs might become ill if fed mouldy nuts, the defendants were liable:
see at 804.
38 There was some debate as to whether the contract was: (i) a combined contract for the sale and
installation of the hopper, or (ii) whether it was a contract in two parts, one part relating to the sale
of the goods and the other relating to their installation of the goods. The majority favoured the first
interpretation, but said that the hopper was unfit for its purpose within s 14(1) of Sale of Goods Act
1893 (now s 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979), and so a claim for breach of warranty arose under
the Act. Lord Denning MR favoured the second interpretation. With respect, it is submitted that
the latter is correct, as there was nothing wrong with the hopper per se: the problem was that it was
not installed properly. Hence, the Sale of Goods Act was inapplicable. The same issue of remoteness
would arise in relation to a breach of the agreement to instal the hopper, but it is submitted that the
remoteness point regarding the loss suffered owing to the breach of contract is even stronger in
relation to the installation of the goods being defective rather than the goods themselves, because it
is one stage further removed from the loss suffered and what the parties contemplated.
39 [1978] QB 791 at 813D-E.
40 See D H Hadjihambis, "Remoteness of damage in contract" (1978) 41 MLR 483 at 484.
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occurring, as a result of the breach of contract. Lord Reid expressed the point in a
well-known passage in The Heron If:41
I am satisfied that the court did not intend that every type of damage which was reasonably
foreseeable by the parties when the contract was made should either be considered as
arising naturally, i.e. in the usual course of things, or be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties. Indeed the decision [in Hadley v BaxendaleJ makes it clear
that a type ofdamage which was plainly foreseeable as a real possibility but which would
only occur in a smallminority ofcases can not be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of the parties: the parties are not supposed to contemplate as grounds for the recovery of
damage any type of loss or damage which on the knowledge available to the [defender]
would appear to him as only likely to occur in a small minority of cases.
In cases like Hadley v Baxendale or the present case it is not enough that in fact the
[pursuers] loss was directly caused by the [defenders] breach ofcontract. It clearly was so
caused in both. The crucial question is whether, on the information available to the
[defender] when the contract was made, he should, or the reasonable man in his position
would, have realised that such loss was sufficiently likely to result from the breach of
contract to make it proper to hold that the loss flowed naturally from the breach or that
loss of that kind should have been within his contemplation. [Emphasis supplied.]
Parsons, on its exceptional facts, falls squarelywithin this dictum—being a case in
which the damage would only "occur in a small minority of cases" and, hence, would
not be within the parties' contemplation. It is hard to say that, when contracting, the
parties would have contemplated there was "a very substantial degree ofprobability"
that a failure to open a ventilator valve on the hopper would result in the pigs dying
from E-coli bacteria. IfParsons had been applied in BalfourBeatty, the pursuers could
have recovered for the loss they suffered despite a lack of knowledge of the relevant
circumstances by the defenders, contrary to the above and contrary to principle.42
In a case subsequent to Balfour Beatty, Sir Thomas Bingham MR commented on
remoteness:43
Somewhat different language has been used to define the test in contract and [delict], but
the essence of the test is the same in each case. The test is whether, at the date of the
contract or [delict], damage of the kind for which the [pursuer] claims compensation was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach of contract or [delictual] conduct of
which the [pursuer] complains. If the kind of damage was reasonably foreseeable it is
immaterial that the extent of the damage was not.
However, this is at odds with the view of the House of Lords in Henderson v
Merrett Syndicates Ltd,44where, in allowing concurrent liability in contract and tort,
Lord Goff of Chieveley (with whom all the other Law Lords agreed)45 spoke of the
41 [1969] 1 AC 350 at 385-386. See also W M Gloag, The Law ofContract, 2nd edn (1929), 696, who
says that "it is unfair to saddle a contracting party, even although he may have broken his contract,
with consequences which could not reasonably have been in his contemplation at the time he entered
into the contract, and which, if realised, might have led him to elect not to enter into the contract
rather than accept the risk"
42 Compare the reasoning of the Second Division: 1993 SLT 1005.
43 Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Ins Co Ltd [1995] 2 WLR 607 at 620B-C, echoing the
views of an illustrious predecessor as Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, in Parsons [1978] QB 791
at 802. These views of Sir Thomas Bingham MR were also applied by Hobhouse LJ in the Court of
Appeal in Brown v KMR Services Ltd [1995] 4 All ER 598 at 643b-d. The decision of the Court of
Appeal in Banque Bruxelles Lambert has, however, been overturned by the House of Lords: [ 1996]
3 WLR 87. See Lord Hoffman at 93B and 95G.
44 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 185H.
45 Lords Keith of Kinkel, Browne-Wilkinson, Mustill and Nolan agreeing.
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rules of remoteness of damages as being "less restricted in [delict] than they are in
contract".46 None the less, the Court of Appeal in Brown v KMR Services Ltd47 has
recently followed Parsons to permit recovery by a Lloyd's Name against an
underwriting agent, although, interestingly, there was no reference to Balfour Beatty,
which had been decided by that time, but not reported in any series of English law
reports.48
The difficulty with blurring the distinction between the remoteness tests for
contract and delict (i.e. negligence) is that, although there can now be concurrent
liability (subject to an established contractual chain49), it ignores the different bases
of the two obligations. Contract is consensual in nature and arises by agreement of
the parties. Subject to any rights a third party may have in Scots law under the jus
quaesitum tertio, the ambit of the obligation is confined to the parties to the contract,
who contractually assume liability for any breach of that obligation,50 based on their
presumed "common knowledge".51 In delict, however, the obligation is "obediential",
imposed by the general law.52 It is owed to your "neighbour",53 and hence is wider in
its ambit than a contractual obligation.54 As a consequence, it follows that, since
remoteness is a device for limiting the recovery ofdamages for breach ofan obligation,
and since the ambit of a contractual obligation is more limited than a delictual one,
the tests for remoteness for contract and delict should be different. Thus, "con¬
templation" connotes forethought ofwhat is likely to occur if a contractual obligation
is breached,55 whereas foreseeability connotes that the damage which occurred due
to a breach of a delictual obligation was a possibility, albeit a "most unlikely" one;56
taken to extremes, almost anything is foreseeable.
46 [1995] 2 AC 145 at 185F. See also Lord Reid in The Heron II at 385G.
47 [1995] 4 All ER 598.
48 Balfour Beatty had, though, been reported in The Times, 23 Mar 1994, and this report of the case is
referred to in Chitty, Contracts* 27th edn (1994), para 26-026. However, it remains unreported in
England, and on the whole English lawyers do not appear to be aware of it.
49 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 196A-C per Lord Goff of Chieveley.
50 See The Forum Craftsman [1991] 1 Lloyd's Reports 81 at 85, col 2, per Hobhouse J. See also Gloag,
Contract, at 696, and The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350 at 386A-C per Lord Reid, both speaking of risk
assessment and allocation by the parties to a contract. And see Lord Hoffman in Banque Bruxelles
at 93H.
51 See The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350 at 422F per Lord Hodson.
52 Stair, Institutions, 1.3.3 and 1.9, talks of obediential obligations. At 1.3.3, Stair says: "Obediential
obligations are those, which are put upon men by the will of God, not by their own will, and so are
most part natural, as introduced by the law ofnature, before any addition made thereto by engagement
and are such as we are bound to perform solely by our obedience to God. . . ."
53 See Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44.
54 See The Heron II [1969] AC 350 at 385G per Lord Reid.
55 See Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 at 365E-F per McHugh
JA (New South Wales Court ofAppeal), who said that the difference between reasonable foreseeability
and reasonable contemplation is "a real one" and not a semantic one, "which results in a significant
narrowing of liability", in the case of the latter. "Contemplation", his Honour said, seems to indicate
"'thoughtful consideration' or perhaps 'having in view in the future'", and "[i]t emphasises that, if
the parties had thought about the matter, they would really have considered that the result had at
least a 'serious possibility' of occurring".
56 See The Heron II [1969] 1 AC 350 at 422F per Lord Upjohn.
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B. CONCLUSION
Balfour Beatty was a case in which there was little disagreement as to the law, but
there was a legitimate difference ofjudicial opinion as to its application to the facts.57
The speech of Lord Jauncey is a welcome addition to the vexed subject of damages
for breach of contract. The case continues the line ofauthoritywhich regards Hadley
v Baxendale as a case with one rule, the application of which depends on the
knowledge—either general or specific—of the defender. It also makes it clear that
one has to look at the circumstances carefully to discover the type of knowledge the
defender has; it is not sufficient to rely on the Monarch Steamship case and assume
knowledge, especially where "complex construction or manufacturing" processes are
involved.
What is a pity about Balfour Beatty is that the final appellate court did not formally
overrule Parsons, although to do so was, admittedly, unnecessary to the decision;
and, on the facts ofBalfour Beatty, no in-depth analysis of the previous case-law was
required. Perhaps mindful of the sorts of difficulty of interpretation that Hadley has
caused, their Lordships adopted a minimalist approach. The consequence of this,
however, is that the "type of damage" approach in Parsons is still being applied by
the Court ofAppeal in England, apparently without consideration of Lord Jauncey s
speech. None the less, Balfour Beatty provides helpful guidance to parties and their
advisers, and emphasises that where a contract—especially a commercial contract—





(I am grateful to Hector MacQueen and Clark Hoodfor their helpful comments on
earlier drafts—PH.)
57 1994 SLT 807 at 809A per Lord Jauncey.
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Mutuality Retained:
Bank of East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise
The mutuality principle involves one of the most misunderstood, and difficult,
concepts in the law of contract. Bank of East Asia v Scottish Enterprise1 is the first
House of Lords case with any extensive discussion of a principle which has been part
of Scots law for centuries. Paradoxically the litigation was English. The case was
heard in the Queens Bench Division in 1992 and in the Court ofAppeal in 1994; in
both courts Scots law was treated as a question of fact. In the appeal to the House of
Lords the respective rights of the parties were considered as a matter of law.2 A
1 House of Lords, 18 Jan 1996, unreported.
2 Elliot v Joicey 1935 SC (HL) 57 at 68 per Lord Macmillan.
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Thank you for your letter of 6th February and I apologise for the delay in responding. The reference
to a method 2 purpose is a reference to registration under the Data Protection Act and not to a method
by which a bank can obtain consent to a use of data. Under the Data Protection Act 1984 all data
users have to register. The Registrar allows a purpose to be described either by a standard purpose
description or by a free text description. The standard purposes are referred to as POOX and free text
are referred to as method 2 purposes. The question of registration does not effect whether or not
consent is separately required.
The Registrar did make an agreement in 1988 over the use of black information but that was only
intended to be an interim arrangement. As I understand the position now credit grantors and banks
clearly notify at the onset of a relationship that information will be filed with credit reference
agencies.
In relation to your request for further information I enclose a set of the guidelines to the Data
Protection Act and a guidance note on Data Protection and Credit Referencing which may be of
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